State v. Bricker

CHASANOW, Judge. On November 17, 1988, James Deon Bricker was convicted of two counts of third degree sexual offense and two counts of assault and battery. Bricker was sentenced to two consecutive 10 year prison terms for the sexual offenses. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the convictions and remanded the case for a new trial.

Bricker v. State, 80 Md.App. 532 , 565 A.2d 340 (1989). We granted certiorari to determine whether the trial court, McCullough, J., correctly ruled that Dr. Edward Schultze did not meet the statutory qualifications of an expert witness competent to testify on the “ultimate issue” of Brick-er’s criminal responsibility. The facts are basically undisputed. The resolution of the controversy hinges instead on statutory interpretation.

At ⁸⁹ trial, Bricker’s counsel, with the primary goal of having the witness designated as an expert, called Dr. Schultze to testify. Schultze was principal of the Leary School in Virginia, where Bricker had been a student approximately one year prior to his arrest. The witness stated that he earned a bachelor’s degree in behavioral and social sciences from the University of Maryland, a master’s degree in psychology from the University of Virginia, a master’s degree in vocational education for the handicapped from Virginia Tech, and a doctorate of education in special education from Johns Hopkins University. Schultze further testified that he was neither a practicing psychologist nor a member of the American Psychological Association.

In addition, Schultze was not licensed as a psychologist in Maryland or Virginia. Defense counsel attempted to have Dr. Schultze qualified as an “expert in the area of handicapped, such as mental retardation” with the intention of having Schultze give his opinion that Bricker was not criminally responsible for his conduct. The following exchange took place: “[Defense Counsel]: ... I am going to argue to the jury insanity. [The Court]: How are you going to argue insanity if you don’t have any expert saying that he was insane at the time?

Don’t you have to have some medical expert get up here and say that he was not responsible because at the time he could not appreciate the criminality of his actions and conform his conduct to the level of the law? [Defense Counsel]: What we are dealing with is mental retardation here as opposed to your straight old-fashion insanity, mental disorder. That is what we are talking about. Not criminally responsible.” The trial court would not allow Dr. Schultze to testify before the jury regarding the issue of criminal responsibility because the witness was not licensed as a psychologist in Maryland or any other state. The judge did, however, ⁹⁰ permit him to proffer his opinion for the record outside the presence of the jury.

Schultze opined that Bricker’s ability to determine right from wrong was “questionable.” He stated further that a mild to moderate degree of mental retardation made Brick-er incapable of comprehending the criminality of his conduct. The witness based his opinion on personal observations and the results of various Wechsler intelligence quotient (I.Q.) tests (which Schultze did not personally administer). The trial court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to generate the question of whether Bricker, due to his mental retardation, was not criminally responsible for his actions. The jury was specifically instructed not to consider the matter in its deliberations, since no evidence had been introduced to show that the defendant was not criminally responsible.

The issue before this Court is whether a nonresident psychologist who does not meet the licensing criteria as set forth in the appropriate Maryland statutes is qualified to testify as an expert and render an opinion on a defendant’s lack of criminal responsibility by reason of mental retardation. We conclude that, before a witness may be permitted to testify as an expert on the “ultimate issue” of criminal responsibility, the witness must meet the minimum statutory standards. We explain. According to Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 9-120, a “psychologist licensed under the ‘Maryland Psychologists Act’ and qualified as an expert witness may testify on ultimate issues, including insanity, competency to stand trial, and matters within the scope of that psychologist’s special knowledge, in any case in any court____” (emphasis added). 1 The Maryland Psychologists Act states in pertinent part: ⁹¹ “(a) In general. — To qualify for a license[ 2 ] an applicant shall be an individual who meets the requirements of this section____ (d) Education. — The applicant shall have a doctoral degree that: (1) Is from an accredited college or university and based on a program of studies whose content was primarily psychological; or (2) Is based on a program of studies judged by the Board[ 3 ] to be substantially equivalent in subject matter and extent of training to a doctoral degree in psychology from an accredited college or university____ (f) Experience. — The applicant shall have at least 2 years of professional supervised experience in psychology that is approved by the Board.

At least 1 year of this required experience shall have occurred after the doctoral degree is awarded.” (Footnotes added). Maryland Code (1981, 1986 Repl.Vol.), Health Occupations Article, § 16-302. There is an exception for nonresidents which states, “The Board may authorize an unlicensed individual to practice psychology, subject to any limitations the Board imposes, if: (1) The Board finds that the circumstances warrant; and (2) The individual: (i) Is not a resident of this State; and (ii) Meets the qualifications, other than residence and examination, for a license.” Md.Code (1981, 1986 Repl.Vol., 1990 Cum Supp.), Health Occ. Art., § 16-301(d). ⁹² As stated supra, Dr. Schultze was not licensed in Maryland.

Although this is important to note, this is not necessarily the determinative factor in the assessment of his competence to testify regarding the “ultimate issue” at trial. The Court of Special Appeals, expressing its reluctance to create a bright line test dependent solely on the existence of a Maryland license, stated: “[w]e hesitate to establish a rigid rule that would automatically disqualify a psychologist from giving an opinion on mental retardation. The absence of a license, in and of itself, does not detract from one’s competency.” Bricker, 80 Md.App. at 544 , 565 A.2d at 346 . When interpreting a statute, the starting point is the wording of the relevant provisions.

If “the language in question [is] so clearly consistent with apparent purpose (and not productive of any absurd result) ... further research [is] unnecessary.” Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 , 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987). In the event that ambiguity clouds the precise application of the statute, the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. Taxiera v. Malkus, 320 Md. 471, 480 , 578 A.2d 761, 765 (1990); Harford County v. University, 318 Md. 525, 529 , 569 A.2d 649, 651 (1990); Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398, 405 , 535 A.2d 471, 474 (1988); In re Ramont K., 305 Md. 482, 484 , 505 A.2d 507, 508 (1986). To perform this task, legislative intent should be gleaned first from the phrasing of the statute itself, giving the words their “ordinary and popularly understood meaning, absent a manifest contrary legislative intention.” In re Arnold M., 298 Md. 515, 520 , 471 A.2d 313, 315 (1984).

See also Jones, 311 Md. at 405 , 535 A.2d at 474 . When engaging in the interpretive process, however, the purpose, aim or policy of the legislature cannot be disregarded. Taxiera, 320 Md. at 480 , 578 A.2d at 765 ; Harford County v. University, 318 Md. at 529 , 569 A.2d at 651 ; Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 513 , 525 A.2d at 632 . Resultant conclusions are to be reasonable, logical and consistent with common sense.

Harford County v. University, 318 Md. at 529-30 , ⁹³ 569 A.2d at 651 ; Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dept., 309 Md. 347, 353 , 524 A.2d 61, 64 (1987). When several statutes are in pari materia, any interpretation must be made with full awareness of all the relevant enactments. Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Schlossberg, 306 Md. 48, 56 , 507 A.2d 172, 176 (1986). It is presumed that the General Assembly acted with full knowledge of prior legislation and intended statutes that affect the same subject matter to blend into a consistent and harmonious body of law.

Id. at 61 , 507 A.2d at 178 ; Ramont, 305 Md. at 485 , 505 A.2d at 508 . Therefore, various consistent and related enactments, although made at different times and without reference to one another, nevertheless should be harmonized as much as possible. Taxiera, 320 Md. at 481 , 578 A.2d at 765 ; Farmers & Merchants Bank, 306 Md. at 56 , 507 A.2d at 176 ; Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 1, 10 , 497 A.2d 142, 146 (1985). To properly distill section 9-120, it is imperative that it be read in an unadulterated yet harmonious fashion with the Maryland Psychologists Act. 4 Based on the statutory language, there is but one conclusion: The legislature intended that psychologists who testify as experts about a defendant’s criminal responsibility must fulfill the Maryland license requirements.

Among the requirements for a psychologist’s license, as enumerated in the Maryland Psychologists Act, are a doctoral degree in psychology and at least two years of professional experience in psychology, 5 as stated supra. The legislature specifically provided that a nonresident psychologist is entitled to reciprocity 6 in Maryland only if the ⁹⁴ “individual is licensed or certified as a psychologist in any other state” 7 and, among other things, fulfills the Maryland licensing requirements. 8 Dr. Schultze met neither of these standards. He was not licensed in Virginia, did not earn a doctoral degree in psychology and was not a practicing psychologist. Thus, the Board would not have granted Dr. Schultze a reciprocal psychologist’s license to practice in Maryland.

Statutory license requirements often are useful guidelines to determine whether a psychologist should be permitted to testify as an expert. In Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637, 645 (D.C.Cir.1962) (en banc), the ultimate decision on admission of psychologist’s testimony was found properly left to the discretion of the trial court. Since “no statutory criteria for licensing psychologists” existed in the District of Columbia, the court looked to the American Psychological Association’s list of approved graduate training programs for guidance when evaluating the witness’ credentials. In Matter of Wellington, 34 Ill.App.3d 515 , 340 N.E.2d 31 (1975) (a proceeding for commitment to hospitalization), the court compared the witness/psychologist’s credentials to the requirements for an Illinois psychol ⁹⁵ ogist’s certificate of registration, which called for a doctoral degree in psychology and two years of professional experience.

The witness lacked the necessary qualifications, and it was determined that he could not properly be termed an expert. The designation of a witness as an expert is a subject of broad judicial discretion in most instances. Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 41 , 542 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1988); Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 515 , 495 A.2d 1, 15 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 , 106 S.Ct. 868 , 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986); Radman v. Harold, 279 Md. 167, 173 , 367 A.2d 472, 476 (1977). When there is a statute directly on point, however, the expert must meet the enumerated qualifications.

A psychiatrist who was not licensed in Maryland nevertheless was allowed to testify as an expert in a “defective delinquency” proceeding. Crews v. Director, 245 Md. 174 , 225 A.2d 436 (1967). We explained that the common law does not require a medical expert witness to be licensed. This Court further stated that “[i]n Maryland this requirement has not been introduced by statute ...” Id. at 179 , 225 A.2d at 438 , thereby implying that the result likely would have been different if a statute had set forth minimum criteria for an expert in a particular situation.

Similarly, in People v. Lopez, 126 Misc.2d 1072 , 484 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977-79 (1985), the New York Supreme Court applied statutory criteria to determine admissibility of expert testimony. The court in a competency hearing could only consider the testimony of a “qualified psychiatrist.” This included a psychiatrist who was “eligible to be board certified.” By assessing legislative intent, the court determined that an eligible psychiatrist was one who met the psychiatric board’s requirements for specialized training. Prior to the enactment of Md.Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.), Cts. & Jud.Proc. Art., § 9-120, although there was no statute specifically addressing the issue, psychologists had not been permitted to testify in a Maryland courtroom about the question of criminal responsibility.

In State v. Tull, 240 Md. 49, 55-57 , 212 A.2d 729, 732-33 (1965), this ⁹⁶ Court acknowledged that jurisdictions were divided on whether a