Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey

Bond, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a case under the provisions of the Maryland Workmen’s Compensation Act. ' The deceased husband of the claimant was employed for six weeks or more by the appellant employer, driving a wagon and delivering cans of oil on sm'all sales about Baltimore. He died March 3rd, 1923-,' of ²⁵¹ lympho-sarcoma or leukemia, that is, of a malignant growth in the glands, and the widow,, his only dependent, has made claim on the ground that this was superinduced hy injury sustained from a fall .against part of the wagon. Oompens'ation was allowed hy the State Industrial Accident Commission, and on appeal to the Baltimore City Court was affirmed.

The question of fact was referred to a jury, under section 56 of the act. All the physicians who attended the man during the last month of his life and at the time of his death at Johns Hopkins Hospital agree in their testimony that the cause of death was lympho-sarcoma or leukemia, with certain attendant conditions; and 'all 'agree that death invariably results from such an affection. The cause of it is unknown, and it is usually insidious at first, and may run for some time before the patient is aware of its presence. Sometimes it developes and progresses rapidly, but it is unusual for it to do' so.

There is some difference in the testimony as to- possibility of acceleration or aggravation by an injury. Dr. John S. Bishop, who-first attended the man, said it was thought a blow or injury would have no- effect- on lympho-sarcoma, but that in all probability this man had some trouble with his spleen' (where the growth was located) before he had the fall alleged, and that ns the thing was in a bad shape a little injury might have hastened it a great deal, and he felt, taking the report of injury as true, that it did have something to do with increasing the rapidity of the thing. Dr. Bishop added that this lympho-sarcoma could have developed if the man had not had any injury, however. D-r.

Lewellys F. Barker, on the other hand, testified that he had never known of lympo-sardoma affected by-injury in the region of the growth, and 'he had no idea that -such an injury could have hurried that disease, and he thought it very improbable. There was no visible injury; no bruising or external mark. Evidence of injury consists entirely of reported statements of tbe man himself prior to his death, which, of course, is hearsay testimony in these proceedings; and all the except ²⁵² tions arise from the 'acceptance of such testimony as a basis of compensation under the Workmen’s 'Compensation Act. The man was first absent from his employment on January 20th, 1923.

He made no report of injury then, but his wife testifies that she telephoned his superintendent that he was ill 'and had slipped and hurt his side on January 16th, and that her husband repeated this to the superintendent when the latter called a few days later. The superintendent says the case was reported to him as grippe or cold, and when he called at the house-the man himself said he had a cold and would he out in a few days, that in February be told tbe superintendent he h'ad been injured. And similar testimony of grippe or cold is given by other employees. The wife testifies that, when her husband came home on January 16th, he reported to her that he had slipped and struck his left side on his wagon that day, and had a feeling as if something-had tom 'and she felt a lump or “bubble” at tbe place indicated.

The superintendent says the man later described to him such a fall against tbe wagon; and three physicians, who attended the man within a few weeks after the beginning of disability, say that when examined he gave each of them a history of such an occurrence. To Dr. Bishop he said it had occurred to him not once, 'but several times, and he paid no attention to it. Additional testimony of some of the workman’s associates is to the effect that lie had been complaining of cold or grippe before bis employment with the Standard Oil Company, and h'ad secured this latter employment in hope of improving his condition by work in tbe open air. Divergent views have been entertained in other jurisdictions on the relaxation by a Court of its ordinary rule for excluding -hearsay evidence on review of compensation eases.

The commissions which administer the- laws in the first instance cannot be expected to adhere closely to- the rather complex rules developed for jury trials in judicial proceedings, and they are in many compensation laws expressly relieved from doing so-. Section 10 of the- Maryland act provides that “The Commission shall not be bound by the usual dom ²⁵³ mjon law or statutory rules of evidence and technical or formal rules of procedure, but may make the investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best Calculated to ascertain the substantial right® of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of this act.” It i.s the view of some courts ' that, in the absence of a statutory provision relaxing the ordinary court rales (and there is none in Maryland!), a court, on -review, is expected to give the case its usual scrutiny, discriminating as to the evidence received according to its ordinary rules. An instance -of this is in Illinois. Peoria Cordage Co. v. Industrial Board, 284 Ill. 90 .

Inland Rubber Co. v. Industrial Commission, 309 Ill. 43 . Wigmore, in la comment oar the latter case, in 18 Ill. Law Rev. 248, questions the propriety of “the- insistence -that