Smith v. State

Graeff, J. On January 5, 1987, 64-year-old Adeline Wilford was stabbed to death in the kitchen of her farmhouse. The investigation stalled for years, but on March 1, 2001, a jury in the Circuit Court for Talbot County convicted Jonathan D. Smith, appellant, of felony murder and daytime housebreaking. The circuit court subsequently sentenced him to life imprisonment. 1 Approximately 10 years later, after appellant’s effort to reverse his convictions by appeal and post-conviction relief were unsuccessful, the Innocence Project in New York filed Maryland Public Information Act (“MPIA”) requests regarding this case. Based on information received from those requests, appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Actual Innocence and a Motion to Reopen Post-Conviction Proceedings. 2 The circuit court denied both the petition and the motion.

On appeal, appellant presents several questions 3 for this Court’s review, which we have consolidated and rephrased, as follows: ³⁸⁰ 1. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s Petition for Writ of Actual Innocence? 2. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s Motion to Reopen Post-Conviction Proceedings? For the reasons set forth below, we shall vacate the judgments of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. The Murder of Adeline Wilford On January 5,1987, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Jack Ripley, Ms. Wilford’s friend, discovered Ms. Wilford’s body in her kitchen and called the police. Ms. Wilford had been photographed by her bank’s security system driving her car through the bank drive-through that day at 2:10 p.m., and therefore, the murder appeared to have been committed at some point in the 50-minute period of time between when she left the bank and when her body was found. Maryland State Police (“MSP”) officers responded to the scene shortly after the call. A window on the west side of the house was propped open with a stick.

The police believed that entry to the home had been made through that window, which led to a utility room. When the police entered the house, they saw that the keys to the house were still in the door lock, and Ms. Wilford was lying face up on the floor. She was wearing a blue coat, and she had a set of glasses on a cord around her neck. There ³⁸¹ were numerous stab wounds to her hands and face, and a large butcher knife with an eight-inch blade was “shoved right through the side of [her] cheek and head.” There were groceries on the kitchen table that had not been taken out of the bag, which suggested that she had surprised someone in the house.

The officers performed a sweep of the house to ensure that no one else was inside. Items inside the home seemed “out of place,” and dressers were opened with “stuff taken out,” which suggested that “someone had broken into the house and was looking for money or other goods.” The police lifted fingerprints and palm prints from various places in the house, including the outside of the utility room window and the washing machine in the utility room. A number of items were missing from Ms. Wilford’s residence, including the tan pocketbook that Ms. Wilford was seen carrying that day, Ms. Wilford’s custom-made diamond and sapphire ring, and her wallet containing credit cards and an undetermined amount of cash. The police did not recover any of these items. [[Image here]] Subsequent Investigations After a number of years passed and the murder investigation had stalled, the victim’s son, Charles Curry Wilford, encouraged the police to reopen the investigation.

He offered a reward of $10,000 for information leading to the arrest of the perpetrator(s) and an additional $15,000 if there was a conviction. Sergeant John Bollinger met with Beverly Haddaway on January 14, 2000, and she told him that her nephew, appellant, and two others had committed the crime. Ms. Haddaway stated that, approximately two years after the incident, appellant confessed to her that he had killed Ms. Wilford. Ms. Haddaway agreed to wear a “wire” and surreptitiously record appellant.

On April 11, 2000, she recorded a eonversa ³⁸² tion with appellant that occurred in a shed behind her house. During that conversation, Ms. Haddaway asked appellant about the day she saw him on “Kingston Road when that old woman got murdered and you told me the dog bit ya and you stabbed it.” She asked who killed the woman. After appellant initially stated, while laughing, that he did not know, 4 the following occurred: [BH:] Why were you in that field with blood all over ya? And they take, I seen ya goin’ up the road that day, you know it?

And you had a blue coat on and Ray [Andrews] and you both had huntin’ hats on. And then when I come back by there and you were in that cornfield and you said that blood come off a dog, but I think that you held her and David [Faulkner] killed her or one of you three done it, [JS:] They never found out yet have they? [BH:] I know, that’s why I want to know ’fore I die. I seen ya, did I ever tell anybody? You know I ain’t gonna tell on ya, goddamn, you’re my blood, I just wanted to know if you done it.

I didn’t really think you did. I think crazy David did. [JS:] It’s a secret. It’s a secret when one person knows[.] It aint [sic] a secret when two people know. [BH:] Well, the three of you know. [JS:] Right, there’s only two left. [BH:] It was you and Ray and David. [JS:] Ray wasn’t there until after it was over. [BH:] Where was he? [JS:] Down the road. [BH:] Ray was right with you in the goddamn field. [JS:] Yeah. That was after it was all done with.

Ms. Haddaway asked again who killed the victim. When appellant responded that he could not remember, Ms. Hadda- ³⁸³ way stated: “Jonathan, you’re lying ’cause you’re laughing,” The conversation continued, as follows: [BH:] Well why do you think I would tell anybody. I ain’t told nobody in 12 goddamn years. I just wanted to know. [JS:] (Inaudible) she had money. [BH:] Huh? [JS:] She had money. [BH:] She had money? [JS:] Uh huh. * * * [BH:] [Dick] said that he’d heard three or four times that you had tried to get somebody to ....

But, ah .... [JS:] It’s been a long time. I don’t even remember it no more. [BH:] Oh. You know whether you done it or David done it if Ray weren’t there. I’ll tell ya reason I ask. ... [T]his lady that lived over Ridgley .... told me that David’s foster mother had something and ... the old woman said that they had bought David out of a murder.

And I was wondering, you know, if she knew anything or did she tell you, I just wondered if he did it or you. Tell me. I ain’t gonna tell nobody, I just want to know (inaudible). [JS:] He didn’t do it. [BH:] You done it. [JS:] Uh huh. [BH:] You said you did it before. Why did you kill her?

I thought she let you in there when you went fishin’[.] ... What, you didn’t know her? [JS:] I knew she had money. [BH:] You knew she had money. [JS:] She had money. [BH:] But you didn’t get none? ³⁸⁴ [JS:] Uh huh. [BH:] You did get it. [JS:] Uh huh. Appellant then stated that the men got $60,000, and they split it three ways. In response to Ms. Haddaway’s question regarding why Mr. Faulkner had appellant’s coat, appellant said that Mr. Faulkner “got cut” and had too much blood on his coat, so he got rid of it.

Appellant then stated that both he and Mr. Faulkner had stabbed the victim, and the conversation continued as follows: [BH:] [T]hat day you told me' I thought no, he ain’t done it, that stupid David if he, anybody done it. [JS:] If there’s enough money I’ll do it. [BH:] Enough money. Well, it’s alright if you don’t get caught. [JS:] I won’t get caught. On April 25, 2000, the police brought appellant, Mr. Faulkner, and Mr. Andrews to the Easton MSP barrack for questioning. Appellant was advised of his rights, and although he initially “almost seemed happy to be answering [their] questions,” his demeanor changed when Sergeant Jack McCauley asked if appellant and Mr. Faulkner had been involved in any criminal activity together.

At that point, appellant “became somewhat withdrawn, dropped his head .... [a]nd he became very evasive, fidgety in his seat.” Appellant denied any involvement with the murder of a woman. He acknowledged his conversation with Ms. Haddaway, but he claimed that he admitted involvement in the murder because he wanted Ms. Haddaway to think that he was a tough person. 5 Sergeant Bollinger and another officer interviewed appellant again later that day. Sergeant Bollinger advised appellant ³⁸⁵ of his Miranda rights, giving him a copy of the form to “follow along as [Sergeant Bollinger] was reading it to him.” Before Sergeant Bollinger asked any questions, appellant volunteered his narrative of what had happened, and Sergeant Bollinger listened for several minutes without interrupting. Appellant stated that “he, David Faulkner, [and] Ray Andrews, had gone to the residence,” and “he and David Faulkner broke into the residence,” but Mr. Andrews stayed outside.

While appellant and Mr. Faulkner were in the house, Ms. Wilford returned, and when appellant “noticed her she was standing in front of him screaming and ... David Faulkner was stabbing her.” Appellant stated that Ms. Wilford was wearing a blue coat and had glasses on a chain around her neck, and “she was fighting and moving her arms about.” As Mr. Faulkner was stabbing Ms. Wilford, she fell back on appellant, getting blood on his shirt. Sergeant Bollinger then asked appellant if he had stabbed Ms. Wilford, and at that point, appellant asked for an attorney. Mr. Andrews also talked to the police.

He told Sergeant Joseph Gamble that appellant and Mr. Faulkner discussed burglarizing Ms. Wilford’s house, but he did not want to, so they told him to stay in the wooded area. Approximately 20 minutes after appellant and Mr. Faulkner approached the house, Mr. Andrews saw a vehicle pull up the Wilford driveway. A few minutes later, appellant and Mr. Faulkner ran from the house. Appellant had blood on his shirt.

The three men then ran through woods and fields until they reached Black Dog Alley, where they saw Ms. Haddaway driving down the road. Ms. Haddaway asked appellant why he had blood on his shirt, and appellant replied that he had been attacked by a dog. The three men then went to appellant’s house, where appellant changed his clothes. 6 Appellant and Mr. Faulkner removed money from their pockets and divided it up. The next ³⁸⁶ day, appellant told him that the woman at the house was dead, and Mr. Andrews should never tell anybody about it.

III

Appellant’s Trial Appellant’s four-day trial began on February 26, 2001. In addition to the evidence discussed, supra, Alexander Manke-vich, a fingerprint expert for the Maryland State Police Crime Laboratory, testified that he did not match any fingerprints left at the scene to any known suspects. He further explained how a fingerprint typically is left on a surface, why fingerprints might not be located, and the inability to determine the length of time a fingerprint has been on any surface. Sergeant Bollinger testified that, although fingerprint, DNA, and hair samples were taken from appellant, those samples did not match any of the evidence the police had collected from the crime scene.

Ms. Haddaway testified that, on January 5, 1987, she was driving on Black Dog Alley and saw her nephew, appellant, emerge from a cornfield with Mr. Faulkner and Mr. Andrews. 7 She pulled over to the side of the road, and appellant approached her truck. His glasses were broken and repaired with tape or a bandaid, and he was wearing a white t-shirt that had “red dots” around the collar. Ms. Haddaway asked him what he was doing there. 8 Appellant stated that he was waiting for somebody, and he thought that person was in the truck Ms. Haddaway was driving. When asked again what the men were doing, appellant said that he had just killed a dog.

Ms. Haddaway called appellant a liar. Appellant started laughing and stated: “Yes I did. I killed him cause [sic] it bit me.” ³⁸⁷ He told her that he had stabbed the dog. Another truck then pulled up behind Ms. Haddaway, and the three men got into the truck.

As Ms. Haddaway drove away, she saw a number of police vehicles and an ambulance driving fast on Black Dog Alley and then turning left onto Kingston Road. Mr. Andrews testified, consistent with his statement to the police, that he waited in a wooded area while appellant and Mr. Faulkner went to Ms. Wilford’s house, and after they came running back, the three men ran until they arrived at Black Dog Alley and saw Ms. Haddaway in her vehicle. 9 Ms. Haddaway asked appellant what happened to him, and appellant responded that he had been attacked by a dog. Mr. Andrews believed that someone was with Ms. Haddaway that day, but he was “not sure if it was a man or not.” The three then went to appellant’s house. 10 Appellant and Mr. Faulkner did not talk about what happened, but they pulled out of their pockets a large quantity of cash, approximately $300 to $400. Mr. Andrews did not get any of the money.

Appellant and Mr. Faulkner never talked to him about what occurred that afternoon. When Mr. Andrews saw a report in a newspaper the next day, appellant and Mr. Faulkner told him “to keep quiet.” On cross-examination, Mr, Andrews acknowledged that, in exchange for his testimony against appellant and his agreement to enter an Alford plea to the crime of involuntary manslaughter for his role in Ms. Wilford’s murder, the prosecutor would recommend that he be sentenced to five years. 11 ³⁸⁸ Mr. Andrews testified, however, that he had not been promised any financial reward or incentive to testify. Michael Snow, a former Baltimore City police officer who had been convicted of bank robbery, testified that he was housed with appellant in the same protective custody ward at the Talbot County Detention Center. At one point during their detention, he asked appellant if he really killed “that lady.” 12 Appellant “just looked at [him] and said uh-hum.” When Mr. Snow asked how appellant killed her, appellant “had his hand kind of just folded like if he was holding something,” and he made stabbing motions.

When Mr. Snow asked appellant why he killed the woman, appellant stated that “she was an old lady” who “startled him when she came in.” Appellant explained that “he was fighting with her trying to get away” when “she bit him,” and he then “went crazy.” Mr. Snow testified that he did not receive a plea deal or anything else in exchange for his testimony. He stated that he testified against the advice of his attorney because he found what appellant said to him “appalling.” After the State concluded its case-in-chief, the defense recalled Ms. Haddaway. Defense counsel questioned her about inconsistencies between her testimony and the police report of her conversation with Sergeant Bollinger on January 17, 2000. Ms. Haddaway stated that a “lot of things that they wrote down [were] wrong.” 13 ³⁸⁹ Ms. Haddaway acknowledged that she had visited Mr. Andrews in jail.

There were occasions that Mr. Andrews’ lawyer was present when she went to visit him. Ms. Haddaway also testified that she received a $10,000 deposit on a $25,000 reward for providing information that led to an arrest. The police told her that, to get the $25,000 reward, all she had to do was testify, which she agreed to do “as long as [she could] tell the truth and only the truth.” On the last day of trial, appellant testified. He recalled his April 11, 2000, recorded conversation with Ms. Haddaway, but he stated that the “whole time [he] did not ever know what she was saying, referring to or what she was talking about or nothing.” He denied admitting to Ms. Haddaway that he killed Ms. Wilford.

Although he did tell her that “all three got the money,” and they “all split $20,000 apiece,” that statement was not true. He testified that he lied to Ms. Haddaway because she kept asking him questions “about something that happened that I had no knowledge [of]” and “that was the only way [he] could think of to get her to leave [him] alone.” Appellant also testified about his interview with Sergeant Bollinger. He stated that he could not hear the recording Sergeant Bollinger tried to play for him. Sergeant Bollinger then advised that if he did not “come clean you’ll never, ever see your wife or your kids again.” At that point, and because Sergeant McCauley told him that he would see appellant “strapped down and [given] lethal injection,” he told Sergeant Bollinger that he “did it, David did it.

Ray was there. I didn’t know what else to do.” Appellant acknowledged that he was placed in protective custody with Mr. Snow. He denied, however, that he told Mr. Snow that he killed Ms. Wilford or that he made “stabbing motions” with his hand. Appellant denied taking part in Ms. Wilford’s murder.

He testified that he was not with Mr. Faulkner and Mr. Andrews at the time because he “did not know neither of the (inaudible) at all, neither one.” He also denied seeing Ms. Haddaway on Black Dog Alley that day. ³⁹⁰ Sergeant McCauley was recalled as a rebuttal witness for the State. He testified that he had reviewed various newspaper articles from 1987 through 1999, and none of the articles that he reviewed contained a description of what Ms. Wilford was wearing when she was killed. As indicated, on March 1, 2001, a jury found appellant guilty of felony murder and daytime house breaking.

IV

Subsequent Procedural History On March 18, 2001, appellant filed a motion for new trial, arguing that “exculpatory DNA evidence was withheld from the defense,” specifically that DNA analysis of debris taken from under the victim’s fingernails was not a match for appellant or Mr. Faulkner. The circuit court denied the motion. On appeal, this Court rejected appellant’s claims of error during the trial, but we concluded that the circuit court erred in denying appellant’s motion for a new trial without a hearing, and therefore, we remanded for a hearing on the motion. Smith v. State, No. 688, Sept. Term, 2001 (filed Jan. 17, 2002).

The Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed. Smith v. State, 371 Md. 496 , 810 A.2d 449 (2002). On remand, defense counsel abandoned the argument regarding the withheld DNA evidence, and instead argued that appellant had been “set up” by Ms. Haddaway and Mr. Andrews. Defense counsel argued that, Mr. Andrews’ attorney, Grayson Eckel, had a conflict of interest because he represented; (1) Mr, Andrews in the criminal case regarding Ms. Wilford’s murder; (2) Lacy Janda, Ms. Haddaway’s daughter, in an estate matter addressing whether appellant or Ms. Janda would inherit appellant’s father’s property; and (3) Ms. Haddaway in a civil suit against Ms. Wilford’s son, regarding the reward money.

The circuit court denied the motion, stating that the argument that the dual representation suggested that Mr. Eckel exercised any influence against Mr. ³⁹¹ Andrews on behalf of Ms. Haddaway was “conjecture.” This Court affirmed. Smith v. State, No. 1184, Sept. Term, 2003, slip op. at 7-8 (filed Nov. 4, 2004). On September 28, 2005, appellant, an unrepresented litigant, filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief. On April 13, 2009, the circuit court denied his petition, and this Court subsequently denied his application for leave to appeal.

Smith v. State, No. 850, Sept. Term, 2009 (filed June 9, 2010). On December 27, 2011, appellant, again unrepresented, filed a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings, which the court subsequently denied. V. Petition for Writ of Actual Innocence and Motion to Reopen In 2011, the New York Innocence Project filed MPIA requests on behalf of appellant. 14 A paralegal with the Innocence Project visited MSP, and she observed a number of “tape cassettes” in the boxes of evidence. Upon request, and after other legal maneuvers, MSP produced copies of the tapes, which contained several recorded conversations between Sergeant Bollinger and Ms. Haddaway (“the Bollinger-Haddaway tapes”).

On August 2, 2013, appellant filed a Motion to Reopen Postconviction Proceeding, arguing that, “based on newly-discovered and otherwise-suppressed evidence,” “the State violated his Due Process rights by withholding exculpatory evidence and affirmatively misleading both [appellant’s] prior counsel and the jury on material issues in the case.” Specifically, he pointed to his discovery of the Bollinger-Haddaway tapes, and the State’s alleged wrongful withholding of “DNA test results showing a foreign profile on the victim’s fingernails from which all defendants were excluded.” He asserted ³⁹² that these violations, in addition to ineffective assistance of counsel, warranted reopening his case. As explained in more detail, infra, Mr. Mankevich subsequently entered the unidentified palm prints from Ms. Wilford’s residence into the Maryland Automated Fingerprint Identification System (“MAFIS” or “AFIS”). He determined that Tyrone Anthony Brooks (“Ty Brooks”) was the source of the palm prints found on Ms. Wilford’s washing machine and on the outside of the utility room -window. 15 On June 11, 2015, appellant filed a petition for writ of actual innocence. In his petition, and at the subsequent hearing, he asserted three claims of newly discovered evidence: (1) the identification of Ty Brooks as the source of the palm prints; (2) the recorded conversations between Ms. Haddaway and Sergeant Bollinger; and (3) statements by an eyewitness that he saw a vehicle at Ms. Wilford’s house at approximately 2:00 p.m. on the day of the murder.

The circuit court consolidated the hearings on appellant’s and Mr. Faulkner’s petitions and motions. The court issued an order detailing the order of presentation, which stated as follows: I. Opening Statements limited to the Petitions for Writs of Actual Innocence; II. Presentation of evidence in support and rebuttal of Petitions for Writs of Actual Innocence; III. Closing Arguments limited to the Petitions for Writs of Actual Innocence; ³⁹³ IV.

Ruling by the Court on the Petitions for Writs of Actual Innocence (or announcement that decision will be taken under advisement); V. If the Court does not grant or defers ruling on the Petitions for Writs of Actual Innocence and provided there is time remaining, the Court will entertain proceedings regarding Petitioners’ Motions to Reopen their prospective Post-Conviction Petitions starting with opening statements; VI. Presentation of evidence/information in support of rebuttal of Motion to Reopen Post Conviction Proceedings[; and] VIL Closing Arguments limited to the Motion to Reopen Post Conviction Proceedings. A seven-day evidentiary hearing began on April 11, 2016. We will discuss the evidence as it relates to the various claims raised by appellant.

A. The Utility Room Palm Prints Mr. Mankevich testified that, after the police discovered the palm prints on the outside of the utility room window and on the washing machine at Ms. Wilford’s residence, the local MSP implemented a policy, in several jurisdictions, of collecting palm prints from all arrestees, on the chance that, if the perpetrators were engaging in a pattern of burglaries, they might return to the area and commit more offenses. 16 From 1987 to 2000, Mr. Mankevich performed 72 manual comparisons of the prints lifted from Ms. Wilford’s residence. In October 2008, the State’s vendor for the MAFIS system “went online” with the ability to perform electronic fingerprint searches, and in 2009, the vendor added the ability to perform ³⁹⁴ electronic palm print searches. The system uses an algorithm that performs a “statistical analysis of the minutia[e]” and creates a score for possible candidates, which are then listed and ranked by the closeness of the match. Mr. Mankevich explained that, before the MSP Crime Laboratory gained access to MAFIS, there was “no systematic way to follow through” with an unidentified print. “So if a print was unidentified at that time it would remain sealed as evidence until another name got forwarded.

There was no follow through with it.” In August 2013, appellant and Mr. Faulkner filed a motion for post-conviction comparison of latent fingerprints, requesting that the court order the State to enter the unidentified latent palm prints found at the crime scene into the MAFIS database to determine whether an unknown suspect could be identified. The State opposed this motion, stating that appellant failed to cite any authority that gave the court the power to order the State to provide such testing. On October 16, 2013, however, the Office of the State’s Attorney for Talbot County, prior to a ruling by the court, contacted Mr. Mankevich and asked him to run the palm prints lifted from the crime scene through the MAFIS database. He retrieved the lift cards from the Hall of Records and personally put them into the MAFIS system.

After receiving the computer generated list of potential matches, Mr. Manke-vich compared Ty Brooks’ known prints to the palm print taken from Ms. Wilford’s washing machine and the palm print taken from the bottom pane of the “point of entry” utility room window. He concluded that Ty Brooks was the source of those prints. 17 On March 22, 2016, Mr. Mankevich received a request from appellant’s defense counsel to compare the remaining prints with known samples from William (“Boozie”) Clarence Thom ³⁹⁵ as. Of the eight remaining “unidentified latent print impressions,” Mr. Mankevich eliminated Mr. Thomas as the source for seven of the prints, but he was unable to perform a full comparison of the eighth print, which was taken from the porch door. The methodology used to perform a manual comparison was the same that he used in 2000, i.e., the science had been the same since 1987, and the “development of the AFIS system played no part in [his] ability to examine the prints and [make a] comparison for [Mr.] Thomas.” On cross-examination, Mr. Mankevich testified that “[p]art of the mission of Maryland State Police is to provide forensic services to any legitimate party requesting, whether it’s the defense part or the [S]tate.” When asked whether he would have compared prints of Mr. Thomas or Ty Brooks to the latent prints recovered if appellant had asked, he responded that he would have if the person requesting had “investigative authority,” which could include the Public Defender’s Office, private defense attorneys, and the Innocence Project.

Mr. Mankevich agreed that, except in cases where he received a match “generated by the AFIS system,” all he needed to make a comparison between Ty Brooks’ hands and the latent prints was “an inked print” from Ty Brooks’ hands and “a request to do so,” which could have been initiated by appellant. With respect to the process of comparing latent print lifts, Mr. Mankevich explained that he looked for “artifacts in the background,” such as “scratches, nicks, cuts, those sort of things,” which “could be matched from image to image.” The State then followed up on Mr. Mankevich’s testimony that, with respect to the prints here, he “noticed rain drops or something.” Mr. Mankevich stated: “Right, moisture, that would be in the second group of impression[s] so that moisture that gets on the background, whether it’s again raindrops or it could be spray from Windex. Some liquid source will leave a distinguishing mark that later gets developed with powder.” He explained that in one group of prints, he saw a “U shaped feature in the center,” which he believed was “caused by extraneous moisture being present that the powder had adhered to.” The following then occurred: ³⁹⁶ [STATE:] So the existence of raindrops after the print was left? [MR. MANKEVICH:] Correct. [STATE:] Which would indicate the print was left before it rained. ... [MR.

MANKEVICH:] You really can’t make that age, time-line association. [STATE:] Okay, let’s talk about that. You can’t tell whether it was before it rained or after it rained. [MR. MANKEVICH:] That’s correct. [STATE:] You couldn’t tell how long a print had been there? [MR. MANKEVICH:] There is no forensic technique to allow you to date a fingerprint. [STATE:] You cannot testify to a degree of scientific certainty at all about the timing of these prints relative to the date of collection? [MR.

MANKEVICH:] Again we have no reliable consistent validated forensic techniques that can indicate the lifetime of a latent print. Kate Wilford Carraher and Evelyn Wilford Lippincott, the daughters of Ms. Wilford, testified that, in the months leading up to the murder, the window in the utility room was propped open with “a stick” because there was a “persistent,” “God awful” odor that smelled “like a family of dead mice.” The window being open was particularly memorable to Ms. Lippin-cott because Ms. Wilford had the window open “in the middle of the winter,” and she gave her mother “a hard time about it.” Mr. Butler, a member of the MSP evidence collection unit, noted that, if the utility room window was opened, the lower portion where a palm print was found would be “pushed up” behind the upper portion, rendering the exterior panes “[[Inaccessible to anyone’s hand.” ³⁹⁷ B. The Keene Observation Sergeant Sabrina Metzger testified about a police report, dated June 12,1987, in which Sergeant James Harmon reported that he was contacted by Daniel (“Danny”) O’Neil Keene on January 9,1987. That police report stated as follows: Same date [January 9,1987,] the writer [Sergeant Harmon] and [Sergeant Samuel] Shelly were contacted at the Easton Barrack by Danny Keene. He reported seeing a silver colored vehicle he believed to be an Olds Cutlass.

He was taken to the victim’s residence, at which time he showed the writer the location he observed the vehicle parked. The location was backed in next to the front porch, next to several bushes, bearing a similar type leaf as found in the living room floor of the victims [sic] house. He was [driven] around Easton, and upon observing a vehicle at the Bonanza Rest[a]urant, he stated it was a vehicle similar to the one he observed. He had picked out a 77 Olds Cutlass.

Refer to [Sgt.] Shelly’s supplements for further details of this individuals [sic] interviews. Mr. Keene’s observation also was noted in a case review complied by Sergeant Bollinger. 18 Neither document, however, specifically noted when Mr. Keene observed the Oldsmobile Cutlass. Mr. Keene testified that, in January 1987, he lived in Trappe, Maryland, and he was working as a hunting guide. He rented a farm next to Ms. Wilford’s house.

He often drove by Ms. Wilford’s house, but he did not know her. On the afternoon of January 5,1987, between approximately 1:50 and 1:55 p.m., he drove past Ms. Wilford’s residence. It was sunny, and he looked at Ms. Wilford’s property for geese. Although he had driven past Ms. Wilford’s house multiple times, he had never seen any “signs of life.” On that occasion, however, he ³⁹⁸ looked and saw some “clothes on [a] line” next to and behind Ms. Wilford’s house, and he thought to himself, “well somebody does live there.” After the clothes on the line drew his attention to the property, he began “looking all around.” As he reached the point where some “little trees start thinning out,” he saw a “jacked up” Oldsmobile Cutlass Supreme “[blacked up against” Ms. Wilford’s house. 19 The car was parked “very close” to the house, “[l]ike it was backed in.

Approximately four days later, Mr, Keene reported his observation to the police. They interviewed him at the Easton barrack and drove him around Easton until he spotted a car “that resembled the one that was parked in the lane.” The police also had Mr. Keene hypnotized on February 9, 1987, in an attempt to develop more information about his observation. A copy of a recording of this hypnosis session, which originally was recorded on Betamax videotapes, was provided to appellant in 2016. During the actual innocence hearing, the beginning of the video was played, in which Sergeant Shelly explained the attempt to get more information regarding Mr. Keene’s statement that he saw a vehicle at the residence of Ms. Wilford at approximately 1:55 p.m. on the date of the murder.

Mr. Keene denied asking for any money in exchange for his assistance. He testified that he “[n]ever heard another word” about the murder until years later, when he was approached by appellant’s post-conviction counsel. On cross-examination, the State asked Mr. Keene if George Merritt was with him when he witnessed the car parked at Ms. Wilford’s house. He did not “remember anybody being in that truck with [him]” at that time, but when confronted with ³⁹⁹ a recording in which he told the police that Mr. Merritt was with him when he saw the car, Mr. Keene stated: “I guess he was, you know.” Mr. Keene stated that, notwithstanding his inability to recall other circumstances, his observation of the Oldsmobile was particularly memorable because that was the first time he had seen a car parked there, and the car had a distinctive appearance, i.e., it was “jacked up.

She had chrome wheels. She had whitewalls. Split grill.” C. James Brooks Implicates Others in the Murder James Brooks, Jr., testified that he grew up in Trappe, Maryland, and he was a longtime friend of Mr. Thomas. At some point around 1991, he contacted MSP and advised that Mr. Thomas had told him that he and Ty Brooks had murdered Ms. Wilford. 20 James Brooks testified, consistent with his statement to the police, that Mr. Thomas confessed to him in late 1989 or early 1990. 21 Mr. Thomas told him that he had borrowed his uncle’s car to get to Ms. Wilford’s house, Ms. Wilford “might have wrote [sic] down the tag number” of the car when she came home that day, and Mr. Thomas instructed him not to tell anyone about his confession.

When asked if he could recall if Mr. Thomas said where that the victim had been stabbed during the murder, he said “it might have been in the back.” As discussed in more detail, infra, the court sustained the State’s objection to the question whether Mr. Thomas had named another individual involved in breaking into the house, on the ground that this hearsay statement did not fall within the hearsay exception for a statement against penal interest because the “particular identification of who the accomplice is ... goes beyond [a] statement against penal interest.” James ⁴⁰⁰ Brooks subsequently testified, without naming the person, that Mr. Thomas told him that he was with another person when Ms. Wilford was murdered. James Brooks stated that he was acquainted with Ty Brooks, and Mr. Thomas and Ty Brooks were brothers-in-law and knew each other in 1987. Counsel for Mr. Faulkner subsequently moved to admit into evidence James Brooks’ written statement to the police. In this statement, he explained that he and Mr. Thomas were on a drinking binge one night, and Mr. Thomas confessed to killing Ms. Wilford, as follows: [H]e said that him and a guy named Ty Brooks were in her house stealing and the lady came home early on them[.] [H]e had borrowed his sister’s car [and] she noticed the car parked near her house and wrote the tag # of the car down before she entered the house[.] [H]e took a butcher knife I believe [and] hid behind the kitchen door[.] [W]hen she came in he stabbed her to death and left her for dead.

The circuit court admitted the statement, over the State’s objection, but it ruled that it would redact two words, i.e., “Ty Brooks,” to be “consistent with [its] earlier ruling [on] the identity of any other person.” When counsel for Mr. Faulkner asked James Brooks about his motivation for contacting the police, he testified: “I was strung out on drugs. I was trying to cash in on the reward.” James Brooks admitted that he previously had been convicted of a number of offenses, including uttering a false document, taking a car without the owner’s permission, and various thefts. When asked whether there was any motivation for him “to be testifying here today other than to tell the truth,” James Brooks responded: “Yeah. I mean I was told to do what was right and turn it over to God.” D. Ty Anthony Brooks and William Clarence Thomas Appellant introduced evidence of Ty Brooks’ extensive criminal history, including breaking and entering and burglary ⁴⁰¹ charges in 1986.

The State stipulated that Ty Brooks and Mr. Thomas were not incarcerated in Maryland at the time of Ms. Wilford’s murder. Appellant attempted to call Ty Brooks as a witness and to introduce a portion of Ty Brooks’ 2015 recorded interview with the police. In this interview, Ty Brooks admitted that he had committed numerous offenses in Easton, but he did not recall going to Ms. Wilford’s house, stating that murder was not his “MO.” As explained in more detail, infra, the court sustained the State’s objection to the admission of this evidence on the ground that Ty Brooks had been convicted of perjury, and therefore, he was not a competent witness. Appellant also introduced a statement of charges that alleged that, on March 12, 1987, Ty Brooks was observed riding as a passenger in a blue 1982 Oldsmobile.

Donald M. Stoop, a staff investigator with the MidAtlantic Innocence Project, testified that his investigation revealed that Ty Brooks “had access to multiple vehicles,” but “none [were] registered to him at the time.” E. The Bollinger-Haddaway Tapes Sergeant Bollinger, who became lead investigator on the Wilford murder case in 1999, testified that he spoke to Ms. Haddaway “several hundred times” before appellant’s trial. One of the reasons Ms. Haddaway contacted Sergeant Bollinger in 2001 was to request that the criminal charges pending against her grandson, Landon Janda, be dropped. When questioned whether Ms. Haddaway asked “in an aggressive manner,” Sergeant Bollinger stated that Ms. Haddaway “did everything in an aggressive manner.” At some point before February 2, 2001, Sergeant Bollinger participated in a meeting at the Talbot County State’s Attorney’s Office with Marie Hill, the prosecutor on appellant’s case, and John Mark McDonald, the prosecutor on Mr. Jan- ⁴⁰² da’s case. Sergeant Bollinger asked Mr. McDonald to drop the charges against Mr. Janda, but he “said no.” Sergeant Bollinger recorded some of his conversations with Ms. Haddaway because they were “directly involved with [his] homicide investigation.” 22 One of these conversations occurred on February 2, 2001, during which Sergeant Bollinger told Ms. Haddaway that the State was not going to drop the charges against her grandson.

Sergeant Bollinger tried to clarify whether she was “still going to come and tell the truth,” and Ms. Haddaway replied: “I’m going to come in and tell the truth but I don’t think the truth is going to want to be known.” Sergeant Bollinger then stated that he could ask the State to reconsider its position regarding her grandson after the trial, and the following occurred: Haddaway: Well, it won’t be no need to ask after the trial’s over because [defense counsel is] going to win hands down. They’ll be doubt in everybody on the jurors’ mind and I’m the one that’s going to roll the iceberg right down there and watch that son of a bitch hit everybody in that fucking courtroom. Do you think I’m kidding, John? I’m not.

You can go get the newspaper to start printing: Three People ⁴⁰³ Found Innocent and I’ve got just one little piece of paper and it can all be had with one word that nobody knows but I know and I got the paper and I got the proof and one word, just one word out of the English language will let all three of them walk and for my grandson, you don’t think I’ll use that fucking word? ... [23] Bollinger: [Chuckles] Haddaway: Now .... Do you think I’m kidding? Bollinger: No, I know you’re not kidding. You just make me laugh sometimes. [24] Ms. Haddaway subsequently stated that the one word was “crazy,” meaning that she was crazy.

She showed Sergeant Bollinger a document from a doctor that she had “an extensive emotional and psychological problem.” During that conversation, Ms. Haddaway suggested that Sergeant Bollinger go over Mr. McDonald’s head to “the boss,” i.e., the State’s Attorney, to get the charges against Mr. Janda dropped. Sergeant Bollinger stated that he would talk to the State’s Attorney. During their conversations that day, statements were made indicating that Ms. Haddaway had access to case files related to the Wilford murder. For example, Sergeant Bollinger stated that he “got the stuff [she] wanted [him] to get,” that she could “see the pictures if you want,” and he got her “two pages of a letter” and a drawing of a ring.

Ms. Haddaway ⁴⁰⁴ indicated that defense counsel gave her things illegally, such as a report which she then underlined. Sergeant Bollinger testified that he did not allow Ms. Hadd-away to look through his “investigative file,” but he did show her some photographs of the Wilford property and “a letter.” Although it was not common practice for the police to permit a witness to look at case files before trial, he showed Ms. Haddaway the evidence “at the direction of the State’s Attorney’s Office.” Counsel asked Sergeant Bollinger why he would “show a witness who was not by Ms. Wilford’s house on January 5th, 1987 pictures of the property,” and he responded: “She wanted to see them.” Sergeant Bollinger could not recall whether he showed Ms. Haddaway an illustration of Ms. Wilford’s ring, which the police believed was taken from Ms. Wilford’s residence. Sergeant Bollinger did note, however, that Mr. Eckel, who represented Mr. Andrews, had “allowed [Ms. Haddaway] to view everything he had in his possession.” He did not know whether she had access to “everything or not,” but he did “know she had access to his files.” Sergeant Bollinger identified Ms. Haddaway’s handwriting on a seven-page police report, written by Sergeant Gamble on June 8, 2000, that detailed an interview with Mr. Andrews. Ms. Haddaway wrote “lie” a number of times on the report.

Sergeant Bollinger could not say when Ms. Haddaway made those annotations. The February 2, 2001, conversation between Ms. Haddaway and Sergeant Bollinger also indicated that Ms. Haddaway had a conversation with Mr. Andrews before she testified at appellant’s trial. Ms. Haddaway advised that she had gone to the jail with defense counsel and talked with “Ray.” Although Sergeant Bollinger knew that Ms. Haddaway, a fact witness, had met with another fact witness, Mr. Andrews, he did not inform appellant’s trial counsel of this fact. On February 8, 2001, Sergeant Bollinger had another conversation with Ms. Haddaway, which he also recorded.

That conversation referred to a conversation the previous day, ⁴⁰⁵ where Sergeant Bollinger told Ms. Haddaway that the State’s Attorney had decided to “nolle [pros] Landon’s case.” 25 Ms. Haddaway wanted the decision to be in writing, but Sergeant Bollinger told her that was not going to happen. Ms. Hadda-way was not happy, and Sergeant Bollinger then said: “I don’t know what they’re gonna do. But, but the only thing we want, and protecting whatever we’re trying her[e], our interest, is all we’re doing. We have three murder trials coming up.” 26 As soon as Sergeant Bollinger finished recording these conversations, he put them in the case file, which “was sent to [a] centralized location ... for the Maryland State Police homicide files.” He could not say whether the tapes made it to the State’s Attorney’s Office.

On cross-examination, Sergeant Bollinger agreed that he “made no effort to inform anybody of [the] alleged deal” with Ms. Haddaway,” but he “also made no effort to hide it from anybody.” On redirect, counsel asked Sergeant Bollinger whether he “purposely ... refused to put [the deal with Ms. Haddaway] in writing so that it would remain secret,” and he responded: “That was not my decision.” 27 ⁴⁰⁶ F. Discovery Provided Scott Patterson, the State’s Attorney for Talbot County, testified that, at some point after taking office in 1991, he established an “open file” discovery policy. This policy entailed copying “everything in the file,” i.e., “police investigative reports, witness statements, technical lab reports or, or reports from other experts, anything of that nature,” but not “attorney’s notes, work product, that sort of thing,” and turning the copies over to the defense. He noted that confidential informants were “tricky,” but if they were “actively involved in the case then they would have to be disclosed.” Handwritten police notes would also be included “[i]f they were part of [a police] report.” Counsel then asked Mr. Patterson about his understanding of the State’s Brady obligations. 28 He stated that “Brady now is a lot more comprehensive [than] it was 10, 15, 20, 35 years ago when I started prosecuting cases.” He agreed that Brady as it currently is interpreted requires prosecutors to inquire into the knowledge of State agents “about the existence of any exculpatory information,” but he could not say whether that rule was clear at the time appellant was prosecuted. Similarly, he agreed that, today, it would be a prosecutor’s obligation, pursuant to Brady, to disclose to the defense an agreement between the State and a witness to drop charges against the witness’ family member in exchange for the witness’ testimony, but he could not say whether that rule was clear at the time appellant was prosecuted.

Ms. Hill testified that she complied with the State’s discovery obligations in two ways: “automatic discovery” and “open file” discovery. She sent out the “basics” in “automatic discovery,” which included documents such as a witness list, police reports, defendant, co-defendant, and witness statements, and ⁴⁰⁷ an autopsy report. The automatic discovery packet included a “Suspect Information” list, which included the following: James Edward BROOKS William Clarence THOMAS Anthony BROOKS James BROOKS was originally a confidential source who came forward and provided information regarding an individual identified as William THOMAS. BROOKS alleged that THOMAS told him that he and Anthony BROOKS were responsible for the homicide.

James BROOKS provided a written statement and submitted to a polygraph examination. With respect to the Talbot County State’s Attorney’s Office’s “open file” discovery policy in 2000 and 2001, “[defense] attorneys would have full access to [the State’s] files. They could come in and go through [their] cases, the files for them.” Defense attorneys could look at “[a]ny of the police reports, written statements, [and other] things that the defense was entitled to.” They were permitted to take notes, request photocopies, and come back any time to review the files. Ms. Hill followed this open file discovery policy in appellant’s case, and it was her intent to have defense counsel rely on their open file policy as her Brady disclosure.

Ms. Hill recalled that appellant’s trial counsel came to her office to review the State’s files, but she could not recall when that occurred. After trial was over, the files in each case were securely stored. Ms. Hill could not recall if there were any audio or video cassette tapes in her files, but she noted that, if they were in her possession, defense counsel would have had access to them. Counsel showed Ms. Hill two audio cassette tapes containing the Bollinger-Haddaway conversations, but she did not recall seeing them before.

She stated that, in her -view, dismissing criminal charges against a grandson of a witness was not required to be disclosed under Brady. ⁴⁰⁸ VIL The Circuit Court’s Ruling On June 21, 2016, the circuit court denied appellant’s petition for writ of actual innocence and motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings, as well as those of Mr. Faulkner. As discussed in more detail, infra, the court found that the evidence presented did not indicate that appellant was innocent of the crimes, that the court was not “persuaded that there is newly discovered evidence that would lead to a substantial or significant possibility of a different result in the Petitioners’ respective trials,” and that it would not advance the interests of justice to reopen the post-conviction proceedings. DISCUSSION I. Petition for Writ of Actual Innocence Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in denying his Petition for Writ of Actual Innocence. He asserts that the following evidence was “newly discovered” evidence that “mandates granting of [his] Innocence Writ”: (1) the identification of Ty Brooks as the person who left the palm prints on a window on the exterior of Ms. Wilford’s utility room and the washing machine inside the room; (2) Mr. Keene’s statement that he saw a vehicle in Ms. Wilford’s driveway at approximately 2:00 p.m. on the day of the murder; and (3) the Bollinger-Haddaway tapes discussing, inter alia, the nol pros of the charges against Ms. Haddaway’s grandson. 29 ⁴⁰⁹ Appellant argues that the court’s ruling denying his petition was “premised on erroneous evidentiary rulings, factual findings unsupported by the record, and legal errors in determining” that the evidence was not newly discovered.

He asserts that these errors prevented the court from “properly considering the totality of the evidence, which far exceeds the quantum necessary to demonstrate” that the new evidence created a substantial possibility that the result of the trial may have been different. The State contends that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in denying the petition. It makes two arguments in this regard. First, it argues that appellant did not present evidence of innocence, asserting that the above-referenced evidence was not “exonerating” evidence.

Second, the State asserts that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that appellant was not diligent in discovering the evidence that he alleges is “newly discovered.” In 2009, the Maryland General Assembly enacted Maryland Code (2016 Supp.) § 8-301 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”), which allows certain convicted persons to petition for a writ of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. See Smallwood v. State, 451 Md. 290, 313-20 , 152 A.3d 776 (2017) (setting forth the legislative history of CP § 8-301). CP § 8-301 states, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) A person charged by indictment or criminal information with a crime triable in circuit court and convicted of that crime may, at any time, file a petition for writ of actual innocence in the circuit court for the county in which the conviction was imposed if the person claims that there is newly discovered evidence that: ⁴¹⁰ (1) creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result may have been different, as that standard has been judicially determined; and (2) could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Maryland Rule 4-331. * * * (g) A petitioner in a proceeding under this section has the burden of proof. The court has several options if it grants the petition; it “may set aside the verdict, resentence, grant a new trial, or correct the sentence, as the court considers appropriate.” CP § 8-301(f)(1).

Thus, to prevail on a petition for writ of innocence, the petitioner must produce evidence that is newly discovered, i.e., evidence that was not known to petitioner at trial. Hawes v. State, 216 Md.App. 105, 134-36 , 85 A.3d 291 (2014). Pursuant to CP § 8-301, the newly discovered evidence must satisfy two requirements: (1) it must be such that it “could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Maryland Rule 4-331”; and (2) it must create “a substantial or significant possibility that the result may have been different.” The Maryland appellate courts, however, recently have made clear that there is a third requirement for newly discovered evidence. Relief under CP § 8-301 is limited to situations where the petitioner shows newly discovered evidence that supports a claim that the petitioner is innocent of the crime of which he or she was convicted.

See Smallwood, 451 Md. at 320 , 152 A.3d 776 (“Only defendants who can allege that they are ‘actually innocent,’ meaning they did not commit the crimes for which they were convicted, may bring a petition for relief under [CP] § 8-301.”); Yonga v. State, 221 Md.App. 45, 61-62 , 108 A.3d 448 (2015) (The “thrust of the writ” and the “substantive object that has to be asserted and then supported by an adequate show of proof’ is actual innocence.), aff'd on other grounds, 446 Md. 183 , 130 A.3d 486 (2016). See also Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 176 , 31 A.3d 250 (2011) (a petition for writ of actual innocence gives a convicted person “an opportunity to ⁴¹¹ seek a new trial based on newly discovered evidence that speaks to his or her actual innocence”); Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 219 , 909 A.2d 1020 (2006) (CP § 8-201 was “designed to provide an avenue for the exoneration of the actually innocent”); Md. Rule 4-332(d)(9) (petition for writ of actual innocence must allege “that the conviction sought to be vacated is based on an offense that the petitioner did not commit.”). Accordingly, a petitioner asserting newly discovered evidence must satisfy three requirements to prevail in a petition for actual innocence. A petitioner must produce newly discovered evidence that: (1) “speaks to” the petitioner’s actual innocence; (2) “could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Md. Rule 4-331”; and (3) creates “a substantial or significant possibility that the result may have been different.” 30 When an appellate court reviews a circuit court’s decision to deny a petition for writ of actual innocence, we limit our review “to whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Smallwood, 451 Md. at 308-09 , 152 A.3d 776 .

Accord Patterson v. State, 229 Md.App. 630, 639 , 146 A.3d 496 (2016), cert. denied, 451 Md. 596 , 155 A.3d 443 (2017). “Under that standard, this Court will not disturb the circuit court’s ruling, unless it is well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what the court deems minimally acceptable.” Patterson, 229 Md.App. at 639 , 146 A.3d 496 (citations and quotation marks omitted). A trial court must, however, “ ‘exercise its discretion in accordance with correct legal standards.'” Jackson v. Sollie, 449 Md. 165 , ⁴¹² 196, 141 A.3d 1122 (2016) (quoting Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 504 , 629 A.2d 70 (1993)). With respect to the circuit court’s factual findings, we accept these findings unless clearly erroneous. Yonga, 221 Md.App. at 95 , 108 A.3d 448 .

Applying this standard of review, we address the requisite elements of a petition for writ of actual innocence as they apply to the present case. Initially, we note that there is no dispute that the three categories of evidence, the Keene evidence, Ty Brooks’ palm prints, and the Bollinger-Hadda-way tapes, were not known at trial, and therefore, this evidence was newly discovered evidence. There is a dispute, however, regarding whether this newly discovered evidence meets the three requirements to entitle appellant to relief. We will address, in turn, these requirements.

A. Actual Innocence As indicated, a petition for writ of actual innocence is limited to cases involving newly discovered evidence that “speaks to” the petitioner’s actual innocence. The State argues that this requirement was not met here because the newly discovered evidence alleged, i.e., the Keene evidence, Ty Brooks’ palm prints, and the Bollinger-Haddaway tapes, “did not tend to exonerate” appellant. The State points to several categories of evidence that were provided to the General Assembly as types of evidence that could support a finding of innocence, including scientific evidence found after trial “ ‘to be unreliable or completely false after subsequent research and analysis,’” Smallwood, 451 Md. at 318 , 152 A.3d 776 (quoting Testimony of Delegate Samuel I. Rosenberg on H.B. 366, before the House Judiciary Committee (Feb. 17, 2009)), as well as: (1) a confession by another individual to having committed the crime; (2) acknowledgement by an eyewitness or other evidence indicating he was mistaken; (3) acknowledgment by an eyewitness or other evidence indicating that the witness intentionally lied; or (4) evidence casting serious ⁴¹³ doubt on the reliability of scientific evidence used against the defendant. Id. at 319 , 152 A.3d 776 (quoting Memorandum from the Governor’s Office of Crime Control and Prevention and the Office of the Public Defender to Chairman B. Frosh and Members of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, at 8-9 (Jan. 15, 2009)).

With respect to the newly discovered evidence here, the State contends that the evidence regarding Mr. Keene did not tend to exonerate appellant and was not “the type of evidence that the Court of Appeals noted in Smallwood that an innocence petition was designed to address.” It asserts that the Bollinger-Haddaway tapes “do not show Haddaway as a recanting, mistaken or intentionally lying eyewitness.” With respect to the Ty Brooks palm prints, it contends that the “presence of his palm prints in Mrs. Wilford’s home does not mean” that appellant was “not in Mrs. Wilford’s home at the time of the murder.” The State’s view of the type of evidence of innocence required under CP § 8-301 is too narrow. Initially, as appellant notes, the enumerated list of types of evidence that could support a finding of innocence, upon which the State relies, was a recitation of categories of evidence provided to the General Assembly by various stakeholders; it did not purport to be an exhaustive list. Moreover, no case has held that the evidence must definitively exonerate the petitioner. We hold that, although CP § 8-301 applies only to newly discovered evidence that “speaks to” actual innocence, the petitioner need not definitively prove his or her innocence to warrant relief under the statute.

That the newly discovered evidence does not definitively exonerate appellant, or may be countered by other evidence, goes to the weight of the evidence, which is considered in the third part of our analysis. In the first part of the analysis, we look to whether the newly discovered evidence “speaks to,” or could support, a claim that the petitioner did not commit the crime for which he or she was convicted. ⁴¹⁴ Applying this analysis to the present case, we conclude that the newly discovered evidence “speaks to,” or could support, appellant’s claim that he did not commit the crimes for which he was convicted. Appellant contends that the match of the palm prints found at the scene to Ty Brooks, a person with a history “of committing crimes similar to the break-in that led to Mrs. Wilford’s murder,” and which corroborated “a 1992 informant’s report that [Mr.] Thomas confessed that [he] and [Ty] Brooks committed the murder,” shows that Ty Brooks, and not appellant, was guilty of the murder. We agree that the palm print evidence, as well as the Keene observation, “speaks to” appellant’s innocence because the evidence, if believed and sufficiently proved, could support appellant’s contention that “two career criminals, Ty Anthony Brooks and William Thomas, Jr., actually committed this crimes.” To the extent the evidence was offered to show that someone other than appellant and Mr. Faulkner committed the crime, it was evidence that supports a claim of actual innocence.

With respect to the Bollinger-Haddaway tapes, appellant argues that they undermine “the State’s Haddaway-based theory of the crime.” He contends that Ms. Haddaway was a crucial witness for the State, and the statements that Ms. Haddaway made in those recordings places her credibility and objectivity seriously into question. Appellant asserts that the tapes show that Ms. Haddaway “extorted a deal from the prosecution with threats to torpedo the State’s case by threatening to ‘come in and tell the truth’ that the State would not ‘want to be known,’” and they “reveal a shocking level of corruption, an utter disregard for the truth, and the willingness of the prosecution to give in to extortion to obtain [appellant’s] conviction.” Although appellant’s characterization of the effect of the tapes appears to be overstated, we do agree that the tapes could support an argument that Ms, Haddaway may have deliberately lied. In the context of this case, where Ms. Haddaway was a key witness for the State implicating appellant, and the new evidence could significantly impair her credibility regarding the core merits of the case, we conclude ⁴¹⁵ that this newly discovered evidence satisfies the first prong of the analysis, i.e., the evidence speaks to actual innocence. See Smallwood, 451 Md. at 319 , 152 A.3d 776 (listing as an example of evidence supporting a finding of innocence evidence indicating that an eyewitness intentionally lied).

B. Could Not Have Been Discovered by Due Diligence Having determined that the newly discovered evidence satisfies the first requirement, we turn to the second prong of the analysis, which is whether the newly discovered evidence “could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Maryland Rule 4-331.” CP § 8-301(a)(2). A Rule 4-331 motion based on newly discovered evidence must be filed “within one year after the later of (A) the date the court imposed sentence or (B) the date the court received a mandate issued by the final appellate court to consider a direct appeal from the judgment or a belated appeal permitted as post conviction relief.” Rule 4-331(c)(l). Here, the docket entries indicate that the circuit court received the mandate from this Court affirming his convictions on direct appeal on February 8, 2005. Accordingly, the appellant must show that the newly discovered evidence could not have been discovered before the one-year deadline of February 8, 2006.

It is important to note that the requirement that the petitioner show that evidence could not have been discovered at an earlier