State v. Brown

Watts, J. In the words of journalist Doug Larson: "To err is human; to admit it, superhuman." 1 On occasion, in a criminal case, a trial court may make a mistake when announcing a sentence; in other words, the trial court might announce a sentence that differs from the one that the trial court intended to impose. Maryland Rule 4-345(c) contemplates such a circumstance, stating: "The court may correct an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence if the correction is made on the record before the defendant leaves the courtroom following the sentencing proceeding." This is the first case in which this Court has been called upon to interpret Maryland Rule 4-345(c). Specifically, we are asked to determine what constitutes "an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence" under Maryland Rule 4-345(c). We are also asked to ascertain the circumstances under which an appellate court may determine that a trial court has corrected such a mistake under Maryland Rule 4-345(c).

In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, the State, Petitioner, charged Andrew Brown, Respondent, with several crimes that arose out of the attempted armed robberies and nonfatal shooting of William Rich and Demaris Glover. A jury found Brown guilty of, among other crimes, attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon as to Rich and Glover, conspiracy to rob with a dangerous weapon as to Rich and Glover, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. At a sentencing proceeding, the circuit court imposed three concurrent sentences of twenty years of imprisonment, with all but ten years suspended, followed by two years of supervised probation, for attempted robbery of Rich with a dangerous weapon, 2 conspiracy to rob Rich with a dangerous weapon, and attempted robbery of Glover with a dangerous weapon. In the same proceeding, the circuit court announced Brown's sentences as to conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence as follows: Count 10, conspiracy to rob with a dangerous weapon as to [ ] Glover, the sentence of the Court is 20 years, suspend all but time served, place him on two years supervised probation ....

Count 19, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, 10 years to the [Division] of Correction[ ], first five without parole, will run consecutive to Count 10. (Emphasis added). After the circuit court announced Brown's sentences, Brown asked: "Count 19, that's to be run consecutive?" The circuit court responded: Right. So what happens is, basically you got a 20 year sentence, suspend all but 10 and then the handgun, use of a handgun in a crime of violence runs consecutive so once you finish the -- and you got to do at least five years without parole on that[.] (Emphasis added).

Shortly afterward, Brown's counsel stated: "So you have 20 years to serve; right?" The circuit court responded: "20 years suspend all but 10. Well, 20, yeah, altogether[.]" The commitment record, probation order, and docket entries indicate that the circuit court sentenced Brown to twenty years of imprisonment, with all but ten years suspended, followed by two years of supervised probation, for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon (Count 10). Brown appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed his convictions, but remanded with instructions to amend the commitment record, probation order, and docket entries to reflect that the circuit court sentenced Brown to twenty years of imprisonment, with all but time served suspended, followed by two years of supervised probation, for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon. See Andrew Brown v. State , No. 1581, Sept. Term, 2017, 2018 WL 5250003 , at ¹⁶, ¹⁵ (Md. Ct. Spec.

App. Oct. 22, 2018). The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari , which this Court granted. See State v. Brown , 462 Md. 555 , 201 A.3d 1228 (2019). The State contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred in determining that the circuit court sentenced Brown to twenty years of imprisonment, with all but time served suspended, for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon.

The State argues that the circuit court's use of the term "time served" was, under Maryland Rule 4-345(c), "an evident mistake in the announcement of" Brown's sentence for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon. The State asserts that the circuit court intended to say "ten years" instead of "time served." The State maintains that, under Maryland Rule 4-345(c), the circuit court corrected the evident mistake by later making informal statements that were seemingly inconsistent with the circuit court having sentenced Brown to twenty years of imprisonment, with all but time served suspended, for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon. Brown responds that the circuit court did not make an evident mistake in the announcement of that sentence, and that, to correct an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(c), a trial court must do so expressly-and the circuit court did not. We conclude that, for a "mistake in the announcement of a sentence" to be "evident" under Maryland Rule 4-345(c), the mistake must be clear or obvious.

Where a trial court has imposed a sentence that is merely unusual or anomalous compared to other sentences that the trial court imposed during the same sentencing proceeding, that circumstance alone does not establish that the trial court made an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(c). An appellate court may determine a trial court to have corrected an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(c) where the trial court acknowledges that it made a mistake in the announcement of a sentence, and indicates that it is correcting that mistake. Where a trial court merely discusses a sentence in a manner that could be construed as inconsistent with the announcement of the sentence, that discussion alone does not constitute a correction of an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(c). Applying our holdings to this case's facts, we conclude that, under Maryland Rule 4-345(c), the circuit court did not make an evident mistake in the announcement of Brown's sentence for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon.

Brown's sentence for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon was unusual or anomalous, as it appears to be inconsistent with Brown's sentences for attempted robbery of Rich with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to rob Rich with a dangerous weapon, and attempted robbery of Glover with a dangerous weapon. The record of the sentencing proceeding, however, falls far short of demonstrating that the circuit court made an evident- i.e. , clear or obvious-mistake in the announcement of Brown's sentence for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon, or that the circuit court intended to suspend all but ten years, as opposed to time served, as to conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon. In addition to the record not demonstrating that the circuit court made an evident mistake in the announcement of Brown's sentence for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon, the record does not demonstrate that the circuit court corrected a mistake under Maryland Rule 4-345(c). At no point did the circuit court acknowledge that it had made a mistake in the announcement of Brown's sentence for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon, or indicate that it was correcting such a mistake.

BACKGROUND Glover's Trial Testimony Although this case's facts are not dispositive of the issues that are before this Court, we set forth the following summary. At trial, as a witness for the State, Glover testified that, on January 18, 2017, at approximately 10 or 11 p.m., he went to Horseshoe Casino in Baltimore City. Glover gambled for approximately an hour, after which Rich, 3 a friend of his, met with him. Glover and Rich gambled for a few hours.

At approximately 3 or 4 a.m., Glover and Rich went to a bar in the casino. There, two women, whom Glover did not recognize, approached him and Rich. The four of them talked to each other, and initially agreed to go to Glover's residence. But, after the four of them left the casino and went to a nearby gas station, they agreed to go to the women's residence instead.

The four of them went to a house on Sterrett Street and went inside. Eventually, there was a knock on the front door, and one of the women opened it. Brown and another man entered the house. Brown was holding a handgun, and said: "You know what it is. [ 4 ] Give it up." Brown fired in Glover's direction, and the bullet grazed the top of his head and struck Rich in his leg or back.

Glover hit Brown's arm, and Brown dropped the handgun. Glover and Brown struggled for the handgun. Glover got ahold of the handgun and ran out of the house. Once outside, Glover fell and dropped the handgun.

Brown ran out of the house, and he and Glover struggled for the handgun again. Glover repeatedly struck Brown with the handgun, which fell apart. Glover ran to a friend's house on Wyeth Street. Eventually, an ambulance transported Glover to University of Maryland Medical Center, where he was treated for the bullet wound in his head.

Guilty Verdicts and Sentencing Proceeding The jury found Brown guilty of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon as to Rich and Glover (Counts 7 and 8, respectively), conspiracy to rob with a dangerous weapon as to Rich and Glover (Counts 9 and 10, respectively), use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence (Count 19), wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun (Count 20), second-degree assault as to Glover (Count 22), conspiracy to commit second-degree assault as to Rich and Glover (Counts 23 and 24, respectively), and reckless endangerment as to Rich and Glover (Counts 25 and 26, respectively). 5 At a sentencing proceeding, the circuit court announced Brown's sentences as follows: Count 7, attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon as to [ ] Rich, the sentence of the Court is 20 years to the [Division] of Correction[ ]. I'm going to suspend all but 10 years, place the defendant on supervised probation upon his release. As to Count 25, reckless endangerment as to [ ] Rich, the sentence of the Court is five years to the [Division] of Correction[ ], that will run concurrent to Count 7. As to Count 9, conspiracy to rob with a dangerous weapon as to [ ] Rich, the sentence of the Court is 20 years to the [Division] of Correction[ ].

I'm going to suspend all but 10 years and place him on two years supervised probation to run concurrent with Count 25. As to Count 17, conspiracy to assault in the second degree of [ ] Rich, 6 that count will merge with Count 9. As to Count 8, attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon as to [ ] Glover, the sentence of the Court is 20 years to the [Division] of Correction[ ], suspend all but 10 years and place the defendant on two years supervised probation, that will run concurrent with Count 9. As to Count 22, assault in the second degree as to [ ] Glover, that will merge with Count 8.

As to Count 26, reckless endangerment of [ ] Glover, five years to the [Division] of Correction and will run concurrent to Count 8. Count 10, conspiracy to rob with a dangerous weapon as to [ ] Glover, the sentence of the Court is 20 years, suspend all but time served, place him on two years supervised probation to run concurrent to Count 26. Count 24, conspiracy to assault in the second degree of [ ] Glover will merge with Count 10. Count 19, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, 10 years to the [Division] of Correction[ ], first five without parole, will run consecutive to Count 10.

Count 20, carrying a handgun openly or concealed about his person will merge with Count 19. (Emphasis added). For clarity, we set forth the following table, which lists all of Brown's sentences as the circuit court announced them, and omits the convictions that the circuit court merged for sentencing purposes: Crime: Sentence: Attempted Robbery of 20 years of imprisonment, with all but 10 years suspended, Rich with Dangerous followed by 2 years of supervised probation Weapon (Count 7) Reckless Endangerment 5 years of imprisonment, concurrent with sentence as to of Rich (Count 25) Count 7 Conspiracy to Rob Rich 20 years of imprisonment, with all but 10 years suspended, with Dangerous Weapon followed by 2 years of supervised probation, concurrent (Count 9) with sentence as to Count 25 Attempted Robbery of 20 years of imprisonment, with all but 10 years suspended, Glover with Dangerous followed by 2 years of supervised probation, concurrent Weapon (Count 8) with sentence as to Count 9 Reckless Endangerment 5 years of imprisonment, concurrent with sentence as to of Glover (Count 26) Count 8 Conspiracy to Rob 20 years of imprisonment, with all but time served Glover with Dangerous suspended, followed by 2 years of supervised probation, Weapon (Count 10) concurrent with sentence as to Count 26 Use of Handgun in 10 years of imprisonment, first 5 of which to be served Commission of Crime of without parole, consecutive to sentence as to Count 10 Violence (Count 19) After the circuit court announced Brown's sentences, his counsel advised him of the right to appeal, to move for reconsideration or modification of his sentences, and to apply for a review of his sentences. Immediately afterward, the following exchange occurred: THE COURT: Do you understand your sentence, sir? [ ] BROWN: Yes, ma'am, so -- THE COURT: Okay. [ ] BROWN: -- I mean, I do have one question.

THE COURT: Sure. [ ] BROWN: Count 19, that's to be run consecutive? THE COURT: Right. So what happens is, basically you got a 20 year sentence, suspend all but 10 and then the handgun, use of a handgun in a crime of violence runs consecutive so once you finish the -- and you got to do at least five years without parole on that which, you know, they calculate that down for you, I'm not going to tell you it's not five years, it used to be three and a half, I'm not going to even start that with you because they'll calculate all of this out for you. Okay? [ ] BROWN: Okay.

THE COURT: So and then you will be on probation to me for two years once you're released. Okay? [ ] BROWN: Okay. [BROWN'S COUNSEL]: So you have 20 years to serve; right? THE COURT: 20 years suspend all but 10. Well, 20, yeah, altogether -- [BROWN'S COUNSEL]: 20 years to serve, yes.

THE COURT: Yes, but it won't be 20[.] [BROWN'S COUNSEL]: And whatever they calculate on that. THE COURT: Yeah, whatever they calculate. Do you understand that? [ ] BROWN: (Nodding head in agreement.) (Emphasis added). The commitment record, probation order, and docket entries indicate that the circuit court sentenced Brown to twenty years of imprisonment, with all but ten years suspended, followed by two years of supervised probation, for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon.

Specifically, the commitment record states that Brown's sentence for that crime was "20 yrs [suspend all but] 10 years[.]" The probation order states that Brown's sentence for that crime was "20 YR [SUSPEND ALL BUT] 10 YRS[.]" And the docket entries state that Brown's sentence for that crime was "20 YRS[,]" with "10 YRS" suspended. 7 Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals Brown appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed his convictions, but remanded with instructions to correct the commitment record, probation order, and docket entries to reflect that the circuit court sentenced Brown to twenty years of imprisonment, with all but time served suspended, followed by two years of supervised probation, for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon. See Brown , 2018 WL 5250003 , at ¹⁶, ¹⁵. The Court of Special Appeals explained that the transcript of the sentencing proceeding-which the State acknowledged was accurate-indicated that the circuit court sentenced Brown to "20 years, suspend all but time served" for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon. Id. at ¹⁵.

The Court of Special Appeals observed that, where there is a conflict between a transcript of a sentencing proceeding and a commitment record or docket entries, the transcript prevails. See id. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that, accordingly, the circuit court needed to correct the commitment record, probation order, and docket entries. See id.

The Court of Special Appeals rejected the State's contention that, under Maryland Rule 4-345(c), the circuit court had corrected Brown's sentence for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon by stating, in response to Brown's question, that he would "basically [get] a 20 year sentence, suspend all but 10 and then the handgun, use of a handgun in a crime of violence runs consecutive[.]" Id. The Court of Special Appeals explained that the circuit court's statement did not constitute a correction of Brown's sentence for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon because, "[a]t best, the [circuit] court's statement[ ], which did not even indicate the conviction or count to which the [circuit] court was referring, casts some doubt over the [circuit] court's intentions with regard to [Brown's] sentence" for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon. Id. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari The State petitioned for a writ of certiorari , raising the following two issues: 1.

Does an announced sentence that is anomalous in context qualify as an "evident mistake" that is subject to correction under Maryland Rule 4-345(c) ? 2. Can statements regarding the defendant's aggregate sentence serve under Maryland Rule 4-345(c) to "correct" a mistake in the announcement of a sentence on an individual count? This Court granted the petition. See Brown , 462 Md. 555 , 201 A.3d 1228 .

DISCUSSION 8 The Parties' Contentions The State contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that the circuit court sentenced Brown to twenty years of imprisonment, with all but time served suspended, for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon. The State argues that the circuit court made an evident mistake in announcing Brown's sentence for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon because sentencing Brown to twenty years, with all but time served suspended, was an unexplained departure from the three identical concurrent sentences of twenty years, with all but ten years suspended, that the circuit court imposed for attempted robbery of Rich with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to rob Rich with a dangerous weapon, and attempted robbery of Glover with a dangerous weapon. The State asserts that, because the circuit court made the ten-year sentence for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence consecutive to the sentence for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon, the circuit court intended to sentence Brown to twenty years, with all but ten years suspended, for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon. The State maintains that the circuit court corrected Brown's sentence for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon after it announced the sentence.

Brown responds that, to "correct an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence" under Maryland Rule 4-345(c), a trial court must do so expressly-and the circuit court did not. Brown argues that, even if Maryland Rule 4-345(c) allows a trial court to implicitly correct an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence, there was no evident mistake in the announcement of his sentence for conspiracy to rob Glover with a dangerous weapon. Standard of Review An appellate court reviews without deference the legal questions of whether a trial court made "an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence" under Maryland Rule 4-345(c), and whether the trial court corrected such a mistake under Maryland Rule 4-345(c). Maryland Rule 4-345(c) and Its Rulemaking History Maryland Rule 4-345(c) states: "The court may correct an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence if the correction is made on the record before the defendant leaves the courtroom following the sentencing proceeding." Maryland Rule 4-345 has not always included language regarding "an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence." On April 6, 1984, this Court adopted former Maryland Rule 4-345, which stated in its entirety: (a) Illegal Sentence. - The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.

(b) Modification or Reduction - Time for. - The court has revisory power and control over a sentence upon a motion filed within 90 days after its imposition (1) in the District Court, if an appeal has not been perfected, and (2) in a circuit court, whether or not an appeal has been filed. The court may modify or reduce or strike, but may not increase the length of, a sentence. Thereafter, the court has revisory power and control over the sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity, [ 9 ] or as provided in section (d) of this Rule. (c) Open Court Hearing. - The court may modify, reduce, or vacate a sentence only on the record in open court after notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard.

(d) Desertion and Non-support Cases. - At any time before expiration of the sentence in a case involving desertion and non-support of spouse, children or destitute parents, the court may modify, reduce, or vacate the sentence or place the defendant on probation under the terms and conditions the court imposes. On October 5, 1992, more than eight years after adopting former Maryland Rule 4-345, this Court first adopted an amendment to former Maryland Rule 4-345 ; the amendment permitted a trial court to correct an evident mistake in the announcement of a sentence. Two cases that were decided in the interim prompted this Court to request that the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure ("the Rules Committee") propose amendments to former Maryland Rule 4-345. The first case was State v. Sayre , 314 Md. 559 , 552 A.2d 553 (1989), and the second was Simpkins v. State , 88 Md. App. 607 , 596 A.2d 655 (1991), cert. denied , 328 Md. 94 , 612 A.2d 1316 (1992).

In each case, a trial court imposed a sentence, and the defendant left the courtroom. See Sayre , 314 Md. at 560 -61 , 552 A.2d at 553-54 ; Simpkins , 88 Md. App. at 624 , 596 A.2d at 664 . Soon afterward, the trial court stated that it had intended to impose a longer sentence, summoned the defendant back to the courtroom, and imposed the longer sentence. See Sayre , 314 Md. at 561 , 552 A.2d at 554 ; Simpkins , 88 Md. App. at 623 , 596 A.2d at 663 .

In each case, an appellate court held that the trial court violated former Maryland Rule 4-345(b)'s prohibition on increasing a sentence's length. See Sayre , 314 Md. at 565 , 552 A.2d at 556 ; Simpkins , 88 Md. App. at 624 , 596 A.2d at 664 . In Sayre , 314 Md. at 560 , 552 A.2d at 553 , a jury found the defendant guilty of only one crime-namely, battery. The trial court sentenced the defendant to five years of imprisonment, "to be served concurrently with" an eight-year sentence that the defendant had received in another case.

Id. at 560-61 , 552 A.2d at 553-54 (emphasis in original). Almost immediately after the trial court dismissed the defendant, the prosecutor pointed out that the trial court had "said concurrently." Id. at 561 , 552 A.2d at 553-54 (emphasis omitted). The trial court stated that it had "meant to say consecutively[,]" summoned the defendant and his counsel back to the courtroom, 10 and stated that the trial court had meant to make the defendant's sentence consecutive to the sentence that he had received in another case. Sayre , 314 Md. at 561 , 552 A.2d at 553-54 (emphasis omitted).

The trial court then stated: "Five (5) years consecutive to. That means you do the eight years then you do the five years." Id. at 561 , 552 A.2d at 554 . The Court of Special Appeals vacated the defendant's new, consecutive sentence, and reinstated his original, concurrent one. See id. at 561 , 552 A.2d at 554 .

This Court affirmed, holding that[,] under [former Maryland] Rule 4-345(b), once sentence has been imposed, there can be no inquiry into intention or inadvertence. The sentence, for [former Maryland] Rule 4-345(b) ['s] purposes, stands as pronounced. Like any bright[-]line rule, this holding may produce occasional hardship for the State, but it will avoid difficult questions of subjective intent[,] and should encourage trial [court]s to use great care in pronouncing sentence[-]an obviously desirable practice. Id. at 565 , 552 A.2d at 556 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

This Court rejected the State's contention that a trial court could correct a slip of the tongue in the announcement of a sentence, stating: [W]hile to permit correction of a slip of the tongue is not necessarily undesirable, to allow a [trial court that] has [ ] made a sentencing decision to change [its] mind in a manner [that is] adverse to the defendant is.... [T]he latter situation carries with it too many possibilities of vindictiveness. Furthermore, it is not always easy to distinguish between a[ ] slip of the tongue and a [ ] change of mind. Id. at 563-64 , 552 A.2d at 555 . In a dissenting opinion, Judge Lawrence F. Rodowsky noted that this Court did "not question that the sentence [that was] first pronounced by the trial [court] clearly resulted from misspeaking." Id. at 571 , 552 A.2d at 559 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).

Judge Rodowsky stated: "I ... would hold that where, as here, the record clearly shows that the [trial court] misspoke in relation to [its] true intent, the misstatement may be corrected promptly, as it was here." Id. at 571 , 552 A.2d at 559 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting). Judge Rodowsky explained that he did not believe that this Court or the Rules Committee had intended former Maryland Rule 4-345(b)'s prohibition on increasing a sentence's length to apply where "a matter of minutes elaps[ed] between a [trial court]'s slip of the tongue and the correction of the misstatement." Id. at 570-71 , 552 A.2d at 558 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting). A subsequent case, Simpkins , 88 Md. App. at 608 , 596 A.2d at 655 , arose "from the tragic, senseless death of [a] two[-]year-old" who had died of "malnutrition and dehydration." A trial court found both of the victim's parents guilty of second-degree murder, and sentenced the victim's mother to thirty years of imprisonment, with all but twenty years suspended, followed by five years of probation. Id. at 608 , 623 n.2, 596 A.2d at 655 , 663 n.2.

Subsequently, the trial court stated: "It is the judgment of the court that the [victim's father] be sentenced to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Corrections for a period of thirty years. I hereby suspend all but five years of that sentence and order him placed on probation for a period of five years." Id. at 623 , 596 A.2d at 663 (cleaned up) (emphasis in original). The victim's parents and their counsel left the courtroom. See id. at 624 , 596 A.2d at 664 .

Approximately ten minutes later, the trial court stated: "I am advised that people in the courtroom heard me say all but five years suspended. At no point was my intention to impose a sentence of five years. At all times it was my intention to impose a twenty-five year sentence." Id. at 623 , 596 A.2d at 663 . Afterward, the trial court then stated that the victim's father "was sentenced to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Corrections for a period of thirty years, all but twenty-five years suspended." Id. at 623 , 596 A.2d at 663 .

The Court of Special Appeals vacated the victim's father's new, twenty-five-year sentence, and remanded with instruction to reinstate his original, five-year one. See id. at 624-25 , 596 A.2d at 664 . The Court of Special Appeals observed that the transcript indicated that the sentencing "proceeding terminated after the original pronouncement of sentence, and that the increase was made during a second proceeding[,]" which began with the prosecutor recalling the case. Id. at 623-24 , 596 A.2d at 664 .

The Court of Special Appeals determined that, "[b]ased on the comments [ ] in the [ ] transcript and on the State's uncontroverted summation of the unrecorded events, it [was] clear that [the] sentence was 'imposed' before the [trial] court increased it." Id. at 624 , 596 A.2d at 664 . The Court of Special Appeals observed that, in Sayre , 314 Md. at 565 , 552 A.2d at 556 , this Court had "held that[,] 'under [former Maryland] Rule 4-345(b), once sentence has been imposed, there can be no inquiry into intention or inadvertence.' " Simpkins , 88 Md. App. at 623 , 596 A.2d at 663 . In a concurring opinion, Judge Diana Gribbon Motz stated that she agreed with the Court of Special Appeals's determination that Sayre "prevent[ed it] from upholding the" victim's father's new, twenty-five-year sentence. Simpkins , 88 Md. App. at 625 , 596 A.2d at 664 (Motz, J., concurring).

Judge Motz explained: I write separately only to suggest that this case may present an excellent opportunity for the Court of Appeals to reconsider ... Sayre . It is, to me, unconscionable that the [trial court]'s inadvertent mistake, corrected within ten minutes, should prevent [the victim's father] from receiving the punishment that he so clearly deserves. Simpkins , 88 Md. App. at 625 , 596 A.2d at 664 (Motz, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

Judge Motz opined that the mistake in the announcement of the sentence in Simpkins , while not a slip of the tongue, was still "just as obvious" as the one in Sayre , explaining: [The victims' parents] were tried, convicted[,] and then sentenced together. Of the two, [the victim's mother], even though erratic, irresponsible, and cavalier in her treatment of [the victim], at least showed more concern than [ ] the [victim]'s father. Accordingly, it seems inconceivable that the [trial court] intended to sentence [the victim's mother] to twenty years [of] imprisonment[,] and[,] at the very same time, in [ ] virtually the same breath, sentence [the victim's father] to only five years [of] imprisonment. Simpkins , 88 Md. App. at 625 n.1, 596 A.2d at 664 n.1 (Motz, J., concurring).

Judge Motz approvingly quoted Judge Rodowsky's dissent in Sayre , stating: The Sayre majority's rigid interpretation of [former] Maryland Rule 4-345(b), as pointed out by Judge Rodowsky[ ] in dissent, makes sense when "some appreciable period of time from the imposition of the sentence" has passed. [ Sayre , 314 Md.] at 570, 552 A.2d [at 558 ] (Rodowsky, J. dissenting). Imposition of this bright[-]line rule, however, is harsher than necessary or appropriate when there has been no lapse of an appreciable period of time[,] and it is clear that the [trial court] simply seeks to correct an obvious mistake in sentencing. Simpkins , 88 Md. App. at 625 , 596 A.2d at 664 (Motz, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). The State petitioned for a writ of certiorari in Simpkins .

See Simpkins , 328 Md. 94 , 612 A.2d 1316 . Subsequently, on April 10 and 11, 1992, the Rules Committee conducted a meeting. According to the minutes of that meeting, the Chair stated that this Court's 4-3 decision in Sayre had "created some terrible consequences"-namely, in Simpkins , the Court of Special Appeals had held that the trial