Sloan v. Edwards

Alvey, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an action of trespass for an assault and battery, alleged to have been committed by the defendant upon the plaintiff. The case was tried upon the general issue plea of not guilty. The declaration charges, that the defendant assaulted, and then and there beat, bruised, wounded, and ill treated the plaintiff, insomuch that his life was thereby greatly despaired of, and other wrongs did, to the great damage, &c.

At the trial several bills of exception were taken by the defendant to the rulings of the Court on questions as to the admissibility of evidence, and one to the granting of prayers on behalf of the plaintiff, and to the refusal of prayers on the part of the defendant. These exceptions present the questions to be decided on this appeal. ⁹⁹ 1. The first exception as to the admissibility of evidence, and the ninth, tenth and eleventh prayers offered by the defendant, and which were rejected by the Court, present substantially the same question; and that question is, whether, under the declaration in this case, it was competent to the plaintiff to give in evidence, and for the jury to consider, the fact that, as a result of the battery alleged, the plaintiff had become subject to convulsions or fits ? It is contended by the defendant that, in order to make such evidence admissible, the fact ought to have been specially alleged in the declaration as ground of special damage.

But we are not of that opinion. It is a well settled principle that the damages recoverable in actions for personal injuries must be the natural and proximate consequence of the act complained of Therefore, whatever injurious consequences result naturally from the-wrongful act done, become elements of damage, and it is not necessary that the particular form or nature of the results should have been contemplated or foreseen by the wrong-doer. It is said, on what would appear to be ample authority, that the natural results of a wrongful act are understood to include all damage to the plaintiff of which such act was the efficient cause, though, in point of time the damage did not occur until some time after the act done. 2 Greenl. Ev., sec. 268 a.

Whenever, therefore, a wrongful act is charged, the plaintiff is at liberty to give evidence of all the natural results or consequences of the act, though, as it may be, such results or consequences were not developed or made apparent until some time after the act done. And it has been held by this Court, that the general rule is, that it is not necessary to state specially any matters which are the legal and natural consequences of the battery; nor are the jury confined to the mere corporal injury which the plaintiff has sustained. Gaither vs. Blowers, 11 Md., 552 ; 2 Greenl. Ev., sec. 89.

In the case of Tyson vs. Booth, 100 Mass., 258 , it was held, that ¹⁰⁰ the plaintiff might show specific direct effects of the wrongful act complained of, without specially alleging them in the declaration. That was an action for an assault and battery, and the plaintiff, without specially alleging such an element of damage in his declaration, was allowed to prove, for the purpose of enhancing the damages, that he became subject to fits as a result of the assault. It is in fact only a means of showing the nature and extent of the injury inflicted on the plaintiff, by the beating and wounding alleged in the declaration. Of course, it was for the jury to determine whether the fits or spasms resulted from the assault and battery complained of; and it was only in the event of finding in the affirmative, that such consequences could be considered in estimating the damages.

We think, therefore, the Court below was quite right in receiving the evidence stated in the first bill of exception, and in rejecting the ninth, tenth, and eleventh prayers. 2. As to the second and third bills of exception, the questions thereby presented may be considered together. It would seem to be settled, in this State at least, that the pecuniary circumstances of the plaintiff, and the extent and dependent condition of his family, are circumstances that may be taken into consideration by the jury, in estimating the damages to be awarded the plaintiff, for the injury suffered by him. This was expressly ruled in the case of Gaither vs. Blowers, 11 Md., 536 , and we discover no sufficient reason for departing from the ruling there made.

And it was held in the same case that the pecuniary circumstances of the defendant could be given in evidence to the jury, to be considered by them in awarding exemplary damages. In all cases of personal wrongs, the general rule is, if the injury has been inflicted maliciously or wantonly, and with circumstances of contumely or indignity, the jury are not restricted to actual or compensatory damages, but may give, in addition thereto, such exemplary or punitive damages as the circumstances of ¹⁰¹ the case will warrant. And, in such cases, the pecuniary circumstances of the defendant are proper to be considered. An amount that might be extremely punitive and severe to a defendant of small or moderate means, would he light and trivial to a defendant of very much larger means; and hence the pecuniary circumstances of the defendant are proper to be considered in estimating the damages.

Meibus vs. Dodge, 38 Wis., 300 . But while the Court below was right in admitting the evidence stated in the second bill of exception, we are of opinion that the evidence allowed to go to the jury, as stated in the third exception, was too general and indefinite. The witness was asked the question, “What is the pecuniary condition of the defendant?” to which he replied, “that it was generally considered good.” It does not appear that the witness spoke from any personal knowledge of his own upon the subject, nor does it appear that his information was derived from any competent or proper source. Indeed, the answer of the witness conveyed no idea of the extent of the defendant’s means.

The jury were left to speculate as to the extent of the defendant’s wealth, and that ought not to be allowed in such cases. 3. The evidence offered by the defendant, as set forth in his fourth and fifth bills of exception, and rejected by the Court, was clearly not admissible, and the Court committed no error in rejecting it. That the defendant was without knowledge to what the published card referred, except as informed by the card itself, furnished no sort of excuse for his seeking the plaintiff in the street and making an attack upon him. If he wanted an explanation there were certainly more appropriate methods of obtaining it than the one adopted.

Hor was there the slightest error in rejecting the proffered evidence stated in the sixth bill of exception. For though it bo true that the plaintiff was an able bodied man, and a pugilist, to the knowledge of the defendant, those facts were quite immaterial, under the ¹⁰² circumstances of this case. Such facts furnished no justification or provocation for the attack on the plaintiff in the street, when it is admitted that he was pursuing his lawful business, and was in no manner seeking a conflict with the defendant. 4. The seventh exception presents a question of a different character.

The plaintiff having been examined as a witness in his own behalf, the defendant offered evidence to impeach the credibility of the plaintiff’s testimony, by proving that his character for truth and veracity was bad, and such as to render him unworthy of belief on oath. The plaintiff then, to support his credibilty, called a witness who testified that he lived in the neighborhood of the plaintiff, and had so lived for some years; that he knew the plaintiff, and that he had never heard his character for truth discussed or talked about, except by one person; he thought that if there was any general talk there about the plaintiff’s character for truth, he would have heard of it. Whereupon the plaintiff proposed to ask the witness the general question, whether he knew the plaintiff’s general reputation for truth in the community, and whether he would believe the plaintiff on oath; to which the defendant objected, but the objection was overruled, and the witness allowed to answer, which he did by saying, that he had never heard the plaintiff’s general reputation for truth questioned, and that he would believe him on oath. Such mode of examination Was certainly a departure from what has been the long established practice in this State.

It is manifest the witness was not speaking of any knowledge he had of the existence of any general reputation of the plaintiff for truth, whether good or bad, but simply of an inference drawn by himself from the negative fact that he had never heard the plaintiff’s character discussed. That certainly was not proof of general reputation, and much less was it a sufficient foundation for testifying to an opinion that the impeached witness was entitled to credit on oath. ¹⁰³ Tlie long settled practice, both in England and in this State, though departed from to some extent in a few of the States in this country, requires that the witness called to prove character, either good or bad, should be interrogated as to his means of knowledge of the general reputation of the person in question among his neighbors, and what that reputation is. The evidence must be confined to general reputation, and the very form of the question assumes and implies that such general reputation must be known