Solorzano v. State

RAKER, J. The issue in this case is whether the Circuit Court imposed an illegal sentence because the sentence was not in accord with the plea agreement. Fausto Ediburto Solorzano, appellant, appeals from the Circuit Court’s denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence for attempted first degree murder on the grounds that the sentence did not conform to the plea agreement. We shall hold that the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County imposed an illegal sentence because the sentence exceeded the terms of appellant’s plea agreement. ⁶⁶⁴ I. Appellant was indicted by the Grand Jury for Prince George’s County for attempted first degree murder, first degree assault, second degree assault, and two counts of carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent to injure an individual in an unlawful manner. He reached a plea agreement with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty to attempted first degree murder.

In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment and to recommend to the trial court that the sentence not be greater than the upper limit of the recommended range established by the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines. It is the terms of the agreement which are at issue in this appeal. The plea proceeding took place before the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. The State explained the terms of the plea agreement to the trial court as follows: “Again, Your Honor, now that the defendant is present in the courtroom, State’s understanding is the defendant is going to enter a plea to Count One, attempted murder.

Free to alloeute. The State will bind itself to the top of the guidelines, which is believed to be twelve to twenty years.” The court informed appellant that he was waiving his right to a jury trial, his right to challenge the form of the indictment, the admissibility of evidence, and the automatic right to appeal by pleading guilty. The State provided a factual basis upon which to accept the plea, followed by a colloquy between the court and appellant: “THE COURT: You’ve heard the negotiations between the State’s Attorney and your attorney, and that is that you enter a plea of guilty to Count One in this case, which is attempted murder, that we are going to order a presentence investigation to determine your background and any history of criminal involvements or convictions, that at the time of sentencing both sides are free to alloeute for what they believe may be an appropriate sentence on your behalf, that the State has agreed to cap its recommendation to what we call the top of the guidelines. ⁶⁶⁵ Do you know what the sentencing guidelines are, sir? [APPELLANT]: Yes. THE COURT: Okay.

And you understand that the State and your attorney believe that those guidelines are somewhere between twelve and twenty years, but we’re not sure, which is why we’re ordering a pre-sentence investigation. But if it turns out to be twelve to twenty years, the State is free to ask for up to twenty years, and you could receive up to twenty years. Do you understand that, sir? [APPELLANT]: Yes. THE COURT: If your sentencing guidelines come back to be greater than either what the State’s Attorney or your attorney anticipated and the top of the guidelines would be higher, you could, in fact, receive a greater sentence than twenty years.

Do you understand that, sir? [APPELLANT]: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. Do you still wish to enter a plea of guilty in this matter? [APPELLANT]: Yes. THE COURT: The Court finds that the State has provided an adequate factual basis for me to accept Mr. Solorzano’s plea of guilty to attempted murder, and I find that his plea of guilty is freely, voluntarily and understanding^ made.

Accept his plea and in fact find him guilty of one count of attempted murder.” The court ordered a pre-sentence report and the sentencing guidelines indicated in the report were twelve to twenty years incarceration. At sentencing, the court engaged in the following dialogue: “THE COURT: You recall the negotiations about your plea of guilty with the State and [your former defense counsel].[ 1 ] ⁶⁶⁶ [APPELLANT]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And those were that the State was free to allocute for up to twenty years in jail if you had no prior record of convictions; do you recall that? [APPELLANT]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And you recall, however, that the State was not bound to that agreement? [APPELLANT]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And you understand, therefore, that you could receive up to life—a term of life imprisonment? [APPELLANT]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: You were aware of that on the last occasion as well, sir? [APPELLANT]: No, sir. THE COURT: You were not? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I was not aware of that. What he explained to me, Your Honor, he thought there was an agreement, and I saw what was in the file where there was an offer, I think, and there was nothing in there that indicated the completed agreement.

He understood that there was an agreement that the parties would allocute within the sentencing range between twelve and twenty years, he thought there was an agreement the State would not ask for more than twenty. [THE STATE]: I believe you said the State was not bound to it, when I think you meant the Court wasn’t bound to it. The State has agreed to cap at twenty years, which is what the agreement was. THE COURT: I didn’t know if you were aware, [defense counsel], because of being new counsel, so I just wanted to make sure that everything was clear. The State has agreed not to recommend more than twenty years in this case but the Court is not bound to that recommendation and could in fact sentence up to life in prison.

You are aware of that? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes. THE COURT: And you are aware of that, sir, as well? ⁶⁶⁷ [APPELLANT]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Okay. We can proceed.

Thank you.” The court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment, with all but fifty years suspended. Appellant filed a timely motion to correct an illegal sentence, seeking specific performance of the plea agreement, and a motion to vacate his guilty plea. The court denied both motions. Appellant noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

We granted certiorari on our own initiative prior to decision by that court. Solorzano v. State, 396 Md. 11 , 912 A.2d 647 (2006).

II

Before this Court, appellant argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court was an illegal sentence because it was not in accordance with the terms of his plea agreement. The State argues that the sentence conformed to the plea agreement and was a legal sentence because the court did not bind itself to a sentence of twelve to twenty years incarceration at the plea proceeding. In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 , 92 S.Ct. 495 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), the Supreme Court noted two options available to a defendant who has not received the benefit of a plea bargain. The defendant can either (1) have the bargain specifically enforced, or (2) withdraw his plea of guilty.

Id. at 263 , 92 S.Ct. at 499 . Since Santobello , the rule is that “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Id. at 262 , 92 S.Ct. at 499 . This principle is based upon the Due Process Clause and the recognition that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09 , 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546-47 , 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 , 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711-12 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).

See also Metheny v. State, 359 Md. 576, 601 , 755 A.2d 1088, 1102 (2000); Miller v. State, 272 Md. 249, 255 , 322 A.2d 527, 530 (1974). Thus, when either the prosecution breaches its ⁶⁶⁸ promise with respect to a plea agreement, or the court breaches a plea agreement that it agreed to abide by, the defendant is entitled to relief. Mabry, 467 U.S. at 509 , 104 S.Ct. at 2547 ; Miller, 272 Md. at 255 , 322 A.2d at 530 . Since Santobello , we have held that where the plea agreement is breached, and it was not caused by the defendant, the general remedy for the breach is to permit the defendant to choose either specific performance or withdrawal of the plea.

Tweedy v. State, 380 Md. 475, 488 , 845 A.2d 1215,1222 (2004); Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 259, 278 , 747 A.2d 1199, 1209 (2000); Miller, 272 Md. at 255 , 322 A.2d at 530 . Whether a trial court has violated the terms of a plea agreement is a question of law which we review de novo. Tweedy, 380 Md. at 482 , 845 A.2d at 1219 . We construe the terms of a plea agreement according to the reasonable understanding of the defendant when he pled guilty.

Id. See also United States v. Scott, 469 F.3d 1335, 1338 (10th Cir.2006); United States v. Farias, 469 F.3d 393 , 397 n. 4 (5th Cir.2006); United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1305 (11th Cir.2006); United States v. Cimino, 381 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir.2003); State v. Bethel, 110 Ohio St.3d 416 , 854 N.E.2d 150, 167 (2006); State v. Bisson, 156 Wash.2d 507 , 130 P.3d 820, 830 (2006). Because plea bargains are similar to contracts, “contract principles should generally guide the determination of the proper remedy of a broken plea agreement.” State v. Parker, 334 Md. 576, 604 , 640 A.2d 1104, 1118 (1994). Contract principles alone, however, are not enough to resolve disputes over the proper interpretation of a plea bargain.

See Jackson, 358 Md. at 275 , 747 A.2d at 1207 . Due process concerns for fairness and the adequacy of procedural safeguards guide any interpretation of a court approved plea agreement. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261-62 , 92 S.Ct. at 498-99 . The trial court may accept a guilty plea only after it determines, upon an examination of the defendant on the record in open court, that (1) the defendant is pleading ⁶⁶⁹ voluntarily, with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea, and (2) that there is a factual basis for the plea.

Rule 4-242(c). Rule 4-243 sets forth the procedures to be followed when the State and a defendant have entered into a plea agreement. The Rule states, in pertinent part, as follows: “(c) Agreements of sentence, disposition, or other judicial action. (1) Presentation to the court.

If a plea agreement has been reached pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(F) of this Rule for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere which contemplates a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action, the defense counsel and the State’s Attorney shall advise the judge of the terms of the agreement when the defendant pleads. The judge may then accept or reject the plea and, if accepted, may approve the agreement or defer decision as to its approval or rejection until after such pre-sentence proceedings and investigation as the judge directs. (2) Not binding on the court. The agreement of the State’s Attorney relating to a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action is not binding on the court unless the judge to whom the agreement