Smith v. State

Stockbrldge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The Legislature of 1916 passed two Acts to regulate the licensing of automobiles'. Both were approved by the Governor upon the same date. Of these Chapter 687 was in the nature of a general Act, relating to all vehicles operated by a power other than muscular, using the highways and roads of this State.

The terms of this Act were of a most sweeping character, the only exemption from its provisions being in the case “of motor vehicles engaged in the business of common carriers or placing such in a special class for regulation in other respects.” The other Act was Chapter 610, and was an Act to regulate license fees and the operation of motor vehicles to be used in the public transportation of passengers for hire. It was distinctly an Act relating to the licensing of motor vehicles used as' common carriers. The rate of license required and the mode of determining it differed in the two Acts. In Chapter 610, because of its dealing with such vehicles as common carriers, there was the prerequisite required of a permit from the Public Service Commission of the State, and its assent to operate over a certain route and upon a named schedule.

The appellant in this case was indicted in the City of Baltimore for a violation of the provisions of Chapter 610, and the agreed statement of facts showed that he operated what is known as a “jitney” between definite terminals.. The ⁴⁸⁴ indictment was demurred to upon the ground that it did not negative some of the provisions contained in Chapter 687. The demurrer was overruled for the reason that the offense as charged in the indictment was charged in the language of the statute. It is not necessary to refer to the large number of decisions in this State to "the effect that where an indictment charges an offense in the terms of the statute it is sufficient, even though the statute itself may not be well expressed.

This ground of attack upon an indictment has been frequently passed upon by this Court, and the line of decisions is long and uniform, sustaining an indictment of such a character’. The latest of these is the case of Mulkern v. State, 127 Md. 41 . After the overruling of the demurrer to the indictment the traverser filed two1 special pleas, one to: each count of the indictment. By the first count the offense charged was that the accused had operated a motor vehicle for the public transportation of passengers for hire without having presented to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles a permit from the Public Service Commission.

The special plea was to the effect that the traverser was operating under Chapter 687 and, therefore, was not required to obtain such permit. The second count of the indictment was that before obtaining the license the accused had not filed a' statement of the route on which said motor vehicle was to be used and the schedule under which it was to be operated. The plea to this count was to the effect that the motor vehicle was operated between Fayette and Howard streets, and Fayette and East streets, but that it had no definite route, nor any regular schedule, and, therefore, was under no obligation to file the same, and that the license for operation of a “jitney” in the manner set forth was one falling within the terms of the general law, Chapter 687, sub-division “F,” and not under Chapter 610. The State demurred to these special pleas, the demurrer was sustained, and upon an agreed statement of facts, which embodied the allegations of the indictment, and those con ⁴⁸⁵ tained in the special pleas of the defendant, the case went to trial, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced, and this appeal has been taken.

From the foregoing outline it will be seen that the issue presented by this Record is but a single one, and very nar: row, namely, whether there is a conflict between the two Acts of the Legislature so as to render either or both of them void, and if not, whether the conduct of the “jitney” business is of a character to bring it under the terms of Chapter 610, or Chapter 687. The burden of the argument on behalf of the traverser is that because he does not follow at all times a prescribed route, and has no regular schedule upon which he operates his motor, that, therefore, he does not fall within the class specially exempted from the operation of Chapter 687, and included within the provisions of Chapter 610. The distinction is sought to be drawn on the basis of definite route and an established schedule. This ground is not tenable.

The intent of the legislative enactment is perfectly clear. What that body was attempting to do, was to distinguish as between motor vehicles