Smith v. State

Morton, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On April 10,1980, appellant was found guilty by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County of daytime housebreaking and sentenced to a term of five years. ⁴²⁶ In this appeal appellant contends that the trial judge committed reversible error in denying his motion to suppress evidence found in his automobile as a result of what the police defined as "an inventory search.” Officer Cocuzzi of the Montgomery County Police Department testified that on December 3, 1979, he observed the appellant near a gold Pontiac parked on a 7-11 Store parking lot located in Montgomery County. He also saw a female alight from the car, join the appellant and both entered the store. Shortly thereafter, the officer observed appellant leave the store, alone, and approach the Pontiac.

Officer Cocuzzi testified that he sought certain information from the appellant, who said he had no identification, but stated that the car belonged to him. He produced the keys to the car and gave them to the officer. According to the officer, he knew that appellant was wanted on an outstanding bench warrant and thereupon placed him under arrest. At that time the officer observed in the back of the car a movie projector, a stereo component set with two speakers and several leather coats.

The car was removed to a police station where the officer undertook "an inventory search” of the contents of the car. Prior to the search Officer Cocuzzi had a conversation with Corporal Jessee concerning the obtaining of a search warrant for the car. According to Corporal Jessee, he conferred with an assistant state’s attorney and was advised that there were no grounds to support the issuance of a warrant. The so-called inventory search was then conducted.

In Manalansan v. State, 45 Md. App. 667, 668 (1980), Judge Moylan, speaking for this Court, encapsulated the principles governing warrantless searches of automobiles, including an inventory search: "We begin with the bedrock proposition that the inventorying of the contents of an automobile is not a constitutionally-permitted' investigative technique. A search for evidence within an automobile may only be undertaken pursuant to a validly issued search and seizure warrant, Coolidge v. New Hamp ⁴²⁷ shire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S. Ct. 2022 , 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971); warrantlessly where there is probable cause to believe that the automobile contains evidence of crime coupled with an exigency excusing the warrant requirement, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S. Ct. 280 , 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925); warrantlessly where all or some of the automobile lies within the reach, lunge or grasp of an arrestee, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S. Ct. 2034 , 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969), and Peterson v. State, 15 Md. App. 478 , 292 A.2d 714 ; or warrantlessly pursuant to valid consent, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S. Ct. 2041 , 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973). The inventorying of the contents of an automobile, on the other hand, serves a noninvestigative purpose.” Thus we turn to an independent examination of the record (Herring v. State, 43 Md. App. 211