State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. DeHaan

CATHELL, J. This case concerns the interpretation of Maryland Code (1997, 2006 Rep. Vol.), § 19-509 of the Insurance Article 1 (the State’s uninsured motorist statute) and the coverage due to an insured under an automobile’s uninsured motorist section of his insurance policy. Four questions are presented for our review: 1. “Did the courts below err in concluding that Richard DeHaan[’s] injuries arose out of the use of an automobile?” 2. “Did the courts below err in concluding that Richard DeHaan was entitled to underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to the terms of the automobile insurance policy issued to him by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in light of the fact that the injuries and damages claimed by Mr. DeHaan arise solely from a gunshot wound?” 3. “Did the courts below err in concluding that simply by sitting in the driver’s seat of a vehicle a person qualifies ¹⁶⁷ as an operator of the vehicle as that term is used in the Maryland Annotated Code, Insurance Article Section 19-509?” 4. “Did the courts below err in concluding that Mr. DeHaan’s Blazer qualifies as an uninsured motor vehicle under the very same State Farm insurance policy that insures it and if not, did the courts below improperly find that the ‘owned but not insured’ exclusion in the uninsured motorist portion of the policy violates Maryland law?” We hold that the injuries to respondent did not arise out of the use of the vehicle as contemplated under the uninsured motorist statute and the insurance policy at issue in the case at bar. Because our holding on the first two questions is dispositive of the case, we shall not address the third and fourth questions.

I. Facts and Procedural History On January 28, 2001, after attending a Super Bowl party, Richard DeHaan, respondent, stopped at the Westview Shell gas station in Baltimore County at approximately 11:15 p.m. He was driving his 1989 Chevrolet Blazer, which was insured under a State Farm Mutual Insurance Company’s (“State Farm”) policy. The policy provided for $10,000.00 coverage in Personal Injury Protection benefits (PIP) and $100,000.00 coverage in uninsured motorist benefits. After arriving at the gas station, Mr. DeHaan turned off the vehicle, placed the keys on the driver’s side floorboard and entered the convenience store portion of the Westview station to make a purchase.

Upon returning to his vehicle, Mr. DeHaan noticed that there was an individual sitting in the driver’s seat of the Blazer. Mr. DeHaan opened the driver’s side door and asked the stranger “what are you doing?” His question was answered with gunfire from the intruder, who then started the vehicle and left the scene, stealing Mr. DeHaan’s car and leaving him wounded at the gas station. After the shooting, Mr. DeHaan was taken to Maryland Shock Trauma Center. As a result of the incident, Mr. DeHaan suffered substantial injuries, incurred approximately ¹⁶⁸ $70,000.00 in medical expenses, and was unable to work for about six months.

The assailant, Mr. Ronald Neely, was later identified, arrested, and convicted of attempted murder. 2 Mr. Neely was incarcerated at the time this case was brought before the Circuit Court for Howard County. Mr. DeHaan submitted two claims to State Farm. The first claim sought recovery under the PIP portion of the insurance policy and the second claim was based upon the uninsured motorist section of the same policy. State Farm denied both claims, alleging that they were not covered by the relevant policy provisions.

Mr. DeHaan then filed a complaint with the Circuit Court for Howard County. The trial court granted Mr. DeHaan’s motion for summary judgment. It determined that the facts, agreed upon by the parties, supported Mr. DeHaan’s claims under both the PIP and the uninsured motorist provisions of the insurance policy. Petitioner then paid Mr. DeHaan the amount covered under the PIP provision, but timely appealed the trial court’s decision regarding the uninsured motorist claim.

The Court of Special Appeals in an unreported opinion agreed 3 with the ¹⁶⁹ trial court and State Farm filed a petition for writ of certiorari on October 6, 2005. We granted certiorari on December 5, 2005. State Farm v. Dehaan, 390 Md. 90 , 887 A.2d 655 (2005).

II

Standard of Review Judge Greene, writing for the Court, recently described the standard of review in respect to the grant of a summary judgment motion by a trial court where, as in the case sub judice, the parties have agreed that there are no disputed issues of material fact: “As stated in Md. Rule 2-501(f), '[t]he court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ Whether summary judgment was properly granted is a question of law, and we must determine whether the trial court was legally correct in doing so. Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, 343 Md. 185, 204 , 680 A.2d 1067, 1076 (1996). In the present case, the parties agree that there are no factual disputes. Rather, the application of case law and the interpretation of a particular section of the Insurance Article were the only questions before the trial court, and they are the only questions now before us.

As such, it is clear that our review is de novo. See Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392 , 788 A.2d 609, 612 (2002) (noting that where the order of the trial court involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court must determine whether the lower court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review).” Johnson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 388 Md. 82, 86-87 , 878 A.2d 615, 617-18 (2005).

Because the parties have agreed upon a stipulated statement of facts, we will review the circuit court’s decision de novo to ascertain whether it was legally correct. ¹⁷⁰ III. Discussion In order to determine whether Mr. DeHaan is entitled to collect under the uninsured motorist provision of his policy we must interpret Maryland Code (1997, 2006 Rep. Vol.), § 19-509 of the Insurance Article. Our interpretation must conform to the well-settled principles of statutory construction: “As we have so often stated, ‘the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.’ Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995).

To begin with, we must consider the plain language of the statute. As noted in Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Director of Finance for Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567 , 683 A.2d 512 (1996), ‘we begin our inquiry with the words of the statute and, ordinarily, when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their commonly understood meaning, we end our inquiry there also.’ Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone, 343 Md. at 578, 683 A.2d at 517 ; see also Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261 , 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (‘If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.’). Moreover, ‘[w]here the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a court may neither add nor delete language so as to ‘reflect an intent not evidenced in that language.’ ” Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone, 343 Md. at 579, 683 A.2d at 517 (quoting Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491 , 632 A.2d 753, 755 (1993)). Johnson, 388 Md. at 88-89 , 878 A.2d at 618-19 .

Furthermore, Judge Greene stated for the Court: “Our goal in interpreting statutes is to give them their ‘most reasonable interpretation, in accord with logic and common sense, and to avoid a construction not otherwise evident by the words actually used.’ Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 429 , 701 A.2d 419, 422 (1997). We will avoid constructions that are ‘illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common ¹⁷¹ sense.’ Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137 , 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994). Moreover, we will not engage in a ‘forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning.’ ‘Nesbit v. GEICO, 382 Md. 65, 76 , 854 A.2d 879, 885 (2004) (quoting Taylor v. NationsBank, 365 Md. 166, 181 , 776 A.2d 645, 654 (2001)).’ ” Id. at 89, 878 A.2d at 619 . At the heart of this appeal lies our interpretation of two specific subsections of § 19-509.

Subsection (a)(1) defines ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ as a motor vehicle, ‘the ownership, maintenance, or use of which has resulted in the bodily injury or death of an insured ....‘ § 19-509(a)(1) (emphasis added). Subsection (c)(1) provides that the insured is entitled to recover “because of bodily injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured motor vehicle.” § 19-509(c)(1) (emphasis added). The statute does not define the word ‘use.’ The fact that word is not defined subjects it to the possibility of different interpretations. We, therefore, look beyond the different meanings of the words in order to determine the intent of the legislature in enacting this section.

We will first analyze the history of the uninsured motorists statute, then evaluate the context of the words as interpreted within the entire section and, finally, we will focus primarily on our interpretation of this language. A. Maryland’s Uninsured Motorist Statute The Legislature first enacted the uninsured motorist statute as Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972. This section was part of a large bill which also created the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund (MAIF), the bill provided: “(c) In addition to any other coverage required by this subtitle, every policy of motor vehicle liability insurance issued, sold,, or delivered in this State after January 1, 1973 shall MAY contain coverage, in at least the amounts required under Section 7-101 of Article 66% of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1970 Replacement Volume and 1972 Supplement), for damages which the insured is entitled to ¹⁷² recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries sustained in an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such uninsured motor vehicle(Bolding added for emphasis.) The statute was later amended and codified as Maryland Code (1957, 1972 Repl.Vol., 1978 Cum.Supp.), Art. 48A, § 541(c). The enactment of this section complied with one of the recommendations made in a Report of the Special Committee on No-Fault Insurance dated January 31, 1972.

The committee’s recommendation stated: “To complement the first party coverage and to protect more fully a Maryland driver, the second bill requires the driver to carry uninsured motorist coverage in the event he suffers damage caused by an out-of-state driver not protected by liability insurance.” This statute did not define the term “use” or explain the meaning of the sentence “an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such uninsured motor vehicle.” § 541(c). In 1981, the Legislature amended section 541 to include a definition of “uninsured motor vehicle.” The amended section provided: “(1) In this subsection ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ means a motor vehicle whose ownership, maintenance, or use has resulted in the bodily injury or death of an insured, and for which the sum of the limits of liability under all valid and collectible liability insurance policies, bonds, and securities applicable to the bodily injury or death is less than the amount of coverage provided to the insured under this subsection.” Md.Code (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol., 1985 Cum.Supp.), Art. 48A § 541(c) (emphasis added). Then in 1982 and 1985, the Legislature enacted additional amendments allowing insurance providers to exclude from coverage ‘[t]he named insured or members of his family residing in the household when occupying, or struck as a pedestrian by, an uninsured motor vehicle that is owned by the named insured or a member of his immediate family residing in his household ....’§ 541(c)(2)(i). ¹⁷³ Respondent asks us to hold that an injury suffered as a result of a gunshot from an insured vehicle, which is standing still and with the ignition off, arose out of the use of the vehicle. Such a holding would imply that in enacting the exclusion clause above, the Legislature intended to allow insurers to exclude only those injuries which occur as a result of an actual collision or accident in which an uninsured vehicle owned by the victim is the instrumentality of the harm, while forbidding the same insurer from excluding the insured from coverage for injuries not directly related to the actual operation of an uninsured motor vehicle owned by the victim. 4 Such interpretation would not be logical.

Another more reasonable interpretation of the amendment is that the Legislature did not consider the entire uninsured motorist statute as one providing coverage from injuries other than those incurred through the actual use of an uninsured motor vehicle, meaning that the motor vehicle had to be the instrumentality that caused the harm and that vehicle had to be a vehicle, under ¹⁷⁴ the circumstances, for which no sufficient liability insurance exists at the time of the incident. 5 The next major revision of the section was codified in Maryland Code (1957, 1994 Repl.Vol.), Art. 48A, § 541, in which the definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” remained substantively unaltered, but the coverage section was amended to state: “(2) In addition to any other coverage required by this subtitle, every policy of motor vehicle liability insurance issued, sold, or delivered in this State after July 1, 1975 shall contain coverage in at least the amounts required under Title 17 of the Transportation Article, for damages, subject to the policy limits, which: (i) The insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries sustained in an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such uninsured motor vehicle; ____” (Emphasis added). Finally in 1997, Article 48A was recodified as the Insurance Article of the Maryland Code. The uninsured motorist section was reenacted without substantive changes and is now codified as Maryland Code (1997, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 19-509 of the Insurance Article, which provides: “§ 19-509. Uninsured motorist coverage—In general.

(a) ... In this section, ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ means a motor vehicle: (1) the ownership, maintenance, or use of which has resulted in the bodily injury or death of an insured; and (c) ... In addition to any other coverage required by this subtitle, each motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued, sold, or delivered in the State after July 1, 1975, shall ¹⁷⁵ contain coverage for damages, subject to the policy limits, that: (1) the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured motor vehicle; and (f) Exclusions.—An insurer may exclude from the uninsured motorist coverage required by this section benefits for: (1) the named insured or a family member of the named insured who resides in the named insured’s household for an injury that occurs when the named insured or family member is occupying or is struck as a pedestrian by an uninsured motor vehicle that is owned by the named insured or an immediate family member of the named insured who resides in the named insured’s household .... ” (Emphasis added.) The history of the statute indicates several relevant concerns. First, the uninsured motorist section was enacted upon a recommendation to provide protection against uninsured drivers for injured Maryland residents who have the misfortune to be harmed by tortious acts, where the injury is caused by the instrumentality of an uninsured automobile, generally driven by the tortfeasor.

From the amendments to the exclusion section we can reasonably infer that the Legislature did not intend to extend coverage under the uninsured motorist provision to situations where the vehicle is only incidentally related to the harm caused by intentional criminal acts. The next step in our analysis is to interpret the language in question in light of the context of the entire section. Here, the interpretation of the exclusion section is important. That section specifically allows insurance companies to exclude from coverage injuries that the insured suffers as a result of an incident with an uninsured vehicle, which the insured owns. ¹⁷⁶ § 19—509(f)(1).

There is no question that if the insured is struck by a vehicle owned by him or her, and the policy contains the permitted exclusion, the policy holder will not be able to recover. This is consistent with the purpose of the statute to protect victims from injury by a uninsured motor vehicle owned by others. The statute would have to be stood on its head to allow recovery for injuries incurred where the vehicle is only incidentally related to the injury, especially where it is standing still with the ignition off, but to bar recovery if the vehicle actually is moving and strikes the owner, i.e., is the direct instrumentality of the harm. With this context in mind, we turn to the case law and its interpretation of this language, more specifically to answer whether injuries from the discharge of a handgun by an individual in the driver’s seat of a standing vehicle with the ignition off, in the course of stealing the automobile, constitutes, for uninsured motorist coverage, a “use” or is “the result of a motor vehicle accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use ” of the vehicle.

Mr. DeHaan argues that the shooting constituted a “use” under the statute because the assailant was in the vehicle and was in control of the vehicle at the time of the incident. Mr. DeHaan contends that the act of stealing the Blazer, by itself, was a “use” of the vehicle as evidenced by the fact that the assailant drove the vehicle away from the scene after the shooting. He states that, as a result, the assailant “had taken control of [Mr. D'eHaan’s] vehicle and was exercising use over it.” Mr. DeHaan, however, fails to recognize that discharging a firearm does not have anything to do with the use of a vehicle as contemplated under the statute. We have previously stated that “[t]he uninsured motorist statutory plan is remedial in nature and ‘dictates a liberal construction in order to effectuate its purpose of assuring recovery for innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents.’ State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co. v. Md. Auto. Ins.

Fund, 277 Md. 602, 605 , 356 A.2d 560, 562 (1976).” Clay v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 356 Md. 257, 265 , 739 A.2d 5, 9-10 (1999). ¹⁷⁷ Such liberal construction, however, “is not without limits. The words of the statute itself delineate the extent of the statute’s reach.” Johnson, 388 Md. at 95 , 878 A.2d at 623 . This Court has never gone as far as respondent suggests when pointing to Stevenson v. State Farm Indem.

Co., 311 N.J.Super. 363 , 709 A.2d .1359 (1998), where the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, noted: “Courts must apply a liberal construction of the no-fault insurance scheme ‘so as to effect the purpose thereof.’ ... The legislators apparently sought to ensure the ‘broadest coverage possible so long as an automobile was involved in that which happened.’ ” Id. at 372 , 709 A.2d at 1362-63 . Stevenson involved the interpretation of New Jersey’s PIP coverage, not that state’s uninsured motorist statute. Furthermore, although Stevenson dealt with two drivers being shot in the course of a carjacking, the victims were inside the vehicle at the time of the incident and the PIP statute provided for coverage to insured people who sustained injuries “while occupying, entering into, alighting from or using [an] automobile.... ” Id. at 366 n. 2, 709 A.2d at 1360 n. 2 (emphasis added). 6 This language of the New Jersey PIP statute, i.e., occupying, is absent from the Maryland uninsured motorist provision.

This Court interpreted the meaning of the language “arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile” in National Indemnity Co. v. Ewing, 235 Md. 145 , 200 A.2d 680 (1964). In that case a drunk driver lost control of his vehicle striking a telephone pole. During the accident the sole pas ¹⁷⁸ senger of the vehicle was thrown onto a snow bank. About twenty-five minutes later, the driver was helping the passenger cross the road when they were both hit by another car.

The Court recognized the issue to be one of first impression and looked at other states for guidance in interpreting the meaning of the “arising out of’ language as it related to the use of a vehicle requirement under the policy. We determined that “it has generally been held that, while the words import and require a showing of causal relationship, recovery is not limited by the strict rules developed in relation to direct and proximate cause.” Id. at 149 , 200 A.2d at 682 . The Court in Ewing pointed to two cases from other states: Schmidt v. Utils. Ins.

Co., 353 Mo. 213 , 182 S.W.2d 181 (1944) and Merchants Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 187 Miss. 301 , 188 So. 571 (1939). In Schmidt , a pedestrian had been injured when two blocks used to unload a truck were negligently left behind by the truck owner’s employees. In that case the Missouri court found that the injuries arose out of the use of the truck.

Schmidt, 353 Mo. at 223 , 182 S.W.2d at 186 . In Merchants, the injuries were caused by poles left on the road after a vehicle had been removed from a ditch. We quoted from the Merchants opinion, which stated: “ ‘Our conclusion, under a policy such as is here before us, is that where a dangerous situation causing injury is one which arose out of or had its source in, the use or operation of the automobile, the chain of responsibility must be deemed to possess the requisite articulation with the use or operation until broken by the intervention of some event which has no direct or substantial relation to the use or operation,—which is to say, that the event which breaks the chain, and which, therefore, would exclude liability under the automobile policy, must be an event which bears no direct or substantial relation to the use or operation; and until an event of the latter nature transpires the liability under the policy exists.’ ” Ewing, 235 Md. at 149-50 , 200 A.2d at 682 (emphasis added) (quoting Merchants Co., 187 Miss. at 301 , 188 So. at 572 ). In the case sub judice, the shooting had no direct or substantial ¹⁷⁹ relation to the use of the vehicle.

The shooting broke the chain of use—even if the vehicle had been in the process of being used. The Ewing Court held that the injuries caused by the second automobile arose out of the use of the first vehicle from which the claimant had been thrown. It pointed out that “The fact that the insured vehicle was exerting no physical force upon the instrumentality which was the immediate cause of the injury, and was not itself in physical contact * * * is neither decisive of nor fatal to the plaintiffs claim of coverage. * * * It is sufficient that the use was ‘connected with the accident or the creation of a condition that caused the accident * * ” Id. at 150 , 200 A.2d at 682 (emphasis added) (quoting Carter v. Bergeron, 102 N.H. 464, 471 , 160 A.2d 348, 353 (1960)). The Court concluded by stating that “the negligent use of the car created a situation where [the passenger] was subjected to the risk of injury____” Id. at 150-51, 200 A.2d at 683 (emphasis added).

Although the Court gave a somewhat broad interpretation to the language, it still required that there be a connection between the use of the vehicle and the injury that was created. 7 As the closing statement in Ewing provides, the “use” of the car must create the risk of injury. To allow recovery under the uninsured motorist coverage, when there is no connection between the “use” of the vehicle and the injury inflicted, would be to require insurance companies to provide coverage for any imaginable incident occurring near a vehicle. A result which is clearly beyond the scope of a statute which was enacted “to assure financial compensation to the innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents who are unable to recover from financially irresponsible uninsured motorists.” Johnson, 388 Md. at 95 , 878 A.2d at 622 (quotations omitted) ¹⁸⁰ (quoting Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.

Co., 321 Md. 165, 169 , 582 A.2d 501, 503 (1990)). In reference to the interpretation of the language “arising] ‘out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle,’ ” respondent cites Frazier v. Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board, 262 Md. 115, 117 , 277 A.2d 57, 58 (1971) (a claim against the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board and not against a policy holder’s insurance carrier). In that case, the driver of an unidentified vehicle threw a lit firecracker into the rear seat of the plaintiffs convertible. The plaintiff, distracted by the ensuing explosion, and the cries of her five-year-old child who was riding in the back seat, lost control of the vehicle and hit a tree.

The Court determined that in evaluating insurance policy coverage “whether an injury is or is not within the coverage provided by an automobile insurance policy may well turn on the question whether the use of an automobile is directly or merely incidentally causally connected with the injury, even though the automobile itself may not have proximately caused the injury.” Id. at 118 , 277 A.2d at 59 (emphasis added). The Court recognized the Ewing test under insurance policy law. It held, however, that for purposes of the then existing Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund (the “Fund”), which required a liberal construction to protect innocent victims, “the injuries under the facts of [that] case did arise out of the ownership, operation or use of an unidentified motor vehicle.” Id. at 119, 277 A.2d at 59 . The Court did not provide any guidance as to the required relation between the injury and the vehicle, nor did it set any limits to its holding.

But, what was very clear in Frazier was that the injured parties were actually riding, i.e., using, a vehicle at the time it ran off the road and struck a tree. The act that caused the crash was also committed from a moving, operating vehicle presumed to be uninsured. The uninsured vehicle was, therefore, being actually used as a car at the time the firecracker was thrown. Respondent also relies on Northern Assurance Co. of America v. EDP Floors, Inc., 311 Md. 217 , 533 A.2d 682 (1987), for ¹⁸¹ the proposition that only a “minimal ‘arising out of causal relation” between the injury and the use is required to entitle the insured to recover under the uninsured motorist provision of the policy.

Id. at 232 , 533 A.2d at 689 . In EDP, the Court was called to interpret an exclusion clause on an general business insurance policy stating that: “Coverage does not apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading of ... [a vehicle].” Id. at 224-25 , 533 A.2d at 686 . The exclusion covered any vehicle owned by the insured or operated by an employee of the insured while in the course of employment. The Court reasoned that “The words ‘arising out of must be afforded their common understanding, namely, to mean originating from, growing out of, flowing from, or the like.

See Baca v. New Mexico State Highway Dept., 82 N.M. 689 , 486 P.2d 625, 628 (1971); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 117 (1961). While these words plainly import a causal relation of some kind, read in context, they do not require that the unloading of the truck be the sole ‘arising out of cause of the injury; they require only that the injury arise out of the unloading of the vehicle.” Id. at 230, 533 A.2d at 689 (citation omitted). The Court has more recently expounded on this view stating: “The insurance treatises support the view articulated in EDP Floors and in Ewing that the words ‘arising out of mean ‘originating from, growing out of, flowing from, or the like.’ See, e.g., 6B J.A. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4317, at 360-63 (R.B. Buckley ed., 1979) (in the context of automobile insurance, the words ‘arising out of have ‘broader significance than the words “caused by,” and are ordinarily understood to mean originating from, incident to, or having connection with the use of the vehicle’); 12 G.J. Couch, Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 45:61, at 294 (2d ed. 1981) (‘[T]he words “arising out of’ ... generally mean “originating from,” “growing out of,” or “flowing from.” ’); 1 R.H. Long, The Law of Liability Insurance § 1.22, at 1-57 (1972) (‘The ¹⁸² phrase “arising out of’ is not to be construed to mean “proximately caused by.” ... The words “arising out of’ mean causally connected with, not “proximately caused by” use.’).” Mass Transit Admin. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 349 Md. 299, 315 , 708 A.2d 298, 306 (1998) (emphasis added).

EDP involved a situation where two employees of the insured were delivering floor tiles to a job site in a truck. One of the employees was inebriated and as a result another person was helping the sober employee unload the floor tiles. At some point, the helper operated the truck’s hydraulic lift and the floor tiles fell and injured him. EDP claimed that the exclusion clause only applied to vicarious liability for the negligence of its employees.

It argued that because the incident did not occur due to the negligence of its employee, it did not arise out of the unloading of a vehicle as contemplated under the policy. The Court disagreed. In arriving at its conclusion, the EDP Court stated: “As we see it, the language in the exclusionary clause clearly focuses the ‘arising out of inquiry on the instrumentality of the injury, i.e., upon the truck and its unloading.” 311 Md. at 230 , 533 A.2d at 689 . In the case at bar, if we focus our inquiry on the instrumentality of the injury, it is the handgun and not the Blazer’s use, as it was intended to be used, which resulted in Mr. DeHaan’s injuries.

More recently in Mass Transit Administration v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 349 Md. 299 , 708 A.2d 298 (1998), we analyzed Ewing, Frazier, and EDP and their interpretation of the “arising out of’ language. CSX was not a case involving an automobile liability insurance policy but related to the interpretation of an indemnification clause in a contract between Maryland’s Mass Transit Administration (MTA) and CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT). That clause provided that the MTA would “ ‘indemnify, save harmless, and defend CSXT from any and all casualty losses, claims, suits, damages or liability of every kind arising out of the Contract Service under’ [the agreement.]” Id. at 301 , 708 A.2d at 300 . CSXT’s claim for indemnification resulted from an accident where a ¹⁸³ backhoe being