Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Commission

CHASANOW, Judge. We granted the request for a writ of certiorari in this case to consider whether a police officer certificate, issued by the ³⁷⁶ Maryland Police Training Commission pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1997 Repl.Vol.), Article 41, § 4-201(d)(6), is automatically “revoked” upon the officer’s termination of employment with a law enforcement unit. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that it is. I. The petitioner, Jessie Wayne Stanford, is a former member of the Easton Police Department.

On February 8, 1992, Stanford, a fifteen-year police veteran, pleaded guilty to a charge of misdemeanor theft of federal government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 . The charge arose from misrepresentations made by Stanford on an application for rural housing assistance from the United States Farmers Home Administration (FHA). Stanford indicated to the FHA that he was the sole income earner in his household; based on these representations, he received approximately $7,752.00 in mortgage interest credits. In fact, Stanford shared his home with a woman whose contributions to the household finances, if properly disclosed, would have affected Stanford’s eligibility for housing assistance.

The plea agreement, pursuant to which Stanford was convicted, incorporated a promise to make restitution. In addition, Stanford was sentenced to one year of unsupervised probation. As a result of Stanford’s conviction, the Easton Police Department, terminated his employment on April 29, 1994. Approximately one week later, Stanford was offered a position with the St. Michael’s Police Department.

The effective date of Stanford’s employment with the St. Michael’s Police Department was May 10, 1994. Hence, there was a ten-day period during which Stanford was not a member of any law enforcement unit. On May 16, 1994, Chief Wade A. Roche of the St. Michael’s Police Department notified the agency- that oversees police officer certification, the Police Training Commission (also “the Commission”), that his department had hired Stanford. Chief Roche urged the members of the Police Training Commission ³⁷⁷ to give Stanford “a second chance” in the event they “decide to take [him] to a decertification hearing.” In response, the Police Training Commission invited Chief Roche to attend an upcoming meeting, at which the issue of Stanford’s recertification was scheduled to be discussed.

The Police Training Commission’s characterization of the issue as one of recertification, as opposed to decertification, goes to the heart of the dispute in this case and will be resolved below. Stanford did not receive notice of, and did not attend, the meeting at which his certification was slated for discussion. Following a review of Stanford’s misdemeanor conviction and a reading of several letters of support, a motion to certify Stanford was made and seconded. The motion did not carry, however, and this litigation ensued.

On June 28, 1994, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Stanford filed a petition seeking judicial review of the Commission’s action. He subsequently filed an amended petition and petition for writ of mandamus, alleging, among other things, that because he satisfied the requirements for certification under Maryland law, the Police Training Commission acted illegally in refusing to certify him. Stanford also asserted that the Police Training Commission should have provided him with notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to “decertifying” him. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of the Police Training Commission, and Stanford appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.

On appeal, Stanford maintained that the action taken by the Commission at the June 7 meeting was a revocation of his certification. The significance of this contention is that Maryland law requires compliance "with certain procedures prior to the Commission’s revocation or suspension of an officer’s certificate. Specifically, the Commission must “hold a hearing, in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act....” Md.Code (1957, 1997 Repl..Vol.), Art. 41, § 4-201(g)(2). 1 In ³⁷⁸ addition, the officer must receive notice of the hearing, including a statement of the grounds for the contemplated revocation or suspension. § 4-201(g)(3). It is undisputed that the June 7 meeting did not conform to the statutorily-prescribed procedures for revocation hearings.

The Court of Special Appeals disagreed with Stanford’s claim that the Commission revoked his certification on June 7. Rather, after examining the relevant statutory language, the court concluded that Stanford’s certification was automatically revoked upon his termination from the Easton Police Department: “Although [the statute] is not as clear as it could be as to what happens to a police officer’s certification when the officer’s employment is terminated by a law enforcement agency, ... the statutory scheme behind the statute reveals that the legislat[ure] did not intend that an individual who ceases to be a police officer continue[ ] to hold his or her certification.” (Footnote omitted). The intermediate appellate court concluded that the meeting of June 7 did not constitute a decertification hearing, the characterization urged by Stanford, but rather amounted to a recertification hearing. Because there is no requirement that an officer be provided with notice and opportunity to be heard with regard to his or her recertification, the Commission’s action of June 7 was held to be proper. 2 This Court granted certiorari to consider the pivotal issue of whether a police officer’s certificate is automatically “revoked” upon the termination of the officer’s employment with a police department.

Stanford presents essentially the same arguments to this Court as he did below; namely, that the Commission improperly revoked his certification at the meeting of June 7, and that the Commission violated Maryland law and principles of due process by depriving him of certification without notice and an opportunity to be heard. For ³⁷⁹ reasons that we shall explain, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that termination of employment effects an automatic “revocation” of certification. Stanford thus lost his certification upon his separation from the Easton Police Department on April 29, not as a result of the Commission meeting of June 7.

II

A. The statutes pertinent to police officer certification do not explicitly provide that termination of employment invalidates an officer’s certificate. Stanford seizes upon the absence of an express statement to this effect as the basis for his argument. Invoking the rule of statutory construction that the express authorization of one action implies exclusion of another, see, e.g., Mossburg v. Montgomery County, Md., 329 Md. 494, 505 , 620 A.2d 886, 892 (1993), Stanford notes that § 4-201 explicitly sets forth a number of circumstances under which an officer may lose his or her certification, but does not include termination of employment among them. The implication, Stanford contends, is that the legislature did not intend termination to result in automatic decertification; otherwise, this potentiality would have been included among the various provisions of § 4-201.

The mere failure to provide expressly for decertification upon termination, however, does not mean that the legislature intended certification to continue. “That which necessarily is implied in the statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.” Soper v. Montgomery County, 294 Md. 331, 335 , 449 A.2d 1158, 1160 (1982)(emphasis added)(superseded in part by statute)(citing Guardian Life Ins. v. Ins. Comm’r, 293 Md. 629, 643 , 446 A.2d 1140, 1148 (1982); Chillum-Adelphi v. Board, 247 Md. 373, 377 , 231 A.2d 60, 62 (1967); Restivo v. Princeton Constr. Co., 223 Md. 516, 525 , 165 A.2d 766, 771 (I960)). Accordingly, the Commission argues that the statutory provisions pertinent to police officer certification “collectively ... demonstrate ... the General Assem ³⁸⁰ bly’s intent in linking a police officer’s certification with his or her continuing employment as a person authorized to enforce the general criminal laws____” More specifically, the Commission contends that because “police officer” is statutorily defined as “a person who has the authority to enforce the general criminal laws of this State and is a member of’ one of twelve enumerated “law enforcement units,” Stanford could not have remained certified as a “police officer” when he was no longer a member of a law enforcement unit.

In further support of its position, the Commission singles out several regulations that indicate that termination brings about an automatic revocation of certification. These regulations have survived several amendments to § 4-201, which, the Commission asserts, evidences implicit legislative approval of the Commission’s interpretation of the effect of termination. B. As the preceding summary of the parties’ arguments indicates, this case involves an issue of statutory construction. “As we have so often said, the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intention.” State v. Crescent Cities Jaycees, 330 Md. 460, 468 , 624 A.2d 955, 959 (1993). In determining legislative intent, “the court’s inquiry begins with the words of the statute____” Tidewater v. Mayor of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 344 , 653 A.2d 468, 472 (1995).

The statutory language is not read in isolation, but “in light of the full context in which [it] appeals], and in light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence.” Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185 , 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989); see also Warsame v. State, 338 Md. 513, 519 , 659 A.2d 1271, 1273 (1995); Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15 , 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987). Applying these principles to the instant case, we conclude that the General Assembly intends a police officer’s certification to be invalidated upon termination of employment with a law enforcement agency. ³⁸¹ 1. Our analysis begins with a review of the statutory provisions under which the Commission acts and pursuant to which certificates are issued. The Police Training Commission was created in an effort by the legislature to improve the educational and clinical training of police officers.

Chapter 286 of the Acts of 1966. Hoping to redress what it perceived as “a serious need for improvement in the administration of law enforcement,” the General Assembly established the Commission for the purpose of developing “a minimal standards educational and training program.” Id. The specific powers, responsibilities, and duties of the Commission presently are codified at § 4-201 and include such tasks as adopting standards for the approval of police training schools; certifying and periodically inspecting training schools; developing curriculum and minimal educational requirements for training schools; prescribing minimum qualifications for police school instructors; and verifying the satisfactory completion of training programs by police officers. § 4-201(d)(1)—(5). Most importantly for purposes of the case sub judice, the Commission is responsible for the certification of police officers.

Maryland law prohibits, with limited exceptions, the employment of any individual as a police officer who is not certified by the Commission. § 4-201(j). Those individuals who have “[satisfactorily met the Commission’s standards; or ... [provided the Commission with sufficient evidence [of satisfactory completion of] a training program in another state of equal quality and content as required by the Commission” are eligible for certification. § 4-201(d)(6). The precise standards for certification are established by regulation 3 pursuant to the Commission’s express rule making authority. See § 4-201(d)(ll). ³⁸² In conjunction with the power to issue certificates, the Commission possesses the authority to revoke, suspend, or recall certificates under certain conditions.

Pursuant to § 4-201(d)(7), for example, the Commission is empowered to revoke or suspend a certificate “if the police officer has violated or has failed to meet the Commission’s standards, including having knowingly failed to report suspected child abuse in violation of § 5-704 of the Family Law Article.” Furthermore, if the suspension or revocation is prompted by the occurrence of certain enumerated events, the Commission may recall the certificate. The specific grounds for recall are: “(1) The certificate was issued by administrative error; (2) The certificate was obtained through misrepresentation or fraud; (3) The holder has been convicted of a felony; or (4) The holder has been convicted of a misdemeanor for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than 1 year may be imposed.” § 4-201(l). Even if the Commission does not initiate an action for revocation, suspension, or recall, an officer may lose his or her certification through “automatic lapse.” Section 4-201(h) provides: “Automatic lapse of officer’s certificate; recertification.— (1) A police officer’s certificate ... shall automatically lapse 3 years from the date of the previous certification.” A police officer’s certificate thus automatically expires 3 years after issuance. Section 4-201(i) suggests that the failure to meet the Commission’s standards may also cause a certificate to lapse.

That section states that “[i]f the certificate is in danger of lapsing or has lapsed because of the police officer’s failure to meet the Commission’s standards, the police officer may request a hearing____” (Emphasis added). Section 4-201 thus sets forth a number of ways in which an officer could lose his or her certification. Stanford urges us to find significance in the failure to include termination of employment among these express provisions. In a number of ³⁸³ cases, we have indeed recognized that “where the Legislature in a statute expressly authorizes a particular action under certain circumstances, the statute ordinarily should be construed as not allowing the action under other circumstances.” Mossburg, 329 Md. at 505 , 620 A.2d at 892 ; see also Office & Prof.

Employees Int’l v. MTA, 295 Md. 88, 96 , 453 A.2d 1191, 1195 (1982)(observing that “the Legislature’s enumeration of one item, purpose, etc. ordinarily implies the exclusion of all others”); American Security v. New Amsterdam, 246 Md. 36, 41 , 227 A.2d 214, 217 (1967)(referring to principle that “the express imposition of one qualification shows a deliberate rejection of any other”). In American Security , for example, this Court held that a mortgagee was not a “purchaser” for purposes of a statute that protected property sold to bona fide purchasers from attachment by the seller’s creditors. 246 Md. at 41 , 227 A.2d at 216-17 . In reaching this decision, the Court explained: “Had the legislature intended to include a mortgagee within the terms of the statute, it would undoubtedly have done so, and since it did not, the implication is that mortgagees were purposely excluded.” Id. In contrast to those cases in which this maxim, sometimes expressed as “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” has been applied, however, the statutory language in the instant case does not support the inference that the General Assembly purposely excluded termination of employment such that an officer’s certification would survive his or her separation from a law enforcement unit.

Stated otherwise, we are unable to conclude that if the legislature had intended termination of employment to invalidate automatically an officer’s certification, it necessarily would have included such a provision in § 4-201. 2. Preliminarily, we note that the provisions dealing with the Commission’s specific power to revoke, suspend, or recall certificates do little, if anything, to resolve the