Sollins v. Baltimore County

Hammond, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellants filed a bill alleging that they owned land improved by their dwelling on the northeast side of Seven Mile Lane between Smith Avenue and Midfield Road in Baltimore County, ⁴⁰⁹ that the County, pursuant to certain specified job orders and contracts, intends to widen Seven Mile Lane between Smith Avenue and Old Court Road, and that in the range between Smith Avenue and Midfield Road the plan is to acquire land for the widening entirely from the northeast side of Seven Mile Lane, leaving the land on the southwest side undisturbed. The bill alleged next that: “such taking and/or proposed taking of all of the land required for widening Seven Mile Lane solely from land lying on the northeast side thereof and, where Seven Mile Lane adjoins your orators’ land, solely from your orators’ land, without dividing the burden of such taking equitably between land on each side of Seven Mile Lane, is and will be and constitutes and will constitute arbitrary, capricious and illegal action by and on the part of Baltimore County * * Appellants’ bill prayed that the County be enjoined from acquiring or condemning any part of their land unless it takes the land needed for the widening “equitably from land lying on each side of Seven Mile Lane,” and that the County be enjoined from improving or widening Seven Mile Lane at all unless it takes the needed land from both sides. The County demurred on the grounds that complainants had an adequate remedy at law and that an injunction will not lie to control the exercise by administrative officials of delegated discretion, absent allegations of fact showing the exercise to be so arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive as to suggest bad faith.

Judge M enchine sustained the County’s demurrer without leave to amend on the ground that the appellants were premature in filing suit, there being no allegation that their lands have been taken or that condemnation proceedings have been instituted, and therefore no actual and justiciable controversy was present. We agree with Judge Menchine’s action although we support it on somewhat different grounds. It is apparent and conceded that Baltimore County has the power to condemn the land of the appellants for the widening of a road and it was established long ago that a court of equity will enjoin or interfere with a condemnation only if the proceed ⁴¹⁰ ings are void because the condemnor lacks constitutional or legal power to condemn the property in question. Baltimore & H. de G. Turnpike Co. v. Union R.R. Co., 35 Md. 224 ; Webster v. Susquehanna Pole Line Co., 112 Md. 416, 423-425 .

It is equally well established that where the condemnor has power to condemn the land in question, equity will remit a litigant seeking its aid in preventing or controlling the condemnation processes to the court of law in which the condemnation case has been or will be filed. The rationale is that a special procedure and remedy exists in a court of law to effectuate and supervise the exercise of the power of eminent domain, and it is the court of law to which has been granted this special power and duty, that can and should decide all questions that are raised concerning the condemnation. See Cumberland & Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 57 Md. 267, 274, citing Western Maryland R.R. Co. v. Patterson, 37 Md. 125, 135, 137 ; and New Central Coal Co v. George's Creek Coal & Iron Co., 37 Md. 537, 565-566 . In Turnpike Road v. Railroad Co., 81 Md. 247, 257-258 , the Court said: “It is held that where the law is constitutional, under which condemnation is sought, a Court of Equity has no power to arrest the proceedings by injunction; because a special tribunal is established for supervising the exercise of the right of eminent domain, to which alone the power has been granted to hear and determine all questions which can arise regarding the inquisition.” In accord are St. James Church v. B. & O. R.R. Co., 114 Md. 442, 450 , and Riden v. Phila., B. & W. R.R. Co., 182 Md. 336, 346 .

Compare Murphy v. State Roads Comm., 159 Md. 7, 19 , which answers the appellants’