State Department of Assessments and Taxation v. Metrovision of Prince George's County, Inc.

MOTZ, Judge. This case involves the questions of whether the cost of “drop cables” installed by a cable television company and the “make ready” costs of the company are subject to the State’s personal property tax. (i) Appellee, Metrovision of Prince George’s County, Inc. (Metrovision), is a cable television company servicing 58,000 homes in southern Prince George’s County. The “drop cables” in dispute consist of cables running from a tap in a feeder cable, which is attached to preexisting utility poles, to the homes of subscribers.

The cable is attached to the subscriber’s home by a “screw hook,” passed through a hole drilled in the exterior wall, and attached to joists or fished through the hollow of an interior wall. The cable is connected directly to a cable-ready television or through a converter box to a television that is not cable-ready. ¹⁹⁸ Metrovision incurs costs to insure the safety of the utility poles across which it runs its wires. These “make ready costs” consist of reimbursement to various utility companies for costs incurred for pre-inspection, adaptation for cable use, and post-inspection of their utility poles. The charges are determined by agreement between Metrovision and the utilities and are made even for those poles for which the utility performed no work, other than inspection.

The “make ready” process is primarily a safety measure, without which the utilities would not permit Metrovision to place wires on the poles. Metrovision also pays to the utilities a rental fee for the use of the poles in delivering its service to the subscriber. Upon completion of the installation, the subscriber signs a work order and an enrollment agreement. These documents indicate that the converter box is the property of Metrovision and that the subscriber must return it when service is terminated.

They also authorize Metrovision to come into a subscriber’s premises to inspect, repair, replace, or remove the converter box at any time for failure to make a monthly payment. Neither document mentions the drop cable or its ownership status; however, while a subscriber continues service, Metrovision maintains the cable. If a subscriber discontinues service, the cable is disconnected at the tap, but not removed. Metrovision does not restrict the subscriber’s use of the cable either while it is connected or after it is disconnected.

Metrovision treats both the drop cables and the make ready costs as “Cable Plant and Equipment” on its balance sheet. This line item includes all of Metrovision’s physical assets, which are depreciated. The Internal Revenue Service requires the depreciation of drop cables. There is no revenue ruling or regulation requiring the depreciation of make ready costs; a certified public accountant employed by Metrovision testified that he believed that the IRS required cable companies to depreciate the make ready costs.

Appellant, the State Department of Assessments and Taxation (the Department), for the years 1984 through ¹⁹⁹ 1987, assessed personal property taxes for the entire cable system, including “drop costs” and “make ready costs.” 1 Metrovision paid the taxes, but objected to the part of the assessments attributable to the drop cables and the make ready costs. After a hearing, the Department affirmed the assessments in a final assessment notice, which Metrovision appealed to the Maryland Tax Court. After a hearing on the merits, the Tax Court reversed the assessments on the drop cables and the make ready costs. The Department appealed to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, which affirmed the decision of the Tax Court.

(ii) The Department again appeals, urging reversal of the Tax Court on five grounds: 1. Did the Maryland Tax Court properly interpret and apply the test for a fixture? 2. Did the Maryland Tax Court fail to consider all the relevant material and persuasive evidence when applying the test for a fixture? 3. Is the Maryland Tax Court’s decision that the cable company owns a property interest in the subscriber’s home a determination that is arbitrary and capricious and not supported by the evidence? 4.

Is the method of valuation used by the Maryland Tax Court an unrecognized version of the cost approach not designed to produce full cash value? 5. Does the valuation of the cable, according to its highest and best use, require recognition that it is part of a network system? As is true in a number of other areas of the law, the standard of appellate review, in large part, determines the result on appeal. When reviewing determinations of ²⁰⁰ law decided by the Tax Court, an appellate court is not bound by any presumption of correctness, but may substitute its judgment for that of the Tax Court.

Supervisor of Assessments of Montgomery County v. Asbury Methodist Home, Inc., 313 Md. 614, 626 , 547 A.2d 190 (1988) (and cases cited therein). On the other hand, when reviewing factual findings by the Tax Court, the scope of appellate review is narrow because the Tax Court has expertise in this area and should be free to exercise its discretion. See Mayor of Annapolis v. Annapolis Waterfront Co., 284 Md. 383, 395 , 396 A.2d 1080 (1979); Finney v. Halle, 241 Md. 224, 236 , 216 A.2d 530 (1966). Thus, if there is “substantial evidence” in the record to support the factual findings, an appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the Tax Court.

See Bulluck v. Pelham Woods Apts., 283 Md. 505, 512-13 , 390 A.2d 1119 (1978); Bernstein v. Real Estate Comm., 221 Md. 221, 230 , 156 A.2d 657 , appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 419 , 80 S.Ct. 1257 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1515 (1960). Moreover, and most significantly in the case at hand, the substantial evidence test is also appropriate when the question on appeal is whether the Tax Court, having a correct understanding of the law, properly applied the law to the facts. Asbury, supra, 313 Md. at 627 , 547 A.2d 190 ; Supervisor of Assessments of Montgomery County v. Group Health Ass’n, Inc., 308 Md. 151, 157-58 , 517 A.2d 1076 (1986); Ramsay, Scarlett & Co., Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 302 Md. 825, 837 , 490 A.2d 1296 (1985). With these principles in mind, we consider the Department’s first three questions involving the status of the drop cables and then the filial two questions concerning the “make ready” costs.

(iii) The parties agree that the proper method to determine whether the drop cables are taxable personal property is application of a fixture analysis under the three-prong common law test for fixtures. That is, if the drop cables are fixtures under this test, they are not personal property ²⁰¹ subject to personal property tax; if they are not fixtures, they are personal property subject to the personal property tax. The Court of Appeals has defined the term “fixture” as “some originally personal chattel which has been actually or constructively affixed either to the soil itself, or some structure legally a part of such soil.” Schofer v. Hoffman, 182 Md. 270, 274 , 34 A.2d 350 (1943). It has outlined a three-part test for determining whether a piece of property is a fixture: (1) Annexation to the realty, either actual or constructive; (2) adaptation to the use of that part of the realty with which it is connected; (3) the intention of the party making the annexation to make the article a permanent accession to the freehold, — this intention being inferred from the nature of the article annexed, the situation of the party making the annexation, the mode of annexation, and the purpose for which it was annexed.

Id. The Court has long-recognized that the third prong— the intention of the party making the annexation — is the most critical factor: As a general rule, it may be stated that whether a thing which may be a fixture becomes a part of the building by annexing it, depends upon the intention with which it is done. The character of the physical attachment, whether slight or otherwise, and the use, are mainly important in determining the question of intention of the party making the attachment or annexation. Schaper v. Bibb, 71 Md. 145, 149 , 17 A. 935 (1889); Dermer v. Faunce, 191 Md. 495 , 62 A.2d 304 (1948).

The parties agree that here the first two prongs of the fixture test are satisfied and that the important third prong is dispositive. The Tax Court held that the third prong of the fixture test had been met and classified the cables as realty. The Tax Court found that: ²⁰² While there may be an intent to relinquish [cable] drops to the freehold, actual transfer may never be realized. Indeed, due to the drops being treated as [Metrovision’s] depreciable assets and the fact that they are continually serviced during the signal subscription, actual transfers of ownership, in some instances (i.e., subscriber never disconnects service), may never occur.

However, the intent to transfer remains. (emphasis in original.) The Tax Court explained that a finding that the cables were fixtures rendered “moot” the issue of who owned the cables for purposes of personal property tax assessment. The Department argues that the Tax Court committed two legal errors in applying the fixture test here. First, the Department claims that the Tax Court erred in “determinpng] that Metrovision did not actually transfer ownership by the annexation because ownership may never be transferred____ This ... shows that the Tax Court’s factual conclusions are inconsistent with its determination that the drop cables were a fixture [sic].

If a drop cable is really a fixture and therefore real property, then it has to be owned by the subscriber.” The short answer is that the Tax Court did not determine the issue of ownership at all for the very reason that it found the fixture analysis determinative of the outcome. Moreover, even if the Tax Court had found that ownership had not been transferred at the time of the annexation, this would not affect an analysis under the third prong of the fixture test. “[T]o call a thing a fixture means that it could, in different legal relationships, be considered to be either real or personal property, and could be separately owned by someone other than the owner of the land. ... [W]here a chattel owned by one person is attached to the land of another, there is a double question: has there been a change in ownership under the principles of accession and, if not, has there been a sufficient identification of the chattel with the realty so that the chattel might be considered in some transactions to be part of the realty?” A.J. ²⁰³ Casner, 5 American Law of Property § 19.1 at 4 (1952) (emphasis added). The second question, of “sufficient identification,” is answered by application of the third prong— the intention prong — of the fixture test; the first question of “change in ownership” is a separate matter altogether. 2 Thus, the Tax Court’s findings were consistent with proper application of the third prong of the fixture test. 3 The Department’s contention that the Tax Court committed legal error in a second respect by failing to consider all relevant evidence when considering the fixture issue, is equally meritless. 4 Specifically, the Department contends, the Tax Court did not consider all “relevant evidence” ²⁰⁴ because it “determined that it did not need to consider the impact” of Metrovision depreciating the drop cables on its books and servicing the drops during the subscription period. Again, the short answer is that the Tax Court expressly considered and made specific findings of fact with regard to these issues.

The Tax Court found that the financial treatment of the drop cables by Metrovision “does not defeat the intent of [Metrovision] to relinquish and abandon the drops upon installation.” See T-V Transmission, Inc. v. County Board of Equalization of Pawnee County, 215 Neb. 363 , 338 N.W.2d 752, 754 (1983) (where cable television company stated that it did not intend to remove the drop, had never removed a drop, and where it lacked the right to remove the drop, it had abandoned the drop and therefore had the “intent” under a fixtures analysis for the drop to be a permanent accession to the freehold). The Tax Court further found that maintenance and service of the drops by Metrovision is not motivated by “any intent to exercise powers attributable to ownership.” Nor is the Department’s final contention as to the drop cable issue — that there was no substantial evidence to support the Tax Court’s decision and that evidence as to depreciation and servicing required it to reach a contrary conclusion — well-founded. There was abundant evidence in the record that Metrovision has never removed, and never intends to remove, a drop cable from the premises of a subscriber. The subscriber may use the drop cable as he or she chooses, both during service and after termination.

Once service is disconnected, the subscriber may leave the drop cable in place, thereby making it readily available for future reconnection, or tear it away. These facts provide substantial evidence for the Tax Court’s finding that Metro-vision had the intent to make the cable a “permanent accession” to the subscriber’s home. Similarly, there was evidence that the servicing arrangement, and depreciation of the drop cables, do not require a contrary conclusion as to Metrovision’s intention. With respect to Metrovision’s maintenance of the cables, a vice president of Metrovision ²⁰⁵ testified that the company is required, under its franchise agreement with the county, to maintain the cable system after it is constructed, not because the company owns the cable, but because it is important to “deliver a good quality signal.” He further testified that Metrovision maintains the system because the Federal Communications Commission requires it to do so.

As for depreciation, a certified public accountant employed by Metrovision testified that the IRS requires depreciation of the drop cables and that absent the IRS requirement, it would have been advantageous from a tax savings perspective for Metrovision to expense the drop cables instead of depreciating them. See Hoppe v. Televue Systems, Inc. (State of Washington Board of Tax Appeals 1976) (cable company’s depreciation of drops for income tax purposes did not disqualify company from claiming a “nontaxable status,” since “[t]he income tax deduction is based on a business investment concept, a matter wholly distinguishable from the concept of ownership”); Tele-Vue Systems, Inc. v. County of Contra Costa, 25 Cal.App.3d 340 , 101 Cal.Rptr. 789, 792 (1972) (“the classification of property for purposes of ad valorem taxation, and the income tax laws and regulations relating to depreciation deductions, are based on entirely different concepts”). 5 ²⁰⁶ In sum, the Tax Court did not commit legal error in applying the fixture test, and its findings are supported by substantial evidence. Having said that, we do note, however, that it is not at all clear to us, particularly in view of the difficulty in determining whether something is a fixture, 6 that the common law fixture test is truly relevant or appropriate in deciding whether drop cables should be taxed as the personal property of a cable company. This is so because exactly the same facts that led the Tax Court to find that the third prong of the fixture test had been met, i.e., that Metrovision intended to make a permanent annexation to the freehold, could as easily lead to the opposite conclusion.

For example, although it is true that Metrovision has never removed, and never intends to remove, a drop cable from a subscriber’s home, this is concededly because the cost of doing so is prohibitive, not because of any intent by the cable company to bestow a gift on its subscribers; thus, the probative value of these facts as evidence of Metrovision’s intention to affix the cable is small. Similarly, although the contract between Metrovision and its subscribers contains no reservation to the company of rights over the drop cables, it is equally true that the contract contains no agreement to transfer ownership of the drop cables to the subscribers; again the evi ²⁰⁷ dence of intention, one way or the other, is minimal. Likewise, Metrovision treats the drop cable, for accounting purposes, as its asset, and depreciates it, but this indicates little about the company’s intention in light of the fact that the Internal Revenue Service