Sparkman v. State

HOLLANDER, Judge. Ronald Sparkman, appellant, was charged with the murder of Ralph “Wes” Pritchett, who was shot to death in Baltimore City on January 14, 2005. Following a trial in May 2007, a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City convicted ⁷¹⁹ Sparkman of first-degree murder, as well as use of a handgun in a crime of violence, and wearing or carrying a handgun. 1 On appeal, Sparkman poses the following two questions: 1. Did the court below err by admitting into evidence a letter purportedly written by Appellant? 2.

Was the evidence legally insufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions? For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm. FACTUAL SUMMARY A. The Suppression Hearing Prior to trial, Sparkman moved to suppress a letter purportedly written by him while he was in pretrial custody. The letter was sent from jail, but it was seized when it was returned to the institution with a label marked “RETURN TO SENDER,” “INSUFFICIENT ADDRESS,” and “UNABLE TO FORWARD.” Corporal Monique Mitchell, a correctional officer in the Intelligence Unit of the Division of Pretrial Detention, Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, was the sole witness at the suppression hearing.

As of the hearing, she had worked for Pretrial Services for eleven years, the last five of which were in the Intelligence Unit. She stated that her unit’s mission is to acquire information about inmates’ involvement in “criminal activity.” On June 25, 2006, some eighteen months after Pritchett’s murder, Mitchell received an envelope from the mailroom at the Baltimore City Detention Center, addressed to Tamira Sparkman. The envelope, which measured 3/¿ by &k inches, contained a yellow label, apparently applied by the U.S. Postal Service, stating “RETURN TO SENDER,” “INSUFFI ⁷²⁰ CIENT ADDRESS,” and “UNABLE TO FORWARD.” The return address on the letter included appellant’s name, his inmate number, and the address of the detention center. Mitchell opened the envelope.

It contained two sheets of lined, letter-sized paper, which were folded repeatedly. It also contained a separate sheet of paper, which was also folded, with a photograph inside of it. The separate sheet appeared to be a copy of an autopsy photograph, which Mitchell found “suspicious” and “not ordinary mail.” She then opened the lined sheets and saw a handwritten letter. At the bottom of the second page she saw the following sentence: “1 picture is of my victim & the other 1 is my mother!” The letter also contained the statement: “I went to prison at a young age & back I am.” Because Mitchell thought that the envelope’s contents indicated “some kind of criminal activity,” she did not return it to appellant (which she normally would have done, having found no contraband).

Instead, it went to the detective assigned to this case. When asked why she opened the mail, Mitchell said: “Because it was return to sender” and “the thickness of the envelope ... it could be something inside the envelope.” Mitchell explained that the institution’s policy provided for the opening and perusal of all “suspicious” mail, and the thickness of the envelope prompted her suspicion that it might contain contraband. Mitchell added that she had to unfold the papers because they could have contained drugs. In addition, Mitchell stated that incoming mail is inspected for contraband and, as a matter of policy, “all return to sender mail” is opened, as it is regarded as “incoming mail.” According to Mitchell, inmates sometimes attempt to circumvent the policy barring inmate-to-inmate correspondence by sending a letter to a bogus address and writing the other inmate’s name as the return addressee.

As to the policy of opening mail that is marked “return to sender,” Mitchell elaborated: That’s the policy because we open it to make sure nothing is coming back inside the institution, they may try to send it ⁷²¹ out or something — sometimes inmates send out mail or send mail to each other, that is not permitted, not permitted mail to each other, mail or correspondence to one another. So in that case, we do check return to sender mail just to make sure they are not trying to get it to another party inside the institution. The State introduced as an exhibit a document governing Mailroom Operations, dated April 15, 2003. 2 It included the statement, in section VI.C, that “DPDS inmates shall be prohibited from mailing correspondence to each other.” On cross-examination, Mitchell acknowledged that State’s Motion Exhibit 3, a page from the inmates’ handbook, said nothing about the institution’s policy of opening returned mail. 3 But, she pointed out that it stated that incoming mail is opened prior to delivery and inspected for contraband or money orders. The following exchange is pertinent: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: For incoming inmate mail, and tell me if I’m right, this ICU, that is your group, right? [MITCHELL]: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: May search an inmate’s incoming mail when there is a reasonable suspicion that inmate is engaged in criminal activity or any action which may jeopardize public safety, correct? [MITCHELL]: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And then it says ICU will document that reasonable suspicion of inmate engaging in activity, including document knowledge that form[s] the basis for reasonable suspicion.

Now, are you telling us that upon receiving this matter, return [to] sender that you had reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Sparkman was engaged in illegal activity? ⁷²² [MITCHELL]: Well, sir, when it is return to sender, again we do open it because we do believe, that sometime[s] it’s inmate to inmate correspon[d]ence and something being done to bring the mail back in, we have to make sure there is no type of contraband, and we search it entering the institution. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. How, first of all, if it is sent out and return[ed] to sender, how is that being sent, how would that be mail sent to another inmate? [MITCHELL]: Because that’s what they do----They put them as the person to send out in order to receive it. I’m trying to say this correctly? When he writes the letter, so that the other party receives it what they do is give a bogus address that’s somewhere that they know they are going to send it back to the person that’s going to receive it; does that make sense?

The following exchange is also relevant: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, my question to you is, what contraband was inside that envelope that allowed you to turn it over to the State’s Attorney’s Office? [MITCHELL]: Well, the letter — picture itself, it’s a morgue, a picture of someone having an autopsy. I thought, that is suspicious. That’s not everyday mail. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But a photo copy is not a contraband, is it? [MITCHELL]: No, it’s not contraband. According to Mitchell, the letter “seem[ed] to be criminal activity that involved some type of criminal activity.

I found it to be.” The following ensued: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You thought that a photo copy was criminal activity? [MITCHELL]: Once I perused it. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So you did read the letter. [MITCHELL]: I perused the letter. Once I saw the picture, I perused it at the bottom and saw a statement that was made. ⁷²³ Following argument by counsel, the court issued an oral ruling denying the motion. It stated, in part: The Court believes and holds that it was proper for the corporal to inspect the letter. There is no question that the Court of Appeals has held that there is no absolute right of expectation, but rather diminished right of expectation [of privacy] pursuant to Fourth Amendment.

And that the rule indicated that the institution has to be reasonable. This was a returned letter, therefore, mak[ing] it incoming mail. The rules in the institution are that any incoming mail that is believed that there is a reasonable suspicion that may involve public safety, there inside the institution or inside or out of the institution, may be inspected. And certainly as the Court of Appeals has said in the Thompson [sic] 4 case, smuggling money, drugs and weapons, other contraband, all too common in the institution; therefore, inspection of the letters that are in this case, two [sic] fat to just be a single letter, warranted her opening the envelope.

Once she opens the envelope and saw a picture, an autopsy picture, this Court holds that she then had the authority then, based on that suspicion, now she has that suspicion, in an effect of exacerbated it by the presence of the autopsy picture, she had a right to read the letter, and when she discovers that the letter indicated that, in fact, the Defendant was admitting that this was the victim of his crime, then [she] had the responsibility to turn that over to the State’s Attorney’s Office. So I will deny the motion for those reasons, and allow the State to introduce the letter.... B. The Trial The prosecution presented five witnesses at trial, including two eyewitnesses to the shooting who identified appellant’s photo in an array and identified appellant at trial. The defense did not present any witnesses. ⁷²⁴ Frank Gilliam testified that at about 10:00 p.m. on January 14, 2005, while he was talking with a friend near an apartment complex he called “Target City,” a “guy came up and shot several times, shot at this guy named Wes about seven times.” At the time, Wes was on the sidewalk, near Madison Street.

Gilliam was about twenty to twenty-two feet away from the victim, but could not estimate how far he was from the shooter. The shooter came from “like Bond Street, across Madison.” Gilliam said: “I saw, saw who it was, I ran.” He described the assailant as a “black male, approximately six foot, dark skinned, short hair cut, black hoodie.” Gilliam later identified appellant in court as the shooter. Gilliam was arrested in the early morning of January 15, 2005, and charged with heroin possession. He told a patrol officer about the shooting.

On February 4, 2005, he spoke with Detective Arthur Brummer, who showed him a photo array. He picked out the photo of appellant, whom he called “Little Ronald,” as the person who shot Wes. He stated that he knew appellant from living in the same neighborhood and seeing him “mostly every day.” Ernest Minor testified that on January 14, 2005, he was with his friend, Ralph “Wes” Pritchett, in the area of Monument Street and Broadway in Baltimore. As the pair walked through a “cut” between apartment buildings, a man in dark clothing and a dark hat walked toward them and began shooting.

Minor saw an “object” in the man’s hand, and then “the fire” of muzzle flashes. After the first flash, Minor ran around the block. When he returned, he saw his “buddy lying on the ground dead.” He did not “know” the shooter, but he “knew of’ him, having seen him once or twice previously. Minor did not report what he had seen until April 2005, when he was arrested on unrelated charges and asked to speak to the police.

He told Detective Brummer what had happened. Brummer showed Minor a photo array, from which Minor picked appellant’s photo as the assailant. He ⁷²⁵ also identified appellant in court. 5 Brummer testified that at 10:19 p.m. on January 14, 2005, he responded to an emergency call for a shooting. Five .38 caliber shell casings and two bullet fragments were recovered from the scene.

He spoke with Gilliam on January 15, 2005, and again on February 4, 2005, when he showed him the photo array. He spoke with Minor on April 12, 2005. He identified State’s Exhibit 4 as a photograph of the “split between Madison and Monument Streets,” where the shooting occurred. Dr. Carol Allen, of the Medical Examiner’s Office, performed the autopsy on the victim.

She was accepted as an expert in the field of medical and forensic pathology. Dr. Allen explained that the victim suffered five separate gunshot wounds, including three to the back and two to the forearm. One of the bullets penetrated the large intestine, heart, and right lung, fatally injuring the victim. Three “large caliber projectiles” were recovered from the body.

Two of the gunshot wounds were “through and through,” i.e., they entered and exited the victim’s body. Those bullets were not recovered. The parties stipulated that a firearms and ballistics expert would have testified that bullets recovered from the victim were all fired from the same .38 caliber weapon. Corporal Mitchell was the State’s final witness.

Her trial testimony was generally consistent with the testimony she provided at the suppression hearing. She stated that on June 25, 2006, she received an envelope from the mailroom at the detention facility, which had a yellow sticker on it that said, “RETURN TO SENDER.” The envelope was addressed to “Tamira Sparkman, 615 N. Ellwood Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202.” The sender’s name appeared as “Ronald Spark-man,” with a return address of 401 E. Eager St. in Baltimore ⁷²⁶ City, the location of the Baltimore City Detention Center. Corporal Mitchell recounted that she opened the envelope “just to make sure it didn’t have a contraband money order, or cash, sometimes mail comes inside the mail.” She saw two handwritten pages and two photographs, one of which appeared to be an autopsy photo. She noted: “[W]e don’t get pictures of that sort in the mail____” Upon seeing the autopsy photo, Mitchell “perused the letter.” It said: “One picture of my victim and the other one is my mother and father.” The letter was admitted into evidence over objection.

After the prosecution rested its case, defense counsel made a motion for judgment of acquittal, stating: “I would make a motion for judgment on all four counts.” The court denied the motion. The defense rested and then renewed its motion for acquittal. DISCUSSION I. Appellant argues that the court erred by admitting the letter purportedly written by him. He asserts that, despite his status as a pretrial detainee, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution afforded him “a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the envelope bearing his name.” In appellant’s view, the “actions of the correctional officer in opening the envelope, inspecting its contents, and reading the letter, violated [his] right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures of his personal papers.” According to appellant, “Opening the envelope, which was returned in the same condition it was mailed, was unreasonable under the circumstances of this case.” He maintains that “the envelope was not fat enough to support reasonable suspicion that it contained contraband,” and the copy of the autopsy photograph did not constitute evidence “that Appellant was engaged in any criminal activity while in the detention facility.” Moreover, he posits that, even if Mitchell was entitled “to open and inspect the contents of the envelope,” once the inspection revealed no contraband and no indication of any ⁷²⁷ criminal activity, Corporal Mitchell should not have read the letter.

Instead, she should have returned it to appellant. In addition, appellant contends that he “was not notified that mail marked ‘return to sender’ would be opened.” The State disagrees, asserting: The short answer to Sparkman’s complaint regarding the opening and reading of the letter returned to him, which was treated by the correctional authorities as incoming mail, is that whatever expectation of privacy Sparkman had with respect to the letter that expectation was trumped by the “legitimate security needs” of the correctional facility where he was housed awaiting trial. According to the State, “there was ample evidence ... that institutional policy on incoming mail, even mail stamped ‘Returned [sic] to Sender,’ mandated that it be opened for security purposes.” In its view, once Mitchell opened the letter and saw the autopsy photograph, it was not unreasonable for her “to skim the letter,” because she “reasonably suspected that it contained evidence of on-going criminal activity.” As noted, the circuit court determined that Mitchell properly opened the envelope and inspected its contents for possible contraband because it was tantamount to incoming mail and because it was “too fat to be just a single letter.” It reasoned that when Mitchell saw the autopsy photograph, she reasonably became suspicious and reviewed the letter. At that time, she saw appellant’s inculpatory statement and properly turned the envelope and its contents over to the State.

We agree with the circuit court. 6 ⁷²⁸ The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized. Under the Fourth Amendment, pretrial detainees may retain some expectation of privacy, although, if they do, it is “diminished” when compared with persons who are not incarcerated. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557, 558-59 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 , 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Thomas v. State, 285 Md. 458, 463 , 404 A.2d 257 (1979). Thomas is instructive.

In Thomas , the defendant, a pretrial detainee, had written a letter to a fellow inmate, sealed it, and handed it to a correctional officer for delivery within the institution. 285 Md. at 459 , 404 A.2d 257 . A detention center official opened and read the letter. Id. Because it contained an inculpatory statement, it was turned over to the prosecutor.

Id. The appellant moved to suppress the letter. Id. The warden testified at the suppression hearing that the regulation governing mail at the detention center “did not cover correspondence from one inmate to another, and that the inmates were not apprised that a letter in a sealed envelope from one to another would be read by institution officials.” Id. at 460 , 404 A.2d 257 .

But, the regulation provided for the opening of all incoming mail, and also imposed certain restrictions on “outgoing” correspondence. Id. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, and the defendant was subsequently convicted of rape and battery. ⁷²⁹ Id. at 459 , 404 A.2d 257 . On appeal to this Court, we were of the view that mail from one inmate to another constituted “incoming mail” with respect to the inmate who was the addressee.

Id. at 461 , 404 A.2d 257 . On that basis, the Court concluded that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy, and affirmed the convictions. See Thomas v. State, 39 Md.App. 217, 229 , 384 A.2d 772 (1978). The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider whether reading the letter and introducing it into evidence violated the appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Thomas, 285 Md. at 459 , 404 A.2d 257 . The Court found no violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. Notably, the Court of Appeals did not regard inmate-to-inmate mail as tantamount to incoming mail.

It said, id. at 461-62 , 404 A.2d 257 : Preliminarily, we ... disagree with the Court of Special Appeals, regarding the scope of the detention center’s regulation. By use of the terms “mail,” “incoming” and “outgoing,” it would seem that the regulation was designed to deal with correspondence sent from inmates, via the United States Postal Service, to persons outside of the institution, and correspondence sent from persons outside of the institution, via the Postal Service, to inmates. This is confirmed by references in the regulation to the addresses of the parties, and the provision for the return to the sender of inappropriate “incoming mail.” It is further confirmed by the distinction drawn between the two types of mail, with outgoing mail being allowed to be sealed, whereas all incoming mail is subject to inspection before delivery to the inmate. Moreover, this is the view of the warden, who promulgated the regulation.

Consequently, we do not believe that the defendant knew or should have known, based on the regulation, that the envelope given to a guard for hand delivery to another inmate was subject to being opened and the contents read. Rather, the case must be treated as one where there was no regulation or practice ⁷³⁰ made known to the inmates regarding correspondence between inmates in the institution. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that, “as a general matter, lawful detention or imprisonment ‘necessarily makes unavailable many rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen,’ but ‘though his rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections.’ ” Id. at 463 , 404 A.2d 257 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). Indeed, the Court acknowledged that “some courts have taken the position that persons incarcerated in jails and prisons retain a measure of Fourth Amendment protection.” Id.

(citations omitted). Yet, with respect to the Fourth Amendment, the Court observed, id.: “[I]t is not at all clear whether the protections of that amendment extend to pre-trial detainees or convicted prisoners in a detention center or correctional institution.” It pointed to the Supreme Court’s then-recent observation in Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U.S. at 556-57 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 , that “an argument can be made ‘that a person confined in a detention facility has no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his room or cell and that therefore the Fourth Amendment provides no protection for such a person.’ ” Id. And, quoting Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 , 82 S.Ct. 1218 , 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962), the Court observed, id., that “ ‘surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day’ ” in penal institutions. Mindful that “[t]he Supreme Court has not decided the question,” id. at 464, 404 A.2d 257 , the Thomas Court “similarly assume[d], without deciding, that a pretrial detainee ... retains some reasonable expectation of privacy and thus a degree of Fourth Amendment protection.” Id.

But, the Court admonished: “[Mjerely because inmates may retain a degree of Fourth Amendment protection with respect to some matters, it does not necessarily follow that the defendant in the present case had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the contents of the sealed envelope handed to the ⁷³¹ correctional officer.” Id. Relying on Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 , the Court reasoned: In that part of the Bell v. Wolfish opinion relating to the Fourth Amendment claims of pre-trial detainees, the Supreme Court seemed to be saying that, even assuming the presence of some reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the subject of a search, resulting in the Fourth Amendment being implicated, if the type of search is justified by institutional security