Slacum v. Slacum

Parke, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On August 24th, 1927, Elizabeth C. Slacum began a suit against Major 0. Slacum for an absolute divorce and alimony. After the parties were at issue, they entered into a contract under seal whereby the spouses duly agreed that in the event a divorce a vinculo matrimonii were decreed, the husband would simultaneously therewith, and subject to the approval of the court, pay to the wife, in lieu of both temporary and permanent alimony, the sum of $7,000; convey to her their residence in fee simple, and deliver to' her the furniture therein, and, further, that the husband would consent to the care and custody of their infant son, aged twelve, being awarded the mother, and would pay her thirty dollars a month for the son’s maintenance until the son became self-supporting.

The testimony fully established the wife’s right to relief, and, on September 19th, 1927, a decree was passed granting her an absolute divorce. In the second paragraph of the decree, the court committed the care and custody of the infant to> the mother, and ordered and adjudged that the father pay to the mother the monthly sum of thirty dollars for the son’s maintenance until he became self-supporting, which was in accordance with the provisions of the agreement, except that the chancellor made both the cus ¹⁰⁹ tody and the contribution to* the child’s maintenance subject to being otherwise ordered by the court. In the third paragraph of the decree, the husband is ordered and decreed to-pay, convey and deliver to his wife the money, realty, and personal property specified in the agreement, in lieu of both temporary and permanent alimony, as provided in the agreement, but without any reservation by the court of the right at any later time to modify its decree with respect to alimony. Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675 ; Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584 ; Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166 ; Neubold v. Neubold, 133 Md. 170 .

The defendant fully complied with the requirements of the third paragraph of the decree; and also made the monthly payments for the support of the infant child until April 1st, 1928, when he stopped. On April 14th, 1928, he filed a petition to have the stipend reduced on the ground of his inability to pay. He was adjudicated a bankrupt on May 2nd, 1928, and in the following August obtained his disr charge in bankruptcy. His petition for the decrease was answered by his former wife, and the matter1 was delayed until, on November 5th, 1928, she filed a, petition reciting his continued default and praying that he might be adjudged in contempt.

The husband then showed cause why he should not be so held, and, on December 27th, 1928, the parties took testimony before an examiner in equity to' sustain their respective contentions on the issues of fact raised by the pleadings. The chancellor adjudged, on the proceedings and the testimony, that the defendant was not in contempt, but that the monthly payment for the maintenance of the infant should be reduced to' fifteen dollars a month, accounting from the first day of April, 1928. The pending appeal is from the decree making this 'reduction, on the ground that the chancellor had not the power to modify the decree by reducing the amount upon which the parties had previously agreed, and the court had thereupon adjudged, should be paid to the mother for the maintenance of the child, and, sec ¹¹⁰ ondly, that if the chancellor had the power, the circumstances did not justify a reduction. 1. The argument of the mother is refuted by the fact that any obligation to perform the several stipulations of the agreement between the mother and father was explicitly conditioned upon the subsequent approval of the chancellor; and that the decree-, while incorporating the provisions of the agreement with respect to the infant, nevertheless did not approve of the provisions as agreed by the parties in this connection, since the chancellor explicitly provided an additional decretal limitation that the continued