Spoto v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Moore, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented here is whether the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (Femia, J.) correctly granted summary judgment for the appellee-defendant in a personal injury suit on the ground that a federal six-month period of limitations applied, and not Maryland’s three-year statute. We find error and vacate the judgment. I Nelson Spoto, an architect, was injured on January 14, 1976, while working for an architectural firm on a Metro site in Prince George’s County.

The employer’s insurer, Continental Casualty Company (CNA) paid him workers’ compensation benefits between February 1976 and December 1977. On January 11, 1979, three days before the three-year statute of limitations expired, Mr. Spoto filed a negligence action against Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) and others. The suit represented the personal claims as well as the subrogated interest of CNA. On the day of trial, the defendants moved for summary judgment contending that Spoto was barred by a six-month limitations period contained in the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Act, 1 33 U.S.C. § 933 (b) (1976 ed.), which reads as follows: "Acceptance of such [workers’] compensation under ⁴²⁶ an award in a compensation order filed by the deputy commissioner or Board shall operate as an assignment to the employer of all right of the person entitled to compensation to recover damages against such third person unless such person shall commence an action against such third person within six months after such award.” (Emphasis added.) II The motion of WMATA for summary judgment was made orally in open court, when the case was called for trial.

Counsel for WMATA informed the court that "rather than go through lengthy introduction of exhibits” in support of the motion, he could establish his case "in two minutes through the plaintiff, Mr. Spoto.” The only relevant facts adduced in Mr. Spoto’s very brief appearance on the witness stand were (a) that CNA paid him a total of "nine thousand some dollars,” beginning approximately one month after the accident and (b) that Mr. Spoto accepted the payments. As we note from the simple, direct language of § 933 (b) quoted above, it was incumbent upon the defendants to show more than the payment and acceptance of workers’ compensation payments. Only acceptance of such compensation — under an award — in a compensation order — filed by the Deputy Commissioner or [Benefits Retirement] Board triggers an assignment to the employer, unless the person entitled to compensation commences an action "within six months after such award, ” (Emphasis added.) The record below is bereft of facts pertaining to an award. This was appellees’ burden.

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