State v. Boozer

McAULIFFE, Judge. The issue before us is whether a defendant once placed in jeopardy on a charge of committing a fourth degree sexual offense may be subjected to a second prosecution for attempted fourth degree sexual offense when both charges arose out of the same criminal episode but the State alleged separate acts by the defendant in each charging document. We hold that the second prosecution is permitted under the facts of this case. ¹⁰⁰ Hampton Boozer was initially charged in the District Court of Maryland. The statement of charges alleged that the defendant “[d]id engage in a sexual act with [the victim], a person aged 14 and 4 years or more younger than [he],” in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1984 Cum.Supp.) Art. 27, § 464C, a sexual offense in the fourth degree.

Pursuant to Boozer’s demand for a jury trial the case was removed to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, and trial commenced on March 5, 1984. After the jury had been sworn and opening statements made, the State’s Attorney became concerned that the charging document might be at variance with the evidence he expected to produce. Specifically, the State’s evidence would show that Appellant had inserted his fingers into the victim’s vagina, and while this conduct fit the statutory definition of sexual contact the State’s Attorney’s concern was that it would not be within the definition of a sexual act. 1 He therefore sought leave of the court to amend the statement of charges to allege that the defendant engaged in sexual contact without consent, rather than a sexual act. Appellee’s counsel objected, stating that offenses involving sexual contact and those involving a sexual act are “totally different offenses.” The trial judge agreed and denied the motion to amend.

Thereupon the State’s Attorney announced that the State could not proceed “for obvious reasons” and entered a nolle prosequi. The defendant did not consent to the entry of the nolle prosequi. A new statement of charges was thereafter filed in the District Court, alleging that Boozer “did unlawfully attempt to commit a sexual offense in the fourth degree to wit: ... did attempt to have vaginal intercourse with [the victim], a female, then 14 years of age, and Hampton Boozer, afore ¹⁰¹ said, then being a male 59 years of age,” in violation of the common law of Maryland. Boozer again demanded trial by jury and when the case reached the Circuit Court he filed a motion to dismiss, contending that further prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The motion was granted by Judge Ahalt, who concluded that 1) an attempt to commit a sexual offense in the fourth degree is the same offense as a consummated fourth degree sex offense for double jeopardy purposes, and 2) the offense of sexual offense in the fourth degree by vaginal intercourse is the same offense as the initial charge of engaging in a sexual act, and therefore barred. The State appealed to the Court of Special Appeals and we issued a writ of certiorari prior to consideration of the case by that court. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in part, that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.... ” The double jeopardy clause is applicable to the states, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 , 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2063 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), and protects not only against multiple convictions and sentences but also against multiple trials for the same offense. Parks v. State, 287 Md. 11 , 410 A.2d 597 (1980).

We have held that the protection against double jeopardy ordinarily bars further prosecution of the same offense when the State enters a nolle prosequi without the consent of the defendant after jeopardy has attached. Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 257 , 261 n. 3, 353 A.2d 240 (1976); Blondes v. State, 273 Md. 435 , 330 A.2d 169 (1975). Jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 , 98 S.Ct. 2156 , 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978).

Boozer has therefore been placed in jeopardy, and may not again be tried for the same offense. Accordingly, the question of what constitutes the “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes is at issue here. Appellee contends that Art. 27, § 464C creates a single offense, sexual offense in the fourth degree, and that the ¹⁰² State cannot bring more than one charge of sexual offense in the fourth degree as a result of a single criminal transaction or episode. The State contends that § 464C groups at least three separate and divisible types of prohibited conduct which may, but need not be charged as separate offenses.

Further, the State maintains that there is no identity of offenses between the first case involving a statutory charge of sexual offense in the fourth degree and the second case involving the common law offense of attempted sexual offense in the fourth degree. We do not reach the question of whether an attempt is the same offense for double jeopardy purposes as the substantive crime attempted 2 because we find the vaginal intercourse prohibited by § 464C is not necessarily the same offense as the sexual act prohibited by the same section, and under the facts of this case it was constitutionally permissible to charge them as separate offenses. Art. 27, § 464C is a part of the comprehensive legislative package enacted in 1976 to reform and codify this State’s rape and sexual offense laws. 3 We reproduce § 464C in its entirety, together with those parts of § 461 (definitions) that are necessary for an understanding the section: § 464C. Fourth degree sexual offense.

(a) What constitutes. — A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the fourth degree if the person engages: (1) In sexual contact with another person against the will and without the consent of the other person; or (2) In a sexual act with another person who is 14 or 15 years of age and the person performing the sexual act is four or more years older than the other person; or ¹⁰³ (3) In vaginal intercourse with another person who is 14 or 15 years of age and the person performing the act is four or more years older than the other person. (b) Penalty. — Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction is subject to imprisonment for a period of not more than one year, or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both fine and imprisonment. § 461. Definitions. * sjs * * 5[S * (e) Sexual act. — “Sexual act” means cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus, or anal intercourse, but does not include vaginal intercourse. Emission of semen is not required.

Penetration, however slight, is evidence of anal intercourse. Sexual act also means the penetration, however slight, by any object into the genital or anal opening of another person’s body if the penetration can be reasonably construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal or gratification or for abuse of either party and if the penetration is not for accepted medical purposes. (f) Sexual contact. — “Sexual contact” as used in §§ 464B and 464C, means the intentional touching of any part of the victim’s or actor’s anal or genital areas or other intimate parts for the purposes of sexual arousal or gratification or for abuse of either party and includes the penetration, however slight, by any part of a person’s body, other than the penis, mouth, or tongue, into the genital or anal opening of another person’s body if that penetration can be reasonably construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal or gratification or for abuse of either party. It does not include acts commonly expressive of familial or friendly affection, or acts for accepted medical purposes.

(g) Vaginal intercourse. — “Vaginal intercourse” has its ordinary meaning of genital copulation. Penetration, however slight, is evidence of vaginal intercourse. Emission of semen is not required. ¹⁰⁴ The problem most often presented in double jeopardy-cases is whether the same conduct may be separately prosecuted and punished because it constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions. See Garrett v. United States, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 2407 , 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 , 103 S.Ct. 673, 679 , 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 , 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1143 , 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691-92 , 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1437-38 , 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980).

The problem presented by the case before us does not fit the usual mold. Here we must consider whether the Legislature has determined that separate acts by a defendant should not be separately prosecuted and punished. Initially, it is clear that many of the various acts of criminal conduct grouped together in § 464C historically and customarily have been considered sufficiently separate and distinct from each other to justify separate punishment, even though occurring in close temporal proximity and within the same criminal episode. Prior to the 1976 revision of our rape and sexual offense laws, a defendant in this State could have been separately charged and punished with offenses now grouped within § 464C.

For example, a 21 year old defendant who had consensual vaginal intercourse with a 15 year old girl and then engaged in anal intercourse and fellatio with her, and who then forced an object into her vagina or rectum without her consent, could previously have been convicted of separate offenses and given consecutive sentences for three offenses. 4 If Appellee is correct the present statute would permit no more than one convic ¹⁰⁵ tion of sexual offense in the fourth degree for this series of criminal acts. Prior to 1976 the two acts alleged to have occurred in this case would have supported separate charges and consecutive sentences. The attempted vaginal intercourse would have been punishable as an attempt to commit carnal knowledge, and the digital penetration punishable as a battery. Taylor v. State, 214 Md. 156 , 133 A.2d 414 (1957).

The courts of this country have had little difficulty in concluding that separate acts resulting in separate insults to the person of the victim may be separately charged and punished even though they occur in very close proximity to each other and even though they are part of a single criminal episode or transaction. In one of the leading cases, People v. Perez, 23 Cal.3d 545 , 153 Cal.Rptr. 40 , 591 P.2d 63 (1979), the Supreme Court of California was called upon to interpret a state statute prohibiting punishment for more than one violation arising out of an “act or omission” where multiple sex acts were involved. The facts indicated a brutal attack lasting forty-five minutes to an hour, during which there occurred two instances of vaginal intercourse, cunnilingus, anal intercourse, two instances of fellatio, and the forcing of a metal tube into the victim’s rectum and vagina. The defendant contended he should not be punished for more than one of the sex offenses because they were all committed with the single intent and objective of obtaining sexual gratification.

In rejecting this contention the California court said: Assertion of a sole intent and objective to achieve sexual gratification is akin to an assertion of a desire for wealth as the sole intent and objective in committing a series of separate thefts. To accept such a broad, overriding intent and objective to preclude punishment for otherwise clearly separate offenses would violate the statute’s purpose to insure that a defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with his culpability. It would reward the ¹⁰⁶ defendant who has the greater criminal ambition with a lesser punishment. A defendant who attempts to achieve sexual gratification by committing a number of base criminal acts on his victim is substantially more culpable than a defendant who commits only one such act. sfc * * * * None of the sex offenses was committed as a means of committing any other, none facilitated commission of any other, and none was incidental to the commission of any other.

People v. Perez, 153 Cal.Rptr. at 46-47 , 591 P.2d at 68-69 (citations omitted). In State v. Frazier, 185 Conn. 211 , 440 A.2d 916 (1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1112 , 102 S.Ct. 3496 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1375 (1982), the Supreme Court of Connecticut rejected a claim that several acts of sexual intercourse with the victim in a short period of time could result in only a single offense of rape, and also rejected a claim that various sexual acts should have been merged. The court said: There is ample authority holding that each separate act of forcible sexual intercourse constitutes a separate crime. 1 Wharton, Criminal Law & Procedure (1957) § 304; 65 Am.Jur.2d, Rape § 106. A different view would allow a person who has committed one sexual assault upon a victim to commit with impunity many other such acts during the same encounter.

The classic test of multiplicity is whether the legislative intent is to punish individual acts separately or to punish only the course of action which they constitute. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302 , 52 S.Ct. 180, 181 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)____ In this case each assault upon the victim involved a separate act of will on the part of the defendant and a separate indignity upon the victim. Under these circumstances we believe the legislative intention was that each assault should be deemed an additional offense. In People v. Brown, 105 Mich.App. 58 , 306 N.W.2d 392 (1981), the Court of Appeals of Michigan upheld a conviction ¹⁰⁷ of two counts of criminal sexual conduct based on two acts of vaginal intercourse occurring during one criminal transaction.

The court there said: In summary, we find clear language in the [criminal sexual conduct] statute evincing a legislative intent to punish each act of sexual penetration or sexual contact. Further, under the Blockburger test, the prosecution must prove one additional fact under each [criminal sexual conduct] charged; that is, the prosecutor must prove at least as many distinct acts of sexual penetration or acts of sexual contact as the number of counts of [criminal sexual conduct]. Therefore, defendant’s right against multiple punishment for a single offense was not violated. In State v. Steele, 33 Or.App. 491 , 577 P.2d 524 (1978), the Court of Appeals of Oregon upheld convictions of oral and anal sodomy of the same victim occurring within a short period of time.

The court stated at 577 P.2d 528 -29: We do not believe that the convictions for oral and anal sodomy in the first degree merge as constituting but one crime. The victim was exposed to additional fear, humiliation and danger during the second sodomy. We see no reason why we should hold that a man who commits one sodomy may do so again and again to the same victim with impunity____ The defendant’s two acts of sodomy constituted two separate crimes, separately punishable. In State v. Smith, 276 S.C. 484 , 280 S.E.2d 56 (1981), the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld convictions of two charges of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree where the facts disclosed compelled acts of sexual intercourse and fellatio within minutes of each other.

In Hamill v. State, 602 P.2d 1212 (Wyo.1979), the Supreme Court of Wyoming considered a claim that the defendant could not be tried on separate charges of sexual assault in the first degree where