Snead v. State

ARTHUR, J. Pursuant to Md. Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2015 Supp.), § 8-301 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“C.P.”), a person convicted of a crime may file a petition for writ of actual innocence “if the person claims that there is newly discovered evidence that,” among other things, “creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result may have been different, as that standard has been judicially determined!.]” C.P. § 8-301(a)(1). Maynard Snead, a prisoner proceeding pro se, petitioned for a writ of actual innocence in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. On April 22, 2014, the court dismissed his petition without a hearing.

The court relied on this Court’s opinion in Keyes v. State, 215 Md.App. 660, 673 , 84 A.3d 141 cert. denied, 438 Md. 144 , 91 A.3d 614 (2014), which affirmed the dismissal ¹⁰² of a petition without a hearing where the newly-discovered evidence would merely have impeached the testimony of a witness for the prosecution. Snead appealed. While the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in State v. Hunt and Hardy, 443 Md. 238 , 116 A.3d 477 (2015). In that case, the Court of Appeals re-affirmed its decision in Douglas and Curtis v. State, 423 Md. 156 , 31 A.3d 250 (2011), that if a petition for a writ of actual innocence substantially complies with the relevant pleading requirements, a court may not deny the petition without a hearing.

In reaching its decision, the Court stated that, even after a hearing on the merits, a petition is not necessarily doomed because it relies on evidence that “merely impeaches” a witness, as opposed to evidence that directly exculpates a criminal defendant. See Hunt, 443 Md. at 260 , 116 A.3d 477 . In so doing, the Court implied that a court should not dismiss a petition because it cites evidence that “merely impeaches” a witness, but does not directly exculpate the defendant. See id.

Because the circuit court dismissed Snead’s petition on account of his failure to meet a standard that no longer appears to apply, we vacate the order that dismissed his petition and remand for further proceedings. Factual and Procedural Background A. Snead’s Convictions On December 22, 1998, a man pointed a semi-automatic handgun into a crowd of people standing at a bus stop on the 2400 block of East Fayette Street in Baltimore City. He feed several shots, hitting three persons. One of the victims, Timothy Thornton, recognized the shooter as someone he had previously seen in the neighborhood.

Later, Thornton positively identified Snead from a photo array as the shooter. Snead was charged with attempted murder and other offenses related to the incident. 1 He made a number of discov ¹⁰³ ery requests, including a motion to produce documents and a motion for disclosure of exculpatory oral communications. At trial, Thornton testified that Snead was the person who shot him. On May 25, 2000, a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City convicted Snead of assault in the first degree, openly carrying a handgun, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, possession of a regulated firearm by a person with a disqualifying conviction, and three counts of reckless endangerment.

The court sentenced Snead to an aggregate prison term of 35 years. This Court later affirmed his convictions in an unreported opinion. Snead v. State, No. 680, Sept. Term 2000 (filed May 7, 2001). The Court of Appeals denied a petition for certiorari.

In 2009, Snead petitioned for post-conviction relief. The circuit court denied that petition in 2012, and this Court denied his application for leave to appeal in 2013. 2 B. Snead’s Petition for Writ of Actual Innocence On April 1, 2014, Snead filed a petition for writ of actual innocence, proceeding pro se in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Snead claimed that he did not commit the crimes for which he was convicted and that there was newly-discovered evidence that created a substantial or significant possibility that the result of his trial would have been different had the evidence been discovered before his trial. Snead attached a set of documents as exhibits to his petition.

All but one of the documents are database entries 3 ¹⁰⁴ made by Detective Raymond Hunter of the Baltimore City Police Department. The reports document Detective Hunter’s investigation of the December 1998 shooting and, in particular, his conversations with the victim, Thornton, between February and October 1999. According to Detective Hunter’s reports, Thornton advised the detective on February 22, 1999, that the person who shot him “hangs at the corner of Collington and Jefferson streets” and wears “an army fatigue jacket.” One report states: On 25 Feb 1999 @ 1930 hrs, this detective spoke with the victim Timothy Thornton. Same advised this detective that he saw the person who shot him at the corner of Collington and Jefferson Street wearing a black sweat suit.

Same also provided this detective with the street name O.G. for the suspect.... Another report states that the detective received additional information from Thornton on February 27, 1999. According to Thornton, one Leroy Milton, a person who was present at the shooting but not one of the victims, told Thornton that the shooter had been arrested outside of a bar on the previous day. In his petition, Snead alleged that these reports came into his possession when they were accidentally included during discovery in connection with a separate prosecution “long after this case was adjudicated.” Snead alleged that he was incarcerated in February 1999, when the witnesses claimed to have seen the shooter, and thus he could not have been at either of the locations cited in the detective’s notes.

According to Snead, therefore, this evidence showed that Thornton and Milton identified someone other than Snead as the shooter. 4 ¹⁰⁵ Snead further alleged that, at his trial, Detective Hunter had testified that Thornton never informed him that he had spotted the person who shot him. Snead also alleged that, according to the detective, Thornton did not provide a description of the shooter’s appearance. Snead argued that the detective’s undisclosed reports were “exculpatory to the extent that they show [Snead] could not have been the shooter and/or that perjury was committed to gain th[e] conviction[.]” 5 C. Dismissal of Snead’s Petition The State did not file a response to Snead’s petition. On April 16, 2014, the circuit court issued an order stating that Snead’s petition failed to describe newly-discovered evidence.

The court concluded that “the newly discovered evidence alleged by the Petitioner has no ‘direct bearing on the merits of the trial under review,’ Keyes v. State, 215 Md.App. 660, 673 [ 84 A.3d 141 ] (2014), citing Jackson v. State, 164 Md.App. 679, 698 , 884 A.2d 694 (2005).” Consequently, the court dismissed Snead’s petition, without a hearing, pursuant to C.P. § 8-301(e)(2), for failure to assert grounds upon which the petition could be granted. On April 22, 2014, Snead noted a timely appeal from that order. Question Presented Snead’s appeal presents a single question: Did the circuit court err in dismissing the petition for writ of actual innocence without a hearing? 6 ¹⁰⁶ In concluding that the evidence described in Snead’s petition did not meet the standard for “newly discovered evidence,” the court relied on a line of cases that the Court of Appeals has since limited. In light of the Court’s opinion in State v. Hunt and Hardy, 443 Md. 238 , 116 A.3d 477 (2015), we vacate the circuit court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

Discussion A. Petition for Writ of Actual Innocence In criminal cases in a Maryland circuit court, a defendant may move for a new trial within ten days after a verdict. Md. Rule 4-331(a). After that ten-day period has passed, a court may “grant a new trial or other appropriate relief on the ground of newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence” within ten days after the verdict. Md. Rule 4-331(c).

Generally, a person must move for a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence within one year after the court’s imposition of sentence or after the date the court receives a mandate issued by the final appellate court to consider a direct appeal from the judgment, whichever is later. Md. Rule 4-331(c)(l). A petition for writ of actual innocence is a collateral, civil proceeding through which a criminal defendant may, at any time, challenge his or her conviction, sentence, or imprisonment. State v. Seward, 220 Md.App. 1, 16-17 , 102 A.3d 798 (2014), cert. granted, 441 Md. 666 , 109 A.3d 665 (2015).

The authorizing statute provides: Claims of newly discovered evidence (a) A person charged by indictment or criminal information with a crime triable in circuit court and convicted of that ¹⁰⁷ crime may, at any time, file a petition for writ of actual innocence in the circuit court for the county in which the conviction was imposed if the person claims that there is newly discovered evidence that: (1) creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result may have been different, as that standard has been judicially determined; and (2) could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Maryland Rule 4-331. C.P. § 8-301(a). An actual innocence petition must: “(1) be in writing; (2) state in detail the grounds on which the petition is based; (3) describe the newly discovered evidence; (4) contain or be accompanied by a request for hearing if a hearing is sought; and (5) distinguish the newly discovered evidence claimed in the petition” from evidence claimed in any prior petition for actual innocence. C.P. § 8-301(b).

For petitions filed on or after October 1, 2011, Rule 4-332 sets forth a number of additional substantive requirements. See Hunt, 443 Md. at 248-49 , 116 A.3d 477 . “The court may dismiss a petition without a hearing if the court finds that the petition fails to assert grounds on which relief may be granted.” C.P. § 8—301(e)(2); see Md. Rule 4-332(i)(l)(A) (providing that “the court may dismiss the petition if it finds as a matter of law that the petition fails to comply substantially with the requirements of [Rule 4—322(d) ] or otherwise fails to assert grounds on which relief may be granted”). If, however, the petition satisfies the requirements of section 8-301(b) and a hearing was requested, the court must hold a hearing. C.P. § 8—301(e)(1).

At a hearing on the merits, the petitioner bears the ultimate burden of proof. C.P. § 8-301(g). If the petitioner meets that burden, “the court may set aside the verdict, resentence, grant a new trial, or correct the sentence, as the court considers appropriate.” C.P. § 8—301(f)(1). In Douglas and Curtis v. State, 423 Md. 156, 165 , 31 A.3d 250 (2011), the Court of Appeals recognized that the denial of ¹⁰⁸ a petition for writ of actual innocence is an appealable final judgment.

In that consolidated case, the Court reviewed two petitions for writs of actual innocence that circuit courts had dismissed without a hearing. Construing the standard for dismissal expressed in section 8—301(e)(2), the Court explained that the statute requires only “that a petition ‘assert’ grounds for relief; it does not require the petitioner to satisfy the burden of proving those grounds in the papers submitted.” Id. at 179 , 31 A.3d 250 . In assessing whether a petition satisfies the pleading requirement, the circuit court must “determine whether the allegations could afford a petitioner relief, if those allegations would be proven at a hearing,” after viewing “the facts in the light most favorable to the petitioner and accepting all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the petition.” Id. at 180 , 31 A.3d 250 . Because the two petitioners in that case were both pro se inmates, the Court stated that a court should liberally construe their petitions.

See id. at 182-83 , 31 A.3d 250 (citing State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 298 , 999 A.2d 1050 (2010)). Applying that standard to Douglas’s petition, the Court held that Douglas adequately “alleged grounds that, if proven, could entitle him to relief.” Douglas, 423 Md. at 185 , 31 A.3d 250 . Douglas had made assertions, supported by a newspaper article published many years after his trial, that a ballistics expert had falsified his credentials at his trial and hundreds of other trials. “[V]iewing the inferences in the light most favorable to Douglas,” the Court held that “it could be that [this] evidence could not have been discovered within time to move for a new trial under Rule 4-331.” Id. at 186 , 31 A.3d 250 . Furthermore, the Court held that the “allegations assert a basis that the newly discovered evidence ‘creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result [of Douglas’s trial] may have been different.’ ” Id.

(quoting C.P. § 8-301(a)(l)). Accordingly, even though “it [did] not follow automatically that he [could] prove his claim” on the merits, the Court held that ¹⁰⁹ Douglas was entitled to a hearing on his petition. Douglas, 423 Md. at 186 , 31 A.3d 250 . 7 Douglas did not explicitly announce a standard of appellate review of decisions rejecting petitions for writs of actual innocence, but subsequent cases have established that the standard depends on whether the court denied the petition after a hearing on the merits or dismissed the petition without a hearing because of the insufficiency of the pleadings. If the circuit court denies the petition after a hearing, the appellate court reviews that decision for abuse of discretion.

See Ward v. State, 221 Md.App. 146, 156 , 108 A.3d 507 (2015); Yonga v. State, 221 Md.App. 45, 56 , 108 A.3d 448 cert. granted, 442 Md. 515 , 113 A.3d 624 (2015); Seward, 220 Md.App. at 25 , 102 A.3d 798 ; Jackson v. State, 216 Md.App. 347, 363 , 86 A.3d 97 cert. denied, 438 Md. 740 , 93 A.3d 289 (2014). On the