Solomon v. Solomon

HARRELL, Judge. In 2000, Michael Solomon, Petitioner, and Nancy L. Solomon, Respondent, then husband and wife, initiated proceedings in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County seeking an absolute divorce, determinations as to child custody and support, and a resolution of the financial aspects of their marriage and divorce. The Circuit Court, among other things, examined the financial characteristics and lifestyle of the parties and identified and valued their marital property. Of particular relevance to the case before us, the Circuit Court, in August 2002, granted a marital award of $550,000 and $50,000 in attorney’s fees to Mrs. Solomon, and ordered Mr. Solomon to pay her $6,000 in monthly rehabilitative alimony for three years, to be followed by $5,000 in monthly indefinite alimony.

Mr. Solomon appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. Mrs. Solomon filed a cross-appeal. In an extensive unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s judgment in part and reversed in part. Both parties petitioned this Court to grant a writ of certiorari.

We granted both petitions. Solomon v. Solomon, 379 Md. 225 , 841 A.2d ¹⁸¹ 339 (2004). The following four questions are presented for our consideration. By Mr. Solomon: I. Whether the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals erred by failing to consider tax consequences as “immediate and specific” in this case.

II

Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in vacating the Circuit Court’s $5,000 monthly indefinite alimony award based on its determination that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount of the alimony award. By Mrs. Solomon: III. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred by failing to reverse the Circuit Court’s finding that there was no irrefutable evidence that Mr. Solomon dissipated his interest in OSI [Orthopedic Systems International, Inc.].

IV

Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in reversing the Circuit Court’s finding that Mr. Solomon’s country club membership is marital property, which has monetary value and can be part of the basis for the marital reward. I. A. The Solomons married on 26 May 1986. Three children were born during their marriage: John, Michael, and Hayden. 1 The Circuit Court ordered joint legal custody of the children as part of the divorce, with Mr. Solomon maintaining primary physical custody of John and Mrs. Solomon having primary physical custody of Hayden and Michael. Mr. Solomon also has a daughter from a previous marriage. 2 ¹⁸² At the time of the parties’ marriage, Mr. Solomon owned a home in Potomac, Maryland.

He had been a tax attorney with a law firm for ten years before the marriage, at an annual salary of almost $500,000. Prior to her marriage to Mr. Solomon, Mrs. Solomon completed three yéars of college, but did not obtain a degree. She lived with her parents during college and earned income sporadically in various administrative support positions. During the marriage, Mr. Solomon’s annual income grew steadily, reaching $1,050,000 in 2001.

Mrs. Solomon and Mr. Solomon agreed that Mrs. Solomon would not work during the marriage. With Mrs. Solomon at home and Mr. Solomon as the breadwinner, the Solomons enjoyed a relatively luxurious lifestyle — they purchased a home on eleven acres, employed a housekeeper, took frequent vacations, acquired an expansive wine collection, and sent their children to private school. Despite Mr. Solomon’s income, the parties lived beyond their means during the marriage and accumulated more than $2,000,000 in secured and unsecured debt. 3 At trial, Mr. Solomon was attempting to pay off this marital debt and professed that he would continue to do so. The Circuit Court valued the Solomons’ marital assets at a minimum of $1,364,217.55 4 in its Amended Opinion and Order of 20 August 2002. 5 Mr. Solomon held $959,217.55 of the ¹⁸³ marital property titled in his name.

His retirement accounts alone contained $445,731 of the marital assets. In comparison, Mrs. Solomon had only $10,000 of the marital property titled in her name. At trial, the Circuit Court found that Mr. Solomon was 49 years old with a guaranteed annual income of $1,050,000. Mrs. Solomon was 40 years old and not working outside the home.

The Circuit Court adopted an employment assessment supplied by a court-appointed expert that stated Mrs. Solomon had a reasonable earning capacity between $25,000 and $28,000 per year. Although she had not obtained employment as of the time of trial in this case, Mrs. Solomon, the Circuit Court held, had the “potential” to increase her earnings with additional education and work experience. Mr. Solomon managed several trusts for friends and clients prior to and at the time of trial. One trust in particular, that of Mr. Solomon’s social friend, Steve Goldstein, often lent money to Mr. Solomon, with Goldstein’s permission.

Mr. Solomon paid those loans back with interest. Mr. Solomon also managed several trusts for wealthy, longtime friend Marc Abramowitz, who also allowed Mr. Solomon to borrow money from these trusts. During the parties’ marriage, Mr. Solomon was involved in a business venture with Mr. Abramowitz, purchasing a minority interest in Orthopedic Systems International, Inc. (“OSI”) in 1992. In 1995, Mizuho, a Japanese corporation, purchased a majority interest 6 in OSI.

At that time, the minority shareholders, including Mr. Solomon and Mr. Abramowitz, were issued a “put” right which obligated Mizuho to buy out the ¹⁸⁴ minority shareholders for a price based on the fair market value of OSI at the time the “put” right was exercised. In 1999, the minority shareholders attempted to exercise their “puts,” but were unable to agree with Mizuho on a fair market value of OSI. The minority shareholders filed a complaint in California Superior Court to enforce their “put” rights on September 7, 2000. After court-ordered arbitration, an independent arbitrator valued OSI, on a “going concern” basis, at $82,144,101 on 15 May 2001.

Thus, under this valuation, Mr. Solomon’s 1.3188% interest would be worth $1,083,334. Other estimates of OSI’s value presented to the Circuit Court varied between $55,000,000 by a court appointed accountant to approximately $100,000,000 by PriceWaterhouseCooper. As a result, Mr. Solomon’s interest in OSI would have been valued between $725,340 and $1,300,000. In contrast, Mr. Solomon valued his shares of OSI in a March 2000 statement at $600,000.

The Circuit Court, however, did not resolve the value of Mr. Solomon’s OSI shares. Mr. Solomon conveyed his OSI shares to one of Mr. Abramowitz’s trusts in December 2000. In April of 2000, Mr. Solomon signed a $200,000 promissory note to the trust, using the proceeds to pay a $150,000 loan from 1997 from another of Mr. Abramowitz’s trusts and applied the remainder for his personal use. He pledged his interest in OSI as collateral for the April 2000 note, 7 but, in the event that he defaulted on the note, retained the right to any surplus from the sale of the stock after satisfying whatever might then be owed on the $200,000 obligation.

In June and September of 2000, Mr. Solomon failed to make two required interest payments of $5,062.50 each on the note. After the trust notified him of default, Mr. Solomon conveyed his shares of OSI to the trust on 29 December 2000 in accordance with the pledge agreement^ and in full satisfaction ¹⁸⁵ of the obligation. He also transferred all right, title, and interest in the shares, including the right to the surplus proceeds from a future sale of the stock. Mr. Solomon testified that he believed the value of his interest in OSI to be equal approximately to the debt amount at the time he transferred his OSI shares.

Using the independent arbitrator’s appraisal from the Mizuho/minority shareholder action in California, Mrs. Solomon’s expert witness, as part of her evidence regarding Mr. Solomon’s claimed dissipation of this asset, valued his now-forfeited interest in the eventual proceeds at $867,759. Prior to the marriage, Mr. Solomon applied for membership in the Congressional Country Club (“the Club”), generally regarded as a prestigious social and recreational organization. He was admitted as a “summer” member in 1980, and maintained this status for several years. Shortly after marrying Mrs. Solomon in 1987, he was granted full membership in the Club.

The entire Solomon family enjoyed use of the Club’s facilities. Mr. Solomon paid a $25,000 initiation fee to become a full member. At the time of trial, the initiation fee for a new, full member in the Club was $80,000. Additional facts will be supplied as necessary to our analysis of the issues.

B. In July and September of 2000, respectively, the Solomons initiated the present litigation by filing cross-complaints in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. In May and June of 2002, a four-day trial was held in the Circuit Court. On 20 August 2002, the Circuit Court issued its final judgment in an Amended Opinion and Order granting Mrs. Solomon a $550,000 marital property award, without any specific judgment ordering the sale or disbursement of the marital property titled in Mr. Solomon’s name. The Circuit Court also awarded Mrs. Solomon $6,000 in monthly rehabilitative alimony for three years.

After determining that the difference between Mr. Solomon and Mrs. Solomon’s lifestyle would ¹⁸⁶ remain unconscionably disparate after the expiration of the period of rehabilitative alimony, the Circuit Court ordered $5,000 in monthly indefinite alimony. Both parties filed post-judgment motions. On 28 October 2002, the Circuit Court denied Mr. Solomon’s motion and much of Mrs. Solomon’s, but did grant her partial relief. 8 On 5 November 2002, Mr. Solomon filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. He argued that the Circuit Court erred in calculating the value of the martial property because it failed to consider the tax consequences he would face in liquidating his retirement accounts in order to pay the marital property award.

Mr. Solomon also maintained that the trial court erred in concluding that Mr. Solomon’s membership in the Club was marital property valued at $80,000. Mrs. Solomon, in her cross-appeal, contended that the Circuit Court erred because the award of indefinite alimony was in an insufficient amount. She also claimed the Circuit Court incorrectly concluded that Mr. Solomon did not dissipate his interest in OSI while the divorce litigation was pending. In a lengthy unreported opinion, a sometimes shifting majority of the Court of Special Appeals’s panel affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court in part, and reversed in part.

The panel unanimously held that the Circuit Court acted within its discretion in not considering Mr. Solomon’s tax liabilities as an “other factor” under Family Law § 8-205(b)(ll). The panel agreed that the Circuit Court did not order a liquidation of the retirement account to satisfy the marital property award. Without such an order, Mr. Solomon had other methods of paying the marital award and, therefore, it was unnecessary for him to liquidate his retirement accounts. As a result, the tax liabilities of an unnecessary liquidation of the accounts were not “immediate and specific,” but rather would be “speculative.” The intermediate appellate ¹⁸⁷ court panel also agreed unanimously that the Circuit Court did not commit clear error in determining that there was insufficient evidence to persuade it that Mr. Solomon dissipated intentionally his interest in OSI.

Two members of the panel formed a majority to reverse the Circuit Court’s ruling that the country club membership was marital property worth $80,000 and directed that that amount be subtracted from the marital property valuation. A different two member majority concluded that the Circuit Court abused its discretion in setting the indefinite alimony amount. That majority found the alimony amount to be unconscionably inadequate and remanded the issue to the Circuit Court for reevaluation in accordance with its opinion.

II

A. Mr. Solomon contends that the Court of Special Appeals and the Circuit Court erred in determining the amount of the marital award because they refused to consider the tax consequences he would face in prematurely liquidating his retirement accounts in order to pay the $550,000 monetary award. He asserts that the courts were obliged to consider the tax liabilities as an “other factor” under Family Law Article, § 8-205(b)(ll) because the tax liabilities are immediate and specific. The consideration of tax liabilities as an “other factor” in determining monetary awards of marital property has not been addressed by this Court. We shall consider the decisions of the Court of Special Appeals and other jurisdictions on this issue in aid of resolving this question.

B. The Court of Special Appeals, in Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 64 Md.App. 487 , 497 A.2d 485 (1985), first considered tax liabilities as a possible factor in determining the amount of the marital property award. Rosenberg observed that tax liabili ¹⁸⁸ ties on a marital asset presented two inter-related problems. First, the value of a marital asset may be lessened by a tax liability. Id. at 512 , 497 A.2d at 497 .

Second, even if the value of a marital asset is not lessened by a tax liability, the equitable distribution of the property by the court may be affected by the tax liability. Id. at 523-26 , 497 A.2d at 503-505 . Interpreting § 3-6A-05 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code Article of the Md.Code, 9 Rosenberg held that value meant fair market value, or “the amount at which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller....” Id. at 525-26 , 497 A.2d at 504 (citation omitted). Thus, tax liabilities should not be taken into account in valuing property for a marital award.

Id. at 512, 527 , 497 A.2d at 497, 504 . Rather, as Rosenberg continued its analysis, tax liabilities may be properly considered as an “other factor” under § 3-6A-05(b)(9) 10 in the determination of the marital property award. Id. at 527, 497 A.2d at 504 . The Court of Special Appeals, relying on cases from both community and equitable property states, see supra, held that Mr. Rosenberg’s tax liabilities may be considered as an “other factor” in an equitable distribution of marital property only when they are “immediate and specific” or not “speculative.” Id. at 523-26, 497 A.2d at 503-505 .

Rosenberg held that tax liabilities for imputed interest on an interest-free loan that figured in the marital property award calculus was “immediate and specific.” Id. at 526 , 497 A.2d at ¹⁸⁹ 504. Mr. Rosenberg had loaned $150,000 interest free to Dorothy Bohny, the soon to be “new Mrs. Rosenberg,” prior to the divorce. Id. at 492 n. 2, 497 A.2d at 501 n. 2. Because the loan was made from marital assets, the interest payments that would have been paid if the loan was made in the normal course of business were imputed as part of the marital property.

Id. The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court, which had some of Mr. Rosenberg’s income tax returns in evidence before it, should consider the tax liabilities on these imputed interest payments on remand because they were “immediate and specific.” Id. at 526 , 497 A.2d at 504 . Rosenberg also held that future tax liabilities on the realization of retirement plan benefits and sales of assets to satisfy the marital property award were speculative and “need not be considered” on remand. Id. at 526 , 497 A. 2d at 504-505 .

Mr. Rosenberg claimed that he would incur tax liabilities on the gains from the sale of his assets to satisfy the marital property award of $1,520,00o. 11 He also asserted that he would pay deferred tax liabilities upon realization of his retirement plan benefits. These alleged tax liabilities, he claimed, were not considered as an “other factor” in determining the equitable distribution of the marital property. Id. at 523-24 , 497 A.2d at 503 . The Court of Special Appeals rejected Mr. Rosenberg’s claims after noting that, “[t]he basis for refusing to consider tax consequences is that they are too speculative— the rates may change, either by legislation or by tax bracket, and the income may be sheltered in any number of ways.” Id. at 525 , 497 A.2d at 504 .

Since Rosenberg was decided, the Court of Special Appeals has relied on the “immediate and specific” or “not speculative” standard as a litmus test for when it is appropriate to consider tax liabilities as an “other factor,” pursuant to Family Law ¹⁹⁰ Code § 8-205(b)(ll). Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md.App. 207, 238-40 , 752 A.2d 291, 308-309 (2000) (holding that appellant’s personal tax liabilities on future sales of property were speculative and possible tax liabilities facing the corporation in tax litigation with IRS were not “immediate and specific”); Skrabak v. Skrabak, 108 Md.App. 633, 657 , 673 A.2d 732, 743-44 (1996) (holding that trial court must account for tax liabilities that are “not too speculative”); Merriken v. Merriken, 87 Md.App. 522, 545 , 590 A.2d 566, 578 (1991) (observing that the trial court on remand must consider tax liabilities as an “other factor” if they are “more than merely speculative”); Quinn v. Quinn, 83 Md.App. 460, 473 , 575 A.2d 764, 770 (1990) (observing that if tax liabilities are discovered on remand, they should be considered if “more than merely speculative”); Williams v. Williams, 71 Md.App. 22, 37 , 523 A.2d 1025, 1032 (1987) (holding that if tax liabilities regarding the marital property award are presented on remand, they should be considered if not speculative). C. Rosenberg acknowledged that other equitable distribution jurisdictions appear to have resolved this issue differently. Oregon and New York adopted an “if, as and when” test. 12 See In the Matter of the Marriage of Rogers, 47 Or .App. 963, 615 P.2d 412, 413-14 (1980) (modifying equitable property distribution to recipient spouse to be reduced by one half of the taxes the paying spouse will incur upon distribution of the retirement account); Majauskas v. Majauskas, 94 A.D.2d 494 , 464 N.Y.S.2d 913, 915-16 (N.Y.App.Div.1983) (observing that the correct distribution of marital property in a pension account included distributing one half of the pension proceeds, when collected, after paying taxes).

Unlike New York, Oregon, and Maryland, Wisconsin statutory law explicitly requires ¹⁹¹ trial courts to consider tax liabilities in the equitable division of marital property. Selchert v. Selchert, 90 Wis.2d 1 , 280 N.W.2d 293 , 297 n. 6 (Ct.App.1979). Rosenberg also considered the views of the community property states of Arizona and California. These jurisdictions, in determining the value of the marital property for community distribution, preferred the “immediate and specific” test adopted by the Court of Special Appeals.

See Johnson v. Johnson, 131 Ariz. 38 , 638 P.2d 705 (1981) (en banc); In re Marriage of Marx, 97 Cal.App.3d 552 , 159 Cal.Rptr. 215 (1979). Normally, tax liabilities of retirement accounts are too speculative to consider because “tax rates change and that the [paying spouse’s] tax bracket would probably change after his retirement.” Johnson, 638 P.2d at 710 (citing Marx, 97 Cal.App.3d 552 , 159 Cal.Rptr. 215 ). The tax liabilities of a retirement account could be considered because, “it is conceivable that the future maturity date could be so close to the date of trial that the tax consequences could be determined and could qualify as “immediate and specific”.” Marx, 159 Cal.Rptr. at 220 n. 5. We adopt the standard and underlying reasoning in Rosenberg and hold that tax liabilities may be considered as “other factors” for purposes of distributing a marital property award, pursuant to Family Law § 8-205(b)(ll), only when they are “immediate and specific or not speculative.” For example, as in the present case, claimed tax liabilities associated with an uncompelled, premature liquidation of a retirement account to satisfy an undifferentiated lump sum marital award are more apt to be regarded as speculative and not “immediate and specific,” unless additional evidence in the record indicates otherwise.

See Marx; Johnson, supra. We now turn to Mr. Solomon’s arguments as to why his claimed tax liabilities are immediate and specific. D. Mr. Solomon looks first for context outside of Maryland. He cites numerous decisions where the paying spouse effec ¹⁹² tively was required to pay a marital property award from a retirement account and faced premature tax liabilities as a result. 13 See In re Marriage of Hogeland, 448 N.W.2d 678, 680-81 (Iowa Ct.App.1989) (holding that Iowa statutory law explicitly required the trial court to consider tax liabilities when allocating marital property in a dissolution of assets); Schuman v. Schuman, 265 Neb. 459 , 658 N.W.2d 30, 36-37 (2003) (holding that the trial court should not consider tax liabilities unless the court finds that sale of non-retirement property is “reasonably certain” to occur); Ford v. Ford, 105 Nev. 672 , 782 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1989) (per curiam) (holding that the trial court committed error by refusing to hear evidence of tax liabilities to recipient spouse when reversing alimony award); White v. White, 382 Pa.Super. 478 , 555 A.2d 1299, 1301 (1989) (holding that tax liabilities may be considered under a “reasonably predicted” standard); Dice v. Dice, 742 P.2d 205, 208 (Wyo.1987) (holding that “after tax cash value should be reflected in a divorce-decree division if an immediate cash payment is required” from a retirement account).

Furthermore, he argues that trial courts in other jurisdictions have refused to consider such tax liabilities only when the paying spouse either presented insufficient evidence that the sole source of funds for the award was the retirement account or did not allege that the retirement asset must be sold. See In re Marriage of Hayne, 334 N.W.2d 347, 353 (Iowa Ct.App.1983) (holding evaluation of tax liabilities within “sound discretion” of trial court and not required); Fechtor v. Fechtor, 26 Mass.App.Ct. 859 , 534 N.E.2d 1, 5-6 (1989) (holding that trial court’s order to apportion marital property should consider tax liabilities when properly presented to trial ¹⁹³ court); In re Marriage of Swanson, 220 Mont. 490 , 716 P.2d 219, 228 (1986) (holding that trial court’s refusal to consider tax consequences correct when paying spouse presented no evidence that the liquidation of the retirement account was required to satisfy marital property award); Gluck v. Gluck, 134 A.D.2d 237 , 520 N.Y.S.2d 581, 583 (N.Y.App.Div.1987) (holding that trial court properly refused to consider tax liabilities when amount is too speculative to determine); Smith v. Smith, 104 N.C.App. 788 , 411 S.E.2d 197, 198-99 (1991) (holding trial court’s failure to consider tax liabilities contrary to statute’s explicit requirement to do so not erroneous when tax consequences purely speculative); Bettinger v. Bettinger, 183 W.Va. 528 , 396 S.E.2d 709, 715-16 (1990) (holding that tax liabilities too speculative unless sale of tax-liable account actually occurs). Naturally, he distinguishes his situation from these latter cases because he alleged here that his retirement accounts must be sold and claims to have presented sufficient evidence at trial (and in a post-trial motion for reconsideration) to support this contention. We find the cases from other jurisdictions unpersuasive.

They differ from the present case either: (a) in their material factual predicates; (b) their results were governed by explicit statutory requirements requiring the trial court to consider tax consequences; or, (c) the courts embraced threshold tests allowing tax liabilities to be considered broader than we are prepared to adopt. Although his argument is expansive, Mr. Solomon’s asserted tax liabilities only could have been “immediate and specific” if he had no option other than to withdraw funds from his retirement accounts in order to pay the marital award. That is not the case on this record. The Circuit Court did not order Mr. Solomon to pay the marital property award from any specific source of funds, let alone his retirement accounts.

Because Mr. Solomon was not ordered to use money from his retirement funds to satisfy the marital award, we review, under the clearly erroneous standard, the trial court’s factual findings as to whether his financial situation nonetheless compelled him to do so. Md. Rule 8-131(c). ¹⁹⁴ Both the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals were persuaded that Mr. Solomon’s financial profile indicated that he had several other funding sources available. First, he had a yearly seven-figure income, which substantially exceeded the monetary award of $550,000. Second, Mr. Solomon had access to several proven lending sources from which he had borrowed significant sums of money in the past.

The trial court had before it Mr. Solomon’s debts and liabilities and weighed them as well as a factor in establishing the marital property award. It is not clear error for the Circuit Court to elect not to believe Mr. Solomon’s protests that he would be required to liquidate his retirement accounts to discharge the monetary award. The record before the Circuit Court supports the conclusion that Mr. Solomon was not required to withdraw funds from his retirement account in order to satisfy the martial award, and any tax liabilities he may face in choosing to do so are speculative, and not immediate and specific. The Circuit Court acted within its discretion in declining to consider Mr. Solomon’s speculative tax liabilities on the record before it.

In turn, the Court of Special Appeals was correct to affirm this aspect of the trial court’s judgment. 14 III. A. It is well settled in Maryland that the “statutory scheme generally favors fixed-term or so-called rehabilitative alimony,” rather than indefinite alimony. Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 391 , 614 A.2d 590, 596 (1992), see also Turrisi v. Sanzaro, 308 Md. 515, 524-25 , 520 A.2d 1080, 1085 (1987). Underlying Maryland’s statutory preference is the conviction ¹⁹⁵ that “the purpose of alimony is not to provide a lifetime pension, but where practicable to ease the transition for the parties from the joint married state to their new status as single people living apart and independently.” Tracey, 328 Md. at 391 , 614 A.2d at 596 (citing the 1980 Report of the Governor’s Commission on Domestic Relations Laws, at 4, hereinafter “1980 Report”).

Nonetheless, rehabilitative alimony alone may not be appropriate in every case. Id. at 391 , 614 A.2d at 594 (citing Turrisi, 308 Md. at 525 , 520 A.2d at 1085 ). In its determination of whether an award of alimony is appropriate, the trial court must consider “all of the factors necessary for a fair and equitable award” set forth in section ll-106(b) of the Family Law Article. 15 Section ll-106(c) ¹⁹⁶ further allows a trial court to order indefinite alimony if the court finds that: (1) due to age, illness, infirmity, or disability, the party seeking alimony cannot reasonably be expected to make substantial progress toward becoming self-supporting; or (2) even after the party seeking alimony will have made as much progress toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably be expected, the respective standards of living of the parties will be unconscionably disparate. The statute places strict limits on a trial court’s ability to grant indefinite alimony and requires a comprehensive case-by-case analysis.

It follows that, after a determination by the trial court that the respective standards of living are unconscionably disparate, the amount of the award of indefinite alimony must relieve the unconscionably disparate condition. The determination of whether an unconscionable disparity exists, according to section ll-106(c) of the Family Law Article, is a finding of fact, reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. See Md. Rule 8-131 (c). “An alimony award will not be disturbed upon appellate review unless the trial judge’s discretion was arbitrarily used or the judgment below was clearly wrong.” Tracey, 328 Md. at 385 , 614 A.2d at 593 . We review the amount of the alimony itself under an abuse of discretion standard.

See Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 74 , 646 A.2d 413, 425 (1994). Thus, absent evidence of an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s judgment ordinarily will not be disturbed on appeal. B. Mr. Solomon contends that the Court of Special Appeal’s majority erred in vacating the Circuit Court’s indefinite alimo ¹⁹⁷ ny award on the ground that the amount was insufficient. He asserts that the Circuit Court’s ruling was reasonable and there is no evidence of an abuse of discretion, especially considering the “wide discretion” given the trial judge “in rendering alimony awards.” Mr. Solomon suggests that the Court of Special Appeals abused its discretion in vacating the judgment of the Circuit Court.

It should have shown greater deference to the Circuit Court’s decision, rather than trying to “substitute its judgment for that of the court that actually heard the testimony and had the opportunity to consider the entire record absent clear error.” Mr. Solomon also asserts that the factual analysis conducted by the Court of Special Appeals was faulty and incomplete. Mrs. Solomon, on the