Sowers v. Reed

WENNER, Judge. Appellant, Gary H. Sowers, appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City ordering him to pay child support arrearages accumulated while he was incarcerated. On appeal, appellant presents us with the following question: “Whether the circuit court properly concluded that a parent who was incarcerated for non-support-related crimes is per se required to pay child support which accrued during his period of incarceration if during that period, his actual income was zero dollars ($0) per month?” For reasons that follow, we shall vacate the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Facts Although appellant and appellee were never married, they are the natural parents of Lauren Paige Sowers (Lauren), who was born in 1987, and Gary Houston Sowers II (Gary II), who was born in 1988.

At the time that Gary II was conceived, appellee was married to Steven Geller. In February 1990, appellee filed two Paternity Petitions in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City claiming that appellant was the children’s natural father. Appellant claims never to have been served with either of these Petitions. ⁶⁰² In April 1990, appellant was incarcerated for three theft convictions, and violation of probation. Despite being incarcerated in April 1990, a “Waiver of Rights by Defendant” signed by “Gary Sowers” was filed in both paternity cases, waiving appellant’s right to a trial, and admitting that he was the children’s father.

Appellant contends that he neither signed the waivers, nor authorized anyone to sign them on his behalf. In any event, two Decrees Determining Paternity were entered by the circuit court, naming appellant as the natural father of Lauren and Gary II, and ordering him to pay child support of $35 per week per child through the Bureau of Support Enforcement beginning 9 May 1990. That amount was to increase to $60 per week per child on 1 August 1990. Although both Decrees Determining Paternity are signed by “Gary Sowers,” appellant again denies signing them, or authorizing anyone to do so for him. 1 Nonetheless, an order for a lien against earnings was forwarded to W.F.G. Communication in Essex, Maryland.

Appellant claims never to have worked for W.F.G. Communication. While appellant was incarcerated, and for approximately six months after his release, Lauren and Gary II each received from the Department of Social Services (DSS) the sum of $25 per week, amounting to $8,875 per child. When appellant was released on parole in May 1995, DSS sought to recover the sum of support it had provided the children. In March 1996, appellant was notified that, pursuant to an intercept order, the Child Support Enforcement Administration was holding his 1995 federal and state income tax refunds, totaling $2,894.

Later that month, appellant received a letter from the Maryland Department of Human Resources informing him that his child support payments were in arrears. Appellant later discovered that several ⁶⁰³ bench warrants had been issued by the circuit court in both paternity cases, charging him with contempt for failing to obey court orders. In April 1996, appellant filed a Motion to Terminate Child Support, Eliminate or Abate Arrearage, and Quash Contempt Warrant in both paternity cases. At a hearing in August 1996, appellant testified that he was the children’s father, but that he was unaware of the paternity cases until March 1996, or that there was an arrearage in child support.

The circuit court concluded that although appellant was the children’s father, he had not been served with either Decree Determining Paternity, and that enrollment of the decrees constituted a “substantial irregularity.” Accordingly, the judge ordered that appellant’s “child support arrearage reflected on the records of the Baltimore City Office of Child Support Enforcement be ... abated, subject to further order of court.” All outstanding bench warrants were quashed, but appellant’s child support obligations were not terminated. A further proceeding was held on 11 December 1996, at which the presiding judge concluded that