State Department of Assessment & Taxation v. North Baltimore Center, Inc.

BELL, Chief Judge. This case presents the issue of whether a nonprofit corporation, almost entirely supported by government funds, and primarily providing outpatient mental health services to indigent members of the community, is eligible for a charitable exemption under Md.Code (1986, 1994 Repl.Yol., 2000 Supp.) § 7-202(b)(l) of the Tax Property Article. 1 A similar issue was decided by this Court in Supervisor of Assessments v. Group Health Ass’n, Inc., 308 Md. 151 , 517 A.2d 1076 (1986). In fact, the parties maintain that the decision in that case controls the decision in this one. Consequently, we will revisit that case before further considering the facts of the case sub judice.

Group Health, a nonprofit HMO exempt from federal income tax under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, operated seven health centers in the Washington, D.C. metro ⁶¹⁴ politan area, providing in each health services to its members on a prepaid basis. Membership could be acquired in two ways, either through a group employment plan or on an individual basis, and at a membership cost ranging from $66.00 per month to $218.80 per month, depending on the type of coverage provided. Besides providing general health care services, Group Health maintained a Special Assistance Fund to assist its members who were unable, due to some unusual financial difficulty, to continue paying membership costs. It also conducted educational programs on various health topics, participated in internship programs with area medical schools, and operated a Minor Injury Unit, providing treatment to both members and nonmembers, in downtown Washington, D.C. While the educational programs were open to members and nonmembers, Group Health members were given preference if space was limited and the programs were advertised by posting brochures in its facilities.

Group Health sought a property tax exemption for its Rockville facility on the basis that it was a charitable organization. When the exemption was denied by both the Supervisor of Assessments of Montgomery County (“Supervisor”) and the Property Tax Assessment Appeal Board of Montgomery County, Group Health appealed to the Maryland Tax Court, which also denied the exemption, but only after considering evidence offered by Group Health to establish that it was a charitable organization 2 and evidence offered by the Supervisor to establish the opposite. 3 ⁶¹⁵ Noting the prerequisites that must be met to qualify for an exemption from real property taxation — the property must be owned by a nonprofit charitable, benevolent, or educational organization and must actually be used, and be necessary, for charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, the Tax Court concluded that Group Health, not being a charitable organization, was not entitled to an exemption from real property taxation. This conclusion was supported by its findings that Group Health’s purpose was “to provide medical care for a reasonable price ... more or less it’s a prepaid medical care facility,” that although providing some educational services to its members, “from a factual standpoint ... the primary purpose of this organization is to provide high quality medical care, and I emphasize high quality, to its members for a fee,” and that “[t]he charitable and educational aspect and benevolent aspects of Group Health Association’s activities ... are only incidental to its main function, and that is to provide high quality medical care.” The Tax Court also stated, along the same lines: “This Court does not intend to in any way minimize the value of the organization, in its attempt to help the public welfare, in very general terms. But we think that the benefit to the general public is certainly secondary to the benefit afforded to its members and its doctors and its employees.” On judicial review in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, the Tax Court’s decision was reversed.

Subsequently, we granted the Supervisor’s petition for writ of certiorari. The question presented in Group Health was “whether a nonprofit health maintenance organization (HMO), which operates primarily to provide health care services to its prepaid members, is a ‘charitable organization’ for purposes of the property tax exemption provided by” the predecessor of ⁶¹⁶ § 7-202(b)(l). 4 We answered the question in the negative. But more interesting for our purposes than the resolution of the issue is the analysis by which we arrived at it. After stating the standard of review of a decision of the Tax Court, an administrative agency, and noting the narrowness of that standard, 5 we rejected Group Health’s argument that the Tax Court erred as a matter of law, stating in the process the test that is dispositive of the case sub judice: “The Tax Court did not make an error of law.

The court reviewed § 9(e)(2) and recognized that the section provides a tax exemption from real property that is (1) owned by a charitable, benevolent, or educational organization and (2) actually used and necessary for the charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes. We do not at this time attempt to establish a hard-and-fast rule as to the meaning of ‘charita ⁶¹⁷ ble’ for purposes of § 9(e)(2). Indeed, we doubt whether such a rule can be formulated---- Clearly, however, a determination of whether an institution is charitable must include a careful examination of the stated purposes of the organization, the actual work performed, the extent to which the work performed benefits the community and the public welfare in general, and the support provided by donations .... The Tax Court considered all of these factors, and we think the Tax Court understood the law and applied it correctly to the facts.” 308 Md. at 156 , 517 A.2d at 1079 (citations omitted).

Next the Court applied the substantial evidence test. It reached the same result, reached by the Tax Court reasoning: “We think that a reasoning mind could easily reach the Tax Court’s conclusion based on the record in this case. The Tax Court found as a fact that GHA’s primary purpose is not charitable, benevolent, or educational, but rather is to provide ‘high quality medical care to its members for a fee.’ The Tax Court also found as a fact that GHA’s charitable, benevolent, and educational aspects are only incidental to its main function of providing health care services to its members. Although the Tax Court noted that GHA attempted to ‘help the public welfare, in very general terms,’ it concluded that the benefit to the public is ‘certainly secondary to the benefit afforded to its members and its doctors and its employees.’ We believe that the record amply supports these findings.

GHA’s Articles of Incorporation, Certificate of Reincorporation, and bylaws all declare that the purpose of the organization is to provide medical care to members and their dependents. Moreover, there was testimony that providing health care services is, in actuality, the major activity carried on by GHA. Furthermore, there was evidence that GHA does not take ‘charity’ cases. Finally, testimony showed that GHA receives only de minimis contributions and is supported almost solely by membership fees. “Contrary to the opinion and order of the circuit court, we do not think that the Tax Court concluded that the provision ⁶¹⁸ of medical services for a fee could simply not be charitable or benevolent within the meaning of the statute^ Rather, the Tax Court simply found that GHA did not provide sufficient benefit to the community to justify exemption from real property taxes.

The Tax Court’s factual determination that GHA is not a charitable organization is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 160-61 , 517 A.2d at 1080-81 (citations omitted). The appellee, North Baltimore Center, Inc., (“NBC”), is a community mental health center operating in Baltimore City and providing counseling and rehabilitative services to mentally ill patients, most of whom are well below the poverty level. 6 As a community health program provider, the appellee is regulated by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. It also contracts with the Mental Health Administration, which has a statutory obligation to provide mental health services to the indigent, an obligation it fulfills through such contracts ⁶¹⁹ with mental health providers, such as the appellee. The majority of the appellee’s income comes from state and federal government funds; only a relatively small amount of support comes from charitable donations.

In fact, excluding four volunteers, each of whom worked 600-800 hours per year, private charitable donations accounted for less than 1% of total revenue. The appellee applied to the appellant, State Department of Assessments and Taxation (SDAT), for a charitable property tax exemption for its building, which it purchased with funds obtained through a grant from the State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and funds obtained through a tax-free bond issue. The appellant denied the exemption, noting that NBC had failed to secure significant private donations. Relying on Group Health, and, in particular, our statement of the factors to be considered when determining whether an institution or organization is charitable, it deemed that fact dispositive.

NBC appealed the denial of the exemption to the Property Tax Assessments Appeals Board for Baltimore City (“PTAAB”), which affirmed the SDAT’s action. NBC successfully appealed to the Maryland Tax Court. In reversing the decision of the PTAAB, the Tax Court demonstrated its grasp of the facts and the law applicable to this case. It began its analysis with Group Health.

After quoting this Court’s statement that it was not attempting “to establish a hard and fast rule as to the meaning of ‘charitable,’ ” and doubt that such a rule could be formulated, it stated its agreement that “it would be very difficult to formulate a rule as to something that would be fair and reasonable to necessarily encompass the facts and circumstances of every particular case.” Then, stating the considerations that must go into determining whether an organization is charitable, the Tax Court observed: “Now, it doesn’t make sense to me that the Court of Appeals is going to say in the previous sentences that it is not attempting and indeed is not establishing a hard and fast rule, and then we’re going to come over and say but look at those four points. Unless we can turn around and ⁶²⁰ take every, given situation and be sure it falls within the [ambit] of what was set forth by the Court of Appeals on page 157 of that case, then you can’t decide a case without doing that.” To be sure, the Tax Court stated its “common sense” reaction to the Supervisor’s argument that the paucity of charitable contributions was fatal to NBC’s claim, 7 but it is clear that it based its decision on a consideration and weighing of the Growp Health factors: “Now let me take into consideration the various criteria that has been suggested as what must be considered in connection with cases such as this. And one of them, when we speak about the examination of the stated purposes of the organization, I see nothing whatsoever in all the evidence that I have heard and read that says any other thing than the fact that this organization stands ready, willing and able and does in fact perform services to the masses. “And when I say masses there is certain eligibility that is necessary in order for it to be treated by the North Baltimore Center, Incorporated. And then Mr. Hammond continually made a point about the fact that well they have to treat them whether they want to treat them or not. “In other words they’re required by the legal structure under which they exist to take these people in whether they want to take them in or not.

And I think that actually goes as a — something that is meaningful from the standpoint as to why this exemption should be granted. “So when I look at the purposes of the organization, when I move on to the actual work performed by the Petitioner, and when I look to the extent to which the work performed ⁶²¹ benefits the community and public welfare in general, I don’t think there is any question about that. * * * * “Again there has been no witness who testified in connection with this case who does not readily accept that North Baltimore Center, Inc. does not only perform a substantial service to the community and the citizenry, but that it apparently does a good job in connection with discharging these services.” With regard to the fourth factor, the support provided by contributions, the Tax Court expressed some uncertainty as to its meaning — “Does that mean that the fact that they receive some donations and very little, that it should be disregarded because [it is] not enough? That the percentage isn’t high enough?” Noting that the test did not explicitly reference or address the minimum level of support from contributions required and indicating its doubt as to whether a finding in that regard needed to be made, the Tax Court pointed out that, although not the critical reason for the decision, the money flowing from the State to NBC could be characterized as donations. Implicitly, therefore, the Tax Court found that substantial charitable contributions were not required to meet the Group Health test. The Supervisor sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

Finding that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Tax Court’s decision and that the Tax Court did not err as a matter of law, that court affirmed. The Supervisor fared no better in the intermediate appellate court. The Court of Special Appeals, after an exhaustive discussion of the historical development of charitable organizations and an equally exhaustive analysis of the meaning of the term, “charitable,” interpreted § 7 — 202(b)(1) as not requiring significant private donations. State Department of Assessments & Taxation v. North Baltimore Ctr., Inc., 129 Md.App. 588, 611 , 743 A.2d 759, 772 (2000).

Moreover, it did not read Group Health as “necessarily requiring significant ⁶²² private donations but as having identified factors to be considered in making what is always a factual determination.” Id. at 610-11 , 743 A.2d at 772 . The court opined: “On the facts before us, specifically, (1) a clear and virtually