Somers v. McCready

Jones, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellants here filed in the Orphans’ Court of Baltimore City a caveat against the probate of the will of James W. McCready, who died in that city April 15th, 1900. Upon this caveat issues were framed and sent to the Superior Court of Baltimore City for trial. This appeal brings up for review certain rulings of the trial Court made in the course of such trial.

The issues were four in number. The first involved the factum of the will; the second the knowledge of the testator of the contents of the will at or before its execution ; the third uhdue influence exercised upon the testator in procuring the will and the fourth testamentary capacity. At the trial nine exceptions were taken to rulings upon objections to testimony offered on the part of the appellants and refused admission by the Court. At the close of the testimony the trial court directed a verdict, upon each and every issue, to be returned by the jury against the contention made by the caveators.

The tenth and last exception in the record was taken to this ruling. Though this exception embraces the rulings upon all of the instructions granted by the Court below the only one of them that we are concerned with here is that which respects the issue involving the question of undue influence in procuring the will in question. All the others have been, not expressly, but practically abandoned by the caveators (appellants) in presenting the case in this Court. As to the issue last mentioned the trial court ruled “ that there is no evidence in this case legally sufficient to show that” the ⁴³⁹ will involved in this controversy, “was procured by undue influence exercised and practiced upon” the testator and directed a verdict accordingly for the caveatee (appellee here.) All the exceptions bringing up rulings upon questions of evidence relate to testimony offered by the appellants as being relevant to this issue.

Without having reference now to the evidence' made the subject of these exceptions, and following the order of inquiry of the appellants’ brief, the instruction of the Court relating to the issue in respect to undue influence will be first examined in the light of the “admitted evidence.” The inquiry as to this is was the trial Court right in ruling that the evidence was not legally sufficient to show that the will in controversy “was procured by undue influence exercised and practiced upon” the testator. What is undue influence, or the influence, that a testator must be shown to have been subjected to in executing a will, that will vitiate and avoid it, has been defined by this Court in a number of, and in some recent, cases. In the case of Hiss v. Weik, 78 Md. 439 , it is said “undue influence is that degree of importunity which deprives a testator of his free' agency, which is such as he is too weak to resist, and will render the instrument executed under its influence not his free and unconstrained act.” An instruction to the jury granted in that case by the Court below and affirmed by this Court was to the effect and in language as follows: “The influence which will avoid the will of a testator must have been exerted on the testator to such a degree as to have amounted to force and coercion destroying his free agency or by importunities that could not be resisted, so that the motive was equal to force or fear; it must not have been the influence of affection or attachment, or the mere desire to gratify the wishes of another, for that would be a very strong ground in favor of a testamentary act; and the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff * * to show not only that such influence existed, but that it was exerted for the purpose of procuring the execution of the will * * and that the same was obtained by means of the undue influence so exerted.” To the same effect in ⁴⁴⁰ defining undue influence is the case of Grove v. Spiker, 72 Md. 300 . In Schouler on Wills it is said “undue influence is defined as that which compels the testator to do that which is against his will, from fear, the desire of peace, or some feeling which he is unable to resist.

We say that the influence must be undue, in order to vitiate the instrument, because influences of one kind or another surround every human being and operate necessarily in determining his course of conduct under every relation of life.” And again, “to invalidate a will on the ground of fraud, compulsion or undue influence, such conduct must be of such a character as to destroy the testator’s free agency, and substitute for his own another person’s will;” see secs. 227 and 229. Further in sec. 232 it is said “the constraint or fraud or undue influence necessary to set aside a will must be a present constraint, fraud or undue influence operating on the testator’s mind in the very act of making the will.” What the learned author states as the result of all of the authorities as to the character of the influence which in law will avoid a testamentary act is in accord with what has been laid down, as we have seen, in our own decisions. From what thus appears to be the rule of law by which we are to be guided in the inquiry as to the sufficiency of evidence to support a charge of undue influence in the procuring of a will it is not sufficient to condemn and avoid the will to find that there was influence which affected the testator’s disposition of his property ; but it must be, to vitiate his act, such influence as, at the time he was making such disposition, dominated his will, took away his free agency and prevented the exercise of judgment and choice by him. There may have been advice, suggestion or importunity going to affect his purpose and his act in the disposition he chooses to make ; yet if he had testamentary capacity and was free and unconstrained in his volition at the time of making his will the influence that may have inspired it or any of its provisions will not be that influence which the law denounces as undue.

The inquiry to be made in any given case goes to the effect of the influence in bringing about the testamentary act, and how the effect ⁴⁴¹ was produced ; and includes first, the existence of the influence ; second, the opportunity for it to be exerted ; and third, its actual exercise or operation to the extent and in such a way as to make the act in question the product of tile influence uncontrolled by and irrespective of, any volition on the part of the testator. We may now examine the evidence in this case in respect to the inquiry before us. Was there evidence legally sufficient to be submitted to the jury upon the issue that proposed the question whether the will of James W. McCready “ was procured by undue influence exercised and practiced upon him.” This may be briefly done dealing with the nature and purport of the evidence rather than with its details. This Court has said, and repeated, that on a question depending, as this does, entirely upon the evidence “ no good result can possibly arise from a recapitulation of the evidence.

It is enough for the Court to announce the conclusion it arrives at.” Stirling v. Stirling, 64 Md. 138 ; Moore v. McDonald, 68 Md. 321 ; Hiss v. Weik, 78 Md. 439 . Here, however, brief reference to the evidence may be appropriate. There was no testimony at all offered by the caveatee (appellee). All of the evidence produced was offered on the part of the caveators; and as respects the question of its legal sufficiency it must be assumed to be true.

The inquiry is whether any of it shows, or tends, by any legitimate inference, to show, the fact of influence exerted by anybody upon the testator to the extent that it was, by dominating his mind and will, the procuring cause of the testamentary disposition he made. There is nowhere in the record any positive or affirmative proof going directly to the fact of the existence of any special or peculiar influence by anybody over the testátor at any time. The three persons who are sought to be connected by the evidence with the procuring of the will are the appellee, a sister of the deceased wife of the testator, and a nephew, all of whom are beneficiaries under the will. The only facts shown in this connection as respects the two last mentioned persons are that they are beneficiaries under the will and were ⁴⁴² of the household of the testator at the time of the making of the will and during his last illness — together with the further fact that during this illness relatives of t-he testator who called to see him and inquire for him were denied admittance to his sick room upon the ground