Southern Management Corp. v. Taha

HOLLANDER, Judge. In this case, we must consider whether a jury’s verdict finding a corporate employer liable for malicious prosecution is fatally inconsistent with its verdict exonerating two corporate employees. The appeal arises from a suit filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County by Mukhtar Taha, appellee, against his former employer, Southern Management Corporation (“Southern”), appellant, and two former co-employees, Deborah Wylie-Forth and Michael McGovern, 1 following ⁷⁰³ Taha’s discharge from his position at Southern. Taha claimed, inter alia, that Southern and the two individual employees committed the tort of malicious prosecution by filing unfounded burglary charges against him.

The jury found in favor of the individual employees but against Southern. After the court denied appellant’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (“JNOV”), this appeal followed. 2 Southern presents four questions for our consideration, which we have rephrased slightly: I. Because the jury found that Southern’s agents were not liable for the tort of malicious prosecution, did the circuit court err in denying Southern’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict as to the claim for malicious prosecution?

II

Did the circuit court err in refusing to instruct the jury that it must find actual malice in order to award punitive damages?

III

Did the circuit court err in denying Southern’s motion to strike punitive damages because there was no evidence of actual malice in the record to support the award?

IV

Did the circuit court err in denying Southern’s motion for remittitur as to the jury’s award of $25,000 for economic damages, because appellee sustained only $500 in such damages? For the reasons that follow, we answer question I in the affirmative. Therefore, we shall reverse the judgment. Accordingly, we need not answer the remaining questions.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND Taha is a black male who emigrated to the United States in 1981 from Africa. On May 15, 1994, Southern hired Taha to ⁷⁰⁴ work as a Maintenance Technician at Silver Spring Towers (“SST”), an apartment complex managed by Southern. Taha’s duties included attending to service calls and undertaking repairs and renovations. After five months of employment, Southern terminated Taha on October 19, 1994.

Six days later, on October 25, 1994, Taha was arrested at his apartment in the presence of his family. Taha’s daughter was “devastated” and “fell on the floor crying.” Taha’s wife was also crying. The charging documents alleged a second degree attempted burglary of Southern’s maintenance shop on October 4, 1994, and a fourth degree burglary of a Southern storehouse on October 8, 1994. The dismissal of the charges against Taha gave rise to the civil suit filed by him on March 3, 1999, against Southern, McGovern, and Wylie-Forth, alleging wrongful discharge, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, false imprisonment, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Southern and the two individual defendants were all represented by the same legal counsel. Prior to trial, by order dated May 27,1999, the circuit court dismissed all but two of Taha’s claims. At the close of Taha’s case, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of the defense as to the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, leaving only the claim for malicious prosecution. 3 What follows is a summary of the evidence adduced at trial relevant to the malicious prosecution claim. While at SST, Taha worked under the supervision of McGovern, who managed the maintenance employees at the complex.

McGovern was the only white employee at SST among 30 or more employees. McGovern reported to Wylie-Forth, a black female who was the Property Manager of the apartment complex. McGovern and Wylie Forth had worked together for over 10 years. ⁷⁰⁵ Taha alleged that he was implicated in two burglaries at Southern because of his poor working relationship with McGovern and Wylie-Forth. He claimed that within several weeks after he began working at SST, McGovern and Wylie-Forth were unhappy with his job performance and indicated that he needed to be more of a “team player.” Wylie-Forth also disliked Taha’s abrasive conduct and advised Taha that he needed to cooperate with the other employees.

Taha believed, however, that his job performance was adequate, and felt that he had been criticized unfairly because McGovern and Wylie-Forth did not like him. At trial, Taha recounted that McGovern complained to Wylie-Forth “[ajlmost every day” about Taha’s performance. Taha also stated that McGovern singled him out and complained about “the smallest stuff,” such as the length of his hair. Additionally, Taha testified that McGovern made derogatory remarks to him about Africans and African-Americans, describing them as “lazy” and “stupid.” According to Taha, McGovern once “took off his shirt, rolled it off and throw [sic] it on my face.

He said to me, ‘Do you want to be a supervisor?’ and he gave me—he throw his shirt on my face like that.” Further, Taha believed that McGovern and other employees, including Wilfredo Martinez, purposely attempted to injure him by letting go of a heavy barrel that they were attempting to move. Taha testified that on three or four occasions he complained to Wylie-Forth about McGovern’s racial comments. According to Taha, Wylie-Forth was unresponsive and told him that he complained “like a child.” When Taha told Wylie-Forth about the shirt incident, she remarked: “Mike have short temper [sic]. Just bear with him, and as soon as you finish your training period, you are going to be transferred and you are going to be okay.” On or about October 5, 1994, McGovern sent a memorandum to Wylie-Forth implicating Taha in an attempted burglary of one of Southern’s maintenance shops.

The memorandum said: ⁷⁰⁶ DEAR DEBRA [sic]: THIS LETTER IS WRITTEN TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION AN INCIDENT RELAYED TO ME BY ONE OF THE MAINTENANCE WORKERS, WILFREDO [MARTINEZ]. WILFREDO REPORTED TO ME THAT WHILE WALKING TO HIS CAR HE OBSERVED TAHA TRYING TO BREAK INTO THE MAINTENANCE SHOP ON OCTOBER 4, 1994 AT APPROXIMATELY 8:30 PM. WILFREDO OBSERVED TAHA SHAKING AND PULLING ON THE LOCK AFTER HIS KEY DID NOT OPEN THE DOOR. WHEN WILFREDO ASKED “WHAT ARE YOU DOING HERE?”, TAHA REPLIED “I DO NOT HAVE THE KEY TO THIS DOOR”.

WILFREDO SHARED THIS SCENARIO WITH ME BECAUSE OF HIS CONCERN THAT RECENTLY A MULTITUDE OF MATERIALS HAVE DISAPPEARED FROM THE MAINTENANCE SHOP AND COULD NOT BE ACCOUNTED FOR. THIS IS NOT ONLY A CONCERN OF WILFREDO’S BUT HAS BEEN AN ONGOING CONCERN OF ALL MAINTENANCE WORKERS. WILFREDO COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY TAHA WOULD BE INTENT UPON ENTERING THE MAINTENANCE SHOP WHILE ON MEDICAL LEAVE. WILFREDO THEN LEFT THE SCENE AND REPORTED THE INCIDENT TO ME THE NEXT MORNING.

A few days later, Wylie-Forth learned that property had been removed from a locked storage area containing Southern’s maintenance supplies and tools. Consequently, she called the Montgomery County Police Department to report the missing property. At trial, Wylie-Forth testified as an adverse witness and also in the defense case. When asked if she had called the police to report the missing property, Wylie-Forth initially said: “No. Someone in my office called the police.” When asked again, she replied: “I can’t remember.” When asked a third time, Wylie-Forth admitted: “Yes, I called the police.” Later, she said: “I did not call the police on Mr. Taha.” In ⁷⁰⁷ response to a question from her lawyer, Wylie-Forth explained: “[I]n my business anytime you have any type of an incident where something is stolen ... or broken into, you are supposed to call ... the ... police.” On October 23, 1994, Robert Grims, a Montgomery County Police Officer, responded to the call about missing property.

Although Wylie-Forth advised him that several expensive tools were missing, she did not identify any suspects. Nevertheless, in response to Grims’s inquiry, Wylie-Forth identified Taha as an employee who had recently been terminated, and said that two of her maintenance workers reported that Taha had been seen at SST. She also informed Grims that she and Taha had argued after his termination. Additionally, Wylie-Forth gave permission to Grims to talk to any of Southern’s employees about the matter.

Grims spoke to McGovern, who informed Grims that his tools were missing from the storage room. Although McGovern did not identify Taha as a suspect, he told Grims that Taha and Wylie-Forth had argued following Taha’s termination, and that McGovern believed that Taha still had keys to the storage area. During Grims’s investigation, he also interviewed Wilfredo Martinez and Anna Udit, two other Southern employees. Neither Martinez nor Udit testified at trial. 4 Grims also interviewed Taha at his apartment, and Taha denied knowledge of the burglaries.

Although Taha indicated that he still had keys to several rooms in the apartment complex, Taha claimed he did not have keys to the areas in question. Grims noticed several large tool boxes on the floor of Taha’s apartment, but Taha indicated that those tools belonged to him. Based on Grims’s investigation, Grims completed an Application for Statement of Charges, charging Taha with second degree attempted burglary of the maintenance room at SST, ⁷⁰⁸ and fourth-degree burglary of the main office at SST. Grims also obtained a warrant for Taha’s arrest.

According to the Application For Statement Of Charges, Martinez reported to Grims that he had observed Taha “shaking and pulling on the lock” in the maintenance shop of SST on Saturday evening, October 4, 1994, and Taha “fled” when confronted by Martinez. Wylie-Forth learned about the incident from Martinez, after various items had “disappeared” from the maintenance shop. At the time, Taha was on disability leave and had no right of access to the SST property. In addition, according to the Application, Udit informed Grims that she had observed Taha in Wylie-Forth’s office on October 8, 1994, while Taha was still on medical leave.

Nevertheless, Grims said at trial that he was the one who decided to bring charges against Taha, notwithstanding that he had obtained information concerning Taha from Southern’s employees. The following trial testimony is relevant: [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Who made the decision to file the application for statement of charges against Mr. Taha? [GRIMS]: It was my decision. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: What if any role did Mr. McGovern, Michael McGovern, play in making that decision? [GRIMS]: No role. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: What if any role did Ms. Debbie Wiley-Forth [sic] play in making your decision to file the application for statement of charges? [GRIMS]: She was the original complainant for the police investigation, however, it was my decision to file the charges. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: At any point in time, what if anything did Ms. Debbie Wiley-Forth [sic] say to you to encourage you or pressure you into filing charges for Mr. Taha? ⁷⁰⁹ [GRIMS]: None that I recall. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: What if anything did Mr. McGovern say to you to pressure you or get you to file an application of statement of charges against Mr. Taha? [GRIMS]: Nothing. On cross-examination, the following testimony was elicited: [APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY]: Who was the complainant in this case? [GRIMS]: Ms. Forth. [APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY]: Who does she work for? [GRIMS]: Southern Management. [APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY]: Did she ever tell you that she wasn’t authorized to about this to you [sic]? [GRIMS]: No. I can’t recall that. [APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY]: Did anybody ever say from Southern Management Corporation that they weren’t authorized to make any statements to you, that they needed to talk to corporate counsel before they could make a statement to you? [GRIMS]: No. [APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY]: So the investigation really originated with Southern Management employees. Isn’t that correct? [GRIMS]: Yes. [APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY]: Ms. Debra Wiley-Forth [sic], is she the one who called you on the phone? [GRIMS]: She was the initial complainant to one of the burglaries. [APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY]: ...

Did you speak to Michael McGovern, then? [GRIMS]: I can’t recall. I believe I did, but I am not positive. ⁷¹⁰ [GRIMS]: ... I know I spoke with Mr. Martinez. I can’t recall speaking with Mr. McGovern. * * * [GRIMS]: I probably was speaking to him.

I just don’t remember speaking to him. [GRIMS]: I interviewed Ms. Hudit [sic] and Mr. Martinez. * sis * [APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY]: Apparently, you say all of the victims, and I assume Mr. McGovern is one of the victims since you list him as a victim, indicated that items began disappearing ever since Mr. Taha was working there? [GRIMS]: Yes. That is in there. [APPELLEE’S COUNSEL]: Would it be fair to say that the information that you got regarding the whereabouts or any behavior or observations of Mr. Taha came from Southern Management employees? [GRIMS]: Yes. After Taha’s arrest on October 25, 1994, he was released on his own recognizance. Taha maintained that, on the dates of the two alleged burglaries, he was in New York, and thus could not have committed the crimes.

He also produced documentary evidence to support his assertion that he was in New York on October 2, 1994, and October 8, 1994. Taha’s account was corroborated by his wife and a customer service representative who worked at the Greyhound bus terminal in Silver Spring. Taha recounted to the jury that the criminal charges were eventually dismissed. He recalled that the prosecutor stated in court: “This guy he have an air-tight alibi, and we cannot prosecute him.” The record reflects that, on January 10, 1995, the criminal case against Taha was placed on the “stet” docket for one year.

Thereafter, a nolle prosequi was entered ⁷¹¹ on January 11, 1996. According to Taha, he incurred $500 in legal fees in connection with the criminal charges. At the end of Taha’s case, the court ruled on the defense motions for judgment, and said: “With respect to individual liability, it is clear that a corporate entity acts through its agents, but that doesn’t eliminate the possibility of agent/individual liability.” As we noted, the court granted the motion as to the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In its initial instructions to the jury, the court never addressed or explained the concept of respondeat superior liability.

At the end of the instructions the court said: “Anything further, Counsel?” Appellee’s counsel answered “yes.” Then, counsel approached the bench, but the trial transcript indicates that the bench conference was “inaudible.” In any event, after the bench conference the court gave several clarifying instructions. Of significance here, the court gave the following supplemental instruction: In this matter, the defendants are sued as employer and employee, so the management may be employer and co-defendant, and the employees, being Mr. McGovern and Ms. Wiley, for them. If the employee or employees are responsible for the acts about which the complaint is made by the plaintiff, the employer is also responsible since they would have been acting in the course of their employee responsibilities. (Emphasis added).

No objection was lodged to that instruction, nor was any request made for further amplification of the doctrine of respondeat superior. After presenting closing arguments, the lawyers discussed the proposed verdict sheet. Southern’s lawyer identified as a “problem” that it included only one question that pertained to all three defendants. 5 Therefore, he asked the court to submit a special verdict sheet containing a separate question “with respect to each individual defendant.” No objection or excep ⁷¹² tion was interposed by counsel for appellee with regard to Southern’s request. Accordingly, the special verdict sheet included separate questions as to liability for each defendant, phrased as follows: 1.

Was the Plaintiff, Mukhtar Taha, the victim of malicious prosecution by the Defendant Southern Management Corporation? 2. Was the Plaintiff, Mukhtar Taha, the victim of malicious prosecution by the Defendant, Deborah Wylie-Forth? 3. Was the Plaintiff, Mukhtar Taha, the victim of malicious prosecution by the Defendant, Michael McGovern? If “Yes” to any Defendant, answer Question 4. 4.

What amount of damages do you award Plaintiff? A. Economic $_ B. Non-Economic $_ Appellee did not object to the wording of the questions, nor did he ask the court to make clear in Question 1 that Southern’s liability, if any, necessarily rested on the conduct of one or more of its employees acting within the scope of employment. As we noted, the jury found against Southern but exonerated the individual defendants. It awarded Taha $100,000 in compensatory damages, consisting of $25,000 for economic damages and $75,000 for non-economic damages.

Thereafter, the court submitted the issue of punitive damages to the jury. With respect to punitive damages, the court instructed the jury as follows: Mr. Foreman, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, there is an additional consideration that you must make, but you are not required to. It is fundamental that you make a determination with respect to liability; that is compensatory damages, but you may make an award for punitive damages if you deem appropriate. An award for punitive damages, if you decide to award punitive damages, must be established by clear and convine ⁷¹³ ing evidence, and I am going to define what clear and convincing evidence is.

To be clear and convincing, evidence should be clear in the sense that it is certain, plain to the understanding and unambiguous and convincing in the sense that it so reasonable [sic] and persuasive as to cause you to believe it. But you need not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt; only to clear and convincing evidence. An award of punitive damages, I indicated, must be established by clear and convincing evidence, and for an award of punitive damages to be made, you should consider the following thee factors: in an amount that will deter the defendant and others from similar conduct in the future; two, proportionate to the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct and the defendant’s ability to pay; and three, but not designed to bankrupt or financially destroy a defendant. As I indicated earlier, you may, if you deem it appropriate, award for punitive damages, but you are not required to.

Because Southern believed that the court did not adequately instruct the jury on the element of “actual malice,” Southern objected and asked the court to “instruct [the jury] that there needs to be actual malice.” The court refused to modify its instruction, reasoning that the jury does not even have to award punitive damages. I said they may, but they are not required to do so—malice—malicious prosecution, I do not think I have to—they have determined that there is malice by their verdict already. Thereafter, the jury awarded Taha $100,000 in punitive damages. Subsequently, Southern moved for JNOV, claiming that, as a matter of law, it could not be liable for malicious prosecution because the jury exonerated the two individual defendants who were employees of Southern and who committed the conduct at issue.

Although the court acknowledged that the verdict appeared “on the surface to be factually inconsistent,” it denied the motion. We shall include additional facts in our discussion. ⁷¹⁴ DISCUSSION I. STANDARD OP REVIEW “In a jury trial, a party may move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict only if that party made a motion for judgment at the close of all the evidence and only on the grounds advanced in support of the earlier motion.” Md. Rule 2—532(a); see Md. Rule 2-519. An appellate court considering the denial of a motion for JNOV must determine whether the record contains legally relevant and competent evidence, however slight, from which a jury rationally could have found in appellee’s favor. Jacobs v. Flynn, 131 Md.App. 342, 353 , 749 A.2d 174 (2000); Bartholomee v. Casey, 103 Md.App. 34, 51 , 651 A.2d 908 (1994), cert. denied, 338 Md. 557 , 659 A.2d 1293 (1995).

In our review of the trial court’s decision, we consider the evidence, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the verdict was rendered. Md. Rule 2-519(b); Houston v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 346 Md. 503, 521 , 697 A.2d 851 (1997); Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden, 330 Md. 632, 636 , 625 A.2d 959 (1993); Jacobs, 131 Md.App. at 353 , 749 A.2d 174 . Moreover, all evidentiary conflicts are resolved in favor of the party who prevailed below. Caldor, 330 Md. at 636 , 625 A.2d 959 ; Miller Bldg.

Supply, Inc. v. Rosen, 61 Md.App. 187, 193 , 485 A.2d 1023 (1985), aff'd, 305 Md. 341 , 503 A.2d 1344 (1986). On the other hand, we will reverse a trial court’s denial of a motion for JNOV when the verdict is unsupported by the evidence or legally flawed. See Lusby v. First Nat'l Bank, 263 Md. 492, 506 , 283 A.2d 570 (1971); Piquette v. Stevens, 128 Md.App. 590, 598 , 739 A.2d 905 (1999), cert. granted, 357 Md. 481 , 745 A.2d 436 (2000). “If ... the evidence as a whole does not rise above speculation, hypothesis, and conjecture, and does not lead to the jury’s conclusion with reasonable certainty, then the denial of [the] motion [ ] for judgment or JNOV was error.” Bartholomee, 103 Md.App. at 51 , 651 A.2d 908 ; see Campbell v. Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co., 95 Md.App. 86 , ⁷¹⁵ 95, 619 A.2d 218 (1993), cert. denied, 331 Md. 196 , 627 A.2d 538 (1993).

The parties have not referred us to the law that generally governs inconsistent verdicts, but we believe that it is useful to review the fundamental principles. “ ‘Inconsistent jury verdicts are generally not sufficient grounds for an appellate court to reverse a jury verdict’ unless there is proof of ‘actual irregularity.’ ” Davis v. Goodman, 117 Md.App. 378, 423 , 700 A.2d 798 (1997); see Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs, 135 Md.App. 403 , 440 n. 17, 762 A.2d 991 (2000), cert. denied, 363 Md. 206 , 768 A.2d 54 (filed March 9, 2001). “ ‘That the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters.’ ” Zachair, 135 Md.App. at 441 n. 17, 762 A.2d 991 (citations omitted). Ordinarily, we accord great deference to a jury verdict. We have stated that a “jury’s verdict should not be casually overturned.

In our system of justice, the jury is sacrosanct and its importance is unquestioned. The members of the jury see and hear the witnesses as they testify. They watch them as they sweat, stutter or swagger under the pressure of cross-examination.” Adams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 119 Md.App. 395, 408-09 , 705 A.2d 58 (1998)(quoting Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 522 , 682 A.2d 1143 (1996)). Similarly, “[i]n reconciling a jury’s answers to specific interrogatories, we should assume that the jury was rational and consistent, rather than irrational or inconsistent.

Our quest should be for a view of the case which would make the jury’s findings consistent.” Edwards v. Gramling Eng. Corp., 322 Md. 535, 547-48 , 588 A.2d 793 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 915 , 112 S.Ct. 317 , 116 L.Ed.2d 259 (1991); see JGB/Twinbrook Metro Ltd. P’ship v. Wheeler, 346 Md. 601, 621 , 697 A.2d 898 (1997)(stating that an “ ‘appellate court must view a case in a way that reconciles the jury’s verdicts if at all possible.’ ” (citation omitted)); Lyon v. Campbell, 120 Md.App. 412, 443 , ⁷¹⁶ 707 A.2d 850 , cert. denied, 350 Md. 487 , 713 A.2d 980 (1998). On the other hand, verdicts that are “irreconcilably inconsistent,” Davis, 117 Md.App. at 424 , 700 A.2d 798 , or “irreconcilably defective,” Adams, 119 Md.App. at 408 , 705 A.2d 58 , may be subject to defeat. What we said in Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Lascola, 31 Md.App. 153, 167 , 355 A.2d 757 (1976), is pertinent here: “The fact of inconsistency between one verdict and another returned by the same jury does not automatically make either verdict illegal.” Rather, an irreconcilably defective verdict occurs “ ‘[w]here the answer to one of the questions in a special verdict form would require a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and an answer to another would require a verdict for the defendant.’ ” Davis, 117 Md.App. at 424 , 700 A.2d 798 (quoting S & R, Inc. v. Nails, 85 Md.App. 570, 590 , 584 A.2d 722 (1991), judgment vacated on other grounds, 334 Md. 398 , 639 A.2d 660 (1994)); see Adams, 119 Md.App. at 408 , 705 A.2d 58 .

II

Appellant alleges that the circuit court erred in denying Southern’s motion for JNOV. Because the jury exonerated Southern’s two employees, who were the alleged tortfeasors, Southern contends that the corporation could not be liable as a matter of law. Appellee counters that Southern has waived its argument about an inconsistent verdict, because it failed to object to the verdict sheet. Taha also contends that the circuit court properly denied Southern’s motion because other employees of Southern, in addition to the two who were sued, gave false information about Taha to the police, and their tortious conduct was attributable to Southern.

Further, Taha asserts in his brief that “nowhere in the Complaint is Mr. Taha arguing derivative liability under a theory of respondeat superior.” Instead, he claims that Southern is directly and independently liable for its own tortious conduct. 6 ⁷¹⁷ A. According to Taha, the verdict sheet was prepared pursuant to appellant’s request, and the verdict sheet gave “the jury ... the impression that it could assign liability to the corporate entity and extend clemency to the individual defendants.” In Taha’s view, if there is any issue about an inconsistent verdict, it is due to the form of the verdict sheet, which Southern requested. Therefore, Taha argues that “it would be improper to continence [sic] [appellant’s] newly asserted arguments that the Jury’s Verdict is somehow inconsistent.” As we understand it, Taha essentially argues that it would be unfair to allow Southern to benefit from a problem that it created with respect to the verdict sheet. In support of Taha’s claim of waiver, he relies on Wright v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. 80 Md.App. 606 , 565 A.2d 377 (1989). Taha’s reliance on Wright is misplaced.

There, pursuant to Md. Rule 2-522(c), the Court determined that the defendants waived their right to have the jury determine a particular issue, because they failed to object to the omission of the issue from the verdict sheet. Here, appellant is not complaining about the omission of an issue from the verdict sheet. Rather, Southern’s argument is premised on its claim that the jury’s exoneration of the individual tortfeasors compels a finding in its favor, as a matter of law. To be sure, Southern did not object to the form of the verdict sheet that was tailored to its request.

To the contrary, it asked the court to pose separate questions pertinent to each defendant. See Md. Rule 2-522. But, Southern maintains that the issue is the verdict, not the verdict sheet, and claims that it challenged the verdict at the earliest opportunity through its motion for JNOV. Therefore, Southern ⁷¹⁸ contends that it has preserved this issue for appeal.

We agree with appellant. Following the bench conference, the jury was specifically instructed that, “[i]f the employee or employees are responsible for the acts about which the complaint is made by the plaintiff, the employer is also responsible since they would have been acting in the course of the employee responsibilities.” That supplemental instruction was accurate but arguably incomplete and, as a result, possibly misleading. Although the court specifically told the jury that Southern would be liable if the jury found McGovern and Wylie-Forth liable, the court never advised the jury of the converse-that Southern’s liability, if any, is founded on the conduct of its employees, and if the jury exonerated the two named employees, Southern could not be liable. Even if liability could attach based on the conduct of other employees of Southern who were not sued, the jury was not instructed to consider the conduct of other employees.

Significantly, Taha never asked the court to amplify its supplemental instruction, nor did he object or except to it as inadequate. Moreover, we cannot find fault with the defense for requesting a separate verdict question for each defendant. Md. Rule 2-522(c) provides, in part, that “[t]he court may require a jury to return a special verdict in the form of written findings upon specific issues.” Moreover, the Court of Appeals has recognized that “special verdicts are often useful in cases with multiple parties or issues.” Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 343 Md. at 525 , 682 A.2d 1143 . In the