Slaska v. Idzi

Marbury, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Helen Slaska, appellant in this case, arranged with the appellee in June, 1944, to install a one-third horsepower General Electric refrigeration unit in the meat box of her store for the sum of $300. The unit was installed, but was not satisfactory, and was eventually moved by appellee into appellant’s yard. Appellant had paid $200 when it was installed and the balance of $100 was to be paid at the end of sixty days.

The appellee then agreed to install a larger three-quarter horsepower unit for the additional sum of $75. The larger unit was brought to the appellant’s place and installed on September 26, 1944. There is some question in the evidence whether the one was installed which appellant had picked out, or whether it was another one, but in any event after the installation, the appellee demanded the balance of $100 on the old ⁵³² unit and $75 on the new, or a total of $175 with the addition of the cost of the installation. Appellant refused to pay him because she said she wanted to try the unit out, whereupon appellee disconnected the system, and started to take it away, but appellant refused to permit him to do so.

Thereafter there was some complaint about the wiring made by Mrs. Slaska to the city and the city inspector said it was not done correctly, and that the man who did it did not have a license. Appellee was subsequently fined. However, this complaint and the charges preferred had nothing to do with the refrigeration, but only with the electrical service coming into the building. It is not shown that this affected in any way the operation of the new unit.

Mrs. Slaska had the second unit hooked up by a man from another company, and used it for about two months, according to her own testimony. She claimed that the second machine operated the same as the old one, and made too much noise, that she called up t^e appellee about it, but he did not do anything. Then she had a new sytem put in, in place of the second one, by another company. When the latter company started to put in its system, the appellee was asked by it if he wanted to get his unit, and he said that he did not want to have anything more to do with it.

Thereafter, he brought suit in the Superior Court in Baltimore City against her for $175 which equalled the balance due on the first machine, and $75 to be paid on the second machine. The declaration asked for installation charges, but this was not allowed. The appellant filed a prayer for a directed verdict, which was refused. After the verdict she filed a motion for judgment n. o. v. which was also refused.

From the judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff against her, she now appeals. A preliminary question is the appellant’s prayer for a directed verdict. It is a sort of combination between a variance prayer and a demurrer prayer, and reads as follows: “The Defendant prays the Court to instruct the Jury that there is no legally sufficient evidence in this case under the evidence and the pleadings to entitle the ⁵³³ Plaintiff to recover, therefore, the verdict of the Jury must be for the Defendant.” It states no grounds. Under Part 3, Subdivision 3, of the Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 4, it is provided that a motion for a directed verdict shall state the grounds therefor.

We have held that where there is but one issue of fact to which a motion or prayer for a directed verdict can apply, it is not necessary to set out specifically the grounds. Rinehart v. Risling, 180 Md. 668 , 26 A. 2d 417 ; Union Mining Co. v. Blank, 181 Md. 62 , 28 A. 2d 568 . In the case before us there are a number of issues of fact, and it is not indicated just what questions the prayer or the motion for judgment n. o. v. intend to raise. We think the prayer is defective for this reason.

The appellant’s contentions seem to be twofold; first,