State v. Coley

KENNEY, Judge. The State appeals the decision of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County granting Victor Leon Coley’s (“Coley”) motion to suppress evidence recovered as a result of a search warrant. The State presents the following question: Did the circuit court err in granting Coley’s motion to suppress evidence where (1) there was probable cause to justify the warrant to search Coley’s residence, and (2) the . officers relied on the warrant in good faith? For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the decision and remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ⁵⁰⁶ Factual and Procedural Background On October 17, 2001, Trooper A.L. McClendon (“Trooper McClendon” or “TFC.

McClendon”) of the Maryland State Police Drug Enforcement Command applied for the search warrant at issue. 1 Because the affidavit recites the facts leading to the issuance of the search warrant, we reproduce part of it: 2 IN SEPTEMBER 2001, I, TFC. MCCLENDON, WAS CONTACTED BY CPL. M. MCDONOUGH IN REFERENCE TO ASSISTING HIM WITH CONTROLLED PURCHASES IN THE AREA OF PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY, MARYLAND. CPL.

MCDONOUGH ADVISED ME THAT HE HAS A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS Cl) 3 WHO WOULD ASSIST WITH THE PURCHASES OF CDS. 4 MCDONOUGH-ADVISED ME THAT THE TARGET OF HIS INVESTIGATION IN PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY IS COLEY, VICTOR AND CURRENTLY RESIDES IN THE LARGO AREA OF THE COUNTY. THE Cl HAS KNOWN COLEY FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME AND HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT COLEY DISTRIBUTES CDS (CRACK COCAINE, SCHEDULE II). THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED ON COLEY UTILIZING THE COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE Cl: ⁵⁰⁷ COLEY, VICTOR LEON M/B/10-05-62 2005 E. WILSON PLACE, LANDOVER, PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY, MARYLAND 20785 6' 02, 210, SSN [ ] SID f ], FBI [ ] DATE AGENCY_CHARGE_DISPOSITION 06/23/88 PRINCE D 1ST. OF GUILTY _GEORGES CO.

COCAINE_ 02/02/89 PRINCE VOP-BATTE RY GUILTY _GEORGES CO._ 02/23/89 M.R.D.C.C. DIST. OF UNKNOWN _COCAINE__ 08/21/96 [MD.] STATE THEFT UNKNOWN POLICE_ BETWEEN THE DATES OF SEPTEMBER. 12 AND OCTOBER 06, 2001, I MET WITH CPL. MCDONOUGH AND THE CI, ON TWO (2) SEPARATE OCCASIONS AT A PREDETERMINED LOCATION IN PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY, MARYLAND FOR THE PURPOSES OF CONDUCTING A CONTROLLED PURCHASE. THE CI WAS SEARCHED AND FOUND FREE OF MONIES/CONTRABAND.

A DRIVE-BY OF THE TARGET RESIDENCE WAS DONE AND THE CI VISUALLY POINTED OUT COLEY’S RESIDENCE AS 13206 CAPE SHELL COURT, LARGO, PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY, MARYLAND. A GOLD COLORED CADILLAC BEARING DC REGISTRATION BA 9241 WAS OBSERVED IN THE DRIVEWAY. THE CI STATED THAT COLEY HAS RESIDED ALONE AT 13206 CAPE SHELL COURT, LARGO, PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY, MARYLAND FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. THE CI WAS GIVEN AN AMOUNT OF U.S. CURRENCY IN ORDER TO MAKE A PURCHASE OF CDS FROM COLEY.

CONTACT WAS MADE WITH COLEY VIA THE TELEPHONE AND COLEY ADVISED THE CI TO MAKE CONTACT WITH HIM IN THE AREA OF HIS RESIDENCE, NOT AT THE RESIDENCE. YOUR AFFIANT POSITIONED HIMSELF TO OBSERVE COLEY LEAVE HIS RESIDENCE TO THE LOCATION WHERE HE WAS TO CONTACT CI. COLEY DID LEAVE THE RESIDENCE OPERATING THE GOLD CADILLAC BEARING DC REGISTRATION BA 9241 AND WAS OBSERVED BY CO-AFFIANT MCDONOUGH MAKE CONTACT WITH THE CI. COLEY THEN BECAME MOBILE WITH THE CI.

SURVEILLANCE UNITS MOMENTARILY LOST VISUAL CONTACT WITH COLEY AND THE CI BUT HAD AUDIO CONTACT WITH THE CI. AFTER A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, COLEY WAS OBSERVED BY CO-AFFIANT MCDONOUGH DROP THE CI ⁵⁰⁸ OFF IN AN AREA OF PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY, MARYLAND WHERE SURVEILLANCE UNITS RECONTACTED THE Cl BUT COULD NOT STAY WITH COLEY. THE Cl GAVE TO ME AN OFF-WHITE SUBSTANCE SUSPECTED OF BEING CRACK COCAINE THAT HE/SHE HAD JUST PURCHASED FROM COLEY. THE Cl WAS AGAIN SEARCHED AND FOUND FREE OF ANY MONIES/CONTRABAND.

CONTACT WITH THE Cl WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TERMINATED. I RESPONDED TO THE MARYLAND STATE POLICE COLLEGE PARK BARRACK WHERE THE SUSPECTED CRACK COCAINE WAS FIELD TESTED AND SHOWED A POSITIVE REACTION TO THE PRESENCE OF COCAINE. BEFORE THE SECOND CONTACT WITH COLEY, YOUR AFFIANT MADE A DRIVE BY OF THE TARGET RESIDENCE. YOUR AFFIANT OBSERVED THE SAME GOLD COLORED CADILLAC IN THE DRIVEWAY THAT WAS USED BY COLEY ON THE FIRST MEETING.

ON THE SECOND OCCASION, THE Cl WAS SEARCHED AND FOUND FREE OF ANY MONIES/CONTRABAND. THE Cl MADE CONTACT WITH COLEY VIA THE TELEPHONE. SURVEILLANCE UNITS OBSERVED THE Cl AND COLEY MAKE PERSONAL CONTACT IN THE AREA OF LARGO, PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY, MARYLAND. YOUR AFFIANTS OBSERVED COLEY ALONG WITH THE Cl GO TO 13206 CAPE SHELL COURT, LARGO, PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY, MARYLAND.

COLEY WAS OBSERVED GOING INTO THE RESIDENCE. A SHORT TIME LATER, COLEY WAS OBSERVED EXITING THE RESIDENCE AND MAKE-ING [sic] CONTACT WITH THE CI. CONTACT WITH COLEY AND THE CI WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TERMINATED. I RE-CONTACTED THE CI AT A PREDETERMINED LOCATION AT WHICH TIME THE CI GAVE TO ME AN OFF-WHITE SUBSTANCE SUSPECTED OF BEING CRACK COCAINE.

THE CI STATED THAT COLEY SOLD HIM/HER THE SUSPECTED CRACK COCAINE. THE CI WAS AGAIN SEARCHED AND FOUND FREE OF ANY MONIES/CONTRABAND. CONTACT WITH THE CI WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TERMINATED. I RESPONDED TO THE MARYLAND STATE POLICE COLLEGE PARK BARRACK WHERE THE SUSPECTED CRACK COCAINE WAS FIELD TESTED AND SHOWED A POSITIVE REACTION TO THE PRESENCE OF COCAINE.

YOUR AFFIANTS KNOW THAT PERSONS ENGAGED IN THE UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES AND THE USE OF CONTROLLED ⁵⁰⁹ DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES, USE THEIR RESIDENCE AS A LOCATION TO SECRETE THEIR CONTRABAND AND AS A STORAGE LOCATION FOR THE ASSOCIATED RECORDS KEPT IN THE DRUG TRADE. YOUR AFFIANTS ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE VARIOUS RECEIPTS, LEDGERS AND DOCUMENTS FREQUENTLY USED AS WELL AS TALLY SHEETS, BALANCE RECORDS, DEBTS AND OTHER FINANCIAL ACTIVITY REGARDING CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES. YOUR AFFIANTS HAVE SEIZED THESE TYPES OF RECORDS IN THE PAST AND UNDERSTANDS [sic] THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH ITEMS IN CONCEALING THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY FROM DETECTION. YOUR AFFIANTS KNOW THAT THE RESIDENCE IS FREQUENTLY REVERED AS A SAFE HAVEN AMONG UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTORS OF CDS AND AS SUCH ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT FOR THE COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE IN A CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCE INVESTIGATION.

YOUR APPLICANTS [sic] THROUGH THE TRAINING, KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE GAINED AS A COVERT INVESTIGATOR HAS DEVELOPED AN EXPERTISE IN CDS INVESTIGATIONS AND THEREFORE KNOWS THAT THE COLLECTION OF THIS DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, AS DESCRIBED BELOW, IN ADDITION TO CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES IS GERMAIN [sic] IN IDENTIFYING EVIDENCE OF THE CRIMES BEING COMMITTED REGARDING CDS AND IN IDENTIFYING THE MODE OF OPERATION AND THE CO-CONSPIRATORS OF THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY THAT IS BEING COMMITTED IN AND ABOUT THIS RESIDENCE. THE Cl HAS PROVIDED ASSISTANCE IN OTHER INVESTIGATIONS HANDLED BY YOUR AFFIANTS. ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE Cl HAS RESULTED IN FELONY CHARGES BEING PLACED ON SUBJECTS AS WELL AS A LARGE SEIZURE OF CDS. THE Cl HAS BEEN A DRUG USER AND IS INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH THE TERMINOLOGY, PACKAGING, AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES.

INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE Cl IN THIS INVESTIGATION AND OTHER INVESTIGATIONS HAS BEEN PROVEN TO BE TRUE AND CORRECT. AT NO TIME HAS THE Cl PROVIDED FALSE OR MISLEADING INFORMATION IN ANY INVESTIGATION. INFORMATION PROVIDED HAS MADE THIS Cl PAST, PROVEN AND RELIABLE. BASED UPON YOUR AFFIANTS!’] TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE IN THE QUANTITIES OF CONTROLLED DAN ⁵¹⁰ GEROUS SUBSTANCES AND ITS DISTRIBUTION, YOUR AFFIANTS KNOW: A. THAT NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS MUST MAINTAIN ON HAND, LARGE AMOUNTS OF UNITED STATES CURRENCY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN AND FINANCE THEIR ON-GOING NARCOTICS BUSINESS; B. THAT TRAFFICKERS MAINTAIN BOOKS, RECORDS, RECEIPTS, NOTES, LEDGERS, AIRLINE TICKETS, MONEY ORDERS AND OTHER PAPERS RELATING TO THE TRANSPORTATION, ORDERING, SALE, AND DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES.

THAT CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES TRAFFICKERS COMMONLY “FRONT” (PROVIDE ON CONSIGNMENT) CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES TO THEIR CUSTOMERS. THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED BOOKS, RECORDS, RECEIPTS, NOTES, LEDGERS, ETC, ARE MAINTAINED WHERE THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS HAVE READY ACCESS TO THEM; (i.e, THEIR HOMES) C. THAT IT IS COMMON FOR DRUG DEALERS TO SECRETE CONTRABAND, PROCEEDS OF DRUG SALES, AND RECORDS OF DRUG TRANSACTIONS IN SECURE LOCATIONS FOR READY ACCESS AND TO CONCEAL THEM FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES; D. THAT CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES TRAFFICKERS COMMONLY MAINTAIN ADDRESSES AND/OR TELEPHONE NUMBERS IN BOOKS OR PAPERS WHICH REFLECT NAMES, ADDRESSES AND/OR TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF THEIR ASSOCIATES IN THE TRAFFICKING NETWORK. E. THAT DRUG TRAFFICKERS COMMONLY HAVE IN THEIR POSSESSION, FIREARMS, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO HANDGUNS, PISTOLS, REVOLVERS, RIFLES, SHOTGUNS, MACHINE GUNS, AND OTHER WEAPONS. SAID FIREARMS ARE USED'TO PROTECT AND SECURE A DRUG TRAFFICKER’S PRODUCT AND PROPERTY FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT AND/OR OTHER PERSONS OF THE DRUG MILIEU.

F. THAT ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT SUCH AS COMPUTERS, TELEX MACHINES, FACSIMILE MACHINES, CURRENCY COUNTING MACHINES, TELEPHONE ANSWERING MACHINES AND RELATED MANUALS USED TO GENERATE, TRANSFER, COUNT, RECORD AND/OR STORE THE INFORMATION DESCRIBED ABOVE [sic], ADDITIONALLY, COMPUTER SOFTWARE, TAPES AND DISCS, AND CONTENTS THEREIN, CONTAIN THE INFORMATION GENERATED BY THE AFOREMENTIONED ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT. G. THAT NARCOTIC TRAFFICKERS USE DIGITAL PAGING EQUIPMENT TO ORDER CONTROLLED DANGEROUS ⁵¹¹ SUBSTANCES AND COMMUNICATE WITH ASSOCIATES IN THE TRAFFICKING NETWORK. YOUR AFFIANTS AVER THAT BASED UPON THE ABOVE INVESTIGATION; YOUR AFFIANT’S TRAINING, KNOWLEDGE, AND PAST EXPERIENCE AS A MEMBER OF THE MARYLAND STATE POLICE, BUREAU OF DRUG AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT, THAT THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE LAWS RELATING TO THE ILLEGAL DISTRIBUTION AND POSSESSION WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES, AS HEREINBEFORE CITED, ARE BEING VIOLATED IN AND UPON SAID RESIDENCE. The search warrant, which requested, inter alia, authorization to enter and search Coley’s residence, to search any person found in or on the premises, and to enter and search the gold-colored Cadillac, was issued on October 17, 2001.

The warrant was executed on October 18, 2001. During the search of his residence, officers found Coley in an upstairs bedroom. They found approximately 34.5 grams of crack cocaine and 7 grams of marijuana. Officers also found a stolen .38 Taurus revolver, ammunition, and $1,736 in cash. 5 Coley was arrested and subsequently indicted on seven charges, including: possession of CDS with intent to distribute (cocaine), possession of CDS (cocaine), possession of CDS (marijuana), possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, theft under $500, possession of a firearm after conviction of a felony drug offense, and conspiracy to distribute CDS.

On February 15, 2002, Coley filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence. A suppression hearing was held on March 1, 2002, at which Trooper McClendon was the only witness. After argument from counsel, the judge asked the trooper to reenter the courtroom, because he “wanted Trooper McClendon ⁵¹² to know why” his affidavit lacked probable cause. The court ruled as follows: All right.

Court has before it a motion to suppress evidence that deals with the issue of probable cause for the search warrant. The Defense counsel wishes to go beyond the bounds of the affidavit. I concluded that I cannot do that because no illegality has been alleged here. The issue is whether or not within the four corners of the search warrant there’s probable cause for the court to believe that the residence known as 13206 Cape Shell Court, Largo, Prince George’s County housed controlled dangerous substances.

There is no disputing the experience of the affiant. Trooper McClendon and Corporal McDonald on page four of the affidavit, the affirmative focus on the specifics of this case. McDonald advised me, meaning Trooper McClendon, that the target of his investigation in Prince George’s County is Coley, Victor currently resided in the Largo area of the County. Cl known Coley for a long period of time.

Has personal knowledge that Coley runs CDS, crack cocaine schedule two. The following information was obtained on Coley utilizing the computer system and information obtained from the Cl. And then it says Coley, Victor Leon, date of birth, 2005 East Wilson Place, Landover, Prince George’s County, Maryland has a criminal history in terms of record. There was prior distribution of cocaine, which shows a guilty finding back in June of 1998. 6 All right.

Thus far the confidential source has not stated anything regarding specifics about the address itself. Nor does the confidential source say anything about having personal knowledge that the residence itself is being used to house or sell drugs out of. Moreover Mr. Coley’s address is ⁵¹³ listed, at least in the record check portion of this affidavit, as being an address other than the address on Cape Shell Court. The affidavit begins: Between the dates of September 12 and October 6, 2001—we know now, I might add, that this search warrant focuses upon a time frame.

That it was presented to [the issuing magistrate] on October the 17th, executed on October 18th. It continues. I met with Trooper McDonald to talk. So the I here will he Trooper McDonald and the CI.

CI, confidential informant, on two separate occasions at predetermined locations in Prince George’s County, Maryland for the purposes of conducting a controlled purchase. The CI was searched and found free of money/contraband. A drive by the target residence was done on CI, visually pointed out Coley’s residence at 13206 Cape Shell Court, Largo, Prince George’s County, Maryland. A gold colored Cadillac bearing DC registration B-A-9-2-1 was observed in the drive by.

The confidential informant stated that Coley resided alone at 13206 Cape Shell Court, Largo, Prince George’s County, Maryland for a long period of time. The CI was given an amount of U.S. currency in order to make the purchase of CDS. Page five it continues. Purchase of CDS from Coley, excuse me.

Contact was made with Coley via the telephone and Coley advised—the CI made contact with him in the area of his residence. Not at the residence. It’s clear to this court, at this point, that there’s no involvement of this residence in criminal activity at this point. Continuing at page five.

Further affiant positioned himself to observe Coley leave the residence to the location where he was to contact the CI. Coley did leave the residence operating the gold Cadillac bearing DC registration B-A-9-2-1 was observed by co-affiant McDonald making contact with the CI. Coley then became mobile with the CI. Surveillance unit momentarily lost visual contact with Coley and the CI, but had audio contact with the CI. ⁵¹⁴ After a short period of time, though, Coley was observed with co-affiant McDonald drop the Cl off in the area of Prince George’s County, Maryland.

Surveillance units recontacted Cl, but could not stay with Coley. The Cl gave me a white substance suspected to be crack cocaine that he/she had just purchased from Coley. Cl was again searched and found free of money, contraband and contact was subsequently terminated. This court opines at this point that does not provide, up to this point, probable cause to believe that the residence in question housed, contained, or was involved in criminal activity regarding the distribution of any controlled dangerous substance.

The second paragraph of page five continues. I responded to the Maryland State Police College Park Barracks where the suspected cocaine was field tested and showed a positive reaction to the presence of cocaine. That obviously related to the first purported buy which was outside of the residence and was made clear by the verbiage in first paragraph of page five that contact with the Cl and Coley did not occur at the residence. Continuing.

Before the second contact with Coley your affiant made a drive by of the target residence. Your affiant observed the same gold colored Cadillac in the driveway that was used by Coley in the first meeting. Even the second occasion the Cl was searched and found free of any monies/contraband. The Cl made contact with Coley via the telephone.

Surveillance units observed the Cl and Coley make certain contact in the area of Largo, Prince George’s County, Maryland. This court notes at this point in time that the contact was clearly not at the residence. Somewhere in the area of Largo, Prince George’s County. Continuing.

The affidavit reads your affiant observed Coley along with the Cl go to 13206 Cape Shell Court, Largo, Prince George’s County, Maryland. This court opines that there’s .no way of determining how they went to that residence, whether it’s by car, walking, whatever, but it’s clear that ⁵¹⁵ they were at a different location before they went to the residence. Continuing. Coley was observed going into the residence.

A short time later Coley was observed exiting the residence, making contact with the CL There is contact with the defendant and Cl after leaving the residence, the court notes. Continuing. Contact with Coley and the Cl was subsequently terminated. It’s not more detail provided.

The following paragraph read, I recontacted the Cl at a predetermined location. It doesn’t say where it’s the same date or not. At this point affiant gave me an off white substance suspected of being crack cocaine. The Cl stated that Coley sold him/her suspected crack cocaine.

There is absolutely no indication as to where that substance was sold. He was again searched, I’m continuing my reading, and found free of any money, contraband. Contact with Cl was subsequently terminated. I, Troop[er] McClendon, responded to the Maryland State Police College Park Barracks where the suspected crack cocaine was field tested and that showed the positive reaction to the presence of cocaine.

Your affiant thereafter states at the bottom of page five, your affiant knows that persons engaged in unlawful distribution of controlled dangerous substance and the use of controlled dangerous substance used their residence in Prince George’s County to create their contraband and their storage for the associated records kept in the drug trade. That is general averment. The court has read this search warrant now at least two times, and gone over it almost word by word on the record, and I cannot find any evidence that the residence known as 18206 is the subject of any detailed information that would lead this court [an] independent tribunal, so to speak, looking at this search warrant for the first time to conclude that the residence housed or contained dangerous substances. It’s pure speculation.

I’m certainly not blinded to the facts that what I may suspect. Certainly not blinded to the fact that there had ⁵¹⁶ been one controlled buy. It was outside the residence. It’s crystal clear in this affidavit.

Secondly the same two buys is not specifically earmarked as to date. And I appreciate the fact it may not be because the police officers in question don’t want to provide any details that may lead one to conclude who the identity of the confidential source, but the reality is what’s lacking in the search warrant is elemental in being specific. What should have been here, I’m sure it’s an oversight, is when that confidential source returned to the presence of the police after the second buy. Wherein it reads at page five I recontacted the confidential source at a predetermined location.

It doesn’t tell me in the statement the date. It doesn’t tell me it’s made in there. I certainly suspect it’s immediately thereafter, but it’s not stated down here. The confidential source stated that [Coley] sold him or her the suspected crack cocaine.

It doesn’t say that that sale occurred in the residence. Is there probable cause for the defendant? Yes, there’s probable cause to arrest the defendant, but there’s' not probable cause to search the residence. Accordingly this court is going to grant the motion to suppress evidence seized at the residence as it relates to this defendant.

My ruling is not focused upon the co-defendant. Nobody has argued that this defendant does not have standing. In fact it’s, clear that he was the owner. So that is my ruling Ms. [Prosecutor], and I wanted Trooper McClendon here to know why I ruled that way.

Thank you very much. The State noted a timely appeal pursuant to Md.Code Ann. (1998 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.), § 12-302(c)(3)(i) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”). 7 Accordingly, this case has not yet proceeded to trial. ⁵¹⁷ Procedural Analysis In his brief, Coley chose to attack perceived procedural shortcomings, rather than to address the merits of the State’s arguments. In particular, Coley argues that the State failed to place the appropriate exhibits, i.e., the warrant application and affidavit, in the record before us and that, therefore, this Court cannot review the affidavit in deciding this case. These documents were not originally transmitted by the circuit court, apparently because of confusion resulting from the court’s instructions that “the exhibits [are to be] returned to the State.

The original search warrant will be filed in the court file.” It is unclear what transpired or why the warrant file was not placed in the jacket with the rest of the proceedings, but somehow the two were separated. On June 10, 2002, the State filed a Motion to Correct Omission in the Record, to include the warrant application and affidavit. 8 Coley opposed that motion, and we entered an order on June 26, 2002, granting it in part and denying it in part. That order states, in relevant part, that the motion to supplement the record be granted in part and denied in part; and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County promptly transmit to this Court all of the exhibits in the possession of the Clerk that were marked for identification during the motions hearing that has resulted in this appeal; and it is further ORDERED that the motion to supplement the record with exhibits that were marked for identification but not retained by the Clerk is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the State’s right to obtain relief in conformity with ⁵¹⁸ the requirements of Md. Rule 8-413(a)[.] [Emphasis in original.] Coley believes that this Court’s order granting in part and denying in part the motion to correct omission in the record means that only the search warrant itself is properly before us. When we received the supplemental materials, all four exhibits presented at the motion hearing were included, each marked with the court reporter’s original exhibit stamp.

Only four items were marked as exhibits at the suppression hearing and are numbered one through four. Exhibit One is “the original of the documents referenced in two, three, four.” 9 Exhibit Two is a photocopy of the original search warrant application and affidavit. Exhibit Three is a photocopy of the search warrant. Exhibit Four is the search warrant inventory report and return.

The original warrant documents, Exhibit One, were intended to be kept with the court file but were apparently returned to the judge who had issued the warrant. Exhibits Two through Four were not returned to the State, apparently due to an oversight, and were placed into the original warrant file jacket given to the issuing judge. Accordingly, Exhibit One, which includes the original warrant application and affidavit, search warrant, and return, was provided along with Exhibits Two, Three, and Four, which were also attached inside the warrant jacket filed to this Court in response to the June 26, 2002 order. 10 Therefore, because ⁵¹⁹ we have all four of those exhibits before us, the State is not, as Coley contends, arguing evidence not in the record. 11 Standard of Review The circuit court in this case was acting as a reviewing court when it decided the validity of the warrant. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-29 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the Supreme Court stated that the “duty of a reviewing court [in cases like this one] is simply to ensure that the [issuing] magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for ... [concluding]’ that probable cause existed.” Gates , 462 U.S at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317 . “[Thus,] after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review.

A magistrate’s ‘determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.’ ” Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969))(emphasis added); see also State v. Ward, 350 Md. 372, 398 , 712 A.2d 534 (1998) (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (When considering the validity of a search warrant, “[t]he task of a reviewing court is not to conduct a de novo review of the magistrate’s determination of probable cause, but only to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the magistrate’s decision to issue the warrant.” (Citations omitted.)). The task of the warrant-issuing magistrate is “ ‘simply to make a practical, common-sense decision’ whether probable cause exists.” Birchead v. State, 317 Md. 691, 701 , 566 A.2d 488 (1989) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ). Therefore, any court that reviews a magistrate’s determination of probable cause does so under the “substantial ⁵²⁰ basis” standard. State v. Amerman, 84 Md.App. 461, 472-3 , 581 A.2d 19 (1990).

Finally, we stress that, “[although in a particular case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965) (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (I960)). See also Davis v. State, 144 Md.App. 144, 152-158 , 797 A.2d 84 (2002)(stating that this deferential standard of review should also be applied to no-knock provisions in search warrants). The Court of Appeals has stated: The Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution and its counterpart, Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 12 require that no search warrant shall issue without probable cause. Probable cause means a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” In determining whether probable cause exists, the issuing judge or a magistrate is confined to the averments contained within the four corners of the search ■warrant application.

Review of the magistrate’s "decision to issue a search warrant is limited to whether there was a substantial basis ⁵²¹ for concluding that the evidence sought would be discovered in the place described in the application and its affidavit. State v. Lee, 330 Md. 320, 326 , 624 A.2d 492 (1993) (citations omitted). A review of the motion court’s quite thorough and detailed ruling, set out supra, suggests that the motion court engaged in a due novo review of the existence of probable cause in the search warrant. The court’s responsibility, however, was not to assess to its satisfaction the existence of probable cause, but, rather, to determine if the issuing magistrate’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.

In making that determination, the magistrate’s decision is to be afforded great deference. Birchead, 317 Md. at 701 , 566 A.2d 488 ; Gates, supra. The substantial basis standard involves “something less than finding the existence of probable cause,” Amerman, 84 Md.App. at 470-71 , 581 A.2d 19 (citing Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728 , 104 S.Ct. 2085 , 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984)), and “is less demanding than even the familiar ‘clearly erroneous’ standard by which appellate courts review judicial fact finding in a trial setting.” Amerman, 84 Md.App. at 472 , 581 A.2d 19 . Thus, while the “clearly erroneous” test demands some legally sufficient evidence for each and every element to be proved—to wit, that a prima facie case be established— Illinois v. Gates rejected such a rigorous standard for establishing probable cause and opted instead for a “totality of circumstances” approach wherein an excess of evidence as to one aspect of proof may make up for a deficit as to another.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 , 103 S.Ct. at 2330 , expressly stated that a legally sufficient or prima facie showing [of probable cause] is not required[.] Amerman, 84 Md.App. at 473 , 581 A.2d 19 . In reviewing a warrant under the substantial basis standard, the following must be kept