Snyder v. Crabbs

Per Curiam. Appellee sued her brother’s estate to recover for the ²⁹ personal services she rendered to him during the last two years of his life. The trial judge, Macgill, C. J., found the fair and reasonable value of her services to be $25 per week. He gave judgment in her favor against the appellant for $2,425.

What follows is an excerpt from his opinion. “There is no dispute in this case that the plaintiff performed the services for which she has claimed compensation. Furthermore, this court finds that, despite the testimony of Mrs. Dorothy B. Snyder, the plaintiff was not paid for her services. In the judgment of this court, Mrs. Crabbs, Mr. Stansbury and other witnesses for the plaintiff were truthful and credible. From the evidence recited, it is clear that Mrs. Crabbs expected to be paid for her services and that the deceased acknowledged that she was entitled to compensation.

Even if it be assumed that the services rendered were to one of the family, the evidence overcomes the presumption that they were rendered gratuitously. It does not appear, however, that Mrs. Crabbs was a member of her brother Charles’ family within the meaning of the law because she was not part of the household of Charles and did not live under his roof until she was asked to go there to render services. See: Krug v. Mills, 159 Md. 670 , and Neudecker v. Leister, 132 Md. 571 . She paid no board and lodging while she was living with the Stansburys and she paid no board and lodging while she was living in the home of Charles.

In view of this it would not seem reasonable that she would leave the Stansbury home where she was able to make as much as twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per week from outside housecleaning and take up more arduous chores on the expectation and understanding that she would receive nothing, particularly, as it ap ³⁰ pears, she had no other source of income. This court believes that this case is covered by the decisions in Gill v. Staylor, 93 Md. 453 and Shaefer v. Hewes, 225 Md. 207 , and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover.” Appellant presents but one issue, namely, that Code (1971 Repl. Vol.), Art. 35, § 3 (the Dead Man’s Statute) commands the exclusion not only of the testimony of parties to the cause but also the testimony of third parties in respect of transactions with the deceased. We have held many times that this statute is an exception to the policy