Smith v. State

Eldridge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. We are presented with the question of whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence and admitting into evidence at the defendant’s trial on charges of storehouse breaking and larceny a power saw seized by the police during a search of the defendant’s residence. The saw was not described in the warrant authorizing the search. A motorcycle shop located in Chester County, Pennsylvania, was broken into sometime during the evening of July 3, 1974, or the early morning of July 4, 1974.

Three pairs of motorcycle boots were stolen. Based in part upon information received from an unnamed neighbor of the shop, the Pennsylvania police obtained a warrant to search the residence of the defendant Charles Edward Smith in Oxford, Pennsylvania, and to seize the three pairs of motorcycle boots and a pair of bolt cutters allegedly used to gain entry into the store. The warrant was executed on July 5, 1974. None of the items described in the warrant was recovered, but several construction tools not described in the warrant were seized.

Among these tools was a Black and Decker ,circular saw with the name “Kirk” written on it. This saw wakjater identified as belonging to Acme Supermarkets, Inc., and it was stolen from a supermarket under construction in North East, Maryland, sometime between June 14 and June 17,1974. The identification of the saw was not made, however, until March 19,1975, by Kirk William Nels'on, an employee in the maintenance department of Acme Majrkets, at the Avondale, Pennsylvania, Police Station. I Subsequently, on August 7, 1975,'Smith was indicted in Cecil County, Maryland, on charges prising from the theft at the Acme store in North East.

On October 3,1975, a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence seized in the search of July 5, 1974, was held. The motion was denied. The power saw, ⁴⁰⁹ but no other items seized at defendant’s residence, was introduced into evidence at his trial. Smith was convicted by a jury of larceny under $100.00 and storehouse breaking under $100.00.

From these convictions, Smith appeals. Smith raises three issues. First, he argues that the search warrant was invalid because it was based on information supplied by an informant without a sufficient showing of the underlying circumstances from which the credibility of the informant or the reliability of the information provided could be determined. Second, he contends that even if the warrant were valid, the seizure of the power saw was beyond the scope of the warrant and was not within any recognized exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

And finally, he argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the convictions. For the purpose of this appeal, we shall assume arguendo that the search warrant was issued upon probable cause and that therefore the resulting search of Smith’s residence was valid. However, the warrant cannot justify the seizure of the power saw and other construction tools. The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (Emphasis supplied.) This provision of the Fourth Amendment was applied in Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192, 196 , 48 S. Ct. 74, 76 , 72 L. Ed. 231 (1927), to prohibit the seizure under a warrant of items not specifically described in the warrant: “The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.

As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” See also Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, 58 , 87 S. Ct. 1873, 1883 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967); Stanford v. Texas, 879 U. S. ⁴¹⁰ 476, 485, 85 S. Ct. 506, 512 , 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965); Brooks v. State, 235 Md. 23, 29 , 200 A. 2d 177 (1964); Anglin v. State, 1 Md. App. 85, 88-90, 227 A. 2d 364 (1967). The power saw and other construction tools seized, not being particularly described in the warrant, could not be seized under the authority of that warrant. Hence the seizure must be treated as a warrantless one. The State, however, relies on the “plain view” doctrine set forth in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 , 91 S. Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), to justify the warrantless seizure of the power saw and other construction tools.

Under the plain view doctrine, a warrantless seizure of incriminating evidence may be permitted when the police are lawfully searching a specified area. For the warrantless seizure to be