State v. Allied Fidelity Corp.

GILBERT, Chief Judge. The limited issue before this Court in this appeal by the State of Maryland is whether a judge of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, abused his discretion in rejecting the State’s motion to reconsider an order striking a bail bond forfeiture. For the reasons stated infra, we conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion, and we affirm. Karen Anderson was charged by the Grand Jury of Montgomery County in June, 1978, with what now would constitute multiple counts of theft.

See Md.Ann. Code art. 27, § 342. We infer from the record that Anderson was released on $25,000 bail that was posted by an approved surety. We further infer that at some point in time the appellee, Allied Fidelity Corporation, acquired the original surety’s interest in the bail bond, and for the purposes of this opinion we are concerned solely with Allied and not any of its predecessors. Anderson did not appear for trial, and the record contains no explanation of why she failed to appear.

As a result of Anderson’s nonappearance at trial, the circuit court on January 22, 1979, forfeited the bail bond. The amount was finally paid by Allied on July 20, 1979. Approximately three years later the proceeds of the bond were disbursed by dividing them equally between the county and the law library. According to the transcript of the oral argument before Judge Beard, matters seemed to lie dormant until Allied discovered Anderson’s presence in a federal institution.

Allied then apparently notified the State of Anderson’s whereabouts. The docket entries show that on October 3, 1983, Anderson’s case was set for trial on October 14, 1983. On the date of trial the State entered a nol pros to the charges against Anderson. For all practical purposes, the ²⁹³ nol pros ended the criminal proceeding against Anderson, even though the State still has the opportunity, subject to constitutional considerations, to obtain another indictment.

Allied, on May 8, 1984, petitioned for a remittance of the forfeiture. A copy of the petition was certified to have been mailed to the deputy state’s attorney. One week later the court ordered a remittance of the forfeiture. Two days later the State moved to rescind the order of remittance.

The court, on June 15, 1984, after a hearing, denied the motion for a rescission. Twenty-seven days later the State appealed. To characterize Md.Ann.Code art. 27, § 6I6V2, the statute relative to bail bond forfeiture remittance, as unique is to understate the situation. Subsection (e)(1) of § 6I6V2 provides: “Any court exercising criminal jurisdiction shall strike out a forfeiture of bail or collateral where the defendant can show reasonable grounds for his nonappearanee.

However the court shall allow a surety 90 days, or for good cause shown, 180 days from the date of failure to appear to produce the defendant in court before requiring the payment of any forfeiture of bail or collateral. The court shall strike out a forfeiture of bail or collateral deducting only the actual expense incurred for the defendant’s arrest, apprehension, or surrender if the defendant is produced in court and if the arrest, apprehension, or surrender occurs more than 90 days after the defendant’s failure to appear or at the termination of the period allowed by the court to produce the defendant.” This Court in Allegheny Mut. Ins. Co. v. State, 50 Md. App. 169, 173, 436 A.2d 515, 518 (1981), said: “The statute is hardly a model for unambiguous legislation.

Why it is phrased as it is is not for us to answer. Whatever defect exists in the legislation, it, at least, spurs a surety on to find any defendant who defaulted on his appearance at trial. The surety is placed, by the statute, in the position of knowing that once he finds a ²⁹⁴ defendant who has fled, the surety may recover his loss by surrendering the defendant in court. Certainly, in the sense of encouraging sureties to seek and find defendants who fail to appear for trial, the statute serves a useful purpose.

Nevertheless, it also seems to encourage sureties not to surrender a defendant, if a forfeiture has occurred, until after the expiration of 90 days following forfeiture. In that manner, the surety avoids the risk of the judge’s failing to find ‘reasonable grounds’ for nonappearance and assures the striking out of the forfeiture by virtue of the clear legislative