Smith v. State

Eldridge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this criminal case is whether a non-party-witness, who has pleaded guilty to a certain criminal charge but has not yet been sentenced, is entitled to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to testify regarding that criminal charge. In 1975, the defendant Juan Smith was arrested together with Ralph Montgomery. Both men'were indicted on charges of possession of heroin and possession, of heroin with intent to distribute.

Subsequently, Montgomery entered into a plea bargain with the State. The terms of this plea bargain required the State to enter a nolle prosequi on.the charge of possession with intent to distribute, to make no recommendation as to sentencing, and to agree to the ordering of a pre-sentence report. Montgomery, in return, agreed to plead guilty to possession of heroin, and also agreed to “make himself available” to testify for the State in the trial of Juan Smith. In September 1976, pursuant to the plea bargain, Montgomery pleaded guilty to possession of heroin.

The sentencing of Montgomery, however, was deliberately set for a date after Smith’s forthcoming trial. The State did not call Montgomery as a witness in its case in chief against Smith. The defense, however, did attempt to call Montgomery as a witness. Montgomery advised the court that he had pleaded guilty to charges arising from the same incident and was still awaiting sentencing.

With the advice of counsel, Montgomery indicated his intent to refuse to testify, invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against ¹⁸⁹ self-incrimination. The trial court conducted a hearing out of the presence of the jury to determine whether Montgomery was entitled to refuse to answer on that ground. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sustained Montgomery’s claim of privilege. Smith was subsequently convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute, and was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment.

Smith took an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the trial judge erred when he permitted Montgomery to refuse to testify on the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed Smith’s conviction, and we subsequently granted Smith’s petition for a writ of certiorari to consider the trial judge’s ruling on Montgomery’s claim of privilege. We affirm. Smith contends that Montgomery had waived his Fifth Amendment rights with regard to the heroin charges when he pleaded guilty to the simple possession count of the indictment, and that the trial court therefore should have compelled Montgomery to testify at Smith’s trial.

Smith relies primarily on Knox v. State, 234 Md. 203 , 198 A. 2d 285 (1964). Knox was an appeal by a witness himself who had unsuccessfully sought to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination arising under the Maryland Constitution. At the time of the attempted exercise, the witness had pleaded guilty but had not been sentenced. After he was sentenced, Knox appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgment.

In Knox , there was no plea bargain involved, and a principal focus of the majority opinion concerned the voluntariness of the guilty plea, 234 Md. at 206-207 . Moreover, the Court viewed Knox’s testimony as exculpatory rather than incriminatory, id. at 207 . However, Knox is inapposite for a more fundamental reason. As the Court made clear, that case did not involve a privilege arising under the Federal Constitution (ibid): “For [the] present purpose, we may assume that the controlling constitutional provision is Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and not the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.” ¹⁹⁰ Subsequent to the decision in Knox , the Supreme Court, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 , 84 S. Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it is the Fifth Amendment privilege which Montgomery attempted to invoke.

Thus, in determining the limits of Montgomery's privilege, the decisions under the Fifth Amendment are more pertinent. There is support for the very broad proposition that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is lost or waived as a result of a plea of guilty. For example, in United States v. Gernie, 252 F. 2d 664, 670 (2d Cir. 1958), the court stated: “[T]he government had the right to compel... [the witness] to answer the questions as he had pleaded guilty and could not be further incriminated____ United States v. Romero, supra [ 249 F. 2d 371 (2d Cir. 1957)]; United States v. Cioffi, supra [ 242 F. 2d 473 (2d Cir. 1957)].” Gernie , however, like many other cases setting forth the same proposition, concerned a witness who had both pleaded guilty and been sentenced on the guilty plea. In the instant case, while the witness Montgomery had entered a plea of guilty, he had not yet been sentenced.

In this regard, this case more nearly resembles Mills v. United States, 281 F. 2d 736, 741 (4th Cir. 1960), where the court upheld a claim of Fifth Amendment privilege, stating: “The-fact that [the subject witness had pleaded guilty but]... had not been sentenced distinguishes this case from United States v. Gernie, 2 Cir., 1958, 252 F. 2d 664, 670 , where the witness had been convicted of the crime with which charged and sentenced. It was held he no longer was able to claim the privilege of the Fifth Amendment and could be compelled to testify. The theory in that case was that, having been convicted and sentenced, the witness could not be further incriminated by his answers. However, at the time of these proceedings ¹⁹¹ in the case at bar, the period within which ... [the witness] could prosecute an appeal of her own conviction had not expired.” Accord, Ottomano v. United States, 468 F. 2d 269 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1128 , 93 S. Ct. 948 , 35 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973); State v. Johnson, 77 Idaho 1 , 287 P. 2d 425 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U. S. 1007 , 76 S. Ct. 649 , 100 L. Ed. 869 (1956); People v. Hartley, 22 Ill.

App.3d 108 , 317 N.E.2d 57 (1974); Kohler v. Meade, 479 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. 1972); People v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich. 645 , 29 N.W.2d 284 (1947); People v. Smith, 34 Mich. App. 205 , 191 N.W.2d 392 (1971); State v. Tyson, 43 N. J. 411, 204 A. 2d 864 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U. S. 987 , 85 S. Ct. 1359 , 14 L.Ed.2d 279 (1965); Kniht v. Maybee, 44 Misc. 2d 152 , 253 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 472 Pa. 435 , 372 A. 2d 771 (1977); Commonwealth v. Garland, 475 Pa. 389 , 380 A. 2d 777 (1977); Davis v. State, 501 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1973). Contra, Trusty v. State, 501 P. 2d 1142 (Okla. Crim. 1972); Oliver v. State, 85 Nev. 418 , 456 P. 2d 431 (1969). The Fourth Circuit in Mills v. United States, supra, suggested two reasons why a guilty plea does not operate as a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, at least until sentence has been imposed.

First, as the above quotation indicates, despite the guilty plea there could be an appeal of the conviction. Second, if a person who had pleaded guilty to a crime but who had not been sentenced were compelled by his testimony to disclose the extent or nature of his participation in the crime, the trial court might be affected in determining the extent and severity of the sentence to be imposed, 281 F. 2d at 741 . That is, the witness might be forced to give testimony which could subject him to a more severe penalty. We agree, for both reasons suggested