State v. Coale

State of Maryland v. Scott Corey Coale, No. 2001, September Term 2018 Opinion by Kehoe, J. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE — INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”) is an agreement among the states to facilitate the prompt disposition of a detainer filed by one state against a person incarcerated in another. Because the IAD has been approved by Congress, it is subject to interpretation by federal courts and Maryland courts defer to interpretations of the IAD provided by the United States Supreme Court. Article III of the IAD, codified as Md. Code Corr. Servs. § 8-405, provides that a prisoner can request disposition of all charges for which detainers have been issued within 180 days.

The 180-day period begins to run on the date that notice of the prisoner’s invocation of his right has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him. Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43 (1993). When the General Assembly approved the IAD in 1965, it enacted supplemental statutes to assist in the implementation and administration of the compact in Maryland. Those statutes are now codified as Corr.

Servs. §§ 8-412–17. Corr. Servs. § 8-412 requires Maryland courts and State and local officials to “cooperate with one another and other party states in enforcing the Agreement and effectuating its purposes.” For the purposes of the IAD, the appropriate court to receive notice is the court in which the charges are pending at the time that the prisoner invokes his right to disposition of all charges. The warden or other appropriate official of the custodial state is required to provide the notice.

If the warden of the custodial state fails to notify the appropriate court of a prisoner’s invocation of his right to disposition of pending charges but does send notice to the appropriate prosecutor, Corr. Servs. § 8-412 requires the prosecutor to take steps to notify the appropriate court. The 180-day time limit begins to run when the prosecutor has actual notice of the prisoner’s invocation of his right to disposition of pending charges. Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County Case Nos. 02-K-08-002294 02-K-08-002295 02-K-08-002296 02-K-08-002297 02-K-08-002435 REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 2001 September Term, 2018 ____________________________________ STATE OF MARYLAND v. SCOTT COREY COALE ____________________________________ Fader, C.J., Kehoe, Beachley, JJ. ____________________________________ Opinion by Kehoe, J. ____________________________________ Filed: March 31, 2021 * Ripken, J., did not participate in the Court’s Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act decision to report this opinion pursuant to (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.

Maryland Rule 8-605.1. 2021-03-31 10:58-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 2 Contents Introduction Background The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Coale’s 2009 convictions Coale invokes the IAD Proceedings in Howard County Proceedings in Anne Arundel County The post-conviction court proceeding The petition and the hearing The post-conviction court’s judgment Timeline The parties’ appellate contentions The standard of review Analysis A. The parties’ statutory arguments B. The post-conviction court’s analysis revisited C. Our independent review Appendix Introduction In 2007, Scott Corey Coale committed a series of crimes in Howard and Anne Arundel counties. He then went to California, where he was convicted of an unrelated crime and sentenced to prison. While Coale was serving his California sentence, officials in Howard County and Anne Arundel County separately filed detainers against him for the charges pending in their respective jurisdictions. Coale invoked his right under the Interstate -1- Agreement on Detainers (the “IAD”) for prompt disposition of those charges.

He was extradited to Maryland and, in 2009, resolved the Anne Arundel County charges by means of a plea agreement. In 2016, Coale filed a petition for post-conviction relief as to the Anne Arundel County convictions, asserting that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and pursue a motion for dismissal under the IAD. The post-conviction court granted the petition, vacated the convictions and sentences entered against him, and dismissed all of the underlying charges with prejudice. The State filed an application for leave to file an appeal pursuant to Md. Rule 8-204, which this Court granted.

State of Maryland v. Scott Coale, ALA No. 0678, 2018 Term. The State presents one issue on appeal, which we have reworded slightly: Did the post-conviction court err when it granted Coale’s petition for post- conviction relief based upon his trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate and pursue a motion to dismiss the cases pending against him on the grounds that the State had violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers?1 We will reverse the court’s judgment. To prevail in his post-conviction action, Coale must demonstrate that his trial counsel’s representation was deficient and that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s shortcomings. State v. Syed, 463 Md. 60, 75 , cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 562 (2019).

A defendant satisfies the second requirement when he 1 The State articulates the issue as: Did the post-conviction court erroneously conclude that Coale’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not investigating and pursuing a motion to dismiss under the IAD? -2- shows that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different; or that the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.” Id. (quoting Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 355 (2017)). For the purposes of our analysis, we will assume that Coale has satisfied the first criterion. However, any suppositional deficiency in trial counsel’s performance neither affected the outcome of the 2009 proceedings nor rendered his convictions unfair or unreliable.

Background The Interstate Agreement on Detainers A detainer is “a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.” White v. State, 223 Md. App. 353 , 372 n.14 (2015) (quoting State v. Jefferson, 319 Md. 674 , 678 n.2 (1990)). The Interstate Agreement on Detainers, codified in Maryland as §§ 8-402–11 of the Correctional Services Article, “is a congressionally- sanctioned compact among the states designed to facilitate the prompt disposition of a detainer lodged by one state against a person incarcerated in another state.” Aleman v. State, 469 Md. 397, 402 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S.Ct. 671 (2020). Because it is an interstate compact that has been approved by Congress, the IAD is subject to construction by federal courts. Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 149 (2001); New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000).

Maryland courts “ordinarily defer to interpretations of the [IAD] provided by the United States Supreme Court.” Pitts v. State, 205 Md. App. 477 , 487–88 (2012) (citing State v. Pair, 416 Md. 157, 168 (2010)). -3- Pending detainers can restrict an inmate’s eligibility for training and educational programs, transfers to moderate or minimum-security facilities, and similar measures intended to assist in the rehabilitation of the inmate. See, e.g., Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 , 730 n.8 (1985); Pair, 416 Md. at 160–61.2 The legislative purpose of the IAD is to establish uniform procedures for the prompt disposition of such charges. Pair, 416 Md. at 162 . To this end, the IAD sets out rules and procedures “for the temporary transfer of the prisoner from the state of incarceration to the state in which charges are pending, upon the request of either the prisoner or the prosecuting jurisdiction.” Aleman, 469 Md. at 402 .

Among those procedures, Article III of the IAD, codified as Corr. Servs. § 8-405, “gives a prisoner incarcerated in one State the right to demand the speedy disposition of any untried 2 In Carchman, the Court summarized some of the negative effects of pending detainers: The inmate is (1) deprived of an opportunity to obtain a sentence to run concurrently with the sentence being served at the time the detainer is filed; (2) classified as a maximum or close custody risk; (3) ineligible for initial assignments to less than maximum security prisons . . . (4) ineligible for trustee [sic] status; (5) not allowed to live in preferred living quarters such as dormitories; (6) ineligible for study-release programs or work-release programs; (7) ineligible to be transferred to preferred medium or minimum custody institutions . . . (8) not entitled to preferred prison jobs; (9) inhibited by the denial of possibility of parole or any commutation of his sentence; [and] (10) caused anxiety and thus hindered in the overall rehabilitation process since he cannot take maximum advantage of his institutional opportunities.” 473 U.S. at 730 n.8. -4- indictment, information or complaint that is the basis of a detainer lodged against him by another State[.]” Pair, 416 Md. at 412 (quoting Carchman, 473 U.S. at 718–19).

For the purposes of the IAD, member jurisdictions can play two roles: The “receiving state” is one in which a criminal trial is to be held as a result of a detainer filed by prosecutors in that jurisdiction; the “sending state” is the jurisdiction in which the person facing the pending charges is currently incarcerated. See IAD Article II, codified as Corr. Servs. § 8-404(b) and (c). In the present appeal, California and Maryland are respectively the sending and receiving states.

The IAD addresses two scenarios. The one that is relevant to this appeal is when a prisoner in a sending state requests a resolution of the charges which are the basis for the detainers filed by the receiving state. This subject is addressed in Article III of the IAD, codified as Corr. Servs. § 8-405.3 In Pair, the Court summarized the initial stages of the process contemplated by Article III: The interstate transfer process begins when the “receiving” state lodges a detainer with the warden “or other official” of the institution where the prisoner in question is currently imprisoned, in what is referred to as the custodial or “sending” state.

The warden . . . in the sending state is then obligated to inform the inmate of the detainer’s source and contents, and of the inmate’s right, under the IAD, to request final disposition of the charges on which the detainer is based. 3 The other scenario arises when the receiving jurisdiction initiates the process by asking the sending jurisdiction for temporary custody so that the inmate can be tried on charges pending in the receiving jurisdiction. This is addressed in Article IV of the IAD, codified as Corr. Servs. § 8-406. -5- To exercise the right of speedy disposition, the inmate must file a request for IAD relief with the warden, who must forward the request to appropriate authorities in the receiving state. This document operates as a request by the prisoner for final disposition of all untried charges underlying the detainer and is deemed to be a waiver of extradition.

Id. at 162–63 (some quotation marks, brackets, footnotes and citations omitted). Article III(b) of the IAD provides that a sending state’s notice of an inmate’s invocation of his Article III rights must be sent to the “appropriate prosecuting official and court” by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested. Once a prisoner invokes his rights for a disposition of the pending charges, he shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the prisoner shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court[4] of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment and the prisoner’s request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint[.] IAD Article III(a), codified as Corr. Servs. § 8-405(a).

The 180-day limit can be extended “for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel being present[.]” Id. Two other provisions of the IAD figure in the arguments raised by the parties: First, a prisoner’s request for disposition under Article III “operates as a request for final disposition” of all pending charges for which detainers have been issued from the receiving state. See IAD Article III(d), codified as Corr. Servs. § 8-405(d).

Second, Article IX of the 4 Corr. Servs. § 8-401(c) states: “Appropriate court” means, with reference to the courts of this State, a circuit court of a county or the District Court. -6- IAD, codified as Corr. Servs. § 8-411, states that its provisions are to be “liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.” The Council of State Governments has promulgated standard forms for the implementation of the IAD. Laster v. State, 313 Md. 548 , 551 n.2 (1988).

The then-current versions of the forms are set out in an appendix to the Court’s opinion, id. at 562–69, and the Court looked to language in the forms as a guide to interpretation of the IAD. Id. at 554–58.5 When it adopted the IAD in 1965, the General Assembly also enacted supplemental statutes (now codified as Corr. Servs. §§ 8-412–17) to assist in the implementation and administration of the compact’s provisions. See chapter 627 of the Laws of 1965; Laster v. State, 313 Md. at 571 n.2 (McAuliffe, J., concurring) (noting that the prior version of what is now Corr.

Servs § 8-416 was added by Maryland at the time of its adoption of the IAD.). Two of these supplemental statutes are relevant to the present case. The first is Corr. Servs. § 8-412, which requires Maryland’s courts and government agencies to enforce the IAD and to “cooperate with one another and other party states in enforcing the Agreement 5 The current version of the forms, now provided by the National Association of Extradition Officials, may be found in Appendix D to Nolan H. Rogers and Edward O. Siclari, Maryland Extradition Manual, accessible at https://sos.maryland.gov/ Documents/MD-ExtraditionManual.pdf.

At least as to the forms that are relevant to this appeal, the current versions of the forms are substantively identical to those discussed in Laster. -7- and effectuating its purpose.”6 The second is Corr. Servs. § 8-416, which states that written notices to the prosecutor and the trial court required by Articles III and IV “may not be deemed to have been delivered . . . until the notice or notification is actually received by the appropriate court” and State’s Attorney’s office.7 There is a final piece to the statutory mosaic. On the same day that the General Assembly enacted the legislation approving the IAD, the Legislature also passed the Intrastate Detainer Act, now codified as Corr. Servs. §§ 8-501–03.

State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 207 (1974). Because the IAD and the Intrastate Detainer Act “are component parts of the same general system[,] they should be construed together to the extent possible.” Id. Decisions by the Court of Appeals in Intrastate Detainer Act cases will assist us in resolving some of the parties’ contentions in the present case. We will now turn to the events giving rise to this appeal. 6 Corr.

Servs. § 8-412 states in full: All courts, departments, agencies, officers, and employees of the State and its political subdivisions shall enforce the Agreement and cooperate with one another and other party states in enforcing the Agreement and effectuating its purpose. 7 Corr. Servs. § 8-416 states: As to any request by an individual confined in another party state for trial in this State, written notice may not be deemed to have been delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of this State in accordance with § 8-405(a)(Article III(a) of the [IAD]) . . . until the notice or notification is actually received by the appropriate court and the appropriate State’s Attorney . . . or any other person empowered to receive mail on behalf of the State’s Attorney. -8- The 2009 Convictions Coale invokes the IAD As we have related, while Coale was serving a prison sentence in California, prosecutors in Howard and Anne Arundel counties filed detainers against him for the charges pending in their respective counties. In May 2008, California prison officials notified Coale of the detainers. About two weeks later, and in addition to other documents, Coale signed two versions of IAD Form II, which contained the formal invocation of his right to stand trial on those charges within 180 days.

See Laster, 313 Md. at 554 . One version of the forms pertained to the Howard County charges and the other to the charges pending in Anne Arundel County. Coale delivered these documents to the warden of the California prison in which he was incarcerated. At this juncture, Article III required the warden to send copies of the forms together with some additional paperwork8 “to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.” Laster, 313 Md. at 554 (citing Article III(b) of the IAD).

In Coale’s case, however, the finely calibrated process contemplated by Article III broke down in two ways. First, even though Coale had signed two versions of Forms I and II, one for the charges pending in Anne Arundel County, and the other for the Howard County charges, and Article III unambiguously required the California prison warden to mail copies of the forms 8 Specifically, the notification of the detainers (IAD Form I), a certificate of Coale’s status as an inmate (Form III) and an offer to deliver temporary custody of Coale to Maryland for purposes of trial (Form IV). -9- and related paperwork to the prosecutor and courts in each county,9 the warden sent both sets of Coale’s paperwork only to the Howard County State’s Attorney’s Office. The State’s Attorney’s Office received copies of Coale’s paperwork by facsimile transmission on June 10, 2008, and the original documents by mail on June 16, 2008. The California warden sent nothing to the Anne Arundel County State’s Attorney.

It was not until July 10, 2008, that Navene Wright, the IAD coordinator for the Howard County State’s Attorney’s Office, telephoned her opposite number in Anne Arundel County regarding Coale’s cases.10 She learned that the Anne Arundel State’s Attorney’s Office knew nothing about Coale’s invocation of his IAD rights. On July 15, 2008, Wright faxed Coale’s IAD paperwork to the Anne Arundel prosecutors. Second, Article III required the California warden to notify “the appropriate . . . court” in which the charges pending against Coale were to be prosecuted in both Anne Arundel and Howard counties. The warden didn’t notify any court in either county.

Although there is no explanation in the record as to why these notices were not properly delivered, the 9 Article III(b) states (emphasis added): The written notice and request for final disposition required under subsection (a) of this section shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of the prisoner, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 8-405 . 10 Wright did not testify at the post-conviction hearing, but her contemporaneous notes were admitted into evidence. - 10 - forms signed by Coale to initiate the IAD process did not identify a court or judicial official to receive notice. In the space on the Anne Arundel form, in which this information should have been entered, is written: “District Attorney, County of Anne Arundel, State of Maryland.” A similar error appears on the corresponding form for the Howard County charges.11 Other than the delivery of notice problems that we have just described, Coale’s attempt to invoke his Article III rights complied with all of the other relevant requirements of the IAD and neither party suggests otherwise.

The Howard County proceedings On June 26, 2008, the State’s Attorney for Howard County filed IAD Form VII, indicating his acceptance of California’s offer to transfer custody of Coale to Howard County for purposes of bringing him to trial within the time specified in Article III.12 On July 8, 2008, the Form VII was signed by a judge of the District Court of Maryland for Howard County, certifying, among other things, that the State’s Attorney for Howard 11 We are attaching an image of the Form II relating to the Anne Arundel County charges in the appendix. During the post-conviction hearing, Coale testified that he had “filled out” the Form IIs after they were presented to him. But he also stated that, when he signed the forms, he “was in segregation so I didn’t have access to anything.” It is unclear what parts of the forms he was referring to. 12 See Laster, 313 Md. at 554 (“Upon receipt of Forms 2, 3 and 4, the prosecutor completes Form 7[,] . . . in which the prosecutor certifies that the prisoner will be brought to trial within the time specified in Article III, and sends it to the warden.”). - 11 - County was the appropriate official to accept temporary custody of Coale. The form was mailed to the California prison warden on July 10, 2008.13 After officials in the Howard County State’s Attorney’s Office and the California prison agreed upon a date, Coale was transferred to Howard County and his pending cases there were resolved by guilty pleas entered on December 1, 2008.

The Anne Arundel County proceedings Our focus now shifts to Anne Arundel County. As we have stated, the Anne Arundel State’s Attorney’s Office first learned of Coale’s IAD request on July 10, 2008, and received the relevant documents from Wright on July 15th. But it was not until October 17, 2008, that the Anne Arundel County State’s Attorney’s office filed indictments against Coale in the circuit court. There were five cases, each arising out of a separate criminal incident; one case was initially scheduled for trial on January 6, 2009, three for trial on February 5, 2009, and the fifth on February 26, 2009.

From what we can tell from the record, no one from the Anne Arundel prosecutor’s office made any effort to inform the circuit court that the cases against Coale were subject to Article III’s 180-day limit for disposition until a status conference on all the cases which occurred on December 12, 2008. On that same day, Coale’s trial counsel met with his client and learned for the first time that there was a potential problem with compliance with Article III’s 180-day limit. 13 An image of the Form VII filed in the District Court for Howard County is included in the appendix attached to this opinion. - 12 - In the status conference, the prosecutor took the position that his office had received Coale’s request for final disposition on July 15, 2008, which the prosecutor took to mean that the pending cases against Coale had to be tried by January 11, 2009 in order to comply with the IAD. The court was skeptical as to this proposition because there was nothing in the circuit court files regarding Coale’s request for final disposition within 180 days. Defense counsel asserted that notice to the State’s Attorney’s Office was imputed to the circuit court.

The prosecutor indicated that he was prepared to try the cases within what he believed was the 180-day limit, but defense counsel opposed the idea as “inappropriate at this point.” Defense counsel asserted that there were discovery issues in two of the cases, that the State’s proposed trial dates did not work with his schedule and that the State’s proposed trial dates would be outside the 180-day limit. Asked by the court if Coale had any documentation related to his IAD request, defense counsel answered that he did not because California had not released any of Coale’s paperwork or personal property when he was transferred to Howard County. Eventually, the parties were directed to the Honorable William C. Mulford, who was the designee of the administrative judge for rescheduling criminal cases. See Md. Rule 4-271(a).

That hearing took place later on the same day. Before Judge Mulford, the prosecutor asked the court to grant continuances in the pending cases. The prosecutor explained to the court that there was “an argument to be made” that the written notice received by the Howard County State’s Attorney’s Office on - 13 - June 16, 2008, could be imputed both to the Anne Arundel County State’s Attorney’s Office and to the circuit court. (If this were correct, the 180-day limit for prosecution would have expired on December 15th.) The prosecutor stated that Coale had “multiple cases, in Howard County, multiple cases in Anne Arundel County,” and that “the sheer volume of cases . . . really precludes the State . . . from trying them within the 180 days under the [IAD].” The prosecutor also pointed out that the prospects for bringing any of the cases to trial in early January were complicated by the fact that the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court did not schedule jury trials for a two-week period ending on January 5th.

He informed the court that there were no pending discovery issues but that there “might be suppression issues.” Defense counsel opposed granting the continuance. He asserted that there were, in fact, outstanding discovery problems and that the State could not possibly show good cause for a continuance. This was so, he said, because the Anne Arundel prosecutors had waited until October 31 to indict Coale even though they had been made aware of his invocation of his Article III rights three-and-a-half months earlier. All of the problems now confronting the State were, according to counsel, readily foreseeable and were no different from those facing the Howard County prosecutors.

The difference, he asserted, was that the Howard County prosecutors “got the ball rolling faster” than did their Anne Arundel counterparts. The court expressed skepticism as to the parties’ assertions that the notice to Howard County courts or prosecutors might constitute notice to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, and observed that the State was “proceed[ing] at [its] peril . . . if it turns out that - 14 - actual notice was given[.]” Nonetheless, the court decided the State had shown good cause for a continuance and granted the State’s motion. In reaching this conclusion, the court specifically mentioned the lack of documentation that could affirm or rebut the parties’ assertions as to when the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County had notice. Coale’s cases were rescheduled for January 6, 2009.

Because of a death in defense counsel’s family, the cases were rescheduled to January 27, 2009. Under the terms of a plea agreement, Coale pled not guilty on an agreed statement of facts to charges of first- degree burglary in one case, theft over $500 in another, and kidnapping in a third. The agreed-upon sentence totaled 25 years to run concurrently with the sentences in California and Howard County. The remaining charges were to be nol prossed.

The court accepted the plea, imposed the agreed-upon sentences and nol prossed the other charges. Coale filed an untimely notice of appeal which he later dismissed upon advice of his appellate counsel. The post-conviction relief proceeding The post-conviction hearing In February 2016, Coale filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and pursue a motion for dismissal under the IAD. Coale asserted that, had he undertaken such an investigation, his trial counsel would have realized the implications of the delay between the trial dates as originally scheduled and the date that the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County received notice of his client’s invocation of his Article III rights.

He told the court—erroneously as it turned out—that it was “explicit in the transcripts” that it had been Coale’s trial counsel - 15 - who requested a continuance past the 180-day limit.14 Instead, argued post-conviction counsel, trial counsel should have “kept his mouth shut” on the issue until the 180-limit had expired which was, under his theory of the case, no later than January 6, 2009. Trial counsel should have then filed a motion to dismiss the charges with prejudice because “the clock has expired.” At the hearing, Coale testified on his own behalf, called his trial attorney as a witness, and presented various documents related to his Article III request for final disposition. Most of the evidence presented at the hearing pertained to asserted deficiencies of his trial counsel’s performance. For the purposes of our analysis, we will assume that Coale met his burden on this issue.

The post-conviction court’s judgement Although the post-conviction court’s view of the evidence and the law was somewhat different than Coale’s, it nonetheless granted his petition. The court’s reasoning was set out in a memorandum opinion dated May 9, 2018, which we summarize: Initially, the court stated that it was “undisputed” the District Court of Maryland for Howard County was placed on notice of Coale’s invocation of his Article III rights on June 14 Post-conviction counsel’s claim that it had been Coale’s lawyer who asked for the continuance was wrong but understandably so. The original version of the transcript of the hearing before Judge Mulford attributed the request to defense counsel. At the post- conviction hearing, Coale’s 2008 counsel testified that “I don’t recall doing that [and] I cannot for the life of me figure out why I would have asked [for a continuance].” Certainly, in the rest of the hearing, defense counsel opposed granting the motion.

On February 5, 2019, the State filed an unopposed motion to correct the transcript, which this Court granted. The corrected transcript shows that the request for a continuance had actually been made by the prosecutor and had been opposed by defense counsel. - 16 - 13, 2008. (That was the date when Wright, the IAD coordinator for the Howard County State’s Attorney’s Office, filed requests for copies of statements of charges and other documents relating to the cases pending against Coale in that court.) From this premise, the post-conviction court concluded that the notice to the District Court for Howard County constituted notice on the same date to the Anne Arundel County State’s Attorney’s Office, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County and the District Court for Anne Arundel County, indeed to all Maryland courts and prosecutors. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on State v. Pair, 416 Md. 157, 178 (2010), for the proposition that the IAD places “one and only one burden on the prisoner, that is, to ask the prison official who has custody over him to prepare and send the forms to the jurisdiction from which the detainer ‘is lodged against him.’” The court noted that in arguing otherwise, the State cited Laster v. State, 313 Md. 548 (1988), which the court characterized as “actually work[ing] in favor of” Coale.15 The post-conviction court interpreted Corr.

Servs. § 8-41216 to mean that, once “the appropriate officials in Howard County, and thus, Maryland had actual notice . . . the responsibility shifted to Howard County to forward [Coale’s] request for disposition to Anne Arundel County[.]” 15 As we will explain, we do not agree with the post-conviction court’s reading of Laster. 16 Corr. Servs. § 8-412 states: All courts, departments, agencies, officers, and employees of the State and its political subdivisions shall enforce the Agreement and cooperate with one another and other party states in enforcing the Agreement and effectuating its purpose. - 17 - Applying the standard Maryland mechanism for calculating time,17 the court next concluded that the 180-day limit set out in Article III expired on December 10, 2008. Because the prosecutor had requested a continuance on December 12, the request was untimely. Had trial counsel been prepared with documentation to show that the District Court for Howard County received notice of Coale’s invocation of his IAD rights on June 13, 2008, the motions court would have had no choice but to dismiss the charges with prejudice.

Based upon the testimony of Coale and his trial counsel at the post-conviction hearing, the court found that Coale had flagged the 180-day issue for trial counsel and that counsel should have obtained copies of the relevant documents from either the circuit court or the 17 Md. Code Gen. Prov. § 1-302 states in pertinent part: (a) In computing a period of time described in a statute, the day of the act, event, or default after which the designated period of time begins to run may not be included. (b) The last day of the period of time computed under subsection (a) of this section shall be included unless: (1) it is a Sunday or legal holiday, in which case the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Sunday or legal holiday; or (2) the act to be done is the filing of a paper in court and the office of the clerk of the court is not open on the last day of the period of time, or is closed for a part of a day, in which case the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or day on which the office is not open the entire day during ordinary business hours. (c)(1) When the period of time exceeds 7 days, intermediate Sundays and legal holidays shall be counted in computing the period of time. * * * - 18 - public defender’s office in Howard County before the status conference on December 12th.

Trial counsel’s failure to have the documents prevented him from arguing to Judge Mulford that the 180-day limit had already expired, much to Coale’s prejudice. Finally, the court concluded: As previously stated, when the State failed to resolve the Petitioner’s untried Anne Arundel County cases within the 180-day limitations period of the IAD, the dismissal with prejudice of the Anne Arundel County charges was mandated. All that was necessary to secure this dismissal was for the Assistant Public Defender to present the documentation showing notification of Petitioner’s invocation of the IAD. . . . Further, by failing to establish a sufficient factual record in the trial record, the Assistant Public Defender prevented a favorable decision on appeal.

Accordingly . . . there is a reasonable probability that (1) there would have been no basis to excuse the State’s violation of the Maryland IAD, thereby mandating entry of a judicial order dismissing with prejudice all of the underlying charges in Petitioner’s Anne Arundel County cases, or (2) the issue would have been resolved in Petitioner’s favor at the appellate court level. For these reasons, the court granted Coale’s petition, vacated his convictions and sentences, and dismissed all of the 2009 charges with prejudice. On the following page, we have set out a timeline to give context to the parties’ appellate contentions. - 19 - Possible triggering event Expiration of 180-day period See Gen. Prov. § 1-132 June 10, 2008: The California warden faxes Coale’s IAD Form II December 7, 2008 (Sunday) so and related paperwork to the Howard County State’s Attorney’s December 8, 2008 Office.

June 13, 2008: The Howard County State’s Attorney’s Office files December 10, 2008 its request for documents related to Coale’s pending cases in the District Court for Howard County.*† June 16, 2008: The Howard County State’s Attorney’s Office December 13, 2008 (Saturday) receives paper copies of Coale’s Form II and related documents so December 15, 2008 from California. June 26, 2008: The Howard County State’s Attorney files IAD Form December 22, 2008 VII (acceptance of temporary custody for trial within time specified in Art. III(a)).** July 8, 2008: A judge of the District Court for Howard County January 4, 2009 (Sunday) so certifies that the Howard County State’s Attorney is the appropriate January 5, 2009 person to take custody of Coale for IAD purposes** July 10, 2008: Howard County IAD coordinator Navene Wright January 6, 2009 contacts her opposite number in the Anne Arundel County State’s Attorney’s Office regarding Coale’s case.** July 15, 2008: Wright faxes copies of Coale’s paperwork to the January 11, 2009 (Sunday) so Anne Arundel State’s Attorney’s Office. January 12, 2009 None‡ Never The circuit court granted the State’s motion for continuances on December 12, 2008. * The date that Coale relies on in his brief. ** Alternative starting dates posited by Coale’s counsel at the post-conviction hearing. † The starting date used by the post-conviction court. ‡ The State’s position in its brief to this Court. - 20 - The parties’ appellate contentions The State presents several arguments as to why the post-conviction court erred in granting Coale’s petition: First, the State asserts that Coale’s invocation of his Article III right to disposition of the charges pending against him within 180 days had to “actually be received by the appropriate court and the appropriate State’s Attorney” to be effective. The appropriate courts to receive the notice were the circuit courts of the counties in which Coale’s charges were pending.

The State relies primarily on Corr. Servs. § 8-416 for this proposition. To the extent that Laster suggests otherwise, the State asserts that the Court’s reasoning in Laster is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Fex v. Michigan. Second, the State argues that the post-conviction court “clearly erred by finding it ‘undisputed that . . . the District Court received actual notice . . . by June 13, 2008’”[18] for two reasons.

The State correctly points out that the post-conviction court’s characterization of its conclusion as “undisputed” is simply wrong—the transcript of the post-conviction hearing shows that the State did not concede that the District Court received notice on June 13, 2008. More fundamentally, the State argues that the post-conviction court misread the critical documents in the post-conviction in its analysis, namely, the requests filed on June 13, 2008 by the Howard County State’s Attorney’s Office for true test copies of documents 18 This was the date on which Wright, the IAD coordinator for the Howard County State’s Attorney’s Office, filed her request for copies of Coale’s pending charges in the District Court of Howard County. - 21 - filed in the pending cases against Coale in the District Court for Howard County. The State asserts that there is nothing in those documents that would alert anyone of the District Court that Coale’s case involved the IAD, much less that Coale had invoked his rights under Article III. Third, the State suggests that “there was nothing [Coale’s] trial counsel could have done to prevent the good-cause finding, secure a dismissal in circuit court, or set the stage for a successful appeal.” According to the State, this was because there was “absolutely nothing in the court files to indicate that the appropriate court and the appropriate State’s Attorney of the State ha[d] received actual notice.

Defense counsel could not have produced any document to show otherwise because none existed.” As a fallback to this argument, the State asserts that there were ample grounds to support Judge Mulford’s grant of the prosecutor’s motion for a continuance on December 12, 2008. Coale takes issue with each of these contentions. At a conceptual level, he suggests that the appropriate analysis should focus on Article I,19 which states that “it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this Agreement to encourage the expeditious and 19 Article I of the IAD (codified as Corr. Servs. § 8-403) states in pertinent part: The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.

Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this Agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments[.] - 22 - orderly disposition” of pending criminal charges, and Article XI of the IAD, which states that the IAD is to be “liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.” Turning to the specifics of the State’s contentions, Coale argues that its reliance on Corr. Servs. § 8-416’s requirement for actual notice is misplaced. He suggests that it has long been the policy of Maryland that “substantial compliance” with the requirements for notice is sufficient, citing State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 210 (1974) (construing the Intrastate Detainer Act, now codified as title 8, subtitle 5 of the Correctional Services Article). Coale disagrees with the State’s contention that the IAD requires actual receipt of the IAD notices by the circuit court of the county in which the charges are pending.

He points to another Intrastate Detainer Act case, Brooks v. State, 329 Md. 98 , 103–04 (1993). In that case, and among other holdings, the Court concluded that the “appropriate court” for purposes of notice was not limited to the court with actual jurisdiction over the pending charges but to any court that exercised “some form of ‘criminal jurisdiction’” in the political subdivision in which the charges were pending. Coale points to the fact that the Howard County State’s Attorney’s Office is located in the same building at the District Court for Howard County as further support for the notion that knowledge on the part of - 23 - the Howard County States Attorney’s Office should be imputed to the District Court, the Anne Arundel State’s Attorney’s Office, and the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.20 Coale also argues that the State failed to demonstrate good cause for its motion for a continuance in the hearing before Judge Mulford because, according to Coale, the sole basis of the court’s decision was the fact that it was unclear as to when the Anne Arundel 20 Coale also suggests that Wright, the IAD coordinator for the Howard County State’s Attorney’s Office, should be treated as an official of the District Court. To support this contention, he asserts: On August 13, 2008, the Attorney General’s Office sent a letter regarding Mr. Coale’s interstate transfer to the State’s IAD clerk in Howard County and addressed her in the letter as the “Extradition-Detainer Coordinator” at the Howard County District Court.

The record discloses that actual addressee of the letter was: Navene Wright Extradition-Detainer Coordinator Office of the State’s Attorney for Howard County District Court/Multiservice Center 3451 Courthouse Drive Ellicott City, MD 21043. As the State points out in its reply brief: [T]enants in the same building do not routinely receive, let alone open or read, each other’s mail or faxes. This is especially true when the tenants are a court and a prosecutor’s office, two entities that frequently receive highly sensitive documents. So there is no reason to believe that District Court officials in the same building as the State’s Attorney’s Office saw or read the IAD forms faxed and then mailed to that office.

We agree with the State and will not further address this argument. - 24 - State’s Attorney’s Office had received notice of Coale’s assertion of his Article III rights.21 The standard of review An appellate court’s “review of a post-conviction court’s findings regarding ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Syed, 463 Md. 60, 73 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ 140 S. Ct. 562 (2019); Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 351 (2017). We review the post-conviction court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Additionally, because Coale’s right to effective assistance of counsel is established in both the federal and Maryland constitutions, we must engage in our own 21 Additionally, Coale asserts that the motions court abused its discretion in granting the motion for a continuance because: [T]he State conceded to the administrative judge that it “certainly could have tried to bring these matters in a sooner way,” but had inexplicably delayed indicting Mr. Coale for a period of over 3 months after being notified of his requests for disposition in early July of 2008, despite conclusion of the police investigations into the incidents underlying the charges in all five cases back in December 2007–February 2008. When questioned by the administrative judge about its reasons for a good cause finding, the State gave no explanation whatsoever for this more than 3-month period of pre-indictment delay.

We do not read the transcript in quite the same way. The prosecutor told the motions court that his office could have tried to bring the cases against Coale to trial “in a sooner way.” But the prosecutor made it clear that the problem with accomplishing this was that Howard County did not conclude its prosecution of that jurisdiction’s three cases against Coale until December 1, 2008, that is, twelve days before the motions hearing. Coale did not argue to either the motions court in 2008 or to the post-conviction court in 2018 that it was practicable for the Anne Arundel prosecutors to try Coale before the Howard County cases