Smith v. State

Kenyatta M. Smith v. State of Maryland, No. 26, September Term, 2021. Opinion by Getty, C.J. PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS — QUALIFICATIONS FOR RELIEF — DISCRETION OF THE CORAM NOBIS COURT The Court of Appeals held that a circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying a petition for writ of error coram nobis where the petitioner satisfied the qualifications set forth in Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52 (2000), but did not establish that the matter presented circumstances compelling the extraordinary remedy of a writ of error coram nobis to achieve justice. Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case No. 03-K-02-002951 Argued: January 11, 2022 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 26 September Term, 2021 KENYATTA M. SMITH v. STATE OF MARYLAND *Getty, C.J. *McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, JJ. Opinion by Getty, C.J. Filed: August 15, 2022 *Getty, C.J., and McDonald, J., now Senior Judges, participated in the hearing and Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal conference of this case while active members of Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. this Court; after being recalled pursuant to 2022-08-15 13:15-04:00 Maryland Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, they also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion.

Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk The case before us involves a petition for the extraordinary remedy of a writ of error coram nobis, which overturns a person’s prior criminal convictions. Petitioner Kenyatta M. Smith (“Ms. Smith”) has twenty-year old convictions for forgery and fraud/identity theft. Due to these felony convictions, Ms. Smith is not eligible to receive the license required to work as a mortgage loan originator under Maryland law. As such, Ms. Smith petitioned the Circuit Court of Baltimore County for a writ of error coram nobis, which the circuit court ultimately denied.

The circumstances of that denial led to the present appeal. Accordingly, this Court is asked to resolve whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Ms. Smith’s petition for writ of error coram nobis. For the reasons explained in detail below, considering the legislative purpose of the Maryland mortgage loan originator licensing statute and the fact that granting Ms. Smith’s petition for writ of error coram nobis would effectively circumvent a federal mandate on mortgage loan originator licensing requirements, we answer that question in the negative and affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. BACKGROUND A. The Underlying Convictions On June 3, 2002, the District Court for Baltimore County convicted Ms. Smith of one count of forgery and two counts of fraud/identity theft.

Ms. Smith subsequently appealed her convictions to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, where she then entered a guilty plea to all counts. The underlying circumstances that led to these convictions involved Ms. Smith using, without authorization, her former employer’s personal identifying information, including the employer’s name, tax identification number, and social security number, to obtain a commercial loan for $40,000.00. Ms. Smith then used checks bearing her former employer’s forged signature to deposit the fraudulently obtained loan into her personal bank account. Ms. Smith purchased a Lexus automobile from a Lexus dealership in Reisterstown, Maryland with the fraudulently obtained money.

The circuit court sentenced Ms. Smith to three years of incarceration, all suspended. The circuit court did not require Ms. Smith to pay restitution because after her convictions of forgery and fraud/identity theft, Ms. Smith sold the automobile, used the proceeds of the sale to pay back the loan, converted the loan to her name and then continued making payments on the outstanding balance. B. Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis On May 21, 2015, over a decade after her convictions, counsel for Ms. Smith filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis (“Petition”) with the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, requesting that the circuit court vacate the forgery and fraud/identity theft convictions. The Petition argued that Ms. Smith’s entry of a guilty plea should be invalidated because neither the circuit court nor Ms. Smith’s counsel advised her of the following: (1) the offenses to which she was pleading guilty; (2) the elements of the crime to which she was pleading guilty; (3) the presumption of innocence; (4) her forfeit of preliminary motions to contest the charging document, arrest, any confession or statement, results of searches and seizures, pretrial or in-court identifications, or other technical defenses; (5) or of the immigration or other collateral consequences of entering a plea of guilt.

Accordingly, counsel for Ms. Smith argued that the “plea was involuntary[.]” 2 Additionally, the Petition asserted that Ms. Smith faces significant collateral consequences as a result of these convictions. Specifically, Ms. Smith is disqualified from obtaining a mortgage loan originator’s license pursuant to Maryland Code (1980, 2020 Repl. Vol., 2021 Supp.) Financial Institutions Article (“FI”) § 11-605,1 and Ms. Smith lost “the opportunity for employment in her field on at least five separate occasions[.]” Counsel for Ms. Smith attached two exhibits to the Petition—the transcript from Ms. Smith’s hearing before the circuit court on September 20, 2002, and a letter from the Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation (“DLLR”) denying Ms. Smith’s application for a mortgage loan originator’s license dated January 26, 2007. The hearing transcript from the guilty plea hearing reflects that neither the circuit court nor Ms. Smith’s counsel advised her of the nature and elements of the offenses to which she pleaded guilty.

The letter from DLLR specifically cited Ms. Smith’s felony conviction for “forgery[—]private 1 In pertinent part, FI § 11-605 provides: (a) The Commissioner may not issue a mortgage loan originator license unless the Commissioner makes, at a minimum, the following findings: * * * (2) The applicant has not been convicted of, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to, a felony in a domestic, foreign, or military court: (i) During the 7-year period immediately preceding the date of the application for licensing; or (ii) At any time preceding the date of application, if the felony involved an act of fraud, dishonesty, a breach of trust, or money laundering; 3 documents” as “negatively relat[ing] to [her] fitness and qualification to act as a mortgage originator.” C. The Circuit Court’s Initial Denial of the Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis The Circuit Court for Baltimore County issued a memorandum opinion and order on August 18, 2015 denying Ms. Smith’s Petition without a hearing. In its analysis, the circuit court relied on State v. Hicks, which articulated that the following five conditions must be satisfied for coram nobis relief to be granted: (1) [T]he grounds for challenging the criminal conviction must be of a constitutional, jurisdictional or fundamental character. (2) [A] presumption of regularity attaches to the criminal case, and the burden of proof is on the coram nobis petitioner. (3) [T]he coram nobis petitioner must be suffering or facing significant collateral consequences from the conviction.

(4) Basic principles of waiver are applicable to issues raised in coram nobis proceedings. (5) [O]ne is not entitled to challenge a criminal conviction by a coram nobis proceeding if another statutory or common law remedy is then available. 139 Md. App. 1, 10 (2001) (citing Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52 , 78–80 (2000)). The circuit court acknowledged that Ms. Smith was “not advised of the nature and elements of the crimes to which she was pleading guilty[,]” and that Ms. Smith had exhausted all other potential legal remedies. However, the circuit court disagreed that Ms. Smith had suffered “significant collateral consequences” as a result of these convictions.

The circuit court stated that Ms. Smith “is simply unable to work in the industry of her choosing. The financial industry has vested and obvious reasons for refusing to hire 4 individuals with convictions for fraud and forgery. It is, therefore, not unjust that she cannot work in that industry because of the convictions.” The circuit court also determined that Ms. Smith waived her right to coram nobis relief “because she did not appeal her conviction when it occurred in 2002.” D. Appeal to the Court of Special Appeals & the Circuit Court’s Remand Hearing Ms. Smith timely appealed the circuit court’s denial of her Petition to the Court of Special Appeals. On August 1, 2016, the intermediate appellate court vacated the judgment of the circuit court in an unreported opinion and remanded the case for the circuit court to hold a hearing on the Petition.

See Smith v. State, No. 1605, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 1, 2016). The Court of Special Appeals concluded that “the circuit court was wrong to deny [Ms. Smith’s Petition] without a hearing,” and therefore vacated the judgment and remanded the matter to the circuit court. Id.

Judge Daniel A. Friedman authored a concurring opinion, maintaining “that the test for ‘significant collateral consequences’ is not supposed to be quite so high a bar as the trial court originally set it[.]” Smith v. State, No. 1605, slip op. at 2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 1, 2016) (Friedman, J., concurring). The concurring opinion set forth that “economic harm, even without more, can satisfy the ‘significant collateral consequences’ element of the test for issuance of the writ of coram nobis.” Id. at 3. The remand hearing took place in the circuit court on February 17, 2017.

At the beginning of the hearing, counsel for Ms. Smith stated, “[a]nd in speaking with the State, we’re both of the opinion we’re sort of back only on the collateral consequences prong if you will[.]” The State agreed and responded that it would not be introducing any evidence 5 at the hearing. Ms. Smith’s counsel reiterated that Ms. Smith’s convictions prevent her from working in the mortgage loan origination industry, and proffered that her convictions have: (1) prevented her from obtaining jobs from at least four private sector firms; (2) prevented her from obtaining work with a salary comparable to what she would be earning as a mortgage loan originator; (3) led numerous recruiters to conclude that a background check would preclude her from particular job opportunities; and (4) resulted in potential educational funding being cut off. Additionally, Ms. Smith’s counsel highlighted that these hardships are exacerbated by the fact that Ms. Smith is a single mother with a liver condition, which limits her mobility. On September 18, 2017, the circuit court issued a memorandum opinion, denying Ms. Smith’s Petition on the grounds that Ms. Smith had not established significant collateral consequences.

The circuit court explained that prohibiting an individual with underlying forgery and fraud/identity theft convictions from obtaining employment in a profession that strongly values honesty and integrity, such as the mortgage loan origination field, is not an uncommon occurrence. Accordingly, the circuit court found that Ms. Smith’s employment difficulties were “incommensurate with the extraordinary and compelling circumstances that warrant” granting a petition for writ of error coram nobis. E. Second Appeal to the Court of Special Appeals Ms. Smith again noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the decision of the circuit court in an unreported opinion. See Smith v. State, No. 1721, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec.

App. May 20, 2019). The intermediate appellate court concluded that “the circuit court failed to properly evaluate the significant collateral 6 consequences element of coram nobis[.]” Id. Additionally, the Court of Special Appeals held, as a matter of law, that Ms. Smith’s inability to become a licensed mortgage loan originator “demonstrated that she is suffering a significant collateral consequence.” Id. Therefore, the intermediate appellate court remanded the matter to the circuit court to determine if Ms. Smith’s Petition “presents ‘circumstances compelling relief to achieve justice.’” Id.

The intermediate appellate court instructed the circuit court to consider on remand whether its “error concerning the significant collateral consequences element of the coram nobis test may have influenced its determination as to whether there were ‘compelling circumstances’ necessary to ‘achieve justice[.]’” Id. at 5. Judge Friedman authored another concurring opinion “because . . . the per curiam majority [did] not go far enough to dispel the circuit court’s erroneous conclusion that economic consequences are not significant collateral consequences on their own.” Smith v. State, No. 1721, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 20, 2019) (Friedman, J., concurring). The concurring opinion emphasized that “economic consequences are alone sufficient to establish significant collateral consequences for coram nobis.” Id. at 7.

F. Further Proceedings in the Circuit Court The Court of Special Appeals issued the mandate for its decision on June 20, 2019, which the circuit court received on September 12, 2019. In response to the mandate, the State filed “State’s Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief” in the circuit court on October 2, 2019. The State argued that the present circumstances “do not necessitate coram nobis relief in order to achieve justice.” Specifically, the State relied on the clear 7 “nature of the offenses[,]” “the statement of the facts, common understanding of the offenses, and the age of [Ms. Smith,]” to demonstrate the lack of such circumstances. Without receiving a response from Ms. Smith,2 the circuit court issued a memorandum opinion on January 28, 2020, again denying Ms. Smith’s Petition.

The circuit court concluded that Ms. Smith satisfied all “of the substantive elements that would afford someone the opportunity to be granted [coram nobis relief].” Beyond the substantive elements, the circuit court explained that Ms. Smith also needed to “convince the [circuit court] that there are compelling circumstances necessary to achieve justice.” (Footnote omitted). The circuit court was “not persuaded . . . that there are compelling circumstances necessary to achieve justice.” Further, the circuit court reasoned that “Maryland does not allow those who were convicted of or pled guilty to a felony involving an act of fraud, dishonesty, breach of trust, or money laundering to obtain a mortgage [loan] originator’s license.” (citing FI § 11-605(a)(2)(ii)). Summarizing the legislative history of FI § 11-605, the circuit court concluded that the legislative purpose for the statute outweighed the purpose of coram nobis relief and any argument in favor of granting Ms. Smith’s Petition. The circuit court set forth that [a] review of the legislative history clearly indicates that the Maryland General Assembly in enacting this legislation intended to combat the problems arising from the dishonesty amongst individuals employed in the mortgage origination field and by necessity given access to the private 2 Ms. Smith noted in her opening brief to this Court that the certificate of service on the State’s Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief listed Ms. Smith’s home address instead of the address of Ms. Smith’s counsel that represented her in the prior coram nobis proceedings. 8 financial information of individual members of the general public be of good moral character, free from issues of dishonesty and lack of trustworthiness.

Accordingly, the circuit court denied Ms. Smith’s Petition.3 G. Third Appeal to the Court of Special Appeals Ms. Smith noted a third timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, challenging the circuit court’s denial of her Petition. The intermediate appellate court issued an unreported opinion on April 20, 2021, affirming the circuit court’s denial of Ms. Smith’s Petition. See Smith v. State, No. 2534, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 20, 2021).

The Court of Special Appeals stated that it reviews “the circuit court’s ultimate decision to deny Ms. Smith relief under the abuse of discretion standard, with legal determinations reviewed without deference and factual findings left undisturbed unless clearly erroneous.” Id. at 4 (citing State v. Rich, 454 Md. 448 , 470–71 (2017)). The intermediate appellate court concluded that “[a]lthough we might have granted Ms. Smith the relief she sought, we certainly cannot say that the circuit court’s decision to deny the writ was so far removed from any center mark as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 4–5. Judge Friedman authored a third concurring opinion, stating “I do not think the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the petition for a writ of error coram nobis. I write separately because I cannot imagine a more deserving petitioner than Kenyatta 3 On January 30, 2020, two days following the issuance of the circuit court’s memorandum opinion and order, an attorney in the Office of the Public Defender’s Post-Conviction Defenders Division filed a notice of appearance in the circuit court.

The same attorney filed a Motion to Reconsider Denial of Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis on February 12, 2020. Ms. Smith noted her third timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals on February 25, 2020. To date, the circuit court has not ruled on this motion. 9 Smith.” Smith v. State, No. 2534, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 20, 2021) (Friedman, J., concurring).

Judge Friedman further articulated that “[t]he collateral consequence is . . . always a respect-worthy legislative policy judgment” and the legislative purpose of FI § 11-605 “ought not be the sole reason to deny relief.” Id. at 3. H. Petition for Writ of Certiorari Ms. Smith petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted on August 25, 2021. Smith v. State, 475 Md. 700 (2021). Ms. Smith posed the following questions: 1.

When a petitioner satisfies the substantive requirements for receiving coram nobis relief—i.e., they have exhausted all other available remedies, have proven that the convictions they are challenging suffer from constitutional or other fundamental error, and have established that the challenged convictions create a significant collateral consequence—to what extent does the petitioner still need to show that there are “compelling circumstances” warranting relief? 2. Where Petitioner met the established prerequisites for obtaining coram nobis relief, did the circuit court err in ruling that, under dicta in Coleman v. State, 219 Md. App. 339 (2014), there are not “compelling circumstances” to vacate Petitioner’s convictions because, inter alia, the legislative purpose behind the creation of Petitioner’s significant collateral consequence (i.e., her inability to obtain a license as a mortgage originator) takes precedence? We consolidate and restate the questions as to whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Ms. Smith’s Petition. For the reasons discussed in detail below, we answer that question in the negative.

We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Smith’s Petition, and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 10 STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews a circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a petition for writ of error coram nobis for abuse of discretion. See Rich, 454 Md. at 470–71. “However, in determining whether the ultimate disposition of the coram nobis court constitutes an abuse of discretion, [this Court] should not disturb the coram nobis court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous[.]” Id. at 471 . An abuse of discretion “occurs where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the circuit court.” Mainor v. State, 475 Md. 487, 499 (2021) (quoting Montague v. State, 471 Md. 657, 674 (2020)) (internal quotation marks omitted). DISCUSSION A. Writ of Error Coram Nobis A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy, rooted in English common law, which is available to correct errors of fact that affect the validity or regularity of a judgment and to correct constitutional or fundamental legal errors.

See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 , 507–12 (1954). In 2000, this Court adopted the United States Supreme Court precedent decided in Morgan, which is “[t]he leading American case concerning the nature and scope of a coram nobis proceeding[,]” Skok, 361 Md. at 71 , that clearly established that a writ of error coram nobis should be utilized “only under circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.” Id. at 72 (quoting Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). We consistently emphasize the extraordinary nature of this remedy in analyzing matters involving a writ of error coram 11 nobis. See Rich, 454 Md. at 461 , 470–71; State v. Smith, 443 Md. 572, 597 (2015) (quoting Skok, 361 Md. at 72 ).

In Skok, this Court set forth five “qualifications” that a petitioner challenging a criminal conviction must establish in a petition for writ of error coram nobis, namely—(1) “the grounds for challenging the criminal conviction must be of a constitutional, jurisdictional, or fundamental character[;]” (2) “the burden of proof is on the . . . petitioner[;]” (3) the petitioner “must be suffering or facing significant collateral consequences from the conviction[;]” (4) “[b]asic principles of waiver are applicable to issues raised in [coram nobis] proceedings[;]” and (5) “one is not entitled to challenge a criminal conviction by a [coram nobis] proceeding if another statutory or common law remedy is then available.” 361 Md. at 78–80. Five years after our decision in Skok, the Court adopted procedural rules governing coram nobis proceedings, which took effect on January 1, 2006. See Md. Rule 15-1201, et seq. Maryland Rule 15-1202(a) establishes that “[a]n action for a writ of error coram nobis is commenced by the filing of a petition in the court where the conviction took place.” Subsection (b) sets forth the pleading requirements for the petition for writ of error coram nobis, which encompasses the five qualifications this Court articulated in Skok.

Maryland Rule 15-1202(b) states, in pertinent part, that the petition shall include: (D) the facts that would have resulted in the entry of a different judgment and the allegations of error upon which the petition is based; (E) a statement that the allegations of error have not been waived; (F) the significant collateral consequences that resulted from the challenged conviction; [and] 12 (G) the unavailability of appeal, post conviction relief, or other remedies[.] Md. Rule 15-202(b)(1)(D)–(G). Maryland Rule 15-1206(a) sets forth that it is within the coram nobis court’s discretion to hold a hearing on the petition for writ of error coram nobis. The coram nobis court is permitted to deny the petition without holding a hearing but, notably, may only grant the petition if a hearing is held. Md. Rule 15-1206(a).

Additionally, at the hearing, it is within the coram nobis court’s discretion to “permit evidence to be presented by affidavit, deposition, oral testimony, or any other manner that the court finds convenient and just.” Id. The coram nobis court is required to “prepare and file or dictate into the record a statement setting forth separately each ground on which the petition is based, the federal and state rights involved, the court’s ruling with respect to each ground, and the reasons for the ruling.” Md. Rule 15-1207(a). Further, “[t]he statement shall include or be accompanied by an order granting or denying relief.” Md. Rule 15-1207(b). If the coram nobis court grants the petition for writ of error coram nobis, “the court may provide for rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, discharge, correction of sentence, or other matters that may be necessary and proper.” Id.

This Court’s precedent regarding the extraordinary nature of a writ of error coram nobis in connection with the governing Maryland Rules, clearly establishes that the Skok qualifications are threshold requirements that a petitioner must satisfy, but satisfaction of these qualifications does not result in an automatic grant of a petition for writ of error 13 coram nobis. If these qualifications are not sufficiently established in the petition for writ of error coram nobis, the coram nobis court is permitted to deny the petition without conducting a hearing on the matter. See Md. Rule 15-1206(a). Notably, even where the Skok qualifications are established in the petition for writ of error coram nobis, the coram nobis court still has the discretion to deny the petition without a hearing if the petition does not present the coram nobis court with circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.

Id. Accordingly, a petition for writ of error coram nobis shall only be granted where the coram nobis court conducts a hearing pursuant to Maryland Rule 15-1206(a), determines that the Skok qualifications are satisfied, and settles that the matter presents circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice consistent with this Court’s precedent. Determining whether the matter involves circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice is not a threshold requirement such as the qualifications enumerated in Skok. Instead, this is a discretionary determination left with the coram nobis court to ensure that this extraordinary remedy is reserved for only the most egregious and deserving of situations.

With this understanding, we turn now to the principal issue before us—whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Ms. Smith’s Petition. B. The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying the Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis. 1. Parties’ Contentions Ms. Smith maintains that the circuit court erred in denying her Petition because she satisfied the Skok threshold requirements. Ms. Smith emphasizes