Snyder v. Jones

Bartol, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. “Ann Jones, the wife of the appellee, and mother of the appellant, Virginia, was entitled to the income during her life of a legacy of $7000.00 under the will of Larkin Shipley, and the principal was to be distributed after her death, among her children. Mrs. Jones first married a brother of the appellee, by whom she had five children, of whom Virginia Snyder was one, and all of whom survived her, except William.” “In July, 1845, she married the appellee by whom she had two children, both of whom survived their mother, who died in 1869. At the time of the marriage between Mrs. Jones and the appellee, all her children were minors except Milton ; Virginia, the youngest, was then fourteen years of age.” Mrs. Jones owed some debts, contracted during her widowhood, which the income from her legacy, then In litigation, proved insufficient to pay, and they were paid by the appellee ; and he thenceforth insisted that her children by the first marriage were morally and justly hound to repay him the money he had thus expended. Tie accordingly adopted such measures as he thought expedient to secure it; and after the children ⁵⁵⁰ reached their majority, he obtained from them written due-bills, or obligations for what he estimated to be their several portions thereof, payable out of the legacy, after the death of their mother. .

The due-bill of Virginiá, the appellant, for the collection of which this proceeding was instituted, is as follows: “(Stamp 15 cts.) October 20th, 1852. “$214.34 “Due Joshua Jones or order, two hundred and fourteen dollars and thirty-four cents, to be paid out of my reversionary interest out of Ann Jones’ trust fund, in the name of Wayman & Stockett, trustees, after the said Ann Jones’ death ; for value received, with interest from date. “ Witness my hand and seal. “Virginia Jones, [Seal.]” • The money constituting the legacy aforesaid, being in the hands of a trustee, appointed under a decree of the Court of Chancery, who was about to distribute the same among the children of Ann Jones, deceased, the parties entitled thereto in remainder; the appellee filed his petition, praying that the trustee may be required to pay out of the distributive share due the appellants, the amount of Virginia’s due-bill, with interest thereon; or that he may he required to retain the same. The Circuit Court decreed in favor of the appellee, directing the trustee to pay out of the distributive share of Virginia, the sum of $214.34, with interest thereon from the 20th day of October, 1852; and from that decree this appeal has been taken. The question of jurisdiction has been raised by the appellants’ counsel, who have argued that the only remedy of the appellee is by a suit at law ; “the instrument not being an assignment, but merely a covenant to pay out of a particular fund.’’ We agree that such is ⁵⁵¹ the proper construction and effect of the instrument; it does not operate as an assignment; but being charged upon, or payable out of a particular fund over which the Court of Equity has jurisdiction, there can be no question of the power of that Court to entertain the claim of the appellee, and order it to be paid, out of the fund in the hands of the trustee ; provided it be established by proof, and be a valid and equitable claim. It is a contract to pay money, and in order to entitle the appellee to enforce it, it must appear to have been made upon a good and sufficient consideration.

We have stated that it was given to reimburse the appellee for money expended by him in paying certain debts due by his wife, contracted while she was a widow. The consideration is so stated by the appellee in his petition, wherein it is averred “ that the whole amount of such debts, at the time of the marriage was $3835.58, and after the appropriation of the proceeds of the legacy, and of all other moneys belonging to Mrs. Jones from other sources, amounting to $2968.21, the balance due by her amounted to $867.37, which said balance was paid by your petitioner out of his individual funds.” There being four children of Mrs. Jones by her first marriage, the appellee, considered himself entitled to exact repayment of one-fourth from each of them, and this constitutes the only consideration for the obligation now in question. It is obvious from the appellee’s own statement, that there was no valid consideration whatever to support the contract. The money paid by the appellee was paid in satisfaction of his own debts; being due by his wife before marriage they devolved upon him, and her children were in no manner bound to pay them, either in law or in morals.

It thus appears that the instrument of writing signed by the appellant, Yirgiuia, is a mere voluntary contract without consideration, which a Court of Equity will not enforce, even if it was free from objection on other accounts. ⁵⁵² The payment of Mrs. Jones’ debts by the appellee after their marriage, could not make her his debtor ; but if any such debt existed, it would not be a good consideration to support a promise by the appellant, Virginia, to pay it. It was decided in Wyman vs. Gray, 7 H. &. J., 409, that a promissory note given by one person, for a debt due by another, without any consideration moving to the party promising, is nudum pactum; and an action will not lie thereon as between the original parties to the note. In this case the iñstrument of writing is under seal, and purports on its face to be “for value received;” but a Court of Equity cannot be prevented by the form of the instrument, from inquiring into the real