Smith v. State

WEANT, Judge. On the morning of 16 June 1982, Gerald Klinger, a resident of eastern Baltimore County, discovered the body of Demetrius Kelly in his front yard under some shrubbery. ⁶³⁰ Lying nearby was an opened pack of Newport cigarettes. Police were never able to identify any eyewitness to the killing, but Klinger related that he heard a gunshot the day before at about 10:20 p.m. He looked out of a front window; he saw a large car which was parked; he heard voices but could not discern what was said.

Investigators later concluded that Kelly had been shot once in the head, and his body dragged from the road. Several witnesses who were friends of Kelly saw him in Baltimore City on the night of 15 June. He was wearing several gold chains. (Significantly, no gold chains were found on Kelly’s body.) Kelly was riding in a gold-colored. car badly dented on the driver’s side.

Two witnesses identified the appellant, Frankie Smith, as the driver of the car that night. Police stopped Smith on the afternoon of 16 June. A witness at the scene, who saw Kelly with Smith the night before, identified appellant and his car. The police questioned Smith at Baltimore County Police Headquarters.

They also searched Smith’s gold and black Ford Maverick after he executed a search consent form. A gold chain was concealed in a hole in the glove compartment. Members of Kelly’s family identified the chain as Kelly’s. A rear door of the car had stains which later proved to be blood.

An opened pack of Newport cigarettes was on the front seat. By indictment the State charged Smith with murder in the first degree, robbery with a deadly weapon, use of a handgun in the commission of. a felony, and theft. In a trial by a judge sitting without a jury, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County convicted Smith of murder in the second degree and theft of property of $300 value or more. On appeal, Smith raises the following questions: 1.

Did the trial judge err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress? 2. Did the trial judge err in admitting the results of the blood enzyme testing? ⁶³¹ 3. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction? 1. At trial, appellant moved to suppress two oral statements he made to the police as well as evidence obtained from the search of his car.

As to the oral statements, he argued that his first statement should be suppressed because he was in police custody but had not been advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), at the time he spoke. In addition, he claimed that the police obtained his second statement by continuing questioning after he had asked to see an attorney. Further, Smith claims that the State did not reveal the “substance” of his oral statements despite defense counsel’s request, thereby violating Md.Rule 4-263(b)(2) (formerly Rule 741(b)(2)). The trial court agreed that those statements that were not disclosed pursuant to former Rule 741 should be suppressed, but denied the rest of the motion.

The court denied appellant’s motion to suppress the results of the car search on the basis that Smith voluntarily consented to the search. Taking these arguments in order, we conclude that appellant volunteered the first statement before the police had taken him in their custody. Smith testified that the police had their guns drawn when they initially stopped him, but he admitted that they holstered their guns thereafter. The police asked Smith to accompany them to police headquarters; one of the detectives, however, testified that he told Smith both after the initial stop and at headquarters that he was not under arrest and was free to leave.

Smith was not handcuffed at any time. Under these circumstances, the trial court was correct in finding that Smith’s first statement did not arise out of a custodial interrogation, so that the Miranda warnings were not mandated. Appellant’s second statement came after the detectives had arrested him and delivered the Miranda warnings. The trial court’s finding that Smith made this state ⁶³² ment before he terminated the questioning by requesting an attorney was amply supported by the record and should be affirmed.

Md.Rule 1086. Accordingly, the court’s refusal to suppress this evidence must stand. Next, we consider the State’s failure to comply with the discovery provision of Md.Rule 4-263(b)(2). The trial judge granted the appellant’s motion to suppress, ruling that the court would “[j]ust consider that which is put forth in the discovery area.” This was an appropriate sanction.

We find no basis for imposing the requested total exclusion of Smith’s