State v. Blizzard

Alvey, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court.' The indictment in this case is for obtaining what are alleged to he valuable securities, by false pretences. It consists of a single count, wherein it is alleged that the defendant, “by certain false pretence by him then and there made to Richard Manning, unlawfully, knowingly, and designedly did obtain from Richard Manning n certain valuable security, to wit, a certain hill of sale or mortgage of personal property, for the payment ³⁸⁷ of six. hundred dollars on condition, executed by one John Blizzard to Annie M. Blizzard and Samuel Blizzard ; and certain other valuable securities, to wit, the endorsement and signature of the said Annie M. Blizzard to two certain promissory notes for the payment of three hundred dollars each, and the signature of Samuel M. Blizzard, her husband, with her, the said Annie M. Blizzard, to said promissory notes, with intent then and there to defraud ; he, the said John W. Blizzard then and there well knowing the said false pretences to be false,” &c. The defendant demurred to the indictment, and the Court sustained the demurrer and discharged the defendant. The State filed a petition in error, and assigned as ground of error in the ruling of the Court: 1st.

That the Court erred in holding that the indictment did not sufficiently allege the offence of obtaining a valuable security under false pretences, with intent to defraud, &c.; and, 2. That the Court erred in ruling the indictment defective in law, because it was not sufficiently alleged therein that a valuable security had been obtained by the defendant by false pretences, with intent to defraud, within the meaning of the statute. The two assignments of error being substantially the same, they may be considered together as a single assignment. Formerly, before the Act of 1835, ch. 319, it was necessary that the false pretences, by means of which the goods or money had been obtained, should be specifically set forth in the indictment, with the allegation of their falsity to the knowledge of the defendant, so that the Court could determine whether they came within the meaning of the statute.

But the statute now provides (Code, Art. 27, sec. 288,) that “in any indictment for false pretences, it shall not be necessary to state the particular false pretences intended to be ³⁸⁸ relied on in proof of the same, hut the defendant, on application to the State’s attorney before the trial, shall be entitled to the names of the witnesses and a statement of the false pretences intended to be given in evidence.” The present indictment, therefore, was not demurrable because it failed to set out the false pretences intended to be relied on. It does not appear that any application had been made for a statement of such false pretences, or that any such statement had been placed upon record. But while there is no longer a necessity for specially alleging in the body of the indictment the particular false pretences made use of by the defendant, as means of perpetrating the fraud, the indictment in other respects must have that degree of certainty and precision that will fully inform the accused of the special character of the charge against which he is called upon to defend, and that will enable the Court to determine whether the facts alleged upon the face of the indictment are sufficient in the contemplation of law to constitute a crime; and, whether the trial be followed by acquittal or conviction, that the record may stand as a protection against further prosecution for the same alleged offence. It is true, the Legislature, to obviate some of the technical difficulties and refined distinctions that frequently arose in the trial of this class of cases, has provided, by the Act of 1862, ch. 80, (Code, Art. 27, sec. 291,) that, in indictments for obtaining" property by false pretences, and also in some other cases, it shall be sufficient to allege that the defendant did the act with intent to defraud, without alleging the intent of the defendant to be to defraud &nyparticular person, and that, on the trial, it shall be sufficient to prove that the defendant did the act charged with an intent to defraud.

And, by the same statute, it is also provided, that in indictments for obtaining by ³⁸⁹ false pretences any instrument, “it shall he sufficient to describe such instrument b.y any name or designation by which the same- may be usually known, or by the purport thereof, without setting out a copy or facsimile thereof, or otherwise describing the same.” These provisions, however, only relate to the manner of alleging the facts and bringing them upon the record, but do not dispense with the necessity of their averment in the indictment as essential to the proper description of the crime