Smith v. State

Yellott, J., delivered the opinion of the Court’. The appellant, Peter P. Smith, having been appointed collector of State taxes for the year 1883, gave bond with Annie C. Smith, his wife, and George L. Smith and Mary E. Smith, wife of said George,'as sureties. Suit was brought by the State on said bond. Annie C. Smith was returned not summoned.

The other defendants appeared and pleaded, and having obtained leave of. the Court to^ withdraw their pleas, leave was granted to Mary E„ Smith to sever in her defence and to plead separately, and she filed the plea of coverture. The said Peter and George then pleaded “ that the said writing obligatory was and is wholly without validity as to the said Annie and Mary, and hence the said writing obligatory was and is the obligation of these defendants, Peter and George alone, and as such was never duly. approved as required by law, and in the manner prescribed by law, and hence is wholly without validity as a bond of the said Peter as such collector as aforesaid, and is not good or pleadable or admissible in evidence against these defendants,” &c., &c. The second plea filed by the defendants Peter and George was to the same effect and presented substantially the same defence. The plaintiff demurred to all these pleas, and judgment for plaintiff on demurrer was given in the Court below, and afterwards judgment against the defendants on the bond.

On this appeal the first question to be decided relates to the liability of married women on bonds of this nature. The Act of 18i72, ch. 210, reads as follows : “ Any married woman may be sued jointly with her husband in any of the Courts of this State, or before any justice of the peace, on any note, bill of exchange, single- ²¹⁷ bill, bond, contract or agreement which she may have executed jointly with her husband, and may employ counsel and defend such action or suit separately or jointly with her husband, and judgments recovered in such cases shall be liens on the property of defendants, and may be collected by execution or attachment, in the same manner as if the defendants were not husband and wife.” Whatever latitude may, at one time, have been assumed by Courts in the construction of statutes, the more recent cases have established the rule that when the language of a legislative enactment is clear and unambiguous, a meaning, different from that which the words plainly imply, cannot be judicially sanctioned. Even when a Court is convinced that the Legislature really meant and intended something not expressed by the phraseology of the Act, it will not deem itself authorized to depart from the plain meaning of language which is free from ambiguity. As was said by Lord Denman, in Green vs. Wood, 7 Adol. and E., 185, “ Those who used the words thought they had effected the purpose intended.

But we, looking at the words as Judges, are no more justified in introducing that meaning than we should be if we added any other provision. We can do no more than give such a meaning as the words authorize.” The Supreme Court of Ohio, in Woodbury vs. Berry, 18 Ohio, 462, emphatically say: ” It is our legitimate function to interpret legislation but not to supply its omissions.” And the doctrine in all the States seems to be well established, and it is now uniformly held that if the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction, there being nothing to construe. United States vs. Ragsdale, 1 Humph., 497 ; Bosley vs. Mattingly, 14 B. Mon., 89 . This is undoubtedly the recognized rule in Maryland.

In Alexander vs. Worthington, 5 Md., 472 , it was said that “ Courts cannot imagine an intent and bind the letter of the Act to it.” In Clark vs. Mayor and C. C. of Baltimore, 29 Md., 283 , the principle