STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. Briscoe

Hammond, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appeal is from a declaration that an automobile liability insurer is required by its policy to defend an additional insured who had been brought in as a third party defendant by the original defendant in a suit by the additional insured’s mother. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Inc. insured one Monday against liability in named amounts for ¹⁵⁰ bodily injury (Coverage A) and property damage (Coverage B) caused by accident arising out of the ownership or use of his automobile, and, in addition to the applicable limits of liability, agreed under the provisions as to Coverages A and B, to-defend any suit seeking damages against the insured on either ground. By policy definition “under coverages A, B, * * * the unqualified word ‘insured’ includes (1) the named insured, and also * * * (3) any other person while using the owned automobile, provided the actual use of such automobile is with the permission of the named insured.” On November 14, 1963, Monday lent his automobile to Charles C. Briscoe, Jr., who drove off in the car with his mother, Margaret V. Briscoe, as a passenger and soon collided with the automobile of Shirley W. Rouff, injuring his mother.

Charles C. Briscoe, Sr. and Margaret V. Briscoe filed suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County against Rouff, claiming damages caused by his negligence. Rouff interpleaded Monday and young Briscoe under Maryland Rule 315 a, alleging that their negligence caused the automobile accident and the consequent damages for which the elder Briscoes sought recovery, and asking for contribution or indemnification for any sums-recovered against him. The senior Briscoes did not choose to-avail themselves of the right given by Rule 315 d 1 to assert against Monday or young Briscoe “any claim * * * [they have] * * * which arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant * * Under Rule 315 d 3 the elder Briscoes could not,, after Monday and young Briscoe had been impleaded, assert a claim against them in a separate proceeding. Young Briscoe requested the insurer to provide for his defense in the suit, alleging that he was an additional insured because he had been driving the insured car with the owner’s-permission.

The insurer agreed that it was obligated to defend Monday but refused to defend Briscoe on the ground that the so-called “household exclusion” clause of the policy removed him from coverage under the insurance policy. The household exclusion clause reads: “This insurance does not apply under r * * * (g) coverage A * * * (2) to bodily injury to the in ¹⁵¹ sured or any member of the family of the insured residing in the same household as the insured * * The purpose of the household exclusion is so obviously to protect the insurer against collusive or cozy claims, to exempt him from liability stemming from one whose natural ties and pulls are likely to favor a claimant who lives in the same household, that the courts have unhesitatingly recognized that purpose and excluded from policy coverage claimants who live in the same household as the named insured. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins.

Co. v. James (4th Cir.), 80 F. 2d 802, 803-04 ; To mlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich (Minn.), 58 N. W. 2d 855, 862 ; Puller v. Puller (Pa.), 110 A. 2d 175, 178 ; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Ward (Mo.), 340 S. W. 2d 635 . Similarly, the insurer has been held not liable to' a member of the household of an additional insured in a direct suit against the additional insured. Third National Bank of Ashland v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins.

Co. (Ky.), 334 S. W. 2d 261 . The cases have drawn a distinction between situations in which a member of the named insured’s family has sought to impose liability on the insurer in a claim against the additional insured and the situation in which a member of an additional insured’s family seeks to impose liability on the insurer in a claim against the named insured. In the first situation the insurer generally has been held not to be liable. See Patton v. Patton (Pa.), 198 A. 2d 578, 581 ; Johnson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.

Co. (8th Cir.), 252 F. 2d 158 . In the second situation there is a split of authority. The insurer was held to have extended coverage in Patton v. Patton, supra, 198 A. 2d at page 582 , and to have excluded it in Zipperer v. State Farm Mutual