Smith v. State

KARWACKI, Judge. On May 3, 1982, James E. Smith, the appellant, appeared before the District Court of Maryland for Anne Arundel County for the trial of criminal charges that on December 19, 1981, he had violated Md.Code (1977, 1982 Cum.Supp.), § 21-902 of the Transportation Article by driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while intoxicated (§ 21-902(a)), or while under the influence of alcohol (§ 21-902(b)), or while under the influence of a drug, any combination of ¹⁵⁸ drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol (§ 21-902(c)). Appellant pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol (§ 21-902(b)) and was fined $250.00. On March 3, 1986, appellant filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County a petition for a writ of certiorari which alleged that the District Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it convicted him in 1982 because he was at no time advised of and therefore did not waive his right to a jury trial.

The Circuit Court issued the writ, which ordered the District Court to produce the record of the proceedings with regard to the 1982 conviction. The District Court produced the docket entries of the appellant’s 1982 conviction, but could not produce the audio tape of the proceedings because it had been destroyed. 1 The docket entries of the District Court did not, however, reflect whether the appellant had been advised of his right to a jury trial on the charges. After conducting a hearing, Circuit Court Judge Martin A. Wolff quashed the writ of certiorari, ruling that the District Court was vested with jurisdiction over the 1982 proceedings. We agree with his conclusion and affirm.

Appellant’s assertion that the District Court lacked jurisdiction is structured as follows. He posits that since he was charged with driving while intoxicated as well as with driving under the influence of alcohol, the District Court’s jurisdiction to conduct any proceedings on these charges was conditioned upon the court advising him that he was entitled to pray a jury trial on the charges. Had he demanded a jury trial, the charges of violating § 21-902(b) and § 21-902(c) would have been transferred to the Circuit Court for trial by jury along with the charge of driving ¹⁵⁹ while intoxicated (§ 21-902(a)), because the charge of driving while intoxicated provided for a possible penalty in excess of three months’ imprisonment. Md.Code (1974, 1981 Cum.

Supp.) § 4-302(e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article; Thompson v. State, 278 Md. 41, 46-47 , 359 A.2d 203 (1976). He then reasons that because the records of the proceedings on May 3, 1982, which were available 46 months later, failed to reveal that he was so advised, the court’s jurisdiction was not established and any proceedings which it conducted with regard to any of the charges pending against him were a nullity. We reject this rather novel proposition for two reasons. First, it ignores the distinction between the fundamental jurisdiction of a court—the power to act with regard to a subject matter which is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court, Pulley v. State, 287 Md. 406, 416 , 412 A.2d 1244 (1980), and the exercise by a court of its fundamental jurisdiction.

Second, it misconstrues the fundamental jurisdiction of the District Court to adjudicate a charge of a crime punishable by imprisonment in excess of three months. Because appellant was an adult over the age of sixteen charged with a violation of the vehicle laws, exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal charges pending against him was vested in the District Court by Maryland Code, supra, § 4-301(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. This jurisdiction was subject to 4-302(d) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article which provided in relevant part: (d) Jury trial.—(1) The District Court is deprived of jurisdiction if a defendant is entitled to and demands a jury trial at any time prior to trial in the District Court. (2)(i) Except as provided in