Stanley v. State

⁹⁵ ALPERT, Judge. Michael Wardell Stanley, the appellant, was found guilty by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (Femia, J., presiding) of felony murder, robbery with a deadly weapon, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. The court merged the robbery conviction into the murder conviction and imposed concurrent sentences of life and 20 years. This Court affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion.

Stanley v. State, No. 1175, September Term 1986 (filed April 21, 1987). The Court of Appeals granted certiorari, 310 Md. 276 , 528 A.2d 1267 (1987), to examine the issue of whether the procedures used by the State violated the prohibition against racially discriminatory jury selection, as explained in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The Court concluded that under the standards set forth in Batson , a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors was established in this case. Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 73 , 542 A.2d 1287 (1988).

The Court ordered a limited remand under (then) Maryland Rule 871, 1 to allow the State an opportunity to explain the exercise of its peremptory challenges against black venire members during the selection of the petit jury. Pursuant to the remand, a hearing was held on November 22 and 23, and December 1, 1988. At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court found that the State’s reasons for striking black venire members were credible and racially neutral, and denied appellant’s motion for a new trial. Appellant now files this appeal, in which his sole contention is that the State failed to carry its burden of justifying the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges.

We disagree, and shall affirm. In Batson v. Kentucky, supra, the Supreme Court set forth the evidentiary standards and procedures to evaluate a criminal defendant’s claim that he has been denied equal ⁹⁶ protection through the State’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of his race from the petit jury. Under those procedures the defendant has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination in the State’s exercise of its peremptory challenges. Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, however, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging jurors of the defendant’s race. 2 476 U.S. at 97 , 106 S.Ct. at 1723 .

In the instant case the Court of Appeals looked to the following facts and circumstances as giving rise to a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination under the evidentiary standards of Batson . Appellant is a black man; only three of the 12 members of the petit jury were black. The State used eighty percent (eight out of ten) of its peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the jury panel. Through the use of a highly skewed number of challenges, the State eliminated almost one-half of the blacks on the venire.

Moreover, only two of the excluded black jurors indicated any response to the court’s voir dire questions, and of those two neither gave a response which would seem a clear basis for prosecution challenges. Stanley, 313 Md. at 72-73 , 542 A.2d 1267 . These were the circumstances that the State was called upon to explain at the 1988 hearing. The Court of Appeals further directed that at the hearing, the State was to present, if it could, honest, neutral, nonracial reasons for the challenges of each black potential juror who was stricken.

Id. at 92 , 542 A.2d 1267 . The Court ⁹⁷ cautioned that the reasons would have to be legitimate, clear, and reasonably specific, as general assertions of assumed group bias 3 or broad denials of discriminatory motives would be insufficient to overcome the appellant’s prima facie case. Id. The appellant then would be afforded the opportunity to rebut any explanations put forth by the prosecutor and to expose any justification that appeared on its face to be racially neutral, but was in fact a sham or a pretext.

Id. The Court also pointed out, however, that the appellant had the ultimate burden of persuading the court that there had been intentional racial discrimination. Id. at 61 , 542 A.2d 1267 . As it turned out, because of the commendable foresight of the prosecutor, Joseph B. Chazen, the State was able to reconstruct in some detail the circumstances of the jury selection that had taken place two and a half years earlier.

Mr. Chazen testified extensively as to those circumstances. The case began as a death penalty case, and therefore involved a larger than usual venire and a more extensive voir dire examination. Mr. Chazen was aware of the Bat-son decision, then about one month old, and he felt it was important to record and retain as much information about the venire members as possible. During the voir dire examination he made notes on the list of potential jurors provided by the jury commissioner.

He then made his own list on the evening before the final selection of the petit jury, noting which venire members remained on the panel and placing a red dot next to the names of those he definitely intended to strike and a blue dot next to those he would strike if he had enough challenges remaining. These ⁹⁸ lists were entered into evidence at the 1988 hearing and formed the basis for much of Mr. Chazen’s recollection. The examination at the hearing focused on these eight black venire members who were excluded from the petit jury through the State’s peremptory challenges. Rosetta Lester had a red dot next to her name.

Mr. Chazen’s notes did not reflect her age or race, but contained the information that she was employed as a counselor for the District of Columbia Youth Services, and that she had been the victim of several crimes in which no arrests were ever made. Mr. Chazen testified that he challenged her on the basis of her occupation, because it was his belief that counselors are often from a “more social work background, and more liberal in nature.” In addition, he felt that Ms. Lester might harbor some bitterness about police work, since she had been victimized several times in crimes where no arrests were ever made. Joyce Johnson had a blue dot next to her name. The notes reflect that she was 42 years old, divorced, black, and female.

The word “counselor” appears twice, and is underlined for emphasis. In addition, the notes say “avoided eye contact” and “very serious look at me." Mr. Chazen testified that he challenged Ms. Johnson based upon her occupation and her demeanor. Belton Edwards had a blue dot next to his name. The notes reflect that he was 47 years old, married, black, and male, and that he worked for the Department of Recreation.

Mr. Chazen testified that he challenged Mr. Edwards on the basis of his occupation, explaining that: “He worked, I presumed based on that job, he worked with people similar to Mr. Stanley as far as his age and a young man, and I had a problem with the occupation.” Claude Kinard had a red dot next to his name. The notes reflect that he was 65 years old, married, black, and male. They also reflect Mr. Kinard’s answer to one of the questions on voir dire — that his nephew had been charged with murder in the past, but had been “exonerated.” Mr. ⁹⁹ Chazen explained that this situation was “too parallel” for his comfort, and he was concerned that this incident may have created some bias in Mr. Kinard against the State. Trade Ann Simmons was identified in Mr. Chazen’s notes as 19 years old, single, black, and female.

Her age and marital status were underlined. Melodie Lewis was also identified as 19 years old, single, black, and female. Althea Trent was identified as 19 years old, single, and female. Her race was unspecified.

Each of these venire members had a red dot next to her name. In addition, Laurie Riggs, a 20 year old, single female, also had a red dot and the word “strike” underlined twice next to her name. At the time Mr. Chazen placed the red dot next to her name, however, he had her erroneously listed as white. The record reflects some confusion as to Ms. Riggs’ actual race, but it was later stipulated for purposes of the Batson analysis that Ms. Riggs is black.

In any event, her age and marital status are underlined twice. As to each of these venire members, Mr. Chazen testified that he challenged them on the basis of their youthful age. Appellant was 28 at the time of the murder; 25 at the time of the trial. Mr. Chazen believed that young people might be more sympathetic to appellant, and might be more reluctant to impose the death penalty on a young defendant.

Mr. Chazen wanted older, more mature jurors, people who had had some time to grow more conservative as they became “fed up” with crime. He was concerned that young people might not take a drug-related murder as seriously as older jurors. In addition, Mr. Chazen did not favor unmarried jurors, at one point offering his opinion that unmarried people are “less settled.” The defense attempted to persuade the court through argument that the prosecutor’s explanations were essentially a sham, and suggested that the notes might not have been taken contemporaneously with the jury selection but rather might have been reconstructed some time later to bolster the State’s position. The trial judge was not persuaded.

He found instead that the notes were contempora ¹⁰⁰ neous with the jury selection and that the prosecutor’s explanations were honest and credible, were supported by the information contained in the notes, and were racially neutral. The trial judge’s findings as to the contemporaneous nature of the notes, and as to Mr. Chazen’s honesty and credibility, are factual findings that are entitled to great deference by a reviewing court. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, n. 21 , 106 S.Ct. at 1724, n. 21 . This deference, however, applies only to first level fact finding.

We must make our own independent constitutional appraisal as to the ultimate second level fact, the existence or non-existence of neutral, nonracial reasons for striking the black venire members. Chew v. State, 317 Md. 233, 245 , 562 A.2d 1270 (1989); see also Simpkins v. State, 79 Md.App. 687, 694-95 , 558 A.2d 816 (1989). Moreover, the exercise of each and every peremptory challenge must be free from a racially discriminatory purpose. As the Court of Appeals emphasized in Stanley: “[T]he State will not be allowed ‘one free discriminatory strike.’ Any violation requires a new trial.” 313 Md. at 93 , 542 A.2d 1267 .

The challenges, however, are not to be examined in a vacuum. Rather, each must be examined in light of the circumstances under which it was exercised, including an examination of the explanations offered for other peremptory strikes. Id. at 77 , 542 A.2d 1267 . In reviewing the State’s exercise of its peremptory challenges in this case, we are reminded that the peremptory challenge is still considered “one of the most important of the rights in our justice system.” State v. Gorman, 315 Md. 402, 404 , 554 A.2d 1203 (1989).

The State’s reasons for the exercise of its peremptory challenges need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 , 106 S.Ct. at 1723 . The only limitation on these reasons is that they must not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. The ¹⁰¹ reasons need not be scientifically verifiable or politically pleasing.

They need only be honest and racially neutral. In this case the prosecutor offered one or more of the following reasons as the basis for each of his peremptory challenges: age, occupation, demeanor, and prior experience with the criminal justice system. His primary concern was to remove young people from the jury panel. He repeatedly stressed his belief that young people were more likely to empathize with appellant and less likely to impose the death