Snyder v. Fulton

Bartol, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an .appeal by the plaintiff, who recovered a judgment below; and being dissatisfied therewith, asks for a reversal for-certain alleged errors in the ruling of the Superior Court, in refusing to grant his several prayers, and in tne instruction given to the jury. The suit is for the publication of an alleged libel, in “ The Baltimore American,” a newspaper of which the defendants arc editors, proprietors and publishers. The plaintiff’s occupation was selling newspapers and periodicals on the railway trains between Washington and Baltimore.

The alleged libel was contained in an article published, in “ The American,” the whole article was given in evidence. After stating that passengers passing through Baltimore from Washington, on their way to Philadelphia, had been, on several occasions, assaulted and beaten by ruffians, and that the repetition of ¹³³ swell outrages reflected discredit on the Police Department as well as on the Railroad Companies; it then refers to a particular instance in which such an outrage had been committed on a Mr. Clary, a passenger, at the President Street Depot, in' Baltimore, and commenting thereon, states that “ the object of this brutal outrage was to prevent Republican clerks, and others temporarily employed in Washington, from going to Philadelphia to vote;” then adds the following, which constitutes the libellous matter complained of by the plaintiff? and set out in the declaration : “A young man on the Washington train, who is engaged in selling papers, and who takes every occasion to insult Republican passengers, appears to have been in collusion with the ruffians. On approaching the city he went around to take a vote of the passengers, the object being evidently to spot the Republicans, that the assailants might know who were their friends and who their opponents. The scheme was successful, and on passing through the city, an ex-police officer of Washington pointed out the victims, who had unwittingly proclaimed their political! predilections in favor of Grant and Colfax.” The declaration alleges as special damage, that he lost his situation as newsboy in consequence of the publication, and also claims for general damages.

The defendants plead “that they did not commit the wrong alleged,” upon which issue was joined. After the evidence on both sides had been concluded, the Court below rejected the five prayers offered by the plaintiff, and instructed the jury as follows: “To entitle the plaintiff to recover in this action, the jury must find that the writing, set out in the declaration, was published by the defendants, of and concerning the plaintiff. But if they shall also find that at or just previous to the time of the said publication, the peace of the city was repeatedly disturbed, and the rights of private persons traveling on their own lawful business between Washington and Philadelphia, violently and unlawfully invaded and violated ¹³⁴ ■by evil doers, who were not arrested nor punished, as detailed in- the evidence, then it was the right and duty of the defendants, as publishers of a public newspaper, to publish the facts which came to their knowledge, constituting the said crime, and to comment thereon with such severity of rebuke as a flagrant breach of the peace deserves; and-such statement and comment, if fairly and bona fide made with a view to the public good, was a privileged communication, free from the legal presumption of malice which attends a libellous publication not privileged; and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. But, in order to entitle the defendants to a verdict upon the ground of privilege, the jury must find that they were actuated by proper motives, exercising reasonable prudence in the ascertainment of the facts, and had reasonable grounds to believe the statement made by them was true, and that they made the same without malicious motives.” “If, under these instructions, the jury shall find a verdict for the plaintiff, then they are at liberty to give compensatory damages for such injury as the plaintiff may have proved himself to have sustained; and if they find express malice on the part of the defendant, or the absence of good faith or reasonable prudence, then they may give such exemplary damages as they may think such a state of case justifies.” We think there was error in these instructions, both in respect to the nature and extent of privilege ascribed to the defendants, and in the rule of damages laid down for the jury.' There can be no doubt or question that the defamatory words set out in the declaration are, in themselves, libellous, and if published of and concerning the plaintiff, entitle him to maintain the action, unless the defendants are protected from liability by reason of some privilege accorded to them by the law.

To make defamatory words actionable per se, when they are written or published, it is not necessaiy that they should charge a party with a crime or offence which would subject him to indictment or ignominious punishment. There is a broad and just distinction, in this respect, between ¹³⁵ spoken words and words written or published. Chancellor Kent says, 1 Comm., 620: “ Expressions, which tend to render a man ridiculous, or degrade him in the esteem and opinion of the world, would be libellous if printed, though they would not be actionable if spoken. So, if they tend to injure his reputation and expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.” Tins proposition was laid down by Justice Bayley, in McGregor vs. Thwaites, 3 Barn. & Cres., 33.

It has been affirmed, in many other cases, some of which are cited in the notes in Kent’s Commentaries, above referred to, and was recognized and affirmed by the Supreme Court in White vs. Nicholls, 3 How., 266 . As was said by Justice Daniel, in the case last cited: “The principle of the law always implying injury, whoever the object or effect is the exposure of the accused to criminal punishment or to degradation in society.” The defamatory words here charged being per se actionable; the question arises, whether the publication comes within the class designated as privileged, so as to entitle the defendants to exemption from liability for the consequences, even though the charge prove to be untrue; provided they made it in good faith, believing it to be true, and had reasonable grounds for that belief, after exercising reasonable prudence in