Stanley v. State

DeAngelo Montier Stanley v. State of Maryland, No. 521, Sept. Term 2019. Opinion by Arthur, J. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE⸺CROSS-EXAMINATION Defendants have the right to cross-examine witnesses about matters relating to their biases, interests, or motives to testify falsely, but this right is not unlimited. In this case, the trial court permitted the defense to elicit testimony that a prosecution witness made numerous allegations against the defendant and others under an expectation of leniency. The court did not abuse its discretion in restricting cross-examination about the details of the witness’s allegations against others, such as their names and the crimes that they allegedly committed.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE⸺SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court does not re-weigh the evidence or re-assess the credibility of witnesses. Here, even though the defendant identified many reasons to disbelieve two witnesses who implicated the defendant, the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant committed the offense. Circuit Court for Wicomico County Case No. C-22-CR-18-0636 REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 521 September Term, 2019 ______________________________________ DEANGELO MONTIER STANLEY v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Nazarian, Arthur, Sharer, J. Frederick (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Arthur, J. ______________________________________ Filed: December 16, 2020 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. Suzanne Johnson 2021-01-14 13:01-05:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk On August 5, 2018, two strangers assaulted Johnata DeCastro on a Salisbury street, permanently disabling him.

Crediting evidence that appellant DeAngelo Stanley was one of those assailants, a jury in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County convicted him of first- and second-degree assault and reckless endangerment. The court sentenced him to imprisonment for 18 years. In this timely appeal, Stanley presents the following questions: 1. Did the trial court err in limiting defense counsel’s cross-examination of Glay Kimble, a jailhouse informant and critical State witness? 2.

Is the evidence sufficient to sustain [Stanley’s] convictions? We conclude that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in restricting the cross-examination. We also conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to support Stanley’s convictions. Consequently, we shall affirm the convictions.

BACKGROUND At some point after 1:00 a.m. on August 5, 2018, Johnata DeCastro and his wife, Raquel Queiroz, were driving along Church Street in Salisbury, heading to her sister’s house to pick up their child. DeCastro had gotten extremely drunk at a party, and he and Queiroz were arguing. Three blocks from their destination, DeCastro got out of the car, shouted back at Queiroz, and walked away. When her husband was approximately 25 to 30 feet away from the corner of Church Street and Davis Street, Queiroz saw that two men, one white and the other a “dark-skinned,” “skinny” African American with dreadlocks, were walking with DeCastro.

One of the men put his hands on DeCastro’s shoulder and said something, which Queiroz could not hear. By the time Queiroz rounded the block and circled back, she did not see anyone. According to DeCastro, two men came up to him while he was walking away from his car. They started grabbing at his bag.

When they rounded a corner, the men hit him on the head, and he fell to the ground. He remembers nothing else. At 1:41 a.m. on August 5, 2018, police officers and paramedics responded to a report of a “man down” behind 700 East Church Street, at the intersection of Church and Davis Streets. They found DeCastro behind a garage or shed in the back of the house.

He was unconscious and bleeding, with head wounds that included a basal skull fracture, a “brain bleed” (apparently a hemorrhage of the blood vessels in the brain), and “scalping” injuries consistent with being kicked. His wallet was nearby, but $100 in cash was gone. Felipe Perez had called 911 to report the altercation in which DeCastro was assaulted. At the scene, Perez, who has a mental disability, told the police that he saw a couple of people arguing out on the corner.

Although many of the neighbors came out to watch the police officers and EMTs, no one gave any information about what had occurred. Porsha DuPont, who lived at 700 East Church Street, told the investigators that she “didn’t see anything.” DeCastro was in a coma for three days and was unable to be interviewed for several weeks. Even then, he was unaware of his surroundings or of the year, and he seemed to believe he was back in his native Brazil. His traumatic brain injuries have left 2 him with epilepsy, impaired language and motor skills, and personality changes.

He remains unable to work. On August 28, 2018, a Salisbury police detective received an anonymous call from a woman who reported that she had information about the assault that happened on Church Street. The police traced the call to Cotrenna Drayton. She denied making the call and refused to talk to the detective.

On September 13, 2018, Drayton was arrested on unrelated charges. She initially refused to make any statement about the Church Street assault, but she changed her mind when the investigators told her that the State’s Attorney had “options” to address her concerns about her safety.1 Although Drayton was initially tearful and reluctant to talk, she eventually gave a recorded statement, in which she told the police that on August 5, 2018, she was driving on Barclay Street in Salisbury, toward its intersection with Church Street. She pulled up at the stop sign, from which she could look toward 700 East Church Street and the intersection of Church Street and Davis Street. She said that she “caught the end” of the assault and saw “DeAngelo” (i.e.

Stanley) kicking the victim. Drayton identified Stanley from a photo array. Next to the photograph of Stanley, Drayton wrote, “[T]hat’s the person that we talked about earlier.” At trial, Drayton gave a different account, refusing to implicate Stanley. She testified that she and Stanley had a relationship that ended “back around August 2018[,]” that she did not see Stanley “kick anybody in the head[,]” and that she did not tell the 1 According to the State, Drayton ultimately received nothing of value. 3 police that she saw Stanley at the scene of the assault.

Admitting that she did not want to be in court, she claimed that she could not see the assault while stopped on Barclay Street. A Salisbury police detective had previously testified on cross-examination that a person could not see the location where the victim was found (behind a shed or garage at the back of 700 East Church Street) from the intersection of Church and Barclay Streets. 2 After reviewing a transcript of the recorded statement that she gave to the police, Drayton claimed that she did not recall identifying Stanley. She continued to claim that she knew nothing about the assault. She nevertheless admitted that her handwriting was on the photograph of Stanley in the photo array.

The court admitted the recorded statement under Md. Rule 5-802.1(a)(3), the hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements recorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic or electronic means contemporaneously with the making of the statement. A second informant, Glay Kimble, also implicated Stanley in the assault on DeCastro. Kimble told the investigators that, when he and Stanley were incarcerated on unrelated charges on August 30, 2018, Stanley had admitted his involvement in multiple crimes, including an assault on Church Street in which Stanley believed that the victim 2 Because it is difficult to grasp the configuration of the various intersections without a visual guide, and because there was some question at trial about whether Drayton could have seen an assault near the intersection of Church and Davis Streets from the intersection of Church and Barclay Streets, we have attached copies of State’s Exhibit 4 and Defendant’s Exhibit 2 in the appendix to this opinion. State’s Exhibit 4 is an aerial photograph that shows the intersection and Church and Davis Streets and the nearby intersection of Church and Barclay Streets.

Defendant’s Exhibit 2 is an image of 700 East Church Street (including the shed or garage at the back of the property), taken from the intersection of Church and Barclay Streets. 4 “did not make it.” During a police interview earlier that same month, Kimble had implicated others in unrelated crimes. At trial, Kimble testified that Stanley had approached him while they were both in jail. Stanley inquired whether Kimble was the father of Drayton’s son. When Kimble answered that he is, Stanley warned him that he “needed to get [his] son” because Drayton “knew some things” that Stanley had done and was threatening to call the police about them.

In response to Kimble’s question about what Drayton knew, Stanley said that he had beaten someone up on Church Street, that he was not sure whether the person had died, but that he did not think that the person had made it. According to Stanley, the beating occurred near a white house where “Dave” and Porsha DuPont lived. On cross-examination, the defense established that Kimble initially told the investigators that Stanley had described the victim as a woman. Kimble tried to explain away that statement by saying that Stanley was “beating on” Drayton, and he did not know whether Stanley was referring to her as a person who knew about the assault or as the victim.

Although Kimble had received a benefit for testifying in other cases (he got into a drug-rehabilitation program), he insisted that he did not receive anything for testifying against Stanley in this case. David Cutler, a resident of 700 East Church Street, testified that he had seen Stanley “a lot in Salisbury” and that Stanley would hang out on the porch of Cutler’s house “[o]ff and on.” Cutler recalled seeing Stanley on the porch earlier on the day of the assault. On cross-examination, Cutler stated that had never seen Stanley with dreadlocks. 5 Porsha DuPont, called by the defense, testified that she was living at 700 East Church Street on August 5, 2018, but “really didn’t know” DeAngelo Stanley. She said that she “didn’t see him all that day or night.” Like Cutler, she testified that she had never seen Stanley with dreadlocks.

The defense also called Darrell Mainor, who had been in an intimate relationship with Cotrenna Drayton when she was arrested in September 2018. Mainor testified that when he picked Drayton up from jail after she had been arrested, she told him that she had falsely accused Stanley in order to obtain favorable treatment. According to Mainor, Drayton said: “I lied on him whatever, saying, basically, that he really did it, but he really didn’t.” On cross-examination, Mainor admitted that he had “just recently” been housed with Stanley “on lockup[.]” When asked why he had not come forward earlier with exculpatory information that he had had since last September, Mainor claimed he “was working or . . . had warrants out.” Mainor acknowledged that, even though he had been incarcerated for the last four months, he did not notify anyone in law enforcement that Drayton had told him about her false accusation against Stanley. Instead, he waited until “about three or four days” before trial, to tell defense counsel what Drayton had allegedly said.

In closing argument, defense counsel argued that there was reasonable doubt about whether Stanley assaulted DeCastro because neither Drayton nor Kimble were reliable witnesses. Counsel maintained that Drayton falsely accused Stanley and recanted her accusation and that Drayton could not have seen the assault from the intersection where 6 she claimed to have stopped. Counsel also maintained that Kimble was an unreliable jailhouse informant who had fabricated Stanley’s confession in order to get favorable treatment on charges in other cases, but that he “got it all wrong” by claiming that the victim was a woman. Counsel pointed out that no physical evidence linked Stanley to the crime and that, unlike the person described by Queiroz, Stanley has never worn dreadlocks.

The jury acquitted Stanley of attempted first- and second-degree murder, but convicted him of first- and second-degree assault, as well as reckless endangerment. DISCUSSION I. Cross-Examination Challenge Stanley contends that “[t]he trial court’s refusal to allow defense counsel to cross- examine jailhouse informant Glay Kimble about the multitude of other people he identified as murderers in August 2018 violated the Confrontation Clause as well as principles of fundamental fairness and due process, and otherwise amounted to an abuse of discretion.” After reviewing the relevant law and the record, we disagree. Standards Governing Review of Cross-Examination of Prosecution Witness About Bias Based on Dealings with Law Enforcement The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee criminal defendants the ability to confront the witnesses against them. See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 416 Md. 418, 428 (2010); Church v. State, 408 Md. 650, 663 (2009).

This right includes the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses about matters relating, among other things, to 7 their biases, interests, or motives to testify falsely. See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 416 Md. at 428 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974)); accord Marshall v. State, 346 Md. 186, 192 (1997). “Where a witness has a ‘deal’ with the State, the jury is entitled to know the terms of the agreement and to assess whether the ‘deal’ would reasonably tend to indicate that his testimony has been influenced by bias or motive to testify falsely.” Marshall v. State, 346 Md. at 197-98 . Thus, for example, a trial court may not restrict cross-examination about the pending charges against the State’s eyewitness, Manchame-Guerra v. State, 457 Md. 300, 303, 322 (2018); about whether a State witness’s testimony was motivated by the hope of favorable treatment on other charges, Martinez v. State, 416 Md. at 431 - 32; or about whether a State witness came forward “in the hope of being released from detention, and whether he was testifying at trial in the hope of avoiding a violation of probation charge.” Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 619-20, 637 (2010).3 “The ability to cross-examine witnesses, however, is not unrestricted.” Martinez v. State, 416 Md. at 428 . In accordance with its duty and power to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence” (Md. Rule 5-611(a)), a trial court may exercise its discretion to “impose reasonable limits on cross-examination when necessary for witness safety or to prevent harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, and inquiry that is repetitive or only marginally 3 The primary evidentiary contributors to false convictions include lying jailhouse informants.

Jeffrey Bellin, The Evidence Rules that Convict the Innocent, 106 Cornell L. Rev. ---- (2020) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 3547421). 8 relevant.” Martinez v. State, 416 Md. at 428 . These limits do not infringe a defendant’s confrontation rights so long as the defendant has reached “the ‘constitutionally required threshold level of inquiry’” (Martinez v. State, 416 Md. at 428 , quoting Smallwood v. State, 320 Md. 300, 307 (1990)), that is, so long as the defendant “has been ‘permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness[.]’” Id. (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 318 ); accord Manchame-Guerra v. State, 457 Md. at 309-10 . In summary, “[a] judge must allow a defendant wide latitude to cross-examine a witness as to bias or prejudices, but the questioning must not be allowed to stray into collateral matters which would obscure the trial issues and lead to the factfinder’s confusion.” Marshall v. State, 346 Md. at 195 .

On appeal, the standard of review “takes into account both the defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation and the discretionary authority of the trial judge to assert ‘control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence.’” Manchame-Guerra v. State, 457 Md. at 311 (quoting Md. Rule 5-611(a)). In controlling the course of examination of a witness, a trial court may make a variety of judgment calls under Maryland Rule 5-611 as to whether particular questions are repetitive, probative, harassing, confusing, or the like. The trial court may also restrict cross-examination based on its understanding of the legal rules that may limit particular questions or areas of inquiry. Given that the trial court has its finger on the pulse of the trial while an appellate court does not, decisions of the first type should be reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Decisions based on a legal determination should be reviewed under a less deferential standard. Finally, when an appellant alleges a violation of the Confrontation Clause, an appellate court must consider whether the cumulative result of those decisions, some of which are judgment calls and some of which are legal decisions, denied the 9 appellant the opportunity to reach the “threshold level of inquiry” required by the Confrontation Clause. Manchame-Guerra v. State, 457 Md. at 311 (quoting Peterson v. State, 444 Md. 105, 124 (2015)). Cross-Examination Record During direct examination, the prosecutor elicited Kimble’s testimony that he “provide[d] information in other cases not related to this” one.

Kimble told the jury that Stanley’s involvement in the DeCastro assault “came up” “[d]uring the course of [his] cooperation in those other cases.” Kimble insisted, however, that he did not “receive any benefit for [his] testimony” “in this particular case.” On cross-examination, defense counsel sought to impeach Kimble’s credibility by establishing that he was a “jailhouse snitch” in multiple cases: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You call yourself a snitch, is that correct? [KIMBLE]: I guess if you want to call it telling, snitching, I did. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Telling, okay. And you have done that in several cases, is that correct? [KIMBLE]: I did. Defense counsel also sought to impeach Kimble’s credibility by establishing that he fabricated his testimony that Stanley made incriminatory statements about the DeCastro assault: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: [W]hen you were interviewed by the police, you implicated numerous people in murders, is that correct? [PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor – 10 THE COURT: Sustained. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It’s your contention to the police that numerous people come to you and confess their crimes, correct? [PROSECUTOR]: There’s multiple different interviews – THE COURT: If you’re going to say objection, say objection. [PROSECUTOR]: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. – Mr. Stanley’s – the accusation you made against Mr. Stanley was one of many accusations you made against people to these detectives, is that correct? [KIMBLE]: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. [KIMBLE]: And they were true. . . . [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.

They’re all true. You said you’re out of jail now, correct? [KIMBLE]: I’m still in an institution. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: What institution? [KIMBLE]: I’m in the NCTC [sic]. It’s like the Malcolm Manor Treatment . . . Facility [sic].[4] [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And that’s a rehab? [KIMBLE]: It’s a behavior modification treatment center. 4 Kimble may have said that he was at “MCTC” (the Maryland Correctional Training Center near Hagerstown) and that he was in treatment at the Mountain Manor Treatment Center, which has locations in Sykesville and West Baltimore, among other places. 11 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.

And at the time you talked to the detectives, you were in jail, correct? [KIMBLE]: Several jails. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Several jails. And you had 14 years hanging over your head that you thought you might get? [KIMBLE]: 13. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 13, is that correct? [KIMBLE]: Yes, sir. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But instead from the State you got rehab? [KIMBLE]: Or I could have did [sic] three years and came home off the 13. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And . . . that’s what you do. When you go to jail, you start telling on people to get reduction of sentences, isn’t that correct? [KIMBLE]: Actually, I could have served three years. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You could have served what? [KIMBLE]: I could have did [sic] three years. It was just three years off the 13.

So I really wasn’t looking at 13. It was just the number, but the actual sentence I had to do was three years. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. [KIMBLE]: So it wasn’t to come home from jail. I really needed some rehabilitation and for my drug addiction [sic]. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But when you were talking to the detectives about these people confessing to you, you wanted a deal, didn’t you? You wanted leniency? [KIMBLE]: It wasn’t a deal.

It was help, treatment. 12 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Help. [KIMBLE]: I didn’t actually go to home, and I probably could have went [sic] home. I asked to get help. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You could have what? [KIMBLE]: I probably could have been released and went home