State v. Cavey

Morton, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The sole issue in this appeal by the State of Maryland from an order of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County dismissing criminal indictments against the appellee, Frank Delano Cavey, is whether the lower court’s finding that he had been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial should stand. We think it should not. Indictments against Cavey were returned by an Anne Arundel County grand jury on October 8, 1964, charging him with armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery and forgery.

Because of the decision in Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121 , he was reindicted on November 10, 1965. ²⁷⁶ Prior to the original Anne Arundel County indictments, Cavey had been convicted of armed robbery in the State of Florida on September 8, 1964, and sentenced to prison for a term of six months to five years. While serving this sentence, he was convicted of escape and sentenced to an additional term of eighteen months. In June of 1969 Cavey filed, pro se, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County a “demand for trial on the charges against him in the above court, else dismiss said charges.” Thereafter, he was released from the Florida prison and extradition proceedings were initiated by Anne Arundel County authorities which Cavey at first resisted and then apparently waived. Upon his return to Maryland, counsel was appointed to represent him; a motion to dismiss the indictments for lack of a speedy trial was filed; and, after an evidentiary hearing, the court passed an order dismissing the indictments on that ground.

In the “demand for 1 trial” filed by Cavey in June 1969, he asserted that while awaiting trial in, Florida “the State’s Attorney for Anne Arundel County signed a warrant for detainer against this defendant on or about July 5, 1964.” At the hearing on his motion to dismiss the indictments, Cavey testified that he had been told of the “detainer for armed robbery” but could not remember whether he had been advised of the other charges. He further testified that on March 1, 1965, he wrote a letter to the State’s Attorney for Anne Arundel County offering to make restitution “if he could get the detainer dropped.” In April 1969 the State’s Attorney advised Cavey that the detainer would be withdrawn upon his •making restitution and Cavey informed the State’s Attorney by letter dated May 1,1969, that restitution would be promptly made. Restitution was never made and the State’s Attorney advised Cavey by letter dated August 1, 1969, that because of his failure to make restitution “my offer to remove the detainer against you is withdrawn.” Upon Cavey’s return from Florida, his case was set for trial and the motion for dismissal ensued. ²⁷⁷ It is in this factual posture that we are asked to determine whether Cavey was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The right is anchored in our Federal Constitution 1 and in the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 2 It is a right which has been discussed by this Court in nearly a half hundred cases.

The principles shrouding the right to a speedy trial have been articulated in these cases with great particularity and their repetition here would serve no needful purpose. It is a right which an accused may validly waive, as other constitutional rights may be waived. State v. Oglesby, 8 Md. App. 415 , and cases cited therein. Whether a waiver is found to have occurred depends, of course, upon the conduct of the accused.

A salient factor in any such determination is the failure of the accused to affirmatively assert the right by demanding a prompt trial. 3 See Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 Va.L.Rev. 1587, 1601-1610 (1965). It is apparent from the record before us that no demand or request for trial was made prior to June 1969. In fact, it is abundantly clear that Cavey was not interested in a prompt trial. Rather, he sought to avoid any trial by negotiating an agreement with the State’s Attorney under which the charges against him would be withdrawn in exchange for his making restitution.

In the course of the hearing, Cavey readily acknowledged that at the time he made the offer of restitution in his letter of March 1, 1965, he “didn’t want a speedy trial.” With reference to his letter of May 1, 1969, to the State’s Attorney, he was asked: “* * * Did you at that time, want a speedy trial?” and he replied: “No, I didn’t.” Thus, it is apparent that prior to June, 1969, he not only did