State v. Buckingham

KRAUSER, C.J. Maryland Rule 2-625 provides that “a money judgment expires 12 years from the date of entry or most recent renewal.” In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether that rule applies to a money judgment held by the State of Maryland. The State obtained the judgment at issue, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, against Russell Buckingham, Jr., a State lottery agent, after he failed to remit to the State the proceeds from the sale of lottery tickets. More than twelve years after that judgment was entered, the State obtained writs to garnish Buckingham’s wages, which were thereafter ⁶⁷⁴ served on his employer. In response, Buckingham filed a motion, requesting that the State’s judgment be declared “null and void” and that the writs in question be quashed.

When, citing Rule 2-625, the Baltimore County circuit court granted that motion, the State noted this appeal. Rule 2-625 implements the twelve-year limitations period found in section 5-102 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 1 Because, in our view, that limitations period is not applicable to a judgment held by the State, we hold that the circuit court erred in both finding that the State’s judgment against Buckingham had “expired” and in, subsequently, quashing the State’s writs of garnishment. Background On March 27, 1998, a judgment in the form of a “notice of lien” 2 was entered, in the Baltimore County circuit court, in favor of the State of Maryland and against Russell Frost Buckingham, Jr., in the amount of $7,078.64, plus interest, reflecting proceeds from the sale of lottery tickets, which Buckingham had failed to remit to the State, together with “court costs,” a “service charge,” and “penalties.” More than twelve years later, on September 13, 2010, that judgment was then “indexed” 3 in favor of the Central Collection Unit of the Maryland Department of Budget and Management 4 on behalf ⁶⁷⁵ of the State Lottery Agency (“State”), although it had never been renewed. At that time, the State also obtained a writ garnishing Buckingham’s wages that was subsequently served on his employer, RFB Trucking, Inc. 5 The writ was in the amount of $14,574.30, manifesting the proceeds from the unremitted sale of lottery tickets, plus interest, court costs, and attorney fees.

A year later, the State obtained a second writ of garnishment of wages, which, because of the accrual of additional interest since the first writ, was in the amount of $15,219.23. Following the second writ of garnishment, Buckingham moved to have the court declare the March 27,1998, judgment against him “null and void” and to quash the previous two writs of garnishment on the grounds that the judgment, having not been renewed, had expired on March 27, 2010, twelve years after it had been entered. Following a hearing, the circuit court granted Buckingham’s motion, declaring that, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-625, the judgment had “expired” and quashing the writs of garnishment. After its motion for reconsideration was denied, the State noted this appeal.

Discussion The State claims that, because it is not subject to the limitations period created by Section 5-102 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and purportedly implemented by Rule 2-625, the circuit court erred in concluding that Rule 2-625 barred the State from enforcing its March 27, 1998, judgment against Buckingham. Buckingham disagrees, insisting that the State must renew a judgment it holds, as any other judgment holder must do under Rule 2-625, or the judgment will expire after twelve years. And that is what, Buckingham claims, occurred here. Unfortunately for Buckingham, we agree with the State, that is, that Rule 2-625 ⁶⁷⁶ implements the limitations period found in Section 5-102 and that, therefore, the State was not required to renew its judgment within twelve years of having obtained it, a conclusion which compels us to reverse the judgment below.

Section 5-102 provides that an action on a judgment must be filed within twelve years from the date that the cause of action accrues. But it specifically exempts, from that limitations period, actions on a judgment held by the State. Specifically, the section states, in part: (a) Twelve-year limitation.—An action on one of the following specialties shall be filed within 12 years after the cause of action accrues, or within 12 years from the date of the death of the last to die of the principal debtor or creditor, whichever is sooner: (1) Promissory note or other instrument under seal; (2) Bond except a public officer’s bond; (3) Judgment; (4) Recognizance; (5) Contract under seal; or (6) Any other specialty. But most relevant to the issue before us is subsection (c) of section 5-102 which states, “This section does not apply to a specialty taken for the use of the State.” With this State exemption in mind, we turn to Rule 2-625 that provides that a money judgment expires after twelve years, unless it has been renewed by the judgment holder.

Missing from that rule is an exemption for judgments held by the State as is found in section 5-102. Rule 2-625 states: A money judgment expires 12 years from the date of entry or most recent renewal. At any time before expiration of the judgment, the judgment holder may file a notice of renewal and the clerk shall enter the judgment renewed. Because the statute expressly exempts judgments held by the State and the rule does not, we are faced with the question of whether the rule, alone, may be properly invoked to extinguish the State’s right to enforce its judgments after twelve ⁶⁷⁷ years or whether it should be read so that it impliedly incorporates the State’s exemption pronounced in section 5-102.

Our answer to that question begins with the observation that the “cardinal rule” of statutory interpretation “is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent,” Mayor of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128 , 756 A.2d 987 (2000), and that “[t]he primary source from which we glean this intention is the language of the statute itself,” Subsequent Injury Fund v. Ehrman, 89 Md.App. 741, 747 , 599 A.2d 875 (1992) (quoting Mazor v. Dep’t of Correction, 279 Md. 355, 360 , 369 A.2d 82 (1977)). “If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.” Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261 , 647 A.2d 1204 (1994). Finally, we conclude by noting that these tenets of construction apply not only to our statutes but to our rules as well. State v. Montgomery, 334 Md. 20, 24 , 637 A.2d 1193 (1994). We now turn to the legal axiom which provides the fulcrum for our analysis, which is: Under the principle of sovereign immunity, state statutes of limitations do not apply to the state, unless a state statute provides otherwise.

Central Collection Unit v. Atlantic Container Line, 277 Md. 626, 629 , 356 A.2d 555 (1976). In applying that doctrine, we observe that, in enacting section 5-102, the Legislature did not expressly waive the State’s immunity as to limitations on actions taken on a judgment in the State’s favor. In fact, it did just the opposite. Apparently not content to rely on the principles of sovereign immunity, the Legislature expressly exempted the State from the running of those limitations.

Although, when the Court of Appeals adopted Rule 2-625, it did not expressly exempt State judgments from the operation of that rule, it did not need to, as “any waiver of immunity must emanate from the legislature.” Bradshaw v. Prince George’s Cnty., 284 Md. 294, 300 , 396 A.2d 255 (1979). Moreover, the rule of harmonization requires that we “not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor ... confíne strictly ⁶⁷⁸ our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone.” Lowery v. State, 430 Md. 477, 496 , 61 A.3d 794 (2013) (quoting Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275-76 , 987 A.2d 18 (2010)). Instead, “[w]e presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope.” Id. When we apply that presumption, we are compelled to conclude that Rule 2-625 does not extinguish an unrenewed judgment held by the State that is more than twelve years old.

First of all, we note that, although section 5-102 imposes a twelve-year limitations period on the life of judgments, it does not set out the procedures for implementing that temporal restriction. But Rule 2-625 does. It provides that a money judgment expires after twelve years, but may be renewed by the judgment holder before that twelve-year period lapses. To do so, the holder of that judgment is required, by Rule 2-625, to file a notice of renewal with the clerk, who is then to “enter the judgment renewed.” As that rule implements the limitations period found in section 5-102, the rule also, by implication, incorporates that section’s State-held judgment exemption.

Furthermore, even if the statute appears to be clear and unambiguous, as it does here, we may, “in the interest of completeness” and as part of a “confirmatory process,” delve into “the legislative history of the statute under review” to “compare the result obtained by use of its plain language with that which results when the purpose of the statute is taken into account.” Mayor and City Council of Balt. v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 131 , 756 A.2d 987 (2000) (citation omitted). And the history of Rule 2-625 confirms our interpretation. Rule 2-625 was derived from former Rules 622 and 624 which were adopted in 1956. Together they provided that a judgment, although ordinarily not enforceable by execution or attachment more than twelve years from the date of the judgment, could be enforced if the judgment holder obtained a ⁶⁷⁹ writ of scire facias, 6 subject, however, to temporal limitations.

Rule 622 set out the twelve-year period for enforcing judgments, stating: At any time within twelve years from the date of a judgment the court where such judgment is entered or recorded, pursuant to Rule 619 (Recording of Judgment), may issue an execution or attachment. The judgment may be otherwise proceeded on within twelve years from its date. Rule 624 then outlined the requirements for renewal of judgments through the writ of scire facias. Under that procedure, a judgment holder could seek a writ of scire facias to have a judgment renewed or revived, but the judgment could not be renewed over the objection of the judgment debtor after it was barred by the limitations period.

Specifically, the rule provided: A plaintiff may have a writ of scire facias issued to renew or revive a judgment, but such