Southern States Marketing Cooperative, Inc. v. Lippa

Grason, J., delivered the opinion of the court. Marie M. Lippa (appellee) worked for the Southern States Marketing Cooperative, Incorporated (appellant). This corporation, among other activities, was in the business of packing and shipping eggs. The appellee was sent by her superior to bring a gallon glass jar, in which eggs were to be packed, and while returning with it she slipped, fell, and the jar crashed, cutting her right forearm just above the wrist.

Claim for the injury was filed with the State Industrial Accident Commission and she was awarded for temporary total disability, permanent partial disability for the loss of the use of her right thumb, and compensation for the disfigurement of her forearm. The appellant objects only to the compensation allowed for disfigurement and mutilation of her forearm. It appealed to the Superior Court of Baltimore City, where the action of the Commission was affirmed, and from the judgment of that court it brings this appeal. The cut that appellee sustained from the broken glass severed three tendons in her arm.

This resulted in the loss of 15% of the use of her right thumb, and in leaving a scar on her right arm, three inches long. It is claimed by appellant that the compensation which has been paid for the loss of the use of the thumb is satisfaction in full for the injury received from this accident, including the scar on the right forearm; while appellee contends that she is entitled to be compensated for the disfigurement ³⁸⁸ caused by the scar, as well as the loss of the use of her right thumb. It would seem to be the law if a workman meets with an accident in the course of his employment and sustains several distinct and separate injuries, and in addition thereto, and not connected with or a part of the separate and distinct injuries, he suffers a disfigurement, if the injuries and disfigurement are provided for in the workmen’s compensation law he should be compensated for each injury and the disfigurement. In Article 101, section 35, 1947 Supplement, Code 1939, provision is made for the loss of the use of a thumb, and for disfigurement.

The question before us has been considered by the courts of other States and by this court. It is a narrow question, and stated briefly it is this: Does the injury to appellee’s thumb, caused by the accident, comprehend the injury she received by the disfigurement of her forearm? Or are the two injuries which were caused by this accident, within the purview of Article 101 of the Code, to be considered as one injury? In Wells Bros.

Co., v. Industrial Board, 285 Ill. 647 , 121 N. E. 256 , the workman, by the explosion of gas, suffered injuries to his head, neck, arms, and hands. His face and head were severely and permanently disfigured. He was allowed compensation for the specific injuries, as well as disfigurement of his face. In Calumet Paving Co. v. Butkus, 113 Ind.

App. 232 , 47 N. E. 2d 829, 830 , the workman was injured by the explosion of dynamite. His left eye was so badly injured it had to be enucleated. There was imbedded in his face and neck 350 to 400 specks of earth of varying size, three of them in the ball of his right eye, and several hundred such specks on the left wrist and forearm. The specks imparted a bluish cast to the skin.

It was said: “Compensation being payable for the loss of the eye under Paragraph (f), he could receive nothing under Paragraph (i) for disfigurement incidental thereto. * * * but having nevertheless received other injuries resulting in permanent disfigurement, he could receive compensation ³⁸⁹ under Paragraph (i) for such permanent disfigurement being the disfigurement caused by the specks in his face, neck, arms, and right eye, * * In International Coal & Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 Ill. 524 , 127 N. E. 703 , 10 A. L. R. 1010, the workman was injured while in a mine, by the premature explosion of powder. He suffered disfigurement which was separate and distinct from all other injuries he sustained, and was allowed compensation therefor. In Hansen v. Dakota Transportation Co., 65 S. D. 277, 273 N. W. 261, 264 , the court said: “* * * where a