Skidmore v. State

MEREDITH, J. Anthony Joseph Skidmore appeals his conviction of manslaughter by motor vehicle, Md.Code (2002), Criminal Law Art. (“C.L.”) § 2-209. Skidmore contends that the evidence admitted against him at his bench trial was insufficient to ⁸⁴ support his conviction. We disagree, and shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Harford County. QUESTION PRESENTED Was the evidence sufficient to sustain a verdict of negligent manslaughter?

BACKGROUND On April 23, 2003, at approximately 2:30 p.m., a motor vehicle collision occurred on Route 23 in Harford County, resulting in the death of Kelsey Guckert. Skidmore’s truck crossed the center line, and traveled into the oncoming traffic. Witnesses who testified at Skidmore’s trial explained that they observed Skidmore’s truck swerving, and then traveling into the opposite lane, at which point it hit Guckert’s car head on. Deborah Leroy, who was traveling in the same direction as Skidmore, testified that, before the accident occurred, she noticed Skidmore’s truck drifting off the road.

Leroy stated that she was in a vehicle ahead of Skidmore, and that she saw Skidmore’s truck drift to the right onto the shoulder, and then drift back to the left. James Rockey testified that he was traveling in the opposite direction of Skidmore when he noticed Skidmore’s truck slowly swerving to the left of the center line, into the lane for oncoming traffic. Rockey testified that he pulled onto the shoulder of the road, and Skidmore’s truck passed him, clipping his driver’s side mirror-. Both Rockey and Leroy observed Skidmore’s truck hitting Guckert’s vehicle head on.

The evidence at trial also included a statement Skidmore had given to the Maryland State Police on August 12, 2003. The statement was tape-recorded, and read into the record at Skidmore’s trial by Maryland State Trooper Jennifer Patterson. In his statement, Skidmore explained that he reported to work at around 7 a.m. on the date of the accident. He was working on a job at the Inner Harbor in Baltimore.

Later ⁸⁵ that morning, Skidmore was told that his crew was going to be called in for an emergency shift later that night. Skidmore dismissed his crew and went to the Rusty Scupper restaurant for lunch. Skidmore left the restaurant around noon or 12:30 p.m., and headed for home. Skidmore made the following statement to Trooper Patterson: Um, I headed north on Route 95, or Interstate 95, and I had gotten off on Route 24.

I was already drowsy, and I didn’t feel like I should be driving. I pulled over at the Park and Ride on Routes 24 and 95, and I took a nap, and I do not know the time, but one of my crew men had called me and asked if I had come up with any decisions yet. And I said, no, I had been sleeping. And once we had hung up with the phone call, I figured I’d make it the rest of the way home.

I went down Route 24 and took the by-pass to get over to Route 23. I had caught myself nodding off behind the wheel a few times. So — but I figured I’d be all right. I was close to home.

I was only about seven miles from the house. I hung the left on Route 23, which I kind of remember, and then after that, the next thing I remember was the actual rolling over of my vehicle. (Emphasis added.) As noted, the trial judge found Skidmore guilty of manslaughter by motor vehicle. Skidmore was sentenced to eight years imprisonment wdth all but thirty days suspended.

Skid-more was also sentenced to two years of supervised probation, and fined $355 in court costs. DISCUSSION The standard for our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is “whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 325 , 765 A.2d 97, 124 (2001); see Briggs v. State, 348 Md. 470, 475 , 704 A.2d 904, 907 (1998); Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 167 , 512 A.2d 1056 (1986) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , ⁸⁶ 313, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2785 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). As the Court of Appeals stated in State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733 , 720 A.2d 323 (1998): [O]ur concern is not whether the verdict below was in accord with the weight of the evidence, but rather, whether there was sufficient evidence at trial “that either showed directly, or circumstantially, or supported a rational inference of facts which could fairly convince a trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 750 , 720 A.2d 323 (quoting Albrecht, 336 Md. at 479, 649 A.2d 336 ). Skidmore was convicted of violating C.L. § 2-209, which states in pertinent part: A person may not cause the death of another as a result of the person’s driving, operating, or controlling a vehicle or vessel in a grossly negligent manner.

Skidmore contends that he should not have been convicted of this offense because there was insufficient evidence that he was acting in a grossly negligent manner. Skidmore argues that his falling asleep at the wheel may have constituted negligence, but it did not rise to the level of gross negligence. The common law standard of “gross negligence” has been adopted in cases of automobile manslaughter as the minimum requirement for a conviction. Faulcon v. State, 211 Md. 249, 257 , 126 A.2d 858 (1956); State v. Gibson, 4 Md.App. 236, 242-43, 242 A.2d 575 (1968).

Gross negligence in this context has been defined as “a wanton or reckless disregard for human life.” State v. Kramer, 318 Md. 576, 590 , 569 A.2d 674 (1990); see Pineta v. State, 98 Md.App. 614, 622 , 634 A.2d 982 (1993). In Kramer, supra, the Court of Appeals quoted its earlier opinion of Duren v. State, 203 Md. 584, 592 , 102 A.2d 277 (1954), and discussed the concept of gross negligence. The Court stated: “If there is found such lack of control, whether by reason of speed or otherwise, in a place and at a time when there is constant potentiality of injury as a result, there can be ⁸⁷ found a wanton and reckless disregard of the rights and lives of others and so, criminal indifference to consequences.” Kramer, 318 Md. at 591-92 , 569 A.2d 674 . Regarding the burden of proof needed to sustain a conviction for manslaughter by automobile, the Court further stated in Kramer : In each case, as a matter of law, the evidence must be sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to establish that the defendant was grossly negligent, that is, he had a wanton or reckless disregard for human life in the operation of an automobile.

It deals with the state of mind of the defendant driver. Only conduct that is of extraordinary or outrageous character will be sufficient to imply this state of mind. Simple negligence will not be sufficient — even reckless driving may not be enough. Reckless driving may be a strong indication, but unless it is of extraordinary or outrageous