Snyder v. Cearfoss

Delaplaine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. These two actions of assumpsit were brought in the Circuit Court for Washington County by Mrs. Elva B. Snyder against Miss Augusta M. Cearfoss, surviving executrix of the estate of Jesse O. Snyder, deceased lawyer. One suit was filed by plaintiff as administratrix of the estate of her mother, Mrs. Malinda Summers; the other as administratrix of the estate of her aunt, Mrs. Mary A. Hughes. . The cases were removed to the Circuit Court for Frederick County, where they have been tried three times.

It was shown that in 1919 Abraham K. Snyder, of Clear Spring, suffered a paralytic stroke and was removed to the Laurel Sanitarium. While a patient there he made his mark to a deed of trust conveying his entire estate, valued at about $120,000, to Jesse O. Snyder, his attorney, to whom he was not related. In May, 1921, Abraham was adjudged by a sheriff’s jury ¹⁵⁵ in Prince George’s County to be mentally incompetent upon a petition filed by his brother Jacob; and the Court appointed Jacob’s son, Frederick H. Snyder, and Henry F. Wingert as the incompetent’s committee. The committee' sought to recover the estate from Jesse, who was administering the trust under the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court for Washington County, and the action was pending when Abraham died on January 1, 1922., His next of kin were his brother Jacob and two sisters, Mrs. Summers and Mrs. Hughes, who were living in Clear Spring; but in 1902 he had executed a will making Jesse the principal beneficiary.

The amount distributed to him was $88,564.85. Plaintiff’s son, Charles Harold Snyder, testified that on the day Abraham died Jesse called to see Mrs. Summers and Mrs. Hughes and promised that he would pay each one-third of the amount that he received from Abraham’s estate if she would not join with Jacob in any action he might take against him. Plaintiff alleged that, although they forebore from attacking the will, Jesse failed to comply with his promise. The first trial of these cases was held in 1945 before three judges and a jury.

The jury rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $29,521.62 in each case. Two of the judges, with one judge dissenting, granted a new trial on the ground that the evidence was not convincing. Plaintiff appealed from the order granting a new trial, but the appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Cearfoss, 186 Md., 360 , 46 A. 2d 607 .

The second trial was held in 1946 with Judge Clark, of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, presiding by assignment. At the close of the testimony the judge directed the jury to find verdicts in favor of defendant on the ground that the alleged contracts were indefinite and lacked consideration. Plaintiff again appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the judgments and granted a new trial. Snyder v. Cearfoss, 187 Md., 635 , 51 A. 2d 264 .

The third trial was held in 1947 with Judge Clark again presiding. This time the jury rendered verdicts ¹⁵⁶ in favor of defendant. Plaintiff now complains of five rulings on the evidence and certain portions of the. charge to the jury. First, she objects to the admission in evidence of her individual claim for $121,776.26 which she filed in 1941 against Jesse’s estate, and defendant’s letter refusing to pay it.

She contends that her individual claim and defendant’s letter rejecting it were not material, and merely revived defendant’s contention, which had already been rejected by the Court of Appeals, that plaintiff was barred by the testamentary statute from bringing suit in her representative capacity. This statute provides that if a claim shall be asserted against or exhibited to an administrator or executor in any form, and he shall refuse payment thereof in writing, such claim shall be forever barred, unless the creditor shall bring suit upon the same within nine months after such rejection. Code 1939, art. 93, secs. 112, 113. One of the grounds for defendant’s motion for directed verdicts at the second trial was that plaintiff was barred from recovery by the testamentary statute of limitations.

The result on the present appeal makes it unnecessary to pass on that defense now. When this evidence was admitted the court refused to rule, or to permit counsel to argue, that the evidence was a bar to the present suit, but stated that it would be regarded as irrelevant unless this court should decide to rule otherwise on appeal. It was admitted solely to enable defendant to raise that question in this court. We think this was an unusual procedure, but the case was fully and fairly presented to the jury on the law and the evidence.

No instruction of the court or argument of counsel gave the jury any opportunity to give effect to this evidence. Under the circumstances this evidence, whether relevant or not, was practically stricken out as soon as it was admitted and could not have been prejudicial to plaintiff or have played any part at all in the lower court. Second, she objects to the testimony of James Bernard Smith, an employee of Hoffman Coal Company, ¹⁵⁷ that, while he was employed as a rural mail carrier, he heard Abraham K. Snyder say at the store in Clear Spring that Jesse had made his money for him, and he wanted Jesse to have his money. The witness asserted that he had heard Abraham make this statement at least 20 or 25 times when “the boys around the store” tauntingly asked him what he was going to do with his money.

We reaffirm the rule announced by Judge Robinson in Griffith v. Diffenderffer, 50 Md. 466 , 482 that the declarations made by a testator as to his testamentary intentions prior to the execution of his will may be admitted in evidence either (1) to establish a charge of fraud or undue influence by showing that his will was contrary to his well settled convictions of what he thought was a just and proper disposition of his estate, or (2) to show that his will was consistent with his long cherished wishes. In this case the testimony was relevant to show that the testator understood the terms of the will and was satisfied with them. The testimony had probative value on the questions whether Mrs. Summers and Mrs. Hughes had an honest intention to prosecute litigation which they believed to be well founded, and whether such litigation would have been frivolous, vexatious or unlawful. It tended to show that Abraham’s intention was common knowledge, and corroborated to some extent the testimony of Mrs. Hughes at the trial of the caveat proceedings in the Orphans’ Court, hereafter referred to.

Snyder v. Snyder, 142 Md. 290 , 120 A. 710 . Third, she objects to the introduction of the deed executed by defendant on April 2, 1943. It appeared that Jesse O. Snyder, who died February 10, 1941, left a will giving the bulk of his estate to Miss Cearfoss, his secretary; The testator appointed his brother, William Firey Snyder, and Miss Cearfoss as his executors. His brother cpntemplated filing a caveat to the will; but on March 4, 1941, he and Miss Cearfoss entered into an agreement that he would not take any action to attack the will, and Miss Cearfoss would convey to him certain real and personal property.

On the same day ¹⁵⁸ Jesse’s will was admitted to probate. Both, executors qualified, but William Firey Snyder died in 1942. As Miss Cearfoss had not conveyed the property, William Firey Snyder’s widow, Elva B. Snyder, plaintiff in the instant suits, and their son entered suit for specific performance to compel Miss Cearfoss to carry out the compromise agreement; and on April 2, 1943, Miss Cearfoss executed two deeds, one conveying real estate in Maryland, the other conveying real estate in Franklin County, Pennsylvania. . On the same day Mrs. Snyder qualified as administratrix of the estates of her mother and aunt.

Thereupon she filed the instant suits. We find no error in the introduction of the deed, which contained a recital that all of the debts of the estate had been paid. We hold that recitals in a deed, while not evidence against strangers, are admissible against the parties to the deed and their privies. Wanex v. Hurst, Md., 53 A. 2d 38 ; Rhoades v. Bussinger, Md. 53 A. 2d 419, 422 .

Fourth, she objects to the transcript of certain testimony given by Mrs. Hughes at the trial of the caveat proceedings concerning Abraham’s will in the Orphans’ Court of Washington County in 1922. Mrs. Hughes testified in the Orphans’ Court (1) that Jesse read