State Roads Commission v. Parker

⁶⁵³ O’Donnell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On August 7, 1968, the appellant, State Roads Commission, pursuant to the provisions of Maryland Code (1957, 1964 Repl. Vol.), Art. 89B, § 9, 1 filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to “quick take” a parcel of 1.83 acres, running a distance of 732 feet along the eastern boundary of a tract totalling 10 acres owned by Roscoe H. Parker and his wife, the appellees, in Largo, for the relocation of Landover Road (Maryland Rt. 202). In accordance with the provisions of the statute, the Commission deposited with the clerk of the court $65,308.94, its estimate of the “fair market value” of the portion taken by it for the highway construction.

The appellees requested that the case be referred to the Board of Property Review for a determination of the value of the property, without prejudice to their right to have the matter considered by a jury. See Code (1957, 1964 Repl. Vol.), Art. 89B, §§ 17-20 2 and Maryland Rule U27. Dissatisfied with the award determined by the Board, the Commission on May 1, 1969, requested the reinstatement of the condemnation proceedings.

After the matter had laid dormant for more than four years, the Commission, with leave of the court, filed an amended petition to include within the scope of the condemnation, the entire rectangular 10-acre tract of the appellees so that an interchange could be constructed thereon between Central Avenue (Maryland Rt. 214) and the reconstructed and relocated Landover Road. Described as rolling and wooded land, the acreage “fronts” along its northern boundary for a distance of 530 feet on Central Avenue. It had no frontage along the relocated Landover Road since access thereto was denied upon the “quick taking.” Situate upon the land were several delapidated farm buildings conceded to have no significance in the valuation of the acreage. Zoned as “C-2” (general ⁶⁵⁴ commercial), 3 the property is located approximately one mile east of the intersection- of Central Avenue and the Capital Beltway.

Three miles to the north is located the Landover Mall, a large shopping center; one mile to the northwest, the new Capital Centre Sports Arena conducts sports contests and entertainment events almost nightly. A small shopping center, Hampton Mall, is located one mile westward; Prince George’s Community College campus is one and one-half miles to the south and a garden apartment development is located immediately southwestward. Within the géneral geographical area there are 4,000 acres described as being in the “early stages of intensive residential development” together with related commercial service facilities. Just to the east and southeast of the subject property — off Central Avenue — is a prestigious single family residential development named “Kettering,” which is served by a small shopping center on that avenue.

A gasoline filling station, a' fruit stand and a dry cleaning establishment were described as being operated at the intersection of Routes 214 and old Route 202. During the proceedings before the jury leading to the inquisition, the appellant produced testimony from two expert witnesses — Messrs. Roy K. Davis and Paul J. Gilroy. Davis placed a fair market value upon the 10 acres of $501,200.00; Gilroy’s appraisal was $450,000.00.

Two expert witnesses who testified on behalf of the appellee-owners, Messrs. John L. Richards and Adelbert W. Lee were of the opinion that the property being taken had a value, of $3 per square foot, or a total fair market value of SI,306.800.00 The jury, apparently finding the opinion testimony of Messrs. Richards and Lee to be the more persuasive, on July 1, 1974, by their inquisition awarded the cohdemnees $1,306,800.00. The appellant, aggrieved at the valuation placed upon the tract by the jury, contends in its appeal here that the trial court (Judge George Sachse 4 ): ⁶⁵⁵ I. Abused its discretion by admitting evidence of comparable sales: (a) sales of lots grossly disparate in size from the subject property, (b) sales of lots incompatibly zoned in that they were zoned industrial and (c) sales proximately remote from the subject property; II.

Committed prejudicial error by remarks made in the presence of the jury tending to buttress the appellees’ valuation testimony; III. Erred by sustaining objections to questions upon cross-examination of appellees’ appraisers when it “sought to ascertain if the latter understood a relevant principle implicit in the statutory definition of ‘fair market value’ ”; and IV. Erred in not granting appellant’s instruction that comparable sales “can be viewed as primary or independent evidence of value.” I It must be observed at the outset that there is a conflict concerning the existence of utilities to service the subject acreage; although appellant authoritatively states that no utilities serve the property and a four-year-old sewer moratorium was in effect upon the stipulated date of valuation, it points to no such evidence in the record. Contrariwise, both the expert witnesses on behalf of the appellees gave testimony in connection with the existence of water and sewer; John L. Richards, acknowledging the existence of a “sewer moratorium,” testified that a public water system served the property, that a ten-inch sewer line and terminal was within 60 feet of the property line and that such service would be available “in the very near future” since the capacity of Western Branch was being increased.

The witness Lee testifed that the property “had water across the front” and that “sewer was in very close proximity in the rear.” In testifying concerning his opinion on the “fair market value” of the tract being condemned, the witness Lee listed ⁶⁵⁶ as comparable sales six transactions, occurring between 1970 and 1972, five of which such properties were zoned “C-2” and the sixth of which was zoned “C-O.” 5 The property so sold ranged in area from 33,706 sq. ft. to 199,421 sq. ft. and ranged in price between $2.28 per sq. ft. and $4.03 per sq. ft., or from $99,317.00 per acre to $175,547.00 per acre. The appellant objected to the inclusion of three of these transactions as not being “comparable sales.” It objected to the property zoned “C-O,” which contained 199,421 sq. ft.—and which had sold at $2.28 per sq. ft. — involving the largest area and the lowest price per sq. ft. of all the properties described by the witness Lee, solely on the ground of the incompatibility of the zoning classification. There was no evidence concerning the proximity of that acreage to the subject property. A property consisting of 33,706 sq. ft.

(.77 acres) which had been sold at $4.03 per sq. ft. was objected to as being dissimilar in size. The third such sale objected to pertained to a parcel of land containing 53,316 sq. ft., which had been sold at $2.57 per sq. ft. which was objected to solely on the basis of its distance from the subject property. Although the appellant alleges in its brief that that sale involved property located “12 miles” distant and argues that it was “15 miles” removed from the subject property, the testimony disclosed that it was described as being located “7 to 8 miles” from the Parkers’ land. Each of these objections was overruled by the trial court.

The appellant made no objection to the other three sales considered by the witness Lee; these were described as containing, respectively, 33,956 sq. ft. (.78 acres), 34,512 sq. ft. (.79 acres) and 48,358 sq. ft. (1.13 acres) with sale prices, respectively, of $2.72, $2.50 and $3.55 per sq. ft.

Each of the unobjected-to sales pertain to property located between seven and ten-and-one-quarter miles from the property being condemned. The witness described each one of said sales as each having ⁶⁵⁷ been made by “well informed buyers,” each involved property zoned “commercial” and all were described as having a comparable traffic flow and type of development within their areas. It was further the opinion of the witness that although property zoned “C-O” was limited to office use, property zoned “C-2” authorized generally commercial enterprises — including office use. The witness was never cross-examined by the appellant concerning the property zoned “C-O,” although the asserted differences in zoning were the sole basis for its objection.

Fifteen sales made between 1969 and 1973 located from within 800 feet of the subject property to a maximum of two miles distant were submitted by the witness Richards. Challenging their comparability the appellant objected to all but four of such transactions. 6 The trial court sustained its objections to four of the sales which involved tracts of less than one-half acre in size and property zoned for high-density apartments; its objections to the remainder of the sales were overruled. Six of the property sales considered comparable by Richards were of land zoned “1-1” (Industrial-light); five were zoned, as was the subject property, as “C-2.” Objection was made solely on the grounds of incomparability as to five of the six sales of land zoned “light industrial.” Objection to the sixth such sale (of 42,112 sq. ft.), also on the ground of incomparability was not limited to its zoning classification but included as well its size. Objection was made to only one of the sales of property zoned “C-2” and this was predicated upon asserted differences in a number of the features of the sale.

The sales considered by Richards, to which no objections were made involved properties all zoned “C-2” which ranged in size from 42,000 sq. ft. (.97 acres) to seven acres and which had been sold at prices ranging from $1.13 (for the seven-acre tract) to $2.78 (for the .97 acre site) per square foot. In comparing each of the described transactions, Richards ⁶⁵⁸ made adjustments — both upward and downward — in the prices for which said properties had been sold to allow for increases in valuation due to inflation, from the date of such sales to the time of trial, made adjustments for differences in zoning classifications, for the size, shape and frontáge of the acreage sold, in comparison to the subject property, and made adjustments as well to compensate for differences in topography and the existence vel non of utilities upon the sold properties. It was his opinion that “C-2” zoning was a “better” classification for obtaining the highest and best use of the property.

Basically he added a ten-cent per sq. ft. adjustment upward to each of the reported sales to compensate for the zoning differences. On cross-examination it was the witness’ view that a district zoned “commercial” permitted “more variety of uses” than that allowed in a district zoned “light industrial” and that one “has less trouble getting zoning for commercial land than . . . for industrial.” The objection to the sale of the sole property zoned as “C-2” involved 1.32 acres which had been sold in 1968 by the Simplex Land Co. to the Boron Oil Co. — for a filling station site — which was located on the south side of Central Avenue (Rt. 214) 800 feet southwest of the subject property. It was the same acreage (53,315 sq. ft.) which the appellees themselves had sold at $2.25 per sq. ft. to the Simplex Land Co. and which, according to the testimony of the appellee Roscoe H. Parker, had been resold — on the same day by Simplex — for $2.78 per sq. ft. In his testimony Roscoe Parker described that lot as being located 435 feet from the “boundary of the subject property” and projecting an allowance for inflation since 1968, calculated its value, as of the time of trial, at $4.17 per sq. ft.

Each of the appraisers — both for the appellant and the appellee — in. stating his opinion of the fair market value of the acreage being taken, employed the “comparable sales” approach, but each used a different methodology. All agreed that the location of property so sold was an important element in helping to assess its comparability, but to each, however, location carried a slightly different weight. To the ⁶⁵⁹ appellant’s appraiser, Roy K. Davis, whose testimony was limited to five such sales, it meant the “general neighborhood.” To its other appraiser, Paul J. Gilroy, who listed only three such comparable sales, it literally meant that the closer the property sold was to the subject property, the more comparable was the sale. The appellees’ witness Lee was of the view that physical proximity of the reported sales was only one element in determining comparability and that adjacent geographical areas with similar traffic flow counts and adjacent economic development provided “very comparable locations.” To Mr. Richards the general economic area provided a basis for comparability and he emphasized that the principal element in his opinion of valuation was the “location of the subject property in an area of intense and rapid commercial development.” Having limited his analysis of comparable sales to those occurring within a two-mile radius, he emphasized that the appellees’ property was “located at the cross-roads of Prince George’s County” and compared its location to a similar area in Montgomery County at the intersection of the East-West Highway and Wisconsin Avenue.

By way of contrast, it appears from the record that the expert witnesses for the appellant did not give any consideration in their opinion evaluation to the rapidly changing economic state of real estate values in the general area of Largo, nor did either of them make any adjustments for any differences whatsoever between the land being condemned and the eight sales they considered to be comparable which ranged in size from 2.34 acres to 32.68 acres. As early as 1915 our predecessors in a condemnation proceeding, in Patterson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 127 Md. 233 , 96 A. 458 (1915), stated: “It is the settled law, in this State and elsewhere, that in establishing the value of land, the prices realized at the sales of similar lands in the vicinity, made within a reasonable period of time theretofore, being voluntary and not forced sales, ⁶⁶⁰ are admissible in evidence, either on direct or cross-examination of witnesses conversant with the facts. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Smith, 80 Md. 472 -473, and other cases there cited. “In regard to the degree of similarity which must exist and the nearness in respect of time and place no general rules are laid down, and as the trial judge is usually conversant with such matters they must be left largely to his discretion.” 127 Md at 241, 96 A. at 461 . The rule stated in Patterson has been explicated and applied in Lustine v. State Roads Comm’n, 217 Md. 274 , 142 A. 2d 566 (1958); Bergeman v. State Roads Comm’n, 218 Md. 137 , 146 A. 2d 48 (1958); Winepol v. State Roads Comm’n, 220 Md. 227 , 151 A. 2d 723 (1959); Hance v. State Roads Comm’n, 221 Md. 164 , 156 A. 2d 644 (1959); Taylor v. State Roads Comm’n, 224 Md. 92 , 167 A. 2d 127 (1961), and State Roads Comm’n v. Adams, 238 Md. 371 , 209 A. 2d 247 (1965) — to mention but a few of our cases discussing the admissibility of expert testimony pertaining to “comparable sales.” In Lustine , the trial court had ruled inadmissible testimony by one of the appellant’s experts concerning two transfers which he had considered as “comparable sales”; one was of a 42-acre parcel of land, approximately one-half mile from the subject property which had been formerly used as a gravel pit but which had been graded and laid out for subdivision purposes before its sale; the other transaction related to an adjacent parcel of 17 acres which had been “raw land” prior to its sale for subdivision purposes but which was “served by a dead end road.” In reversing, this Court, in connection with these evidentiary rulings, stated: “We think that the court, in ruling out testimony as to the sales prices of these properties, as not. being comparable, was unduly restrictive.

We are aware that there is considerable latitude in the exercise of discretion by the lower court in determining ⁶⁶¹ comparable sales. Patterson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 127 Md. 233, 241 , Williams v. New York, P. & N R. Company, 153 Md. 102, 108 . It should be borne in mind, however, that real estate parcels have a degree of uniqueness which make comparability, one with the other, in a strict sense, practically impossible. We think it the better policy, where there are any reasonable elements of comparability, to admit testimony as to the sales, and leave the weight of the comparison for the consideration of the jury, along with such distinguishing features as may be brought out on cross-examination or otherwise.

Forest Preserve District of Cook County v. Eckhoff 372 Ill. 391 , 24 N. E. 2d 52 . Cf. Turner v. State Roads Commission, 213 Md. 428, 431 .” 217 Md. at 280-81 , 142 A. 2d at 569 . In Bergeman , the appellants contended that two of the sales described by an expert witness for the State Roads Commission were not comparable because the properties were not, when sold, located in a commercial zone.

This Court, in sustaining the admissibility of such evidence recognized, that it is “generally true that property in a residential zone is less valuable than in a commercial zone which would make them not truly comparable, but we have held that the probability of rezoning within a reasonable time may be taken into account in some situations,” and pointed out, citing Lustine, supra, that the “trial court” has a wide discretion in determining what sales are reasonably comparable, leaving the weight of the comparison for the consideration of the jury. In connection with the opinion of the expert witness, the Court stated: “It is trite to observe that the weight of evidence is for the triers of fact, or for the court on motion for new trial. We are only concerned with the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, and in passing upon that question the testimony, and all proper inferences therefrom, must be ⁶⁶² considered in a light most favorable to the plaintiff’s case. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 173 .

We have also said that ‘the opinion of [an expert] witness, and the grounds upon which it was formed, and the weight to be attached thereto, were matters for the consideration of the jury.’ Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15, 41 ; Marshall v. Sellers, 188 Md. 508, 518 . The value or weight of the opinion of an expert is dependent on, and is no stronger than, the facts on which it is predicated. Cf. Grant v. Curtin, 194 Md. 363, 385 .

The conclusions of the witnesses as to value in the instant case depend upon basic facts to which the formulae are applied, and we perceive no reason why the jury should not be permitted to draw their own conclusions from such basic facts as they may choose to find, if supported by testimony or permissible inferences therefrom. We think there was legally sufficient evidence to support the verdict.” 218 Md. at 144 , 146 A. 2d at 52 . In Winepol , the holdings in Lustine and in Bergeman were described as an approval of “the liberal approach” to the admissibility of such evidence. In Hance v. State Roads Comm’n, the property owners on appeal asserted inter alia error by the trial court in two of its evidentiary rulings.

An expert for the condemnor used the capitalization of rent method of appraisal in connection with two of the three buildings located upon the land. When asked why he did not use the capitalization method with reference to the third building, he replied that in his opinion it was not “fit for human habitation.” The refusal of the trial court to strike this answer was asserted as error. Additionally, a real estate appraiser produced on behalf of the owners was precluded from offering as evidence of a comparable sale a transaction which had occurred subsequent to the “taking” of the property by the appellee. In rejecting the appellant’s contention concerning the lack of habitability of one of the buildings, Judge Prescott, who delivered the opinion for the Court, stated: ⁶⁶³ “We think the evidence objected to in the case at bar was clearly relevant and admissible.

It was nothing more nor less than an expert, who had expressed his opinion as to value, stating his reasons for the opinion given; and these reasons may be elicited by the party who has called the witness, as well as by the opposite party upon cross-examination. In Baltimore Belt R. R. Co. v. Sattler, 102 Md. 595, 602 , 62 A. 1125 ; 64 A. 507 , this Court said, ‘[a]n expert witness * * * may give his opinion as to the value of the property * * * and he may state to the jury the reasons upon which his opinion is based, in order that they may judge of the value of his testimony.’ Again, in Baltimore City v. Hurlock, 113 Md. 674, 683 , 78 A. 558 , the Court quoted, with approval, from an Illinois case as follows: ‘The facts upon which opinions of expert witnesses as to the value of property proposed to be taken in condemnation proceedings, may be stated by them, either in chief, or upon cross-examination’ * * * as their [the opinions’] weight and value depends largely upon the foundation of fact and reason upon which they stand.’ See also M & C. C. of Balto. v. Smith, etc. B. Co., 80 Md. 458, 472 , 31 A. 423 , 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd Ed.), Secs. 562, 655. Cf. State Roads Comm. of Md. v. Novosel, 203 Md. 619, 626 , 102 A. 2d 563 .” 221 Md. at 168-169 , 156 A. 2d at 646 .

Although the Court did find that it was error to have excluded the evidence concerning a comparable sale solely on the basis of it having occurred subsequent to the taking, the Court was “unable to see how the exclusion of this one sale worked any real harm to or substantially prejudiced the appellants” and that “it was doubtful that this ruling of the trial court made any difference in the jury’s verdict, much less a substantial one.” After noting that no proffer was made in connection with the evidence which had been rejected, it stated, “Courts are reluctant to set aside verdicts for errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence unless ⁶⁶⁴ they cause substantial injustice. This is especially true in condemnation proceedings. Such cases usually consume much time in trial, and are expensive in nature. As a rule, they are determined by a myriad of different items of evidence.” 221 Md. at 176 , 156 A. 2d at 650 .

In Taylor , one of the grounds urged for reversal was the contention by the land owners that the testimony of an expert for the appellee as to a comparable sale should have been excluded because the property referred to by him was “zoned,” whereas the property being condemned was “not zoned.” Although this contention was rejected because the record did not disclose how the lots in the sale had in fact been zoned, the Court, again through Judge Prescott, pointed out that “this Court has stated, and repeatedly restated, the rule in Maryland.” After quoting from Lustine v. State Roads Comm’n, supra, (as we have hereinabove set forth) he further wrote: “the rule as thus stated conforms with the great weight of authority elsewhere (citations omitted).” Judge Barnes, for this Court, in State Roads Commission v. Adams, supra, in a review of the rule and our antecedent holdings, stated: “In Maryland it is well settled that evidence of the price for which similar property has been sold in the vicinity may legitimately be used in support of, and as background for, the opinion of an expert testifying as to the value of the property taken in condemnation proceedings. Williams v. New York, P. & N. R. Co., 153 Md. 102, 108 , 137 A. 506 (1927); Patterson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 127 Md. 233, 241 , 96 A. 458 (1915). There is a conflict of authority nationally upon the question of whether the price paid at voluntary sales of land similar to that taken is admissible as independent evidence of the value of the land taken. See Annotation, 85 A.L.R.2d 110 (1962), ‘Admissibility on issue of value of real property of evidence of sale price of other real property.’ We adhere to the ‘Massachusetts’ or ‘majority’ view that evidence of ⁶⁶⁵ such sales is admissible as primary evidence of the value of the property taken, or to support an expert witness’s opinion as to such value, or both.

Hance v. State Roads Commission, supra; Taylor v. State Roads Commission, 224 Md. 92 , 167 A. 2d 127 (1961); see 5 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3rd ed.), Section 21.3 [1], In those states which adhere to the Massachusetts view the question frequently arises as to whether or not the conditions of other real property together with the circumstances surrounding its sale, are sufficiently similar to those of the land taken as to permit the admission of the sale price of the former as evidence of the value of the latter. In Lustine v. State Roads Commission, 217 Md. 274 , 142 A. 2d 566 (1958), we held that the trial court has ‘considerable latitude’ (or ‘wide discretion,’ Bergeman v. State Roads Commission, 218 Md. 137 , 146 A. 2d 48 (1958)) in determining what sales are ‘reasonably comparable.’ Moreover, we went further in Lustine and declared it the better policy to admit testimony as to the sales where there are any reasonable ele m ents of comparability, and leave the weight of the comparison to the consideration of the jury, together with such contrasting or distinguishing features as may be brought out on cross-examination or otherwise (Lustine, p. 281 of 217 Md.). Cf. Winepol v. State Roads Commission, 220 Md. 227 , 151 A. 2d 723 (1959) and State Roads Commission v. Smith, 224 Md. 537, 548-549 , 168 A. 2d 705 (1961).

The appellant states that the question to be decided is whether Judge Macgill’s rulings were ‘correct,’ but this formulation of the issue is ambiguous and perhaps misleading. We do not undertake to weigh the similarities vel non between allegedly comparable properties as matters of first impression in this Court to be decided without reference to the action of the trial judge. Rather, we decide only whether the standards enunciated in Lustine and Bergen),an as applied to the facts of a ⁶⁶⁶ given case ‘compel a finding that the trial court abused its discretion,’ Winepol v. State Roads Commission, supra, in admitting or refusing to admit the contested evidence. Even a finding of abuse of discretion does not compel a reversal: see the comments of Judge Prescott, speaking for the Court in Hance, supra, at page 176 of 221 Md., discussing the reluctance of the courts generally to set aside judgments in condemnation cases for errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence, in the absence of express showing that these errors caused ‘substantial injustice’ to the complaining party.” (Emphasis supplied.) 238 Md. at 378-79 , 209 A. 2d 250 -51.

In Adams , the Court held that there was no abuse of the wide discretion vested in the trial court when it admitted evidence of a sale of 280.3 acres of farm land, with a few out buildings thereon in a trial where the State Roads Commission was condemning 12.65 acres of the appellee’s 196 acre dairy farm. The Court pointed out that the “tract [was] sufficiently close, in point of locatipn and distance, and the sale thereof, sufficiently near, in point of time, as to furnish a test of the present value, other considerations aside.” After pointing out that Taylor v. State Roads Commission, supra, had made it plain that the “5 year and 5 mile limits” was not a rule of law we held, “as a legal proposition,” that the sizes of the respective tracts (196 acres owned by the appellee and 280.3 acres in the “comparable sale”) were not “grossly dissimilar.” After holding that “appellant’s contentions go to the weight rather than to the admissibility of the disputed evidence,” the Court stated: “[W]e base our disposition of these objections on the additional ground that there has been no satisfactory showing that the admission of the challenged evidence worked any ‘substantial injustice’ to the appellant, [footnote omitted.] Hance v. State Roads Commission, supra. ⁶⁶⁷ Prejudice, or the lack of it, is always of significance to an appellate court, and it assumes increased importance in condemnation cases, in view of the ‘myriad of different items of evidence’ sought to be introduced, (Hance, at 176). See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. State Roads Commission, 232 Md. 145, 151 , 192 A. 2d 271 (1963).” 238 Md. at 381-82 , 209 A. 2d at 252 . In affirming the judgment entered on the inquisition, the Court stated further: “[T]he appellant has singularly failed to show what substantial injustice has been done to it.

We are not dealing with an award of damages whose size is greatly in excess of the highest estimate of the appellees, and which must be taken to be based entirely upon the impressions gained by the jury from its view of the premises. Cf. Bergeman v. State Roads Commission, supra, at 142-143 of 218 Md. Nor does the verdict rest upon the untutored judgment of .the property owner.” 238 Md. at 385 , 209 A. 2d at 254 . In Smith v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 236 Md. 51 , 202 A. 2d 604 (1964) while recognizing that “in condemnation suits we have held admissible evidence of comparable sales as an aid in determining value and we have left much to the discretion of the trial court in deciding what sales are sufficiently comparable to be admissible,” this Court found no abuse of discretion when the trial court excluded proffered evidence as to the rentals of a tract of land, developed as an industrial park less than a half mile distant from the land being condemned, because the two tracts were not comparable and the valuation was too speculative in character.

The tract being condemned was raw land, scarred from mining operations, in need of regrading and was wholly undeveloped for use as an industrial park. By contrast, the condemned tract was a developed industrial park with improved roads and utilities, including five railroad sidings and a number of constructed and ⁶⁶⁸ industrially-used buildings. See also Winepol v. State Roads Comm’n, supra, where it was held not to have been an abuse of discretion to have excluded evidence of a sale in a “shopping district concededly of much higher grade than that in which the store of the appellant was located, and that its frontages on two commercial streets gave it an extraordinary and almost unique value.” 220 Md. at 231 , 151 A. 2d at 725-26 ; and Greater Balto. Cons.

Mkt. Authority v. Duvall, 255 Md. 90 , 256 A. 2d 882 (1969), where it was held the trial court properly refused, as being too speculative a basis for valuation, proffered evidence from the property owner concerning the value of his undeveloped land based on his intention to ultimately develop the land for an industrial park and his belief concerning the valuation of finished sites in a neighboring industrial park. In Taylor v. State Roads Comm’n, supra, this Court approved the method whereby an expert witness in connection with his opinion evidence of value makes “adjustments” in connection with sales he considers to be comparable. See also State Roads Commission v. Wyvill, 244 Md. 163, 171 , 223 A. 2d 146, 149-50 (1966) where a comparable sale was adjusted upward for time and downward because of location, and First Nat’l Realty v. State Roads Comm’n, 255 Md. 605, 611 , 258 A. 2d 419, 422 (1969).

The appellant’s expert witness Gilroy recognized the problem in attempting to locate sales which could be considered to be comparable when he stated “you try to get the properties with pretty much the same utility. However, in this case it wasn’t easy because there weren’t that many sales in the area that I felt were comparable to the subject zoning-wise and utility-wise.” He limited such sales to three in number since he felt that the “closer” they were to the subject property “the more comparable they were.” As this Court pointed out in Lustine, supra, “real estate parcels have a degree of uniqueness, which makes comparability, one with the other, in a strict sense practically impossible. What the Utah court stated in Redevelopment Agency of ⁶⁶⁹ Salt Lake City v. Mitsui Inv., Inc., 522 P. 2d 1370 (Utah 1974), cited by the appellant, concerning the exercise of “common sense” in this area as to the admissibility of such evidence is here particulárly apropos. That court stated: “On the question of evaluation property, as in most areas of the law, a resort to common sense and practical experience is helpful.

Real estate has always been regarded as unique because no two parcels can be exactly alike. . . . It is certainly not to be supposed that there will be found sales which are identical as to time, location, quantity and various characteristics of the property. The requirement is that it meet the test of ‘reasonable comparability. ’ That is, that these factors exist in sufficient similarity that the sale can fairly be regarded as having some probative value in arriving at a proper appraisal of the property.” (Emphasis supplied.) 522 P. 2d at 1373 . In striving for proximity the witness Richards, on behalf of the appellee, limited such sales to a radius of two miles, even though a number of such sales involved property zoned “light industrial.” The sale from Simplex Land Co. to Boron Oil Co. was, in distance, that closest to the property being condemned.

Although the sales described by the appellee’s witness Lee, were as much as 10 miles distant, all such properties were of land zoned “commercial.” Although the appellant in its brief, by arbitrarily packaged passages reminiscent of the chapters in James Joyce’s “Ulysses” recites in great factual detail a jury-type argument in support of dissimilarities between the land being condemned and the properties described by the witnesses Lee and Richards to which it made objection because of “size,” “distance” and “zoning,” it overlooks the fact that “[w]e do not undertake to weigh the similarities vel non between allegedly comparable properties as matters of first impression in this Court to be decided without reference to the action of the trial judge.” Our function is to “decide only whether the standards enunciated in Lustine ⁶⁷⁰ and in Bergeman as applied to the facts of a given case ‘compel a finding that the trial court abused its discretion’ ” in admitting the contested