State v. Brown

ELDRIDGE, Judge. Herbert Franklin Brown was indicted for illegally manufacturing phencyclidine (PCP). The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County dismissed the indictment on the ground that Brown was not brought to trial within the 180-day time limit of Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1986 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 591, and former Maryland Rule 746. 1 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the dismissal. State v. Brown, 61 Md.App. 411 , 486 A.2d 813 (1985).

This Court then granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari presenting the question of whether the defendant’s “waiver of Rule 746 requirements” constituted express consent to a trial date in violation of Rule 746, thereby rendering inapplicable the dismissal sanction. This question, arising in a somewhat similar situation, was expressly reserved in Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32, 42 , 472 A.2d 452, 456 (1984). ⁶⁵³ The defendant Brown was indicted on March 14, 1983, and his first appearance before the court pursuant to former Rule 723 (now Rule 4-213) was on March 28, 1983. Therefore, the 180-day period for bringing the case to trial pursuant to Code, Art. 27, § 591, and Rule 746, concluded on September 26, 1983. 2 Counsel for Brown entered his appearance on April 14, 1983, at which time Brown entered a plea of not guilty and requested a jury trial. The trial of this case was originally scheduled for July 19, 1983.

On July 7, 1983, Brown filed a document purporting ⁶⁵⁴ to “waive” the 180-day requirement of Rule 746. The title and first paragraph of the document read as follows: “WAIVER OF MARYLAND RULE 746 REQUIREMENTS “The Defendant named above, who is not in custody, pending the trial of this case, having been advised by counsel, of the right to a prompt disposition of this case, hereby waives the time requirements from appearance of Defendant before the Court pursuant to Maryland Rule 723* *[ 3 ] to trial (180 days).” A second paragraph of the document reflected an agreement between the prosecution and the defense for a postponement of the July 19th trial date, stating: “That counsel for the Defendant, Stanley H. Needle-man and the Assistant State’s Attorney, Patrick J. Bell have agreed to the continuance of the trial date of July 19, 1983 for the above-entitled case.” In addition, on July 11, 1983, defense counsel filed a letter requesting a postponement due to a scheduling conflict. The County Administrative Judge granted the request, and the trial was rescheduled for September 13, 1983, thirteen days before the expiration of the 180-day period. The case was called for trial on September 13, 1983, but was postponed upon the State’s request.

The postponement was granted by the County Administrative Judge, in his chambers with both counsel present; however there was no court reporter present to record the proceedings. The docket entry states that the case was postponed because Brown had not been transported to the court from the ⁶⁵⁵ Baltimore City Jail. 4 Trial was rescheduled for January 26, 1984, 304 days after Brown’s initial appearance and 122 days after the end of the 180-day period. The case was called on January 26, 1984, and again was postponed due to the State’s failure to transport Brown for trial. 5 Trial was rescheduled for March 15, 1984, 353 days after Brown’s arraignment. On March 9, 1984, Brown filed a motion to dismiss, asserting both a violation of Rule 746 and of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

On March 15, 1984, when the case was called for trial, the trial judge granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that Art. 27, § 591, and Rule 746 were violated and that dismissal was the appropriate sanction. The judge stated: “[The 180-day requirement] was waived, but then the waiver became a nullity in the sense that a trial date was set for September 13th, so it would have been within the time period anyway. So the waiver no longer was a factor because a trial date was set within the time period....” The trial judge did not rule on the constitutional speedy trial claim, although the judge commented that there was an unreasonable delay in bringing the case to trial which was attributable to the State. In affirming the dismissal, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that Brown did not expressly consent to a trial date beyond the 180-day limit.

As to Brown’s “waiver” of the 180-day requirement, the Court of Special Appeals stated that “the effect of it was only to provide ‘a continu ⁶⁵⁶ anee of the trial date of July 19, 1983.’ ” State v. Brown, supra, 61 Md.App. at 416 , 486 A.2d 813 . The court relied upon Pennington v. State, 299 Md. 23, 29 , 472 A.2d 447, 450 (1984), quoting from Pennington as follows ( 61 Md. App. at 416 , 486 A.2d 813 , quoting 299 Md. at 29, 472 A.2d 447 ): “ ‘[W]hen a defendant’s attorney on February 6th seeks a postponement of a March 11th trial date because of a scheduling conflict on that day, it is not reasonable to infer that he is seeking a trial date beyond June 7th [the 180th day] absent any evidence in the record supporting such inference.’ ” With respect to the postponement of the trial on September 13, 1983, the Court of Special Appeals was “not persuaded that [County Administrative] Judge Williams was clearly erroneous when he granted the September 13 postponement.” 61 Md.App. at 417 , 486 A.2d 813 . The appellate court held, however, that the extreme length of the delay between September 13, 1983, and the ultimate trial date of March 15, 1984, shifted the burden of justification to the State, and that the State had failed to justify the delay. Id. at 418 , 486 A.2d 813 .

Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals decided that the trial judge did not err in dismissing the indictment. This Court then granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari which presented two questions. The first was whether a defendant’s “express ... waiver,” filed at about the same time as his request to postpone the trial date, “becomes a nullity if the postponement does not in fact exceed the 180-day period.” The second question concerned whether the length of the postponement here “was unreasonable.” For reasons which will be apparent hereafter, we shall not reach the second question. I. Preliminarily, we wish to emphasize that this case does not involve a defendant’s “waiver” of the requirements ⁶⁵⁷ of Art. 27, § 591, and former Rule 746.

Despite the terminology used by both parties and by the courts below, the requirements of § 591 and Rule 746 cannot be rendered inoperable because a defendant purports to “waive” them. Neither the accused nor the prosecution nor the trial court are empowered to dispense with the mandates of § 591 and Rule 746. We have repeatedly distinguished the requirements of § 591 and Rule 746 from a criminal defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights to a speedy trial. See, e.g., Curley v. State, 299 Md. 449, 460 , 474 A.2d 502 (1984); Satchell v. State, 299 Md. 42, 45 , 472 A.2d 457 (1984); Farinholt v. State, supra, 299 Md. at 41, 472 A.2d 452 ; Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1 , 5 n. 2, 472 A.2d 436 (1984); State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 427-429, 456-457 , 463-464 n. 33, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984); Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 109 , 442 A.2d 550 (1982); State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 320 , 403 A.2d 356 , on motion for reconsideration, 285 Md. 334 , 403 A.2d 368 (1979).

Unlike statutes or rules in many other jurisdictions, “§ 591 and Rule 746 were not intended to be codifications of the constitutional speedy trial right____ Instead, their chief purpose was to operate as a prophylactic measure ‘to further society’s interest in the prompt disposition of criminal trials,’ ” Curley v. State, supra, 299 Md. at 460, 474 A.2d 502 , quoting from State v. Frazier, supra, 298 Md. at 456 , 470 A.2d 1269 . See Calhoun v. State, supra, 299 Md. at 11-12, 472 A.2d 436 . “The provisions of [§ 591 and] Rule 746 are of mandatory application, binding upon the prosecution and defense alike,” State v. Hicks, supra, 285 Md. at 318 , 403 A.2d 356 . All postponements of a circuit court criminal trial date must be done in accordance with the requirements set forth in § 591 and Rule 746 (now Rule 4-271). Thus, every postponement must be granted by the county administrative judge or his designee and must be supported by good cause.

Grant v. State, 299 Md. 47, 53 , 472 A.2d 459 (1984); Farinholt v. State, supra, 299 Md. at 40-41, 472 A.2d 452 ; State v. Frazier, supra, 298 Md. at 428 , 470 A.2d 1269 . Conse ⁶⁵⁸ quently, the fact that the accused may seek the postponement or agree to it does not dispense with these requirements. In State v. Hicks, supra, and subsequent cases, we held that when a circuit court criminal case was not tried within the 180-day time limit set forth by § 591 and Rule 746, and was not postponed beyond the 180-day deadline in accordance with § 591 and Rule 746, the sanction for such violation of the statute and rule is ordinarily dismissal of the criminal charges. The sanctions for other violations of § 591 and Rule 746 are ones of internal judicial administration.

Farinholt v. State, supra, 299 Md. at 41, 472 A.2d 452 ; State v. Hicks, supra, 285 Md. at 335 , 403 A.2d 356 . See Grant v. State, supra, 299 Md. at 53, 472 A.2d 459 . The sanction of dismissal, where that sanction is applicable, is not for the purpose of protecting a criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial; instead, it is a prophylactic measure to further society’s interest in trying criminal cases within 180 days. Farinholt v. State, supra, 299 Md. at 41, 472 A.2d 452 ; Calhoun v. State, supra, 299 Md. at 11-12, 472 A.2d 436 .

Finally, even when a circuit court criminal case has been postponed beyond the 180-day time limit' in violation of § 591 and Rule 746, the sanction of dismissal is inapplicable “where the defendant, either individually or by his attorney, seeks ,or expressly consents to a trial date in violation of Rule 746.” State v. Hicks, supra, 285 Md. at 335 , 403 A.2d 356 . See Pennington v. State, supra, 299 Md. at 28-29, 472 A.2d 447 ; State v.