Slingluff v. Smith

Roberts, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The record in this case presents but a ngle question for the consideration of this Court. The question is, “was the Court below right in refusing to allow to the appellant any compensation whatever for his services to the trust estate of Forster, Clark & Co., in the interval between December 14th, 1887, the date of the deed of trust to him, and June 12th, 1889, on which day the deed was finally adjudged to be void by this Court ? The facts are that George H. Forster on the 14th of December, 1887, made a deed of trust to the appellant for the benefit of creditors.

The appellant accepted the trust, and proceeded to administer it under the direction of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. Subsequently in the month of January, 1888, certain creditors of Forster, Clark & Co., of which firm, said George H. Forster was a member, caused to be issued out of the Superior Court of Baltimore City, attachments for the purpose of assailing the validity of said deed. In the following December, the Court quashed the attachments, and the creditors took the appeal to this Court, which declared said deed to be fraudulent and void. Collier and Shea, Ex’rs vs. Hanna and Smith, et al., 71 Md., 253 .

The appellant obtained on April 2nd, 1888, and on May 18th, 1888, orders from the Circuit Court, by which he was allowed certain commissions. On May 29th, 1888, certain creditors filed objections to the allowance of the commissions. The said Forster, Clark & Co. having been adjudicated insolvents, the appellees, were on the 1st of May, 1888, elected and qualified, as their permanent trustees. On the 12th of June, 1888, the appellees filed their bill of complaint assailing the valid ⁵⁶⁰ ity of the deed from Forster to the appellant, which hill was amended on the 19th of July, 1889.

The latter bill amongst other things, asked to have rescinded the orders of April 2nd, 1888, and May 18th, 1888, allowing commissions to the appellant. On the 27th June, 1892, the Court below filed an opinion sustaining the contention of the appellees, and immediately thereafter signed a decree rescinding the two orders, allowing commissions to the appellant, and directing him to pay over to the appellees, the sum of three thousand, six hundred and sixty-nine dollars, and fifty cents, the amount admitted by the appellant to be due by his final account, filed May 12th, 1892, and also the sum of nine thousand and twenty-five dollars, and seventy-nine cents, the amount retained by the appellant for his commissions. From this degree this appeal is taken. It will scarcely he necessary to enter upon any extended discussion of the facts of this case, in order to reach the only conclusion which, in our opinion can he properly maintained.

It must he conceded that the deed in question did not fall through any fraud of the appellant, but through that of Forster, and if he misapprehended his duty in the premises, it is nevertheless a hardship upon him that he sees his time and labor misapplied without hope of remuneration. There is, however, hut one rule applicable to persons who have had the misfortune to meet a fate like his. We have been able to find but a single case, which has apparently departed from it. When deeds are annulled and vacated, because they are fraudulent in fact, they are to be considered as void ab initio, and wholly wanting in legal fitness to stand even as security for advances.

They have in truth no lawful existence, and to use the expression of Mr. Sugden, 525, “It would he wholly inconsistent and absurd to recognize them for any lawful purpose.” Strike vs. McDonald, & Son, 2 H. & G., 261 ; Bennet vs. Musgrove, 2 Ves., Sr., 52; ⁵⁶¹ Sands, et al. vs. Codwise, et al., 4. Johns., 536; Boyd vs. Dunlap, 1 Johns. Ch., 482 . This doctrine is in no way impaired by the fact that Courts having jurisdiction in such cases, have uniformly allowed to be paid all such necessary disbursements, as benefit or tend to benefit all the creditors of the assignor.

Such a result necessarily follows as the natural consequence of the changed condition of the property sought to be assigned. So in this case, whilst the appellant found himself under the provisions of said deed burdened with cares and responsibilities, and called upon to occupy his time in the discharge of duties, and the performance of labor, yet all this was self-imposed; “the law presumes every man to intend the legal consequences which must naturally flow from his own voluntary acts,” and every man is held responsible accordingly. In this case the appellant does not appear to have been entirely without apprehension, as appears from the petition which he filed in the Court below, on the 18th of May, 1888, in which he says, “that the deed of trust under which he has been acting, has been attacked by numerous proceedings at law, by way of attachment, under which said proceedings an effort is being made to break said deed, and thus secure to said attaching creditors a preference; that proceedings have also been taken in insolvency, looking to the breaking of said deed of trust, and which said proceedings, if successful, can only result in the destruction