State Roads Commission v. Teets

Bruñe, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves a controversy between the State Roads Commission (the “Commission”) and the owners of certain lots in a subdivision known as “Lake View” on Deep Creek Lake, in Garrett County. The lots owned by the appellees overlook the lake and lie between it and a State road (Route 219). Between the southwesterly boundary of the appellees’ lots and the State road lies a strip of land twenty feet wide and seven hundred feet long, which the Commission wishes to use in widening and improving Route 219.

For a time negotiations proceeded between the Commission and the ap ²¹⁶ pellees for the acquisition by the Commission of these lot owners’ rights in this strip, but these negotiations ended when the Commission reached the conclusion that there had been a dedication of the strip to public use as a road, as a result of the Commission’s own acceptance of an offer of dedication, and hence that the lot owners had no interests which the Commission needed to purchase or condemn. The lot owners were notified of this conclusion and thereupon instituted this suit for an injunction to restrain the Commission and its contractor from entering upon the strip. The Commission’s demurrer to the bill was overruled, the case came on for hearing on the merits and the Circuit Court held that the lot owners were entitled to an injunction as prayed. The Commission appeals from the order overruling its demurrer and from the decree for an injunction.

There is no real dispute with regard to the facts, though the Commission challenges the admissibility of parol evidence intended to show that one of the owners of the subdivision did not intend to dedicate the strip in dispute to public use as a road. The chief question is whether or not there was a dedication. This main question is common to both the ruling on the demurrer and the final order, and it has been so treated by the parties. We shall follow the same course.

In November, 1925, Charles N. Mclntire acquired the record title- to the property, which later became the Lake View subdivision, from John O. Thayer and wife, and he continued to hold such title in 1928. During this time (and longer) he was in partnership with Alexander C. Mason in this real estate venture. This fact was determined in January, 1938, in an equity proceeding in the Circuit Court for Garrett County instituted by Wade H. Mason, the sole heir of Alexander C. Mason; and it was decreed in that case that Mclntire held the record title in trust for himself and his partner, Mason. All of the appellees derive their titles through Mclntire and Mason, though Mason’s name does not appear as a grantor.

Alexander C. Mason was a civil engineer and at one time was county surveyor for Garrett County. He laid out the ²¹⁷ Lake View subdivision and his plat of it was recorded among the land records of Garrett County at some time prior to June 27, 1928. This plat shows the scale to which it was drawn and the general layout of the development, including lots 27-41 and the twenty-foot strip now in controversy, but it does not state the courses and distances of any lot lines or roads or ways. The shoreline of Deep Creek Lake in front of lots 27-41, as shown on this plat, runs roughly on a northwest-southeast line.

A margin — presumably a road or right of way — was left between the lakeshore and the northeasterly boundaries of these lots. Those boundaries constitute a continuous straight line which is nearly parallel with the shoreline. The lots appear from the plat to be of about the same width, but they increase markedly in depth from No. 27 at the northwest end to No. 41 at the southeast end of the tier. Their boundary lines on the southwesterly side constitute a single, straight line, which is parallel with the State road, Route 219.

Between them lies the twenty-foot strip here in dispute, which is designated on the plat as “Road Way.” On the other side of the State road, and separated from it by a strip of varying width designated as “Front Street,” are: first, lots 20 and 21, which lie behind lots 27-29; second, a cemetery, which is not identified as such on the 1928 plat and which lies behind lots 30-35; and third, lots 22-26 which lie behind lots 36-41. Behind these lots and the cemetery there is a strip designated as “Back Street.” Running from Back Street along the northwest boundaries of lots 20 and 27 to the lake front, and crossing Front Street and the State road approximately at right angles, is a way designated as “Thayer Street.” Unmarked, narrow, open spaces — apparently ways of some sort — parallel to Thayer Street and running from Front Street to Back Street separate the cemetery tract from lot 21 to the northwest and from lot 22 to the southeast. There is also another apparent way, which likewise bears no designation on the 1928 plat, running parallel to Thayer Street along the southeast side of lot 41 from the “Road Way” to the lakeshore. The recorded plat does not contain a legend, such as is ²¹⁸ often placed on subdivision plats, to the effect that there is no dedication of any streets, alleys or ways shown thereon; and in fact it says nothing whatever about dedication.

The description of the various lots by courses and distances was set forth in an instrument recorded among the land records of Garrett County in Liber E. Z. T. No. 97, folio 11, and the Chancellor found that the various deeds for lots referred to the lot numbers only and did not give courses and distances. References were also made to the recorded map mentioned above. None of the deeds specifically mentioned the 20-foot “Road Way,” but all of them contained the usual clause granting easements reading, “Together with the rights, roads, ways, water, privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging or in anywise appertaining.” The deeds further provided that the grantees should be entitled to use and enjoy in common with the grantors, their heirs and assigns, the water, right of way and road privileges contained in a deed from John O. Thayer and wife to Charles N. McIntire, dated June 25, 1928, and recorded in the land records of Garrett County in Liber E. Z. T. No. 97, folio 404. On June 26, 1928, by a deed recorded at the next folio of Liber E. Z. T. No. 97, Mclntire conveyed to Thayer all those roads or rights of way in “Deep Creek Farm” designated on the map already referred to as “Front Street”, “Thayer Street”, and “Back Street” and also the unnamed road or right of way alongside of lot 41.

These were to be used in common by the parties and their heirs and assigns. No mention was made of the 20-foot “Road Way.” (In the deed of June 26, 1928, the ways which were called “Streets” on the map of Lake View were referred to as “Roads.”) Neither of the deeds dated June 25th and 26th is included in the record, nor is the document giving the courses and distances of the lots here involved. They and the map seem to give such information pertinent to the present suit as was a matter of public record before a public sale of lots in Lake View which (the map indicates) was to be held on June 27th, 1928. ²¹⁹ As was found by the Chancellor: “At the time the addition was laid out by Mason, and at a time when he was one of the owners, he stated to two reputable witnesses, neither of whom are parties to this suit, that the purpose of the twenty foot strip called ‘Roadway’ on the plat, was for the use of the various lot owners, in parking their cars, and (according to Wade H. Mason) not for the use of the general public.” 2fí ;•< 5j« 3-Í “No use of the strip in common by the owners of Lots 27-41 has been shown. Apparently by mutual consent — or at least without dissent — each owner treated the space between his lot and the space marked on the plat as ‘State Road’ as though it were part of his property.

In addition to constructing thereon driveways leading to their homes or garages, some of them have beautified the space by planting ornamental trees or by grass plots. One has built a wall which cost about $500. None of them have been assessed for taxes on parts of the strip, but tax assessments were simply by lot numbers. Several of the lots are unimproved, but most of them have attractive summer cottages — one at least is designed as a year-round-home — and all lots slope down towards and have a good view of Deep Creek Lake.” The plaintiffs’ right to maintain their bill is challenged solely on the ground of an alleged dedication, and the nature and extent of their interests in the twenty-foot strip have not otherwise been put in issue.

A court of equity is not ordinarily the appropriate forum in which to try questions of title, but jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent and it is necessary that the plaintiffs have some interest which may serve as the basis of equitable relief. Their bill alleges facts sufficient to support claims on their part to at least one-half of the twenty-foot strip, and the proof sustains these ²²⁰ allegations. The bill also alleges that a private right of way-over the whole strip was created in favor of the purchasers of lots bounding on the “Road Way”, but the present status of any such right of way is cloudy on both the allegations of the bill and the proof by reason of its apparent abandonment and inconsistent use. The lot owners also allege possessory rights and rights based upon improvements on both sides of the strip, though they have not pressed any claims in this proceeding based upon adverse possession.

The plaintiffs’ claim to one-half of the strip is supported by Code (1951), Article 21, Section 115, under which “All * * * grants or conveyances of land in this State, binding on any street or highway, or when any street or highway shall be one or more of the lines thereof, shall be construed to pass to the * * * grantee * * * all the right, title and interest of the * * * grantor of the said land, to the centre of the street or highway * * * unless the * * * grantor shall in express terms in the writing by which the * * * conveyance is made reserve to himself all the right, title and interest to the said street or highway.” This Section is applicable to property binding on a private street as well as to property binding on a public one. Campeggi v. Wakefield, 157 Md. 229 , 145 A. 546 ; Maryland Telephone & Tel. Co. v. Ruth, 106 Md. 644 , 68 A. 358 ; Pope v. Clark, 122 Md. 1 , 89 A. 387 . The lot owners also base their claims in part upon improvements made by them on the portions of the strip lying between their respective lots and the State road.

In support of these claims they rely upon Whittington v. Crisfield, 121 Md. 387 , 88 A. 232 . See also Broumel v. White, 87 Md. 521 , 39 A. 1047 . We think that the plaintiffs have shown sufficient interest to maintain the suit. There is no dispute between the parties on the proposition that the “Road Way” shown on the plat of Lake View did indicate some kind of way.

The dispute is as to what kind. The Commission’s claim is that there was a dedication of the strip to public use, and it relies strongly on ²²¹ Harlan v. Bel Air, 178 Md. 260 , 13 A. 2d 370 , in support of this contention. The lot owners deny any dedication. As the Chancellor pointed out in his opinion, there may he a marked difference between the rights acquired by a grantee and those acquired by the public where a deed described land as bounding on a street or road.

See White v. Flannigain, 1 Md. 525 ; City of Baltimore v. Broumel, 86 Md. 153 , 37 A. 648 ; Broumel v. White, supra; Baltimore v. Yost, 121 Md. 366 , 88 A. 342 ; Adams v. Peninsula Produce Exchange, 138 Md. 656 , 115 A. 106 ; United Finance Corporation v. Royal Realty Corporation, 172 Md. 138 , 191 A. 81 ; Blank v. Park Lane Center, 209 Md. 568 , 121 A. 2d 846 . See also Tiffany, Real Property, 3rd Ed., § 1103, where the author points out that there is no need to invoke any doctrine of dedication where purchasers of lots sold by reference to a plat are seeking to enforce, as against their vendor, rights to have streets or other public places kept open in accordance with the plat upon the strength of which they bought. He then goes on to say: “Many of the cases, however, which assert this doctrine of dedication by sales with reference to a plat, involve the rights of the public generally, or of the municipality as representative of the public, and that such sales do usually involve a dedication in accordance with the plat may be regarded as settled in most, if not all, of the states. It is to be regretted that, of the great number of cases in which a dedication by sales in accordance with a plat is asserted, none, so far as the writer has observed, undertake to explain why such sales should operate as effecting a dedication; * * *.

The doctrine had its origin, it may be suspected, in a failure to distinguish between the rights of the individual purchasers and of the public, the courts saying, as they not infrequently do, that sale of lots with reference to a plat involves a dedication of the lots [sic, streets?] in favor of the purchasers and ignoring the well-settled principle that land cannot be dedi ²²² cated for the benefit of particular members of the public. The expression