Stanford v. State

CATHELL, Judge. Petitioner Richard Warren Stanford was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County of possessing cocaine. He was sentenced to two years of imprisonment, with one year suspended in favor of eighteen months of probation. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence in an unreported opinion.

Prior to trial, petitioner moved to suppress as evidence the cocaine he subsequently was convicted of possessing. That motion was denied. On appeal, petitioner challenges that pretrial ruling, arguing that his detention by the police, during which the cocaine was discovered, was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. We agree and vacate his conviction.

I. Background The Baltimore County Police Department obtained on February 7, 1997, a “no-knock” search and seizure warrant for Apartment D in the Hartland Run Apartment Complex near Essex, Maryland. The affidavit supporting the warrant explained that a confidential informant had told the police that two men nicknamed “Poo” and “Tony” were distributing cocaine from Apartment D, which was rented by “Poo.” The informant believed a man nicknamed “Shawn” supplied “Poo” and “Tony” with the cocaine and also carried a handgun. ⁵³⁰ During their preliminary investigation, the police arranged for the informant to purchase cocaine from the men, once from “Poo” and “Tony” together, and on a second occasion from “Poo” alone. The police also learned the lessee of Apartment D was Mr. Tavon Banks and that the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company billing records for the apartment were in Mr. Banks’ name. The search warrant authorized the police to search the apartment as well as the persons of Mr. Banks, whom the police believed to be “Poo,” and the individuals nicknamed “Tony” and “Shawn.” The record reflects the police knew that “Tony” was the street name of Mr. Raoul Jenkins. “Shawn,” however, remained unknown to the police during the investigation and no officer claimed to believe petitioner might be “Shawn.” The warrant, based on the informant’s tip, described “Shawn” as a black male, with a height of five feet, eight inches, and weighing 175 pounds.

Petitioner, a black male, is six feet tall and weighs 210 pounds. At about 8:30 p.m. on February 7, Detective Keith Williams began surveillance of the Hartland Run Apartment Complex in preparation of the execution of the warrant. From his undercover truck, Detective Williams could see the common stairwell of the budding and its entranceway, but not the door to Apartment D. Detective Williams observed three black men exit that stairwell. He immediately recognized Mr. Banks, but not the other two individuals, who were Mr. Jenkins and petitioner.

The three men got into petitioner’s automobile, with petitioner driving, and left. Detective Williams radioed to uniformed officers- in the area to stop the three men so they could be brought back to Apartment D during the search. ' ' Uniformed officers stopped the vehicle on Maryland Route 702 about one-fourth of a mile from the apartment complex. Detective Williams drove toward the scene on Route 702, but observed the stop from a distance to protect his cover. As the officers removed the three men from the car, Detective Williams recognized Mr. Jenkins, whom he knew to be “Tony” from the search warrant.

Detective Williams still did not recognize petitioner. Upon the uniformed officers’ request, ⁵³¹ petitioner produced his registration and driver’s license. Both documents showed his address, which was not Apartment D. The license listed petitioner’s height as six feet and weight as 210 pounds. The uniformed officers checked both documents with the dispatcher for any criminal information, which yielded negative results.

All three men were frisked for weapons, handcuffed, and taken in a police car back to Apartment D. Detective Williams testified that petitioner was “detained” with the others because neither he nor the officers could identify petitioner. 1 Once returned to the apartment, the three men were taken into the kitchen and handcuffed individually to three chairs near the kitchen table. Detective Jeffrey Sewell, the author of the warrant application, sat at the remaining chair at the table and kept an inventory during the search. Detective Frank Massoni, also involved in the investigation, read the three men the search warrant and their Miranda rights. Detective Massoni then took the three men into the bathroom one at a time and strip searched them while other officers searched the apartment for contraband.

Mr. Banks was searched first, then Mr. Jenkins. Detective Sewell later testified that as Mr. Jenkins was being returned to his chair, petitioner “was moving around in his chair [and] moving his hands behind his back.” While petitioner was being strip searched in the bathroom, Detective Sewell found two “baggies” of cocaine on the floor under the table, near where petitioner had been sitting. Other contraband was discovered in the apartment and all three men were arrested. Prior to his trial, petitioner moved to suppress the cocaine as evidence, arguing that his detention was illegal under the ⁵³² Fourth Amendment.

The motions judge, however, denied the motion. Petitioner was tried and convicted in a bench trial before another judge. After petitioner’s conviction, he appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the motions judge erred in denying the motion to suppress. The intermediate appellate court affirmed in an unreported opinion.

We granted a writ of certiorari. Petitioner presents the following questions in his brief: 1. Whether the rule of Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 , 101 S.Ct. 2587 , 69 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981), applies to nonresidents and non-occupants of a residence who are not named in a search warrant to search the residence. 2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress.

II

Michigan v. Summers Seizures of the person are judged under a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697, 699-700 , 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2591, 2593 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981). Generally, any seizure of a person, whether by arrest or detention, must be supported by probable cause. Summers, 452 U.S. at 700 , 101 S.Ct. at 2593 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 ; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 , 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2254 , 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); see also Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 120 , 660 A.2d 447, 472 (1995) (“[A] police officer has legal justification to make a warrantless arrest where he has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed, and that the arrestee perpetrated the offense.” (citing Md.Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol., 1994 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 594B(c))).

For Fourth Amendment purposes the Supreme Court has created certain exceptions to the probable cause requirement. For example, police officers may “stop and frisk” an individual if they have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is engaged in criminal activity and presently armed and dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884-85 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, ⁵³³ 422 U.S. 873, 881 , 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (holding Border Patrol agents may lawfully stop persons they reasonably suspect of being illegal immigrants and question them about their citizenship); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 , 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (extending the holding of Terry to a stop based on a reliable informant’s tip that the defendant might be armed and carrying illegal drugs). Another exception relevant to this opinion was created in Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 , 101 S.Ct. at 2595 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 , when the Supreme Court held that “a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” (Footnote omitted.) In Summers, the defendant was walking down the front steps of his own single family home just as officers approached to search it pursuant to a warrant.

The officers asked Mr. Summers to open the door. Mr. Summers told the police that he had locked his keys inside. He rang the intercom, but the person answering refused to open the door. The police forced open the door.

One officer brought Mr. Summers into the house and detained him. Eight other people in the house also were detained. The officers searched the house and discovered illegal drugs in the basement. The officers then arrested Mr. Summers and, upon a search incident to arrest, found an envelope containing heroin in his jacket.

The Supreme Court initially noted that Dunaway “reaffirmed the general rule that an official seizure of the person must be supported by probable cause, even if no formal arrest is made.” Summers, 452 U.S. at 696 , 101 S.Ct. at 2591 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 . Dunaway , however, “recognized that some seizures significantly less intrusive than an arrest have withstood scrutiny under the reasonableness standard embodied in the Fourth Amendment.” Summers, 452 U.S. at 697 , 101 S.Ct. at 2591 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 . The Supreme Court cited Terry, Adams, and Brignoni-Ponce as examples of less intru ⁵³⁴ sive seizures. In those cases, the Supreme Court “reeognize[d] that some seizures admittedly covered by the Fourth Amendment constitute such limited intrusions on the personal security of those detained and are justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that they may be made on less than probable cause, so long as police have an articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity.” Summers, 452 U.S. at 699 , 101 S.Ct. at 2592-98 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 .

Turning to the circumstances in Summers, the Supreme Court first noted that detaining “residents” of a household during a search of their home was a limited intrusion under the Fourth Amendment because the detention was “surely less intrusive than the search itself.” Id. at 701, 101 S.Ct. at 2593 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 . The Supreme Court reasoned that residents of a home being searched, unless they intended to flee, would want to stay in the premises to observe the search for then-own protection. In addition, because the detention occurs in their own residence, there would be less public stigma than an investigative detention at the station house. Next, the Supreme Court examined the heightened law enforcement justifications for a detention during a search.

The Court noted three particular interests: (1) preventing flight should contraband be found; (2) “minimizing the risk of harm to the officers”; and (3) gaining the assistance of the “occupants” to facilitate an orderly and quick search, for example, by opening locked doors or containers. Id. at 702-OS, 101 S.Ct. at 2594 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 . The Court also emphasized that because a search warrant had been obtained, the decision of whether sufficient probable cause existed to enter Mr. Summers’ home had been made by a neutral, detached magistrate, not the officers in the field. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that as long as police interests justify a limited detention, “[i]f the evidence that a citizen’s residence is harboring contraband is sufficient to persuade a judicial officer that an invasion of the citizen’s privacy is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require that citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a valid warrant to ⁵³⁵ search his home.” Id. at 704-05 , 101 S.Ct. at 2595 , 69 L.Ed.2d 840 .

III. “Occupants” The parties in this case debate the meaning Summers gives to “occupants” of the place to be searched. Summers used the term “occupants” interchangeably with “residents,” without defining either term. The briefs submitted to this Court note a split of authority in other jurisdictions as to whether “occupants” applies to persons visiting the searched premises when the police execute a search warrant. A review of the relevant case law reveals three different approaches.

First, some jurisdictions categorically limit Summers to actual residents of the place to be searched. See United States v. Reid, 997 F.2d 1576, 1579 (D.C.Cir.1993) (“[Ujnlike Summers, Reid was not a resident of the apartment which was to be searched under the warrant, and the trial did not disclose that he had any proprietary or residential interest in the suspected premises.”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1132 , 114 S.Ct. 1105 , 127 L.Ed.2d 417 (1994); State v. Carrasco, 147 Ariz. 558, 561 , 711 P.2d 1231, 1234 (Ariz.Ct.App.1985) (noting that the Supreme Court’s reasoning that police could facilitate the search by using a detained suspect to open locked doors and containers logically does not apply to visitors); State v. Williams, 665 So.2d 112, 115 (La.Ct.App.1995) (affirming a motion to suppress because the defendant “was not a resident of the house to be searched, nor was she even a known suspect.”); People v. Burbank, 137 Mich.App. 266, 269 , 358 N.W.2d 348, 349 (1984) (per curiam) (distinguishing Summers because the defendant “did not live in the house that the police were searching.”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 , 105 S.Ct. 962 , 83 L.Ed.2d 967 (1985); Lippert v. State, 664 S.W.2d 712, 720 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (“[W]e do not agree that Summers can be extended to a non-occupant....”). Language in Summers appears to support this interpretation. For example, the Supreme Court, justifying the probable cause exception, said: ⁵³⁶ A neutral and detached magistrate had found probable cause to believe that the law was being violated in that house and had authorized a substantial invasion of the privacy of the persons who resided there.

The detention of one of the residents while the premises were searched, although admittedly a significant restraint on his liberty, was surely less intrusive than the search itself. Indeed, we may safely assume that most citizens ... would elect to remain in order to observe the search of their possessions. ... Moreover, because the detention in this case was in [Summers ]’s own residence, it could add only minimally to the public stigma associated with the search.... Summers, 452 U.S. at 701-02, 101 S.Ct. at 2593-94 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).

In its holding, the Supreme Court stated that “it is constitutionally reasonable to require [a] citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a valid warrant to search his home.” Id. at 705, 101 S.Ct. at 2595 , 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (emphasis added). Quoting part of this language, Professor Wayne LaFave argues “that the word ‘occupants’ is not to be loosely construed as covering anyone present, but instead is to be interpreted literally.” 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.9(e), at 650 (3d ed.1996) (footnote omitted). A second group of jurisdictions also recognize that a visitor generally may not be detained under Summers; however, these jurisdictions allow a detention if the police can point to reasonably articulable facts that associate the visitor with the residence or the criminal activity being investigated in the search warrant. To ascertain whether such an association exists, these cases recognize that police must make a minimal intrusion to ascertain the visitor’s identity.

See Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1192 (3d Cir.1995) (“Although Summers itself only pertains to a resident of the house under warrant, it follows that the police may stop people coming to or going from the house if police need to ascertain whether they live there.”); United States v. McEaddy, 780 F.Supp. 464, 471 (E.D.Mich.1991) (holding that “‘occupant’ refers to any individual on the premises who, from the per ⁵³⁷ spective of the executing officers at the scene, might reasonably have some relationship to the subject premises.”), aff'd sub nom. United States v.