State Accident Fund v. Julia Jacobs' Administrator

Boyd, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On December 10, 1915, Frank Jacobs, a son of Julia Jacobs, was killed while in the employ of Otis M. Hignutt, in Caroline County, Maryland. In State Accident Fund et ⁶²³ al. v. Julia Jacobs, 134 Md. 133 , she was held to be entitled to compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, being chapter 800 of the Acts of 1914, and now article 101 of the Code. By an order of the State Industrial Accident Commission, passed April 24th, 1919, shortly after the decision of this Court, O. M. Hignutt, employer, and the State Accident Fand, insurer, were directed to pay her the sum of $4.50 per week, payable weekly, for the period of eight years, beginning as of the 10th day of December, 1915, as compensation arising out of the accidental injury and resultant death of her son.

The sum of $801 was paid her as compensation to May 9th, 1919, and $4.50 a week from that time until July 5th, 1919, when she died, and the payments ceased — having been refused by the State Accident Fund, insurer. The appellee was appointed administrator of Julia Jacobs and claimed $1,039.50 as the balance due from July 5th, 1919, the date of the death of Mrs. Jacobs, to December 10th, 1923, being the end of the eight years. On February 20th, 1920, the Commission ordered the employer and the State Accident Fund, insurer, to pay the administrator the balance due. An appeal was taken to the Circuit Court for Caroline County, which affirmed the order of the State Industrial Accident Commission, and this appeal is taken from the action of that court.

No point is made about the form of the order, and therefore it need not be referred to more fully. The question for our determination is: Did the award for compensation made to the dependent mother so vest in her that at her death the unpaid payments passed to her personal representative, or did those payments properly cease, under our statute, at her death ? We understand that Mrs. Jacobs was either actually paid up to the time of her death all sums then due under the award, or, if not, that no question is made in this case as to any of the payments due before her death, and that we are simply asked to pass on what had not become due at that time. ⁶²⁴ There seems to be considerable conflict between the decisions of the courts on the subject, but most of that apparent conflict is due to the terms of the statutes of the different jurisdictions. In referring to sections of the law, we will, unless the contrary is stated, refer to the sections of article 101 in the Code, and not to those of the original act.

There is some difference in the numbers after section 33, evidently due to the fact that what was section 33% of the Act of 1914 is numbered 34 in the Code (3rd vol.). We must also bear in mind that the accident to, and death of, Frank Jacobs occurred on December 10th, 1915, and hence statutes passed after that time, which might otherwise affect the claim, are not applicable to this case — such, for example, as chapter 456 of the Acts of 1920, which amended a number of the sections in the Code. That act concluded by saying “that nothing in this act shall affect any rights arising from' injuries or disabilitites received prior to June 1, 1920.” In section 36, as amended by the latter act, there is a provision that “the right to any compensation payable to any dependent and unpaid at the date of death of any such dependent shall survive to and be vested in the surviving dependents as the Commission may determine, if there be such surviving dependents, and if there be none such, then the compensation shall cease.” Section 36 provides that “each employe (or in case of death his family or dependents), entitled to receive compensation under this article, shall receive the same in accordance with the following schedule,” etc., etc.: That is then set out in subi-sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of that section, and section 36 continues: “In case the injury causes death within the period of two years, the benefits shall be in the amounts and to the persons following: “If there be no dependents, the disbursements shall be limited to the expenses provided for in section thirty-seven hereof. “If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the death, the payment shall be fifty per cent, of ⁶²⁵ the average weekly wages, and to continue for the remainder of the period between the date of the death and eight years after the date of the injury, and not to amount to more than a maximum of four thousand two hundred and fifty dollars, nor less than a minimum of one thousand dollars.” Then, after making provision for partly dependent persons at the time of the death, it provides that: “The following persons shall he presumed to he wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: A wife or invalid husband (‘invalid’ meaning one physically or mentally incapacitated from earning), a child or children under the age of sixteen years (or over said age if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning) living with or dependent upon the parent at the time of the injury or death,” and continues, “In all other cases, questions of dependency, in whole or in part, shall he determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case existing at the time of the injury resulting in. death of such employee, hut no person shall he considered as dependent unless such person he a father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, stepchild or grandchild, or brother or sister of the deceased employee, including those otherwise specified in this section.” Mrs. -Jacobs was determined to be wholly dependent, and 1 he award ivas accordingly made. The language of the statute. as we have seen, is “the payment shall be fifty per cent, of the average weekly wages, and to continue for the remainder of the period between the date of the death and eight gears after date of the injury.” After the Commission does what, is required of it — determine the preliminary questions as to the employment, average weekly wages, the dependency of the claimant, etc. — it is required by the statute to allow the compensation as fixed, unless, of course, it is otherwise provided for somewhere in the statute. ⁶²⁶ In addition to what we have already quoted, the following sections of our statute may be referred to: “In ease of the remarriage of a dependent widow of a deceased employee without dependent children, all compensation under this article shall cease” (section 43). “If a beneficiary shall reside or remove out of the State and shall have been such non-resident for a period of one year, the Commission may, in its discretion, convert any payments thereafter to become due to such beneficiary into a lump sum payment, not in any ease to exceed twenty-four hundred dollars, by paying a sum. equal to three-fourths of the then value of such payments” (section 44).

Section 50 provides for the benefits in case of death being paid to one or more of the dependents for the benefit of all, as may be determined by the Commission, and that the dependent or persons to whom the benefits are paid shall apply the same to the use of the several beneficiaries thereof, according to their respective claims upon the decedent for support, in compliance with the findings and directions of the Commission. Section 51 is: “In every case providing for compensation to an employee or his dependent, excepting temporary disability, the Commission may, if in its opinion the facts and circumstances of the case warrant it, allow the compensation to be paid in a partial or a total lump sum.” Section 52 provides that: “No money payable under this article shall, prior to issuance and delivery of the warrant or voucher therefor, be capable of being assigned, charged or taken in execution or attachment.” There is also the further provision that: “The powers and jurisdiction of the Commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may, from ⁶²⁷ time to time, make such modifications or change with respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto as, in its opinion, may he justified” (section 54). The case of Adleman v. Ocean Accident and Guaranty Corporation, 130 Md. 572 , although not directly involving the main question now before us, sheds considerable light on it. That was a case of a partly dependent sister of a deceased employee, who married after compensation had been allowed her, and it was contended that she thereby lost the right to compensation.

Judge Thomas, speaking for the Court, said: “This obligation to pay and the right to receive are not, by the terms of the Act, made conditional npon the beneficiary remaining unmarried, or dependent npon his or her subsequent state of dependency, and nowhere in the act is there found express authority to the Commission to abate the compensation. The relief to the dependents of the deceased employee provided by the act is in lieu of that afforded by tlie common lawr, and sub-section 11 of section 62 of the Act (63 of the Code), defines ‘beneficiary’ as ‘a husband, wife, child, children or dependents of an employe in whom shall vest a right to receive payment under the Act.’ The Act defines the duties and powers of the Commission, and in the absence of a clear grant of such power, we would not be justified in bolding that it is authorized to abate compensation expressly provided by the Act as ‘sure and certain relief’ for those who were partly dependent upon a deceased employee, and whose right thereto has been determined and lias vested in accordance with the terms of the Act.” It was contended in that case that the provisions of section 53 of the Act (54 of the Code), quoted above, authorized the Commission to abate or modify an award made to a dependent sister who afterwards married, but we held that the question of dependency and the amount of benefits depended npon facts existing at tbe time of the injury, and any modification or change by the Commission of its former findings must likewise be based upon tbe facts existing at that time. ⁶²⁸ It was also contended that under sections 49 (50 of the Code) and 53 (54 of the Code), the Commission could re-apportion the compensation among the dependents, and that it could abate it entirely, but Judge Thomas, after saying that the statute fixes the amount, said: “Thai amount cannot be changed by the Commission, but must be paid to one or more of the dependents, for the benefit of all, or may be apportioned among them as the Commission may deem just and equitable. The Commission in that case awarded $12.50 weekly to the mother and sister of a deceased employee, and apportioned it between them equally. We held that the marriage of the sister did not affect her right to receive compensation and did not authorize the Commission to abate or modify the awai’d made to the sister.

Judge Thomas also referred to section 42 (43 of Code) as to remarriage of a dependent widow, and said: “But there is no such provision in reference to other dependents mentioned in the Act, and it is reasonable to conclude that if the Legislature, while dealing with the subject of abatement of compensation, had intended the compensation provided for a sister to abate